Flores vs. People of the Philippines

The term "recruit" or "recruitment" must be understood in light of what the law contemplates, not how a dictionary defines it, and any act of offering or promising employment for a fee, undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority, constitutes illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. A promissory note signed without counsel is not inadmissible where there is no direct or positive evidence that duress was sufficient to overcome the accused's mind and will. An affidavit of recantation is exceedingly unreliable and should not be given probative value where the witness's prior testimony was given before the court.

Petitioner Encarnacion Flores was charged in two separate informations before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLI: one for Illegal Recruitment under Article 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 442 (the Labor Code of the Philippines), and another for Estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The charges arose from petitioner's alleged representation that she could send private complainant Pedro Oval abroad for employment as a can maker in Japan, for which she received money, despite not being licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers.

Upon learning from petitioner's sister that petitioner had been able to send her brother overseas to work, private complainant Pedro Oval went to petitioner's residence on 15 February 1986 to inquire if she could send people abroad to work. Petitioner replied in the affirmative but on condition that money first be given to her. On the same occasion, Oval met one Pacifico de Jesus, who was likewise in petitioner's house for the same purpose.

On 20 March 1986, Oval gave P2,000.00 for his passport to petitioner, who received the amount. On 26 March 1986, petitioner demanded P13,000.00 from Oval to enable him to leave for his job as can maker in Japan, and Oval again gave the amount demanded. No receipts were issued to him by petitioner for both amounts. Petitioner was able to secure a passport and a visa for Oval; however, Oval was not able to leave for the job in Japan because what was issued to him was a tourist visa and not a work visa. For this reason, Oval demanded that petitioner return his money. Petitioner then gave Oval P1,000.00 and promised to return the balance on 15 August 1986. Pacifico de Jesus underwent a similar experience regarding petitioner's commitment that she would be able to send him abroad to work, and consequently gave petitioner money in consideration of the overseas employment promised him.

Because of their frustration in not being able to work overseas as promised and because of petitioner's failure to return their money, Oval and de Jesus reported the matter to the police authorities. Two policemen brought petitioner to the police detachment at the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) on Roxas Boulevard for investigation. There, petitioner acknowledged her obligation to Oval and de Jesus and signed a promissory note in the amount of P23,000.00 representing the amounts they gave her, payable to both Oval and de Jesus on or before 15 August 1986. When petitioner failed to return his money as promised, Oval filed the complaints for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa.

Petitioner contended that she did not recruit Oval for employment abroad, arguing that it was Oval who sought her help, and that she merely extended assistance by referring him to the placement agency to which she had previously referred her brother. She also claimed that she signed the promissory note under duress, without the presence of counsel, and that Oval later recanted his testimony, clearing her of all guilt. The trial court found petitioner guilty of both charges, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.

• Definition of "Recruiter": Petitioner argued that the term "recruiter" cannot be applied to her, as to recruit means to "engage" or "hire" new employees, and the record shows she did not invite or entice people for possible employment overseas; it was Oval who sought her help after learning she had sent her brother abroad.
• Lack of False Representation: Petitioner asserted that she did not make false representations to Oval, that the amount delivered was given voluntarily, and that the mere fact the transaction did not succeed does not justify imputing misrepresentation; deceit must be proved by acts distinct from non-compliance with a promise, citing Abeto vs. People, 90 Phil. 581.
• Inadmissibility of the Receipt: Petitioner claimed the promissory note she signed should not have been given probative weight, as it was in the nature of an admission of guilt extracted without being informed of her constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, and was signed under duress in a tense atmosphere not unlike a custodial investigation.
• Recanted Testimony: Petitioner alleged that Oval's recanted testimony, though generally frowned upon, may create serious doubt as to her liability, citing Alonzo vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 552.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the respondent's arguments beyond the prosecution's evidence and the lower courts' findings.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Illegal Recruitment: Whether the evidence on record sustains a verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Recruitment despite petitioner's claim that she did not recruit Oval.
• Admissibility of the Promissory Note: Whether the promissory note signed by petitioner in the presence of police officers shortly after her arrest, without the benefit of counsel, should have been given probative weight, considering her constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
• Effect of Recantation: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the affidavit of recantation executed by Pedro Oval.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Illegal Recruitment: Yes. The evidence established that petitioner represented to Oval that she could send him abroad for employment as a can maker in Japan, and because of this representation, Oval and de Jesus gave her money. The term "recruitment" must be understood in light of the Labor Code's definition, and petitioner, by her own admission, was not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers.
• Admissibility of the Promissory Note: No. There was no direct or positive evidence that the degree of constraint or duress was sufficient to overcome petitioner's mind and will. The "duress" alleged was merely petitioner's strong apprehension that she might be kept in detention by the two policemen.
• Effect of Recantation: No. The recanted testimony of Oval was an afterthought and should not be given probative value, as it is incredible that after going through the process of arrest, positive identification, and repeating the accusation before the court, Oval would suddenly remember he was confused.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Illegal Recruitment: The Court agreed with the respondent court that there was evidence petitioner represented to Oval that she could send him abroad for employment as a can maker in Japan, and that Oval and de Jesus gave her money in consideration of that representation. Petitioner's defense that she did not recruit Oval was "beside the point," as the undisputable fact was that she gave Oval the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work, convincing him to give her the money she demanded. The Court quoted the respondent court's explication of Articles 38(a) and 13(b) of the Labor Code, defining illegal recruitment as activities undertaken in any form or manner by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, and recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, whether for profit or not. By her own admission, petitioner was not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers.
• Admissibility of the Promissory Note: The Court acknowledged that the promissory note was indeed signed by petitioner without the presence of counsel. However, there was no direct or positive evidence on record that the degree of constraint or duress either actually inflicted or threatened was sufficient to overcome petitioner's mind and will. The "duress" under which she allegedly was at the time was merely her strong apprehension that she might be kept in detention by the two policemen. The Court also noted that petitioner's claim that she did not receive the amounts from Oval and de Jesus deserved scant consideration, as she gave a refund of P1,000.00 to Oval and promised to return the rest of the amount she received.
• Effect of Recantation: The Court found the recanted testimony unreliable, as Oval merely deposed that in his confusion he mistakenly stated before the fiscal and the court that he gave the money to petitioner. It was incredible that after having petitioner arrested, positively identifying her, and repeating the accusation before the court, Oval would suddenly remember he was confused. The Court quoted the rule that a motion for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of recantation whose effect is to free the appellant from participation in the commission of the crime, as such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, and are exceedingly unreliable, citing de Guzman vs. IAC, 184 SCRA 128.

• Definition of Illegal Recruitment — Under Article 38(a) of the Labor Code (PD No. 442), recruitment activities undertaken in any form or manner by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable. Article 13(b) defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. The Court applied this definition to hold that petitioner's representation of ability to send workers abroad for a fee, without a POEA license, constituted illegal recruitment.
• Duress as a Defense — For duress to be a valid defense, there must be direct or positive evidence that the degree of constraint or duress either actually inflicted or threatened was sufficient to overcome the accused's mind and will. Mere apprehension of detention, without evidence of actual or threatened constraint, is insufficient. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's claim that she signed the promissory note under duress.
• Affidavit of Recantation — As a general rule, a motion for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of recantation of a witness whose effect is to free the appellant from participation in the commission of the crime. Affidavits of retraction are exceedingly unreliable, as they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration. The Court applied this doctrine to disregard Oval's recanted testimony as an afterthought.

• "The term 'recruit' or 'recruitment' must be understood in the light of what the law contemplates and not how a dictionary defines it." — This passage articulates the controlling principle that statutory definitions, not dictionary meanings, govern the interpretation of "recruitment" under the Labor Code, and is central to the Court's finding of illegal recruitment.
• "It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses." — This passage states the rationale for disregarding recanted testimony and is the canonical formulation of the doctrine on affidavits of recantation.
• "The 'duress' under which she allegedly was at the time was merely petitioner's strong apprehension that she might be kept in detention by the two (2) policemen whom she perceived to have the power to do so." — This passage defines the standard for duress as a defense, requiring actual or threatened constraint sufficient to overcome the accused's mind and will, and rejects mere apprehension as insufficient.

• de Guzman vs. IAC, 184 SCRA 128 (April 4, 1990) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that affidavits of retraction are exceedingly unreliable and should not be given probative value, as they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration.
• People vs. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. 65864, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 611 — Cited as the source of the quoted rule on affidavits of recantation in the context of motions for new trial.
• Abeto vs. People, 90 Phil. 581 — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that non-performance and failure to return money give rise only to civil liability, though the Court did not adopt this argument in its ruling.

• Article 38(a), Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the Philippines) — Defines illegal recruitment as recruitment activities undertaken in any form or manner by non-licensees or non-holders of authority. Applied to hold petitioner liable for illegal recruitment, as she was not licensed by the POEA.
• Article 13(b), Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the Philippines) — Defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Applied to determine that petitioner's acts constituted recruitment.
• Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of Estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts. Applied to the charge of Estafa against petitioner for defrauding Oval of P15,000.00 through false manifestations and fraudulent representations.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided text.