Ferrer vs. Ericta

The defense of prescription is not deemed waived by a defendant's failure to plead it in the answer when the complaint on its face, or the plaintiff's own evidence, shows that the action has already prescribed. Where no issue of fact is involved in connection with the question of prescription, the court may consider the defense even if not raised in the answer, and the action may be dismissed on that ground.

The petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Romeo Ferrer and their daughter Annette Ferrer, filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider and their son Dennis Pfleider, arising from a vehicular accident. The private respondents were residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, and were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car driven by their minor son. The action was governed by Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which makes parents responsible for damages caused by their minor children who live in their company, and by Article 1146 of the same Code, which prescribes actions for damages based on quasi-delict within four years.

On December 31, 1970, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in the streets of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, Dennis Pfleider, then only sixteen years of age, drove a Ford pick-up car owned or operated by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, without proper official authority and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations. The pickup car overturned, causing physical injuries to Annette Ferrer, who was a passenger therein. The injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than two years. As a result, Annette suffered unimaginable physical pain and mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock, and spent considerable sums for her treatment.

On December 27, 1974, but actually filed on January 6, 1975, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch XVIII, assigned to respondent Judge Vicente G. Ericta. The defendants filed their answer, putting up the affirmative defense that Dennis Pfleider exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle, and alleging that Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard the vehicle were not passengers in the strict sense of the term but were merely joy riders, and that consequently, the defendants had no obligation whatsoever to the plaintiffs.

At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only the plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were present. Consequently, the defendants-private respondents were declared in default, and the plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. On May 21, 1975, the petitioners moved for an extension of ten days to present their evidence, which was granted. The presentation of evidence was later continued to June 16, 1975, when the deposition of Annette Ferrer was submitted and admitted by the trial court.

On June 26, 1975, the private respondents filed a motion to set aside the order of default and subsequent pleadings on the ground that their failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect. The petitioners opposed the motion on the grounds that the pleading was not under oath, contrary to the requirements of Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules, and that it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The motion was denied by the respondent Judge on July 21, 1975. On the same date, the respondent Judge rendered judgment against the private respondents, finding that the minor Dennis Pfleider was allowed by his parents to operate the Ford pick-up car and, because of his reckless negligence, caused the accident resulting in injuries to Annette. The defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally: (1) P24,500.00 for actual expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; (2) P24,000.00 for actual expenses for the care and medicines of Annette from December 31, 1970 to December 31, 1974; (3) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (4) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; (5) P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (6) costs of suit.

On September 1, 1975, the private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision and of the order denying the motion to set aside the order of default, based on the following grounds: (1) the complaint states no cause of action insofar as Mr. and Mrs. Pfleider are concerned because it does not allege that at the time of the mishap, Dennis Pfleider was living with them, the fact being that at such time he was living apart from them, hence, there can be no application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code; and (2) the complaint shows on its face that it was filed only on January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of more than four years from the date of the accident on December 31, 1970, and therefore, the action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed on September 10, 1975, alleging that the defense of prescription had not been waived and may be raised even at such stage of the proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as well as from the plaintiffs' evidence, the cause of action had already prescribed.

The petitioners opposed the supplemental motion, averring that: (a) the defense of prescription had been waived while the defense that the complaint states no cause of action is available only at any time not later than the trial and prior to the decision; (b) inasmuch as the defendants had been declared in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, they had lost their standing in court and could not be allowed to adduce evidence nor take part in the trial; and (c) the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration were pro forma because the defenses raised therein had been previously raised and passed upon by the respondent court in resolving the defendants' motion to set aside the order of default. Being pro forma, said motions did not suspend the running of the thirty-day period to appeal, and hence the decision had already become final and executory. The petitioners accordingly prayed that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the judgment in their favor.

On September 23, 1975, the respondent Judge, without setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving the defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are only responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company; and (b) the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four years after the date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on quasi-delict prescribes in four years. Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.

• Waiver of Defense of Prescription: Petitioners argued that the defense of prescription had been waived by the private respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer, and that the defense that the complaint states no cause of action is available only at any time not later than the trial and prior to the decision.
• Effect of Default: Petitioners argued that inasmuch as the defendants had been declared in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, they had lost their standing in court and could not be allowed to adduce evidence nor take part in the trial, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
• Pro Forma Motions: Petitioners argued that the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration were pro forma because the defenses raised therein had been previously raised and passed upon by the respondent court in resolving the defendants' motion to set aside the order of default, and being pro forma, said motions did not suspend the running of the thirty-day period to appeal, and hence the decision had already become final and executory.

• Lack of Cause of Action: Private respondents argued that the complaint states no cause of action insofar as Mr. and Mrs. Pfleider are concerned because it does not allege that at the time of the mishap, Dennis Pfleider was living with them, the fact being that at such time he was living apart from them, hence, there can be no application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which parents' liability is premised.
• Prescription: Private respondents argued that the complaint shows on its face that it was filed only on January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of more than four years from the date of the accident on December 31, 1970, and therefore, the action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
• No Waiver of Prescription: Private respondents argued in their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration that their defense of prescription had not been waived and may be raised even at such stage of the proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as well as from the plaintiffs' evidence, their cause of action had already prescribed.

• Waiver of Prescription: Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

• Waiver of Prescription: No. The defense of prescription was not deemed waived by the private respondents' failure to plead it in their answer, because the complaint on its face showed that the action had already prescribed, and no issue of fact was involved in connection with the question of prescription.

• Waiver of Prescription: The Court ruled that the defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading. Citing Chua Lamko vs. Dioso, et al., the Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff, holding that where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. In Philippine National Bank vs. Perez, et al., where the defendants were declared in default for failure to file their answer, the Court ruled that the defense of prescription can only be considered if invoked in the answer, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations. In Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, the Court held that "the fact that the plaintiff's own allegation in the complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same." In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. The complaint alleges that the accident occurred on December 31, 1970, and it is undisputed that the action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years under Article 1146, paragraph 2, of the New Civil Code, and the four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident. Since the complaint was filed more than four years after the accident, the action had already prescribed, and the respondent Judge correctly absolved the defendants from liability.

• Waiver of Defense of Prescription — The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading. Where the complaint on its face, or the plaintiff's own evidence, shows clearly that the action had prescribed, the case is removed from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same, and the court may dismiss the action on the ground of prescription even if the defendant was declared in default.

• "It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations." — This passage, quoted from Philippine National Bank vs. Perez, et al., establishes the exception to the general rule on waiver of the defense of prescription and was applied by the Court to the present case.
• "... the fact that the plaintiff's own allegation in the complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same." — This passage, quoted from Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, articulates the controlling principle that the defense of prescription may be considered when the complaint on its face shows the action is time-barred.

• Chua Lamko vs. Dioso, et al., L-6923, October 31, 1955, 911 Phil. 821 — Cited as early authority sustaining the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of prescription even though the defense was not raised in the answer, holding that the defense is not deemed waived unless it raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Perez, et al., L-20412, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 270 — Followed; held that the rule on waiver of the defense of prescription does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action is already barred by the statute of limitations, even where the defendants were declared in default.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, L-22675, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 766 — Followed; held that the fact that the plaintiff's own allegation in the complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed removes the case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same.
• Diocesa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., L-10542, July 31, 1958, 104 Phil. 1050 — Cited for the proposition that the four-year prescriptive period for actions based on quasi-delict begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident.
• Jamelo vs. Serfino, L-26730, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 464 — Cited for the same proposition that the four-year period begins from the date of the accident.

• Article 1146, paragraph 2, New Civil Code — Provides that actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The Court applied this provision to hold that the action, filed on January 6, 1975, more than four years after the accident on December 31, 1970, had already prescribed.
• Article 2180, New Civil Code — Provides that the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by their minor children who live in their company. The Court noted this provision in relation to the private respondents' argument that the complaint stated no cause of action because it did not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of the accident.
• Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court — Provides that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The Court discussed this rule in relation to the petitioners' argument that the defense of prescription had been waived, but held that the rule does not apply when the complaint on its face shows the action had prescribed.
• Section 2, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Provides that a defendant declared in default loses standing in court and cannot be allowed to adduce evidence nor take part in the trial. The petitioners invoked this provision, but the Court did not rely on it in resolving the issue of prescription.
• Section 3, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Requires that a motion to set aside an order of default be under oath and accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The petitioners cited this provision in opposing the private respondents' motion to set aside the order of default.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concurred.