Ferrer, Jr. vs. Roco, Jr.

A petition for declaratory relief must be dismissed where the issue is not ripe for judicial determination because the challenged municipal issuances merely endorsed a private party's application to an administrative agency—the HLURB—whose primary jurisdiction over the matter must first be exhausted before resort to the courts.

Petitioners Honesto V. Ferrer, Jr. and Romeo E. Espera, together with several other residents of Naga City, opposed the application of ARE Square Realty Development Corporation (later Peñafrancia Memorial Park Corporation) for a memorial park development at Barangay Balatas, Naga City. The application was processed through the Naga City Sangguniang Panglungsod, which issued resolutions granting preliminary locational clearance and a development permit, and enacted an ordinance amending the city's existing cemetery regulations. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development in the Philippines, to whose jurisdiction land use applications of this nature may be endorsed.

Ten residents of Naga City—Wenceslao D. San Andres, Jose A. Ocampo, Crisensana M. Vargas, Honesto V. Ferrer, Jr., Alfonso N. Peralta, Otilla C. Sierra, Jovito A. delos Santos, William Tan, Felipe Sese, and Romeo E. Espera—filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 24. They challenged three issuances of the Naga City Sangguniang Panglungsod: Resolution No. 2000-263, which approved the application of Robert L. Obiedo of ARE Square Realty Development Corporation for Preliminary Approval for Locational Clearance (PALC) for a First Class Memorial Park at Barangay Balatas; Resolution No. 2000-354, which approved the application for a Development Permit for the proposed Eternal Gardens Memorial Park covering 60,781 square meters at the same barangay, subject to conditions and compliance with existing laws, and favorably endorsed the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for appropriate action; and Ordinance No. 2000-059, which amended Ordinance No. 401, series of 1972, specifically the provisions on minimum area requirements for private cemeteries and the Mayor's Permit and License Fees.

Respondents—Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr., the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Naga City, and the private respondent corporation—filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the petition in its April 17, 2001 Order, finding that the prayer was premature because the questioned resolutions and ordinance were merely promulgated to pave the way for endorsement of the private respondent's application to the HLURB, which would ultimately decide whether the application would be granted. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning error to the RTC's jurisdictional ruling and its refusal to grant injunctive relief.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's dismissal in toto on April 21, 2006, applying the doctrine of administrative remedies and holding that no issue ripe for judicial determination existed while the matter fell within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA on August 9, 2006. Only Ferrer and Espera pursued the case to the Supreme Court; the other eight original petitioners did not signify interest or could not be located.

• Ripeness for Judicial Determination: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petition for declaratory relief premature and without basis on the pretext that the issue raised was not yet ripe for adjudication.
• Exceptions to Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the recognized exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to the courts.
• Reconsideration: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying their Motion for Reconsideration.

• Ripeness: Whether the petition for declaratory relief was ripe for judicial determination given that the challenged municipal issuances merely endorsed the private respondent's application to the HLURB.
• Primary Jurisdiction: Whether the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction precluded the courts from resolving the controversy at that stage, requiring prior resort to the HLURB.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine were applicable so as to justify direct judicial intervention.

• Ripeness: No. The issue was not ripe for judicial determination because the assailed resolutions and ordinance did not show that the public respondents acted on the private respondent's application with finality; the application was merely endorsed to the HLURB for appropriate action.
• Primary Jurisdiction: Yes, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction applies. Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where resolution demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of an administrative tribunal such as the HLURB.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No exceptions applied. Adequate relief remained available through the HLURB, satisfying the sixth requisite of declaratory relief that adequate relief is not available through other means or proceedings.

• Ripeness: The requisites of an action for declaratory relief include that the issue must be ripe for judicial determination and that adequate relief is not available through other means or forms of action or proceeding. In this case, the challenged resolutions and ordinance did not reflect any final action by the city government on the private respondent's application. Resolution No. 2000-354 expressly stated that the development permit was approved subject to conditions and compliance with all existing laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations, and further favorably endorsed the application to the HLURB for appropriate action. Because the HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the matter had not yet reached a stage where judicial construction or declaration of rights was necessary or appropriate. The "ripening seeds" of a justiciable controversy had not yet matured into an actual dispute requiring judicial intervention.

• Primary Jurisdiction: Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If a case requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts, even if the matter may also be within the courts' proper jurisdiction. The HLURB, as the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, possessed the specialized competence to evaluate and decide the private respondent's application.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The doctrine of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction, allowing them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence. The administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that any recognized exception to this doctrine was applicable. Because the filing of the petition for declaratory relief was premature, the ancillary application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction had no independent basis to stand on.

• Requisites of Declaratory Relief — The action requires: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. The Court found that requisites (5) and (6) were not satisfied because the application had merely been endorsed to the HLURB and adequate administrative relief remained available.

• Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction — Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts, even if the matter may be within their proper jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine to require prior resort to the HLURB, the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.

• Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Resort must first be made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence, the administrative agency being in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Filing a judicial action while the matter is within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency is premature and has no basis.

• "Clearly, the filing of the petition for declaratory relief with the trial court had no basis, as there can be no issue ripe for judicial determination when the matter is within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency, the HLURB." — This passage, quoted by the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals' decision, encapsulates the core rationale: declaratory relief cannot prosper when the controversy remains within an administrative body's primary jurisdiction.

• "Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and ordinance does it show that the public respondents acted on private respondent's application with finality. What appears therefrom is that the application of private respondent for development permit has been endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for appropriate action, the latter being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development." — This is the Supreme Court's own application of the ripeness requirement to the facts, establishing that municipal endorsement to an administrative agency negates finality and precludes judicial intervention.

• Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 150806, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 470 — Cited as the source of the six requisites of an action for declaratory relief. The Court relied on this formulation to test whether petitioners' case satisfied all necessary conditions, particularly ripeness and availability of adequate relief through other means.

• Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. vs. The Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 301 — Cited as authority for the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction. The Court applied the principle that courts will not determine controversies requiring the specialized expertise of an administrative body, requiring prior resort to that body.

• Rule 63, Rules of Court (Declaratory Relief) — Defines declaratory relief as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The Court applied the six requisites of declaratory relief derived from this rule and jurisprudence, finding that the petition failed to meet the ripeness and adequacy-of-relief requirements.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court (Petition for Review) — Governed the mode of appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Petitioners invoked this rule to elevate the CA's affirmance of the RTC's dismissal.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Roberto A. Abad concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.