Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

Consensual premarital sexual relations between a man and a woman, both possessing no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of deceit, do not constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting denial of admission to the legal profession, even if a child is born out of wedlock as a result of the relationship.

Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco, Jr. were townmates from Janiuay, Iloilo, who had been sweethearts since 1953 when both were in their teens. Respondent passed the 1970 bar examinations on his fourth attempt after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967, and 1968. Before he could take the lawyer's oath, complainant filed a petition in 1971 seeking to deny him admission to the legal profession on the ground of gross immorality, premised on their intimate relationship, the birth of an illegitimate child, and his alleged unfulfilled promises of marriage.

Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco, Jr. were townmates from Janiuay, Iloilo, who became sweethearts in 1953 when both were in their teens. Respondent even acted as complainant's escort when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Their relationship continued through the years, and complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. According to complainant, it was after the child was born that respondent first promised to marry her after he passed the bar examinations. She alleged that respondent made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage over the years, while giving only ₱10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays.

Respondent passed the 1970 bar examinations on his fourth attempt, having previously been unsuccessful in 1966, 1967, and 1968. Before he could take the lawyer's oath, complainant filed a petition in 1971 seeking to deny him admission to the legal profession, averring that they had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them, and that respondent had not fulfilled his repeated promises to marry her. Complainant also alleged that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, an assertion the Court ultimately found not credible given that she continued the relationship for years after giving birth in 1964 until 1971.

The case languished for over two decades, during which respondent filed multiple motions to dismiss. In 1971, complainant's trust in respondent and their relationship ended when she learned that he had married another woman. Respondent was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980 to 1986 and participated actively in civic organizations. The child, Rafael Barranco, died at age 28 from cardio-respiratory arrest and pancreatitis, as manifested by respondent in December 1995.

• Gross Immorality: Complainant maintained that respondent's conduct — engaging in sexual relations with her, fathering an illegitimate child, and repeatedly promising marriage without fulfilling those promises — constituted gross immorality warranting denial of his admission to the legal profession.
• Deceit and Coercion: Complainant alleged that she had been forced into sexual intercourse with respondent, implying that the relationship was not entirely consensual.
• Unfulfilled Promises of Marriage: Complainant argued that respondent made more than twenty or thirty promises to marry her after passing the bar examinations, all of which he failed to honor, ultimately marrying another woman in 1971.

• Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute: Respondent filed multiple motions to dismiss, citing complainant's failure to comment on procedural matters and abandonment of the case due to the unreasonable length of time it had been pending.
• Good Standing and Community Service: Respondent argued that his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980 to 1986, his active participation in civic organizations, and his good standing in the community warranted allowing him to take the lawyer's oath.
• Length of Time: Respondent cited the length of time the case had been pending as a ground to dismiss the complaint and permit his oath-taking.

• Gross Immorality: Whether respondent's consensual premarital sexual relations with complainant, resulting in an illegitimate child, and his failure to fulfill promises of marriage constitute gross immorality warranting denial of admission to the legal profession.

• Gross Immorality: No. Consensual premarital sexual relations between adults with no impediment to marry, devoid of deceit, do not constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting permanent exclusion from the legal profession, even if a child is born out of wedlock.

• Gross Immorality: The Court applied the established standard that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act was defined as one "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree," characterized as a willful, flagrant, or shameless act showing moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. The Court found that respondent's conduct — engaging in consensual premarital sexual relations with complainant and fathering an illegitimate child — suggested doubtful moral character but did not rise to the level of grossly immoral conduct. The Court relied on Arciga vs. Maniwang, which held that mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both possessing no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of deceit, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant disciplinary sanction, even if a child is born out of wedlock. The Court rejected complainant's assertion that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, finding it not credible given that she continued the relationship for years after giving birth in 1964 until 1971. Complainant was an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued the relationship, not an innocent young girl easily led astray. The Court viewed the complaint as an act of revenge by a woman scorned, intended to make respondent suffer perpetually. Even assuming respondent's past indiscretions were ignoble, the twenty-six years he had been prevented from becoming a lawyer constituted sufficient punishment, there being no other indiscretion attributed to him during that period.

• Gross Immorality as Ground for Disbarment or Denial of Admission — To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act showing moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. In this case, the Court applied this standard and found that consensual premarital sexual relations between sweethearts with no impediment to marry, even resulting in an illegitimate child, did not meet the threshold of gross immorality.
• Consensual Intimacy Without Deceit as Not Grossly Immoral — Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both possessing no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of deceit, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction, even if a child is born out of wedlock as a result. This principle, drawn from Arciga vs. Maniwang, was applied to exonerate respondent from the charge of gross immorality.

• "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." — This passage provides the canonical definition of gross immorality as the threshold for disbarment or denial of admission to the bar, distinguishing it from mere immorality.
• "mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, applying the gross immorality standard to consensual premarital relations and concluding that such conduct does not warrant disciplinary action.
• "We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason." — This passage reflects the Court's reasoning that respondent's decision to marry another woman, while causing complainant heartbreak, does not constitute grossly immoral conduct punishable by exclusion from the profession.

• Arciga vs. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591 (August 14, 1981) — Controlling precedent followed. Held that mere intimacy between a man and a woman with no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of deceit, does not warrant disciplinary sanction even if a child is born out of wedlock. The Court found this ruling directly applicable to respondent's situation.
• Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 (January 29, 1975) — Cited for the definition of a grossly immoral act as one so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
• De los Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 (November 28, 1989) — Cited for the characterization of gross immorality as a willful, flagrant, or shameless act showing moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
• Radaza vs. Tejano, 106 SCRA 250 (July 31, 1981) — Cited in support of the proposition that consensual intimacy without deceit does not warrant disciplinary sanction.
• Bitangcor vs. Tan, 112 SCRA 113 (February 25, 1982) — Cited in support of the consideration that the absence of other indiscretions over a long period constitutes sufficient punishment for past misconduct.

• Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court — While not expressly cited by name in the decision, the proceeding is grounded on the Court's power to admit persons to the practice of law and to suspend or disbar attorneys for causes including grossly immoral conduct. The Court exercised this authority in evaluating whether respondent's conduct met the standard for denial of admission.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred. Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., were on leave.