Fetalino vs. COMELEC

A Comelec Commissioner whose ad interim appointment lapses by inaction of the Commission on Appointments is not entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, because the period served constitutes mere tenure and not a term of office, and the law unambiguously requires completion of the term of office as a condition for retirement benefits.

Petitioners Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon were appointed as Comelec Commissioners by President Fidel V. Ramos on February 10, 1998, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which prescribes a seven-year term for Comelec Chairpersons and Commissioners without reappointment. Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. similarly served as Comelec Commissioner from February 12, 2004 to July 10, 2005. R.A. No. 1568, as amended, provides retirement benefits—specifically a five-year lump sum gratuity and a lifetime monthly pension—to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec upon retirement after completion of the term of office, incapacity, death while in service, or resignation after reaching sixty years of age. The petitioners' ad interim appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before Congress adjourned, and they were not reappointed, resulting in service of only a few months each.

On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven years pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Eleven days later, on February 21, 1998, President Ramos renewed the petitioners' ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect, and the petitioners were no longer reappointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.

Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the petitioners' claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06-1369 dated December 11, 2006, directing the grant of retirement benefits subject to release of funds by the Department of Budget and Management. On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and pension. On October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568 does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. The Comelec referred the matter to its Finance Services Department and later to its Law Department for study and recommendation.

Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. later joined the petition. Like the petitioners, Barcelona did not complete the full seven-year term as Comelec Commissioner, having served only from February 12, 2004 to July 10, 2005. In the assailed Resolution No. 8808 dated March 30, 2010, the Comelec, on the basis of the Law Department's study, completely disapproved the petitioners' claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned that the non-confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation, incapacity, or death, and that the partial service of the petitioners constituted tenure rather than completion of the full seven-year term. The resolution applied to all former Comelec Chairmen and Commissioners similarly situated and revoked all previous inconsistent resolutions.

• Entitlement to Full Gratuity: Petitioners maintained that the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the Commission on Appointments until Congress adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity.
• Finality of Prior Resolution: Petitioners argued that Resolution No. 06-1369, which initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity, is already final and executory under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and cannot be modified by the Comelec.
• Vested Right: Petitioners contended that they now have a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by R.A. No. 1568 in view of the finality of Resolution No. 06-1369.
• Liberal Construction: Petitioners prayed for a liberal interpretation of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, submitting that the involuntary termination of their ad interim appointments should be deemed a retirement from service, citing Ortiz vs. COMELEC in support.
• Due Process: Petitioners bewailed the lack of notice and hearing in the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8808.
• Discontinuance of Pension: Barcelona assailed the discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of the assailed Comelec issuance.

• Misplaced Reliance on Finality Rule: Respondent countered that the petitioners' reliance on Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure is misplaced as Resolution No. 06-1369 is not the final decision contemplated by the Rules, which apply only to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies, and special reliefs.
• Estoppel Does Not Lie: Respondent argued that estoppel does not lie against the Comelec since the erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of its errors.
• No Entitlement to Gratuity: Respondent reiterated that the petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity because they cannot be considered officials who retired after completing their term of office, emphasizing that R.A. No. 1568 refers to completion of the term of office, not to partial service or variable tenure, citing Matibag vs. Benipayo where the Court ruled that an ad interim appointment that lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.
• No Vested Rights: Respondent argued that the petitioners do not have any vested right to their retirement benefits because the benefits afforded by R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature and not similar to pension plans where employee participation is mandatory, so the petitioners were not deprived of property without due process of law.

• Entitlement to Lump Sum Gratuity: Whether the petitioners, whose ad interim appointments lapsed without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, are entitled to the full five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.
• Liberal Construction: Whether Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, should be liberally construed to include the termination of ad interim appointments as a form of retirement from service.
• Applicability of Ortiz vs. COMELEC: Whether the ruling in Ortiz vs. COMELEC applies to the present case to justify the grant of retirement benefits despite non-completion of the full term.
• Finality of Resolution No. 06-1369: Whether Comelec Resolution No. 06-1369 attained finality and can no longer be modified by the Comelec.
• Due Process: Whether the petitioners were denied due process when the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8808 without notice and hearing.
• Vested Rights: Whether the petitioners acquired vested rights over the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568.

• Entitlement to Lump Sum Gratuity: No. The petitioners did not comply with the conditions required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, because they did not complete the full seven-year term of office and did not serve a "term of office" as the law contemplates; an ad interim appointment that lapses by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.
• Liberal Construction: No. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for construction or interpretation, only application of the letter of the law; the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied where the law invoked is clear and unequivocal.
• Applicability of Ortiz vs. COMELEC: No. Ortiz does not have the same factual situation as the present case; the appointment in Ortiz was a regular appointment under the 1973 Constitution which did not require CA concurrence, and the courtesy resignation was involuntary under peculiar historical circumstances not present here.
• Finality of Resolution No. 06-1369: No. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure applies only to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies, and special reliefs, and the proceedings that precipitated Resolution No. 06-1369 do not fall within these categories.
• Due Process: No. The petitioners were not denied due process because they actively participated in the Comelec proceedings and were given ample opportunity to present and explain their positions when they sought re-computation of their retirement benefits.
• Vested Rights: No. The retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature and not similar to pension plans where employee participation is mandatory, so the petitioners acquired no vested rights over these benefits.

• Entitlement to Lump Sum Gratuity: Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, provides that the five-year lump sum gratuity is payable when the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec retires from the service for having completed the term of office, or by reason of incapacity, death while in service, or resignation after reaching sixty years of age. The petitioners' situation fits none of these categories. Their termination was not the result of incapacity, as no disability rendered them incapable of performing the duties of a Commissioner. It was not resignation, as they did not voluntarily relinquish their positions; their termination was a consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the Commission on Appointments. The eliminative process leaves only retirement after completion of the term of office. The petitioners served barely four months and never completed the full seven-year term prescribed by the Constitution. More importantly, drawing on the distinction between "term" and "tenure" established in Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles and reaffirmed in Matibag vs. Benipayo, the period during which the petitioners held office constituted mere tenure—the actual period an incumbent holds office—and not a term of office, which is the fixed and definite period during which an officer may claim to hold office as of right. An ad interim appointment that lapses by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office; the period from the time the appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would allow the President to start and complete the running of a term of office without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, rendering inutile the confirming power of that body.

• Liberal Construction: The primary modality of addressing the case is to look into the provisions of the retirement law itself. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is clear and unequivocal; no room for construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law. The doctrine of liberal construction of retirement laws cannot be applied where the law is clear, unequivocal, and leaves no room for interpretation. This principle was affirmed in In Re: Claim of CAR Judge Noel, Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, and Government Service Insurance System vs. Civil Service Commission, where the Court refused to apply liberal construction to unambiguous statutory provisions. The discretionary power to exercise liberality is not limitless; it is exercised on a case-to-case basis and only after consideration of factual circumstances justifying an exception, such as where the lacking element is de minimis or where the retiree's career was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication. No compelling legal or factual reasons exist in this case to warrant liberal application. Granting the petitioners' plea would constitute judicial legislation—engrafting upon the law something that has been omitted—which the Constitution forbids.

• Applicability of Ortiz vs. COMELEC: The principle of stare decisis is limited; specific judicial decisions are binding only on parties to the case and on future parties with similar or identical factual situations. The factual situation in Ortiz is totally different. First, Ortiz's appointment was a regular appointment made by President Marcos, while the petitioners were appointed ad interim during the recess of Congress. Second, Ortiz's appointment was made under the 1973 Constitution, which abolished the Commission on Appointments and did not require its concurrence, while the petitioners' appointments were made under the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that an appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Third, Ortiz addressed whether a constitutional official whose courtesy resignation had been accepted during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement benefits, while the present case addresses whether the termination of ad interim appointments entitles the petitioners to the full lump sum gratuity. The Court in Ortiz had ample reasons based on unique factual circumstances—the involuntariness of the courtesy resignation and the peculiar circumstances surrounding Proclamation No. 1—to grant an exception. No such peculiar circumstances obtain here.

• Finality of Resolution No. 06-1369: Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty days from promulgation, but only in ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies, and special reliefs. Under Section 5, Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, ordinary actions refer to election protests, quo warranto, and appeals; special proceedings refer to annulment of permanent list of voters, registration of political parties, and accreditation of citizens' arms; provisional remedies refer to injunction and/or restraining order; and special reliefs refer to certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt. The proceedings that precipitated Resolution No. 06-1369 do not fall within any of these categories, so the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.

• Due Process: The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or seek reconsideration. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are given fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side. The issuance of the assailed resolution was precipitated by the petitioners' own application for retirement benefits. The petitioners were given ample opportunity to present and explain their positions when they sought re-computation of the initial pro-rated retirement benefits. Under these facts, no violation of the right to due process took place.

• Vested Rights: Retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature and must be distinguished from a pension, which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed where employee participation is mandatory, thus vesting contractual or vested rights. Without such vested rights, the petitioners were not deprived of property without due process of law, and their due process argument fails.

• Distinction Between Term and Tenure — "Term" means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. "Tenure" represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by hold-over; tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the petitioners' partial service constituted tenure, not a term of office, as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568.

• Ad Interim Appointment and Term of Office — An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified. However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. The Court relied on this doctrine from Matibag vs. Benipayo to deny the petitioners' claim.

• Liberal Construction of Retirement Laws — Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retiring employee, and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve humanitarian purposes. However, this doctrine cannot be applied where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal, and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. The Court's discretionary power to exercise liberality is not limitless; it is on a case-to-case basis and only after consideration of factual circumstances that justify the grant of an exception, such as where the lacking element is de minimis or where the retiree's career was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.

• Judicial Legislation Prohibited — Courts cannot read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words of a statute is to alter the statute, to legislate, and not to interpret. Liberal construction cannot be used as a license to legislate; the constitutional separation of powers forbids the Court from engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted.

• Gratuitous Retirement Benefits vs. Pension — Retirement benefits that are purely gratuitous in nature, where employee participation is not mandatory, do not vest contractual or vested rights in the employee. This is distinguished from a pension plan, which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed, where employee participation is mandatory and employees acquire vested rights as part of their compensation.

• "However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments." — This passage, quoting Matibag vs. Benipayo, articulates the controlling rationale for denying the petitioners' claim: an ad interim appointment that lapses does not create a term of office, which is the statutory prerequisite for the lump sum gratuity.

• "The doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions, where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction." — This formulation, drawn from Government Service Insurance System vs. Civil Service Commission, defines the boundary of the liberal construction doctrine as applied to retirement laws: it yields when the statutory text is plain.

• "To depart from the meaning expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of the courts to construe, not to make the laws." — Quoting Nicolas vs. Alberto, this passage anchors the Court's refusal to expand the scope of R.A. No. 1568 beyond its clear terms, reinforcing the separation of powers.

• "The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [Thus, a] formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential." — This passage states the administrative due process standard applied to uphold the Comelec's issuance of Resolution No. 8808 without a formal hearing.

• Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12 (1946) — Established the foundational distinction between "term" and "tenure" in the law of public officers, which the Court applied to determine that the petitioners' partial service constituted tenure, not a term of office.

• Matibag vs. Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554 (2002) — Held that an ad interim appointment that lapses by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office; directly controlling on the question of whether the petitioners served a "term of office" under R.A. No. 1568.

• Ortiz vs. COMELEC, 245 Phil. 780 (1988) — Held that a Comelec Commissioner whose courtesy resignation was involuntarily tendered and accepted during the Freedom Constitution period should be deemed to have completed his term and considered retired. Distinguished by the Court on factual grounds: different constitutional framework (1973 vs. 1987 Constitution), different appointment type (regular vs. ad interim), and unique historical circumstances not present in the case at bar.

• Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, A.M. No. 14061-Ret (June 19, 2012) — Explained that strict compliance with age and service requirements under retirement laws is the rule, with exceptions granted only on a case-to-case basis and only where ample reasons justify the exception. Applied to reject the petitioners' plea for liberal construction.

• Government Service Insurance System vs. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 809 (1994) — Held that the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal, and leaves no room for interpretation. Applied to support the refusal to liberally construe Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568.

• Bautista vs. Commission on Elections, 460 Phil. 459 (2003) — Articulated that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to be heard, and that a formal or trial-type hearing is not always essential. Applied to reject the petitioners' due process challenge.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 1568, as amended — Provides that when the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec retires from the service for having completed the term of office, or by reason of incapacity, death while in service, or resignation after reaching sixty years of age, he or his heirs shall be paid a lump sum salary not exceeding five years for every year of service, plus a lifetime monthly annuity. The Court applied this provision strictly, finding that the petitioners did not satisfy any of the four enumerated conditions, particularly the requirement of having "completed his term of office."

• Section 2, Article IX-D, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Chairman and Commissioners of the Comelec shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. The Court relied on this provision to establish that the full term of a Comelec Commissioner is seven years, which the petitioners did not complete.

• Section 13, Rule 18, Comelec Rules of Procedure — Provides that decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc in ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies, and special reliefs shall become final and executory after thirty days from promulgation. The Court construed this provision narrowly to hold that the proceedings leading to Resolution No. 06-1369 did not fall within the enumerated categories, so that resolution did not attain finality.

The following justices concurred in the decision: Sereno, C.J. (on leave); Carpio, Acting C.J.; Velasco, Jr.; Leonardo-De Castro; Peralta; Bersamin (joined the dissent of J. Reyes); Del Castillo; Abad; Villarama, Jr.; Perez; Mendoza; Reyes (with dissenting position); Perlas-Bernabe; and Leonen. Justice Bersamin noted that he joined the dissent of Justice Reyes. Justices Reyes and Mendoza indicated dissenting positions.

• Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes — Justice Reyes dissented, voting to GRANT the petition of Fetalino and Calderon while denying Barcelona's petition for intervention (Barcelona having admitted he already received his pro-rated gratuity). Justice Reyes agreed that the petitioners' situation did not fall under incapacity, death, or resignation, and acknowledged that strictly construed, the petitioners did not complete the full term. However, he argued that Ortiz vs. COMELEC should be applied by analogy because the severance of the petitioners' appointments, like Ortiz's, was not "attributable to any voluntary act" on their part, and their positions could be "placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him." Justice Reyes further argued that a liberal construction of R.A. No. 1568 would achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law. Critically, he contended that the petitioners were entitled to a pro-rated computation of the gratuity under the proviso of Section 1, which states that the lump sum shall be "his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service," arguing that this proviso contemplates situations where a Commissioner does not complete the full term, such as when serving only the unexpired portion of a predecessor's term. He agreed with the majority that no due process violation occurred and that the petitioners acquired no vested rights over the benefits.