Festin vs. Zubiri

A lawyer who files pleadings labeled as "manifestations" but which actually pray for affirmative relief from the court commits an ethical violation, because such pleadings are motions that must comply with the requirements of notice of hearing and service upon the adverse party. The Court further held that a clerk of court has no ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge has explicitly directed that the writ not be issued, and a lawyer who believes his client is entitled to relief must file the proper motions before the court rather than clandestinely submitting ex parte pleadings to the clerk of court.

Complainant Romulo De Mesa Festin was the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri served as counsel for Villarosa, complainant's opponent in the May 2013 elections who had filed an election protest against him. The dispute arose within the context of election law proceedings governed by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, which prescribes the procedure for execution pending appeal in election cases, including the period within which an aggrieved party may secure a restraining order from the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections.

Complainant Romulo De Mesa Festin was elected Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa, filed an election protest against him before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46. After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an Order dated January 15, 2014 granting Villarosa's motion for execution pending appeal, directing the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court to issue a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal after the lapse of twenty working days from the time complainant's counsel receives a copy of the order, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued pursuant to Section 11(b), Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.

Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections seeking a Temporary Restraining Order against the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. In an Order dated February 13, 2014, the COMELEC issued a TRO directing the RTC Judge, in her official capacity, to cease and desist from enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order, effective immediately. Accordingly, the RTC issued another Order dated February 25, 2014 directing the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in accordance with the January 15, 2014 Order until further notice.

Despite the TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order, respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five manifestations addressed to the COC insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these manifestations to the other party. In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's January 15, 2014 Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on February 12, 2014. Since the COMELEC only issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, respondent argued that the TRO no longer had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC was not bound by the TRO. For these reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal.

The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However, complainant only found out about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him. Soon thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment complaint, arguing that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the COC to defy lawful orders—particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order—allegedly violating Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.

In his answer, respondent claimed that since the case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case and had no more power to issue the February 25, 2014 Order; he put forward the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC Judge. Respondent also claimed that the manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual deviations, as he merely stated his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO, and that he filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.

• Violation of Ethical Duties: Complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the COC to defy lawful orders—particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order—allegedly violating Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.

• Loss of Jurisdiction: Respondent claimed that since the case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case; therefore, it had no more power to issue the February 25, 2014 Order, and this was the same reason he filed the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC Judge.
• No Misleading Statements: Respondent claimed that the manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual deviations, as he merely stated his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no longer had any binding effect, and the filing of manifestations to highlight his position did not violate any rule.
• Duty to Client: Respondent alleged that he filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.

• Procedural Propriety of the Petition for Review: Whether respondent's filing of a petition for review before the Court conforms with the standing procedure for the investigation of administrative complaints against lawyers under the amended Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
• Administrative Liability: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.

• Procedural Propriety of the Petition for Review: No. Under the amended Section 12(b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015, the IBP Board's resolution is merely recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed, and any final action on a lawyer's administrative liability shall be done by the Court based on the entire records of the case, without need for the lawyer-respondent to file any additional pleading. The case of Ramientas vs. Reyala, which respondent cited as basis for his petition, was pronounced based on the old rule.
• Administrative Liability: Yes. Respondent violated Canon 1, Canon 8, and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR by improperly filing five motions as "manifestations" to sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions, thereby depriving the other party of due process. The Court imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three months, finding this sufficient and commensurate with respondent's infractions.

• Procedural Propriety of the Petition for Review: The Court clarified that under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was either exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension of disbarment," in which case the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party files a petition before the Court. However, under the amended provisions of Section 12(b) and (c) of Rule 139-B, the IBP Board's resolution is merely recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The amendment stresses the Court's authority to discipline a lawyer who transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR. Hence, respondent's filing of the present petition for review was unnecessary, and the Court considered it only to completely resolve the merits of the case and determine respondent's actual administrative liability.

• Administrative Liability: The Court agreed with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable but found it proper to impose a lower penalty. The Court distinguished between a manifestation and a motion: a manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated, while a motion is an application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it, in keeping with the principle of due process. In the present case, respondent filed five manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative reliefs—particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments. The fact that he submitted these manifestations directly to the COC, instead of properly filing them before the RTC, highlighted his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter completely unaware of his manifestations.

The Court rejected respondent's justification that he merely represented his client with competence and diligence, reminding him that a lawyer is ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and society, and that his obligation to represent his client is not without limits but must be "within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR. The Court also rejected respondent's argument that the COC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution, ruling that while a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its issuance, in this case the RTC Judge had issued the second Order explicitly directing the COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC did not have a ministerial duty to issue the writ. If respondent honestly believed that his client was entitled to the writ, he should not have clandestinely submitted ex parte manifestations directly to the COC to coerce the latter to grant his intended relief; instead, he should have filed the proper motions before the court, which alone has the inherent power to grant his prayer pursuant to Section 5(c), (d), and (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The Court, exercising its plenary power to discipline erring lawyers and its sound judicial discretion, imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three months, finding this sufficient to achieve the desired end of reforming the errant lawyer.

• Distinction between a manifestation and a motion — A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated; the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. The Court applied this distinction to find that respondent's five "manifestations" were actually motions because they prayed for affirmative reliefs—the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal—and thus required notice of hearing and service upon the adverse party.

• Motion without notice of hearing is pro forma — A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it, in keeping with the principle of due process. The Court applied this doctrine to find that respondent's labelling of his motions as "manifestations" craftily sidestepped the requirement of notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments.

• Ministerial duty of the clerk of court — A clerk of court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its issuance. However, when the judge has explicitly directed the clerk NOT to issue the writ, the clerk has no ministerial duty to do so. The Court applied this doctrine to reject respondent's argument that the COC had a ministerial duty to issue the writ despite the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order directing otherwise.

• "A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party." — This passage articulates the controlling distinction between a manifestation and a motion, which is the ratio decidendi of the Court's finding of administrative liability.

• "Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is proforma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process." — This passage states the settled rule on motions without notice of hearing and explains the due process rationale underlying the requirement.

• "The Court has ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its issuance. In this case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second Order (dated February 25, 2014) explicitly directing the COC 'NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution.' Therefore, the COC in this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution." — This passage rejects respondent's justification and clarifies the scope of the clerk of court's ministerial duty.

• Ramientas vs. Reyala, 529 Phil. 128 (2006) — Cited by respondent as basis for filing the petition for review; the Court distinguished it as having been pronounced based on the old rule under Rule 139-B, before the amendment by Bar Matter No. 1645.
• Vasco-Tamaray vs. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868, January 26, 2016, 782 SCRA 44 — Cited to explain the old rule under which the IBP Board had the power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension of disbarment."
• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Liangco, 678 Phil. 305 (2011) — Cited for the proposition that Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.
• Neri vs. de la Pena, 497 Phil. 73 (2005) — Cited for the definition of a manifestation as a statement to inform the court rather than to contest or argue.
• Boiser vs. Aguirre, Jr., 497 Phil. 728 (2005) — Cited for the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper.
• City of Naga vs. Asuncion, 579 Phil. 781 (2008) — Cited for the rule that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its issuance.
• Foronda vs. Alvarez, Jr., 737 Phil. 1 (2014) — Cited for the proposition that the Court has plenary power to discipline erring lawyers and may impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the desired end of reforming the errant lawyer.
• Ramos vs. Pallugna, 484 Phil. 184 (2004) — Cited in support of the Court's imposition of a three-month suspension penalty.
• Teodoro III vs. Gonzales, 702 Phil. 422 (2013) — Cited for the proposition that a lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice, and any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation.

• Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the law of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes; respondent was found guilty of violating this Canon.
• Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their professional colleagues, and to avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel; respondent was found guilty of violating this Canon.
• Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice; respondent was found guilty of violating this Rule.
• Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law; the Court cited this to remind respondent that his obligation to represent his client is not without limits.
• Section 12(b) and (c), Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 — Provides that the IBP Board's resolution is merely recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed, and that the Board's resolution, together with the entire records, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten days from issuance of the resolution.
• Section 11(b), Rule 14, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC — Provides that if the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections, and the corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days if no restraining order or status quo order is issued.
• Section 5(c), (d), and (g), Rule 135, Rules of Court — Provides the inherent powers of courts, including the power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes; to control the conduct of its ministerial officers; and to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice; the Court cited this to show that the court alone has the inherent power to grant respondent's prayer.
• Rule 15, Sections 1 and 4, Rules of Court — Defines a motion as an application for relief from the court other than by a pleading, and requires that motions be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, J., Del Castillo, J., and Caguioa, J. concurred in the decision.