Festejo vs. Crisologo

Under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, a provincial governor may suspend a municipal officer charged with neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office affecting official integrity without a prior final judgment of conviction; final conviction is required only when the charge is a crime involving moral turpitude not connected with the performance of official duties.

Pablo Festejo was the municipal mayor of Sta. Lucia, Ilocos Sur; Carmeling P. Crisologo was the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur; Brigido Vilog was the vice-mayor of Sta. Lucia; and the Provincial Board of Ilocos Sur was the provincial body that would act on administrative complaints against municipal officers. Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code governed the provincial governor's power to suspend a municipal officer charged with neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office, or with a crime involving moral turpitude. The present case was an original action for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the SC.

Pablo Festejo, the municipal mayor of Sta. Lucia, Ilocos Sur, received on or about January 14, 1966 a communication from Carmeling P. Crisologo, the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, suspending him as mayor effective January 17, 1966, in view of an administrative complaint filed against him by the Governor. The amended complaint charged petitioner with oppression and grave abuse of authority, in that on several occasions he prevented Brigido Vilog, as vice-mayor of Sta. Lucia, from assuming the duties of acting mayor whenever petitioner was on leave or travelling outside Sta. Lucia, by designating the municipal secretary or one of the members of the municipal council to perform those duties. It also charged him with dishonesty, in that, contrary to law and with intent to defraud the municipal government of Sta. Lucia, on June 15, 1965 he collected travelling allowances and per diems in the amount of P19.00 by making it appear in a municipal voucher that he was on official business in Manila when in truth he was in Sta. Lucia, Ilocos Sur, and in December 1965 he collected P100 as his salary from December 16 to 31, 1965 notwithstanding that he had not performed his duties as mayor from December 19 to 28, 1965.

On February 7, 1966, petitioner secured from the SC, in G.R. No. L-25566 (Pablo Festejo vs. Carmen E. Crisologo), an order restraining respondent Crisologo from enforcing or giving effect to the suspension order dated January 14, 1966. Less than a month later, or on March 14, 1966, petitioner received another communication from the Governor advising him that he was suspended effective March 5, 1966, in view of the filing of another administrative complaint against him, charging neglect of duty, corruption, dishonesty, and grave abuse of authority.

The second complaint, likewise filed by the Governor, alleged that on or about June 29, 1965, in the Municipality of Sta. Lucia, Province of Ilocos Sur, and within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Board, Pablo Festejo, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defrauded the municipal government of Sta. Lucia by withdrawing from the municipal treasury P5,000.00 deposited under O.R. No. 943028 dated December 1, 1964 under Voucher No. 132 without authority of law; that the P5,000.00 was the gross proceeds from the popularity contest for the town fiesta of December 13, 1965; that the withdrawal was evidenced by Voucher No. 366 dated June 29, 1965; and that he misappropriated and converted the amount for his personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the municipal government of Sta. Lucia in the amount of P5,000.00. The complaint stated that these acts constituted neglect of duty, corruption, dishonesty, and grave abuse of authority, in violation of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, and the crime of Estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

Soon thereafter, petitioner instituted the present civil action for prohibition with preliminary injunction, alleging that the second administrative complaint was merely a means to circumvent the restraining order in G.R. No. L-25566 and to harass him for having sought the protection of the SC in that case; that respondent Brigido Vilog, as vice-mayor of Sta. Lucia, had threatened to take over the office of mayor on the basis of the second suspension order; that the Provincial Board of Ilocos Sur intended to give due course to and investigate the administrative complaint dated March 4, 1966; and that, since the allegations of fact in the complaint, if true, would constitute a crime, the Governor acted in excess of authority or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the second suspension order, for no administrative action may be taken against petitioner until final judgment of conviction. He prayed that the second suspension order be declared null and void and that the Governor, the Vice-Mayor, and the Provincial Board be restrained from enforcing the order, assuming the powers and duties of acting mayor, and giving due course to and investigating the second administrative complaint.

In their answer, respondents denied that the second administrative complaint had been filed to circumvent the restraining order in G.R. No. L-25566 and alleged that the second administrative complaint was filed and the order of suspension based thereon was issued after the discovery of the acts alleged in the complaint and "the availability of the requisite proof or evidence" establishing the commission of those acts. When the case was heard, petitioner did not even try to establish the truth of his allegation that the second administrative complaint had been filed to circumvent the restraining order; instead, he relied exclusively on the proposition that, when a municipal official is charged with a crime involving moral turpitude, no administrative action may be taken against him until final judgment finding him guilty, even if the same consists of acts constituting neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other forms of maladministration of office.

• Prior Final Conviction: Petitioner argued that when a municipal official is charged with a crime involving moral turpitude, no administrative action may be taken against him until final judgment of conviction, even if the acts charged also constitute neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office.
• Circumvention and Harassment: Petitioner alleged that the second administrative complaint was merely a means to circumvent the restraining order in G.R. No. L-25566 and to harass him for having sought the SC's protection in that case.
• Excess of Authority: Petitioner argued that because the allegations in the second complaint, if true, would constitute a crime, the Governor acted in excess of authority or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the second suspension order.

• No Circumvention: Respondents denied that the second administrative complaint had been filed to circumvent the restraining order in G.R. No. L-25566.
• Discovery and Evidence: Respondents alleged that the second administrative complaint was filed and the order of suspension based thereon was issued after the discovery of the acts alleged in the complaint and "the availability of the requisite proof or evidence" establishing the commission of those acts.

• Prior Final Conviction: Whether a municipal mayor charged with neglect of duty, corruption, dishonesty, and grave abuse of authority—acts that also constitute a crime involving moral turpitude—may be suspended administratively before final judgment of conviction.

• Prior Final Conviction: No. Under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, a provincial governor may suspend a municipal officer charged with neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office affecting official integrity without prior final conviction; final conviction is required only for a crime involving moral turpitude not connected with official duties.

• Prior Final Conviction: Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code allows the Provincial Governor to suspend a municipal officer charged with "neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office," and upon "conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude," if in the Governor's opinion the charge affects the officer's official integrity. The SC explained that the grounds fall into two categories: (1) those related to the discharge of the officer's functions—neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office; and (2) those not connected with official functions—the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. Final conviction is not a condition precedent to administrative action except in the second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, because such a crime, not being associated with official duties, should not ordinarily warrant administrative action unless there is a previous final judgment of conviction. An act or omission constituting neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office is necessarily connected with the office and may be the object of administrative action even if no crime was committed; it would be absurd to deny the authority to suspend when the act is serious enough to constitute not only a crime but also one involving moral turpitude. All that is required for the exercise of the suspension power is that the charge, in the Governor's opinion, affects the official integrity of the officer. The second administrative complaint charged petitioner with misappropriation of P5,000.00 in municipal funds, a charge that certainly affected his official integrity, so the Governor's suspension order was legally justified.

• Two Categories of Grounds under Section 2188 — The grounds for suspending a municipal officer under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code fall into two categories: (1) acts related to the discharge of official functions—"neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office"; and (2) crimes involving moral turpitude not connected with official functions. Final conviction is required only for the second category; for the first, administrative action may proceed even if no crime was committed, and a fortiori when the act also constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Official Integrity as the Test for Suspension — The provincial governor may suspend a municipal officer when the charge, in his opinion, affects the officer's official integrity. The SC applied this test to the charge of misappropriating P5,000.00 in municipal funds, which it held certainly affected petitioner's official integrity.

• "Conviction by final judgment is not required, as a condition precedent to administrative action, except in cases falling under the second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, and for an obvious reason." — The SC limits the final-conviction requirement to crimes involving moral turpitude that are not connected with official duties.
• "Not being associated with said duties, it should not ordinarily warrant any administrative action unless there be previous final judgment of conviction." — The SC explains why an unrelated moral-turpitude crime requires a prior final conviction before administrative action.
• "In the case at bar, the charge contained in the second administrative complaint against petitioner herein (misappropriation of public funds of the municipality of Sta. Lucia) certainly affects his official integrity." — The SC applies the official-integrity test to the charge against petitioner.
• "The legal justification for the preventive measure taken by respondent Governor is, accordingly, obvious." — The SC concludes that the Governor's suspension order was legally justified.

• Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code — The SC applied this provision as the source of the Provincial Governor's power to suspend a municipal officer charged with neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration of office, or upon conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, if in the Governor's opinion the charge affects the officer's official integrity. The SC held that final conviction is required only for the second category and that the charge of misappropriating P5,000.00 in municipal funds affected petitioner's official integrity, justifying the suspension.