Flores vs. People of the Philippines

A claim of self-defense requires proof of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation; once unlawful aggression ceases, continued shooting is retaliation, not self-defense. A motion for reconsideration without a notice of hearing is pro forma and does not toll the reglementary period to appeal. The accused who admits killing but pleads self-defense bears the burden to prove the defense by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

Simon A. Flores was the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, and Jesus Avenido was his cousin. Flores was charged with homicide before the Sandiganbayan as a public officer, in relation to his office. The case required assessment of a claim of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.

On August 15, 1989, the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, visitors Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Paulito Duran were drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus Avenido. They began at 8:30 in the evening, and Jesus joined them only at around 11:00 o'clock after he and his wife, Elisa, arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they had tried to settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children. The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Simon A. Flores, the Barangay Chairman of San Roque and Jesus's cousin, arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle.

According to the prosecution, Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores, who was heading toward the terrace. After glancing at the two, who began talking near the terrace, Duran focused back on the table. Suddenly he heard several gunshots, prompting him to duck under the table. Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground; Flores was no longer in sight. Duran helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital, and Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not notice the victim carrying a gun at any time during the occasion. Gerry Avenido, the victim's son, testified that he was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street with some CAFGU members. On his way back to the house, he saw Flores and his father talking from a distance of about six meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the right shoulder, and continued shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the ground. Elisa Avenido testified that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" when she saw Flores, from their window, approaching the terrace; by the time she reached the terrace, her husband was already lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After Flores left, she and her children rushed Jesus to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Elisa testified that Jesus had an average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) before he died at the age of forty-one, and that he left four children. Although she had no receipt, she asked for actual damages consisting of lawyer's fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00) for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱6,500.00) for funeral expenses.

Dr. Ruben Escueta testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six hours before his body was brought to him. Based on the Autopsy Report, the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in different parts of his body: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. The victim died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.

Flores interposed self-defense. He claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the CAFGU and Civil Service Unit—Maximo Manalo, Maximo Latayan, Ronilo Haballa, and Romulo Alquizar—conducted a ronda in Barangay San Roque upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, because the barangay was celebrating the eve of its fiesta. At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited them for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house. Flores asked the group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare the shooting practice for the fiesta celebration the following day. As he started walking toward the house, Latayan stopped him and handed him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was prevailed upon by Latayan, who placed the weapon over his right shoulder with its barrel or nozzle pointed to the ground, convincing Flores that such posture would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus. Flores then proceeded to the terrace, where Jesus was having a drinking spree with four others. In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their guns as it was already late at night and to save their shots for the following day's fiesta procession. Flores claimed that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the barangay chairman, a person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately stood up and approached him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and poked it directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, Flores was able to partially parry Jesus's right hand, which was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder. Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but Flores was able to instinctively take hold of Jesus's right hand holding the gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again fired his gun, hitting Flores's left hand. Twice hit by bullets from Jesus's magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds, Flores, with his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the baby armalite dangling on his right shoulder toward Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on the floor, he immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran toward the coconut groves, bleeding and bewildered, he heard more gunshots; he continued running for fear of more untoward incidents. He proceeded to the Mayor's house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had happened, and there he found his ronda groupmates. The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.

The Sandiganbayan rejected the claim of self-defense and gave credence to the consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an M-16 armalite rifle, causing his death. It found no reason to doubt the prosecution witnesses, who appeared to have no ill motive to falsely testify against Flores. It also found the defense evidence, both testimonial and documentary, crowded with flaws: the claim that Jesus shot Flores on the right shoulder at close range with a magnum handgun was incredible because the bullet did not exit and apparently did not hit any bone; Flores's September 2, 1989 affidavit did not mention a bullet remaining in his shoulder; he did not secure an x-ray plate or medical records from the hospital; the T-shirt he presented had blood concentrated only around the hole rather than dripping to the hem, and the blood was not definitively shown to be human; Jesus arrived at his house at 11:00 p.m. and the shooting occurred around midnight, so he may not have been drunk, and he was bigger, taller, familiar and experienced with guns, having previously worked as a policeman, and was 41 years old; and it was difficult to accept that Jesus missed at close range or that Flores easily overpowered him and unlocked the M-16 with one hand despite no experience, a wounded right shoulder, and grappling with the victim. The Sandiganbayan also found Dr. Bagamasbad's testimony hearsay because it merely restated entries in a hospital logbook over which he had no personal knowledge, and the photocopy of the logbook had no evidentiary value since no exception under Section 3, Rule 130 was established. The Sandiganbayan concluded that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after Jesus was already lying helpless on the ground. It found that the nature and number of the four gunshot wounds, and their trajectories, were consistent with the testimony that Flores shot Jesus while the latter was already lying on the ground; even assuming unlawful aggression initially existed, it ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to the ground, and there was no reason for Flores to pull the trigger at least three more times.

• Due Process and Notice of Hearing: Petitioner argued that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration on a mere technicality violated his right to due process, especially because the assailed decision was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions contrary to the evidence; he maintained that relaxation of procedural rules was justified by the merits of the case and that the facts demonstrated self-defense.
• Compliance with Rules: Petitioner maintained that he complied with Section 2, Rule 37 and Section 4, Rule 121 because the motion was served on the prosecution and the prosecution admitted receiving a copy; for him, this judicial admission amounted to due notice, which is the intent behind the rules. He further argued that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration was not necessary because no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3, Rule 121.
• Review of Factual Findings: Petitioner invoked the Court's discretionary power to review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. He averred that the ponente and the other members of the First Division who rendered the assailed decision were not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of testifying because they were not present during trial, and that there was palpable misapprehension of facts leading to wrong conclusions of law and his unfounded conviction.
• Self-Defense: Petitioner insisted that the evidence established all the elements of self-defense: there was unlawful aggression by Jesus, who approached him, drew a magnum pistol, and fired at him; the attack was sudden, unexpected, and instantaneous; the intent to kill was present because Jesus kept pointing the gun at him; he was compelled to use the baby armalite to repel the attack; and there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part because he merely requested Jesus and his drinking companions to reserve their shooting for the following day.
• Acquittal: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not acquitting him of the crime charged.

• Notice of Hearing: The Office of the Special Prosecutor maintained that Section 2, Rule 37 and Section 4, Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which requires every motion to be set for hearing by the movant except those the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The Prosecution also filed a Motion to Expunge from the Records Accused's Motion for Reconsideration because the motion did not contain a notice of hearing.

• Due Process and Notice of Hearing: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of notice of hearing and in declaring the judgment final and executory, allegedly violating his right to due process.
• Self-Defense: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not giving due credit to petitioner's claim of self-defense.
• Factual Findings: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed serious but reversible errors in arriving at its findings and conclusions.
• Acquittal: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave error in not acquitting petitioner of the crime charged.

• Due Process and Notice of Hearing: No. A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma and does not toll the reglementary period to appeal; the Sandiganbayan properly dismissed it.
• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not proven; unlawful aggression was absent or had ceased, and the continued shooting was retaliation.
• Factual Findings: No. The Sandiganbayan's factual findings are binding absent grave abuse of discretion, and no misapprehension or misinterpretation of material facts was shown.
• Acquittal: No. The Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

• Due Process and Notice of Hearing: Section 5, Rule 15 requires the notice of hearing to be addressed to all parties and to specify the time and date of the hearing, which must not be later than ten days after the filing of the motion. Section 2, Rule 37 and Section 4, Rule 121 must be read in conjunction with Section 5, Rule 15. Every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except those the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The requirement is mandatory; failure to comply renders the motion defective. A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. Because Flores's motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, it was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect, and the Sandiganbayan properly dismissed it. His argument that service on the prosecution and the prosecution's admission of receipt amounted to notice did not cure the defect, and his reliance on Section 3, Rule 121 did not excuse the mandatory notice requirement. No due process violation attended the denial.
• Factual Findings: The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings. The Sandiganbayan functions in divisions of three Justices each and is a collegial body that arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, exchange of views and ideas, and concurrence of the required majority vote. Flores did not convince the Court that there was misapprehension or misinterpretation of material facts, nor did the defense adduce evidence that the factual findings were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan's conclusion that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after he was already lying helpless on the ground was sustained.
• Self-Defense: Whether Flores acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact; in appeals to the Supreme Court, only questions of law may be raised, and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are binding. No reason appeared to disturb the finding that Flores utterly failed to prove self-defense. Although the prosecution generally bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, if the accused admits killing the victim but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove that defense by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. Flores did not dispute that he killed Jesus by shooting him with an M-16 armalite rifle; by invoking self-defense, he admitted authorship of the crime. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, self-defense requires the concurrence of (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The most important element is unlawful aggression; there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim committed unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury; in case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury, and it presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger, not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces a real and immediate threat to life, and aggression that is not continuous does not warrant self-defense. Flores failed to discharge his burden. The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of the evidence. The defense evidence was crowded with flaws: the claim that Jesus shot Flores on the right shoulder at close range with a magnum handgun was incredible because the bullet did not exit and apparently did not hit any bone; Flores's September 2, 1989 affidavit did not mention a bullet remaining in his shoulder; he did not secure an x-ray plate or medical records; the T-shirt's blood was concentrated around the hole rather than dripping to the hem and was not definitively shown to be human; Jesus arrived at 11:00 p.m. and the shooting occurred around midnight, so he may not have been drunk, and he was bigger, taller, experienced with guns, and had worked as a policeman; and it was difficult to accept that Jesus missed at close range or that Flores easily overpowered him and unlocked the M-16 with one hand despite no experience, a wounded right shoulder, and grappling with the victim. Dr. Bagamasbad's testimony was hearsay because it merely restated entries in a hospital logbook over which he had no personal knowledge, and the photocopy of the logbook had no evidentiary value since no exception under Section 3, Rule 130 was established. Even assuming that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, it ceased when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground; at that point, the perceived threat to Flores's life was no longer attendant, and there was no reason to pump more bullets into Jesus's abdomen and buttocks. The nature and number of the four gunshot wounds, and their trajectories, negated self-defense and were consistent with shooting while Jesus was already lying on the ground. If Flores had merely acted in self-defense, his first shot on Jesus's shoulder, which already caused Jesus to fall, would have been sufficient to repel the attack. The location and presence of several wounds on the victim's body provided physical evidence that eloquently refuted allegations of self-defense. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the original aggressor; the assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense: in retaliation, the aggression begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The continuous shooting by Flores, which caused the fatal gunshot wounds, was not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus, who was already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

• Self-Defense under Article 11, Revised Penal Code — A person acting in defense of person or rights incurs no criminal liability if three circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused who admits killing but pleads self-defense bears the burden to prove these elements by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. In this case, Flores admitted shooting Jesus with an M-16 but failed to prove the elements.
• Unlawful Aggression — Actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury; in case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing wrongful intent to cause injury; it presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger, not merely threatening or intimidating action; present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to life. It is the most important element; without it, no self-defense, complete or incomplete. The Court found Flores failed to prove it.
• Cessation of Unlawful Aggression / Retaliation vs. Self-Defense — When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has justification to kill or wound the original aggressor; the assailant then acts in retaliation, not self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; in self-defense, the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured. Even assuming initial aggression by Jesus, it ceased when he was first shot and fell; Flores's continued shooting was retaliation.
• Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed — The means must be commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted and rationally necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. The continuous shooting and fatal wounds were not necessary or reasonable after Jesus lay flat on the ground.
• Notice of Hearing for Motions — Section 5, Rule 15 requires the notice of hearing to be addressed to all parties and to specify the time and date of hearing, not later than ten days after filing. Sections 2, Rule 37 and 4, Rule 121 must be read with it. The requirement is mandatory; failure renders the motion defective. A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma and does not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Flores's motion was properly dismissed.
• Factual Findings of the Sandiganbayan; Change of Ponente — The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente took over from a colleague who presided at trial, unless grave abuse of discretion in factual findings is shown. The Sandiganbayan is a collegial body that decides after deliberation and majority vote. Flores failed to show misapprehension of facts or grave abuse.
• Hearsay Evidence — Testimonial evidence based on entries in a hospital logbook over which the witness had no personal knowledge is hearsay. A photocopy of the logbook has no evidentiary value unless established under an exception to the hearsay rule. Dr. Bagamasbad's testimony was hearsay and had no probative weight.
• Credibility of Testimony — Testimonial evidence must not only come from a credible witness but must itself be credible; the test is whether it conforms to common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind. Flores's story was contrary to ordinary human experience.

• "To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — This states the elements of self-defense and the burden on the accused who invokes it.
• "The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense."" — This identifies unlawful aggression as the indispensable element of self-defense.
• "When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original aggressor." — This is the ratio for rejecting Flores's defense after the victim had fallen.
• "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading." — This is the procedural rule applied to Flores's motion for reconsideration.

• Preysler, Jr. vs. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 636, 643 — Cited for the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
• People vs. Radam, Jr., 434 Phil. 87, 99 (2002), citing Quinao vs. People, 390 Phil. 1092, 1100 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Cabuslay vs. People, 508 Phil. 236, 250 (2005), citing Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, 235 Phil. 400, 410 (1987) and Consing vs. Court of Appeals, 257 Phil. 851, 859 (1989) — Cited to stress that the Sandiganbayan is a collegial body that arrives at decisions after deliberation and concurrence of the required majority vote.
• Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 211, 219, citing Baldebrin vs. Sandiganbayan, 547 Phil. 522, 533 (2007) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are binding on the Supreme Court in appeals raising only questions of law.
• Galang vs. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 145, 150-151 (2000) — Cited for the shifting of burden to the accused to prove self-defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence once he admits killing the victim.
• People of the Philippines vs. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496, 503, citing People vs. Catbagan, 467 Phil. 1044, 1054 (2004) — Cited for the rule that there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression.
• People of the Philippines vs. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 804, 814, citing People vs. Gabrino, G.R. No. 189981, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 187, 201 — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression.
• Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168827, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 195, citing People of the Philippines vs. Saul, 423 Phil. 924, 934 (2001) — Cited for the rule that aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.
• People of the Philippines vs. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 179278, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 480, 498, citing People vs. Saragina, 388 Phil. 1, 23-24 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the location and presence of several wounds on the victim's body refute allegations of self-defense.
• Belbis, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, citing People vs. Vicente, 452 Phil. 986, 998 (2003) — Cited for the distinction between retaliation and self-defense and for the requirement that the means employed be commensurate to the attack.
• People vs. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 427 — Cited for the rule that testimonial evidence must be credible in itself and conform to common knowledge and experience.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a person acting in defense of person or rights incurs no criminal liability if unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of means, and lack of sufficient provocation concur. The Court applied it to Flores's self-defense claim and found the requisites not sufficiently established.
• Section 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Requires notice of hearing addressed to all parties, specifying time and date of hearing not later than ten days after filing. The Court held this requirement mandatory and read it with Rules 37 and 121.
• Section 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Requires a motion for new trial or reconsideration to be in writing, stating grounds, with written notice served on the adverse party; a pro forma motion does not toll the reglementary period of appeal. The Court applied it to Flores's motion.
• Section 4, Rule 121, Rules of Court — Requires a motion for new trial or reconsideration to be in writing, state grounds, and notice be given to the prosecutor. The Court read it with Section 5, Rule 15.
• Section 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Provides that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except those the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The Court cited this in holding that Flores's motion required a notice of hearing.
• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Lists exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Court noted that the photocopy of the hospital logbook was not shown to fall under any exception, so Dr. Bagamasbad's testimony was hearsay and the logbook had no evidentiary value.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta), and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.