Flores vs. Ruiz

A contempt proceeding, being criminal in nature, demands strict observance of due process, including the right to counsel; the failure of the trial court to assign counsel de officio to an unrepresented accused deprives the court of jurisdiction and renders the contempt order void. Further, mere refusal by a defeated party to vacate the property upon the sheriff’s demand under a writ of execution, where no prior delivery of possession to the prevailing party and subsequent re‑entry has occurred, does not constitute indirect contempt.

Leonardo Mandac obtained a favorable judgment for damages against Crispino Flores and his father in Civil Case No. 1616 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. To satisfy the award, the defendants’ land was levied upon and sold at public auction on November 28, 1968. The defendants failed to exercise their right of redemption. After the death of Leonardo Mandac, the respondent court ordered petitioner to place the heirs in possession of the property. Petitioner refused to vacate the land. On motion of the heirs’ counsel, the trial court initiated indirect contempt proceedings against him.

Nature and Antecedent Civil Case: Crispino Flores and his father were defendants in Civil Case No. 1616, a suit for damages instituted by Leonardo Mandac. Judgment was rendered in Mandac’s favor; to satisfy the award, the defendants’ land was levied and sold at public auction on November 28, 1968. The defendants failed to redeem the property within the statutory period. Thereafter, Mandac died and was substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow Dolores Vda. de Mandac.

Writ of Possession and Refusal to Vacate: Pursuant to the judgment, the respondent court ordered petitioner to place the heirs in possession of the land. Petitioner refused to vacate. According to petitioner, the sheriff never succeeded in locating the specific land to be delivered and therefore could not have placed the prevailing party in actual possession. Thus, no delivery of possession ever took place.

Contempt Motions and Hearing: Two motions for contempt were filed. The first, lodged in July 1969, alleged that after being placed in possession of one parcel, the defendants had invaded it in March 1969 and refused to leave; that motion was not acted upon by the court. The second motion, dated December 17, 1971, involved the property sold at auction and was based on the continuing refusal to vacate. At the contempt hearing on June 19, 1972, petitioner appeared without his counsel of record, who was absent. The stenographic notes purportedly show the court asking petitioner if he was willing to go to trial without his lawyer, to which he answered affirmatively and stated he needed no assistance. Petitioner denied this exchange, claiming he requested a postponement to secure counsel but the judge refused; with the assistance of a certain Atty. Joshua Pastores, he was made to sign an undertaking to deliver the premises within ten days under threat of imprisonment. The transcript was not signed by the stenographer. The respondent judge did not appoint counsel de officio, nor did he defer the hearing to allow petitioner to obtain counsel.

Contempt Order and Detention: On June 20, 1972, the respondent judge issued an order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt (Annex A). Petitioner was given until August 1, 1972 to inform the court whether he would relinquish possession. Upon his failure to do so, he was arrested on August 28, 1972 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Cagayan. He thereupon filed a petition for certiorari and habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.

• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner maintained that the contempt proceedings were void for want of due process because he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing, was not duly informed of the contempt charge, was not furnished a copy of the motion, and was not properly “arraigned” before trial. He invoked Santiago vs. Alikpala, stressing that such defects deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose the penalty.
• Act Not Constituting Contempt: Petitioner argued that his refusal to surrender possession of the levied property did not amount to indirect contempt, citing Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling and Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez. He contended that no actual delivery of possession had been effected by the sheriff, and therefore there could be no contempt by re-entry or defiance of a delivered possession.

• No Denial of Due Process: The respondent judge and private respondents denied any due process violation. They quoted the stenographic notes to show that petitioner expressly stated he was willing to proceed without his lawyer and needed no legal assistance. The respondent judge asserted that “defendant Flores has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts.”
• Authority to File Motion: Private respondents argued that the motion for contempt was filed with proper authority. Atty. Antonio N. Laggui filed the second motion no longer as counsel for the deceased Leonardo Mandac but as counsel for his widow and children, in whose favor the sheriff had executed the corresponding deed of sale on February 12, 1970.

• Due Process: Whether the contempt proceedings were vitiated by a denial of due process, considering that petitioner was not assisted by counsel, was not explicitly informed of the charge, and the court failed to assign counsel de officio.
• Contempt by Mere Refusal: Whether petitioner’s refusal to vacate the property sold on execution, in the absence of prior actual delivery of possession to the prevailing party and subsequent re-entry, constitutes indirect contempt.
• Authority to Move for Contempt: Whether the motion for contempt filed after the death of the original judgment creditor was made with proper legal authority.

• Due Process: The contempt order was void for lack of due process. A contempt proceeding is criminal in nature; accordingly, the accused enjoys the constitutional right to counsel, which cannot be waived merely by the accused’s verbal assent to proceed without an attorney. The trial court bears the duty to provide counsel de officio if the accused has none and cannot afford one. Here, the respondent judge failed to assign counsel de officio or grant a reasonable time to secure a lawyer, despite petitioner’s claim that he had requested postponement. Moreover, petitioner was not properly notified of the contempt charge, and his counsel of record was not furnished a copy. These violations resulted in loss of jurisdiction, rendering the conviction void and subject to collateral attack through habeas corpus.
• Contempt by Mere Refusal: No contempt was committed. Under settled doctrine, what constitutes indirect contempt in the context of execution is the defeated party’s re-entry into the property after actual delivery of possession to the prevailing party. Mere refusal or unwillingness to vacate, upon demand of the sheriff enforcing a writ of possession, does not constitute contempt. Since the sheriff never placed the Mandac heirs in actual possession of the property in question, petitioner’s refusal could not give rise to contempt. The act penalized is defiance after delivery, not defiance of the demand to deliver.
• Authority to Move for Contempt: Although the resolution on due process and the nature of the act rendered this issue unnecessary, the motion for contempt was, in any event, filed with proper authority. The second motion was presented by counsel for the heirs, who had been substituted as parties and in whose favor the certificate of sale had been executed.

• Right to Counsel in Contempt Proceedings — A contempt proceeding partakes of the nature of a criminal prosecution; the respondent is entitled to the constitutional right to counsel. The right cannot be waived by a mere statement of willingness to proceed without a lawyer. The court has the affirmative duty to assign counsel de officio if the accused is unassisted, especially when he is poor, or to grant reasonable time to procure counsel. Failure to do so violates due process, deprives the court of jurisdiction, and renders the ensuing contempt order void.
• Habeas Corpus as a Remedy for Denial of Due Process — Habeas corpus lies to release a person whose liberty is restrained under a void judgment. Deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to be heard by counsel, constitutes a jurisdictional defect that may be attacked collaterally through habeas corpus. (Citing Harden vs. Director of Prisons; Abriol vs. Homeres; Santiago vs. Alikpala.)
• Contempt by Refusal to Vacate on Execution — Mere refusal or unwillingness of a defeated party to vacate a property upon being ordered by the sheriff enforcing a writ of execution or possession does not amount to indirect contempt. What constitutes contempt is re-entry into the premises after possession thereof has been actually delivered to the prevailing party. The writ of execution is addressed solely to the sheriff, whose duty is to oust the defeated party; the defeated party’s passive refusal does not by itself constitute contumacious conduct. (Citing Rom vs. Cobadora; Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez; Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling.)

• “The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence … it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.” (Quoting People vs. Holgado) — This passage underscores the non‑waivable nature of the right to counsel in criminal and quasi‑criminal proceedings.
• “No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive [the accused] of [the right to be heard]. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Quoting Abriol vs. Homeres, as cited in Santiago vs. Alikpala) — This crystallizes the jurisdictional effect of a due process denial and the availability of habeas corpus.
• “The order of execution issued by the lower court is addressed solely and exclusively to the sheriff … and mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the defeated party to relinquish the property, would not constitute contempt.” (Quoting Rom vs. Cobadora) — This passage distinguishes passive non‑compliance from the contumacious act of re‑entry, defining the narrow scope of contempt in execution proceedings.

• Santiago vs. Alikpala, L-25133, September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 356 — Followed. Established that a contempt respondent must be formally informed of the charge and assisted by counsel; failure to do so voids the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
• People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 — Followed. Laid down the enduring rule that the right to counsel in criminal proceedings is not waivable by mere verbal assent; the court must assign counsel de officio.
• Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 — Followed. Held that denial of the opportunity to be heard divests the court of jurisdiction, and the void sentence can be assailed via habeas corpus.
• Harden vs. The Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948) — Followed. Declared that deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights justifies habeas corpus on the ground of loss of jurisdiction.
• Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758 — Followed. Held that mere refusal to vacate upon the sheriff’s demand does not constitute contempt; only re‑entry after actual delivery of possession amounts to contempt.
• Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, L-8565, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 851 — Followed. Reaffirmed that contempt lies for re‑entry after possession had been delivered, not for a simple refusal to vacate.
• Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling, L-14345, July 20, 1961, 2 SCRA 793 — Followed. Similarly held that refusal to surrender possession upon execution does not constitute contempt.

• Constitutional Right to Due Process and Right to Counsel — Although no specific article was cited by number, the decision rests on the constitutional guarantee of due process and the right to be heard by counsel in criminal proceedings. The right was interpreted to impose an affirmative duty on the trial court to appoint counsel de officio, rendering a violation jurisdictional.

Justices Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio‑Herrera concurred.