Fernandez vs. Maaliw

No administrative liability for neglect of duty may be imposed without a formal charge, answer, and opportunity for hearing under the CSC rules, and delay predating an employee's assumption of office cannot be personally attributed to her. The CA's conviction was thus void for denial of due process, and the absence of a prima facie case against Fernandez warranted reinstatement of the CSC dismissal.

Petitioner Atty. Riza S. Fernandez was employed on February 11, 2013 in the Legal Services Division of the CSC-National Capital Region, then headed by Director Lydia Alba-Castillo who had been reassigned there on December 6, 2012 to address aged cases. Respondent Willie Fernando Maaliw was the private complainant in an earlier administrative complaint against a Land Bank of the Philippines employee that had long remained pending before the CSC-NCR. The governing framework includes the Revised Administrative Code procedures for administrative cases, the CSC Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service on formal charge and appeals, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court on appeals from the CSC to the CA.

On September 28, 1999, Willie Fernando Maaliw filed a complaint for grave misconduct, oppression, dishonesty, negligence, and violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and the Civil Service Law against Danilo A. Longasa, his co-employee and a Special Investigator assigned at the Security and Transport Department of the Land Bank of the Philippines in Makati City. After Longasa appeared and submitted his affidavit, the complaint was submitted for decision on January 21, 2000. More than 14 years later, on June 16, 2014, the CSC-NCR, through a decision signed by Director Lydia Castillo and prepared by Riza S. Fernandez, dismissed Maaliw's complaint for being insufficient in form.

By reason of the delay in resolving his complaint against Longasa, Maaliw filed a Complaint-Affidavit dated November 9, 2015 against Fernandez and Dir. Castillo for neglect of duty and violation of RA 6713. The complaint was initially filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, which referred it to the CSC. In their Joint Comment dated December 23, 2015, Fernandez and Dir. Castillo denied liability, asserting that Maaliw's complaint against Longasa was already pending before they assumed their posts, with Dir. Castillo reassigned to the LSD, CSC-NCR only on December 6, 2012 to reduce aged cases and Fernandez employed only on February 11, 2013. They cited the LSD's accomplishments against yearly targets despite sheer volume of cases and only eight personnel, and noted that Maaliw never moved for reconsideration of or appealed the dismissal of his complaint against Longasa.

On August 31, 2016, the CSC dismissed Maaliw's complaint against Fernandez and Dir. Castillo. While recognizing a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases from the 14-year delay, the CSC found the delay not attributable to Fernandez and Dir. Castillo and justified in view of the CSC-NCR's docket vis-a-vis its eight LSD personnel. Maaliw's motion for reconsideration was denied on December 16, 2016. On petition for review, the CA on January 14, 2019 reversed the CSC and found Fernandez and Dir. Castillo guilty of simple neglect of duty, imposing a fine equivalent to three months' salary in lieu of suspension since both were no longer employed at the CSC-NCR, faulting Fernandez's inaction for one year and six months after assuming office and rejecting lack of manpower as a defense.

• Appealability and Personality to Appeal: Petitioner argued that the CSC Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of prima facie case was final and not subject to appeal or petition for review, and that Maaliw had no personality to appeal as he was not adversely affected by it.
• Due Process and Lack of Formal Charge: Petitioner maintained that the CA violated her fundamental right to due process by finding her guilty of neglect of duty despite the absence of a Formal Charge by the CSC, positing that dismissal for lack of prima facie case meant there was no administrative case to speak of against her.
• Absence of Neglect and Justified Delay: Petitioner argued that she cannot be held liable for neglect of duty as it took her only four days to act on Maaliw's complaint against Longasa despite the sheer volume of cases pending at the CSC-NCR and its limited LSD personnel.

• Questions of Fact: Respondent countered that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising questions of fact.
• Due Process Observed: Respondent argued that Fernandez's right to due process was never impaired since she and Dir. Castillo were given opportunity to file counter-affidavits, equating the CSC's Order dated December 10, 2015 requiring comment to a Formal Charge under the RRACCS.
• Liability for Neglect and Speedy Disposition: Respondent maintained that Fernandez is liable for neglect of duty for violation of the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases and Rule 3, Section 4 of the IRR of RA 6713, positing that her defenses are self-serving and dubious for lack of corroborative evidence that, as far as she can remember, she acted in a few days.
• Ancillary Relief: Respondent asked in his Rejoinder that the CA Decision be implemented pending resolution and that petitioner be investigated for violating the canons of the legal profession.

• Rule 45 Cognizability: Whether the petition raising appealability, due process, and liability for neglect involves questions of law cognizable under Rule 45.
• Appealability of CSC Dismissal: Whether the CSC Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of prima facie case is appealable to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43.
• Standing of Private Complainant: Whether respondent Maaliw, as private complainant, has personality to appeal the CSC Decision exonerating petitioner.
• Due Process and Formal Charge: Whether the CA deprived petitioner of due process by finding her administratively guilty despite the lack of a Formal Charge under the RRACCS.
• Liability for Simple Neglect of Duty: Whether petitioner is liable for simple neglect of duty for the delay in resolving respondent's complaint against Longasa.

• Rule 45 Cognizability: Yes. The issues on proper remedy, due process, and liability on established facts are questions of law, and in any event fall under exceptions for grave abuse of discretion, conflicting findings, and misapprehension of facts.
• Appealability of CSC Dismissal: Yes. CSC decisions dismissing complaints for lack of prima facie case are appealable to the CA under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Rule 43, and Section 73, Rule 13 of the RRACCS, not barred by Section 72 or Section 47 on non-appealable agency decisions.
• Standing of Private Complainant: Yes. The private offended party may appeal an erroneous exonerating CSC decision, the applicable provisions using the generic term party rather than limiting appeal to the party adversely affected.
• Due Process and Formal Charge: Yes, violation established. The sanction was void for want of a Formal Charge, Answer, and formal investigation required by the RRACCS and the Ang Tibay rights.
• Liability for Simple Neglect of Duty: No. No prima facie case exists against petitioner, the more than 14-year delay being institutionally explained and not personally attributable to one who assumed office much later.

• Rule 45 Cognizability: A question of law exists when doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of fact concerns truth or falsehood of alleged facts. The assigned errors on remedy for CSC dismissals for lack of prima facie case, deprivation of due process, and liability for neglect on facts already before the CSC and CA are questions of law. The petition also falls within recognized exceptions because due process violation, if true, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and the CSC and CA made conflicting factual findings on reasons for delay.
• Appealability of CSC Dismissal: Section 72, Rule 13 of the RRACCS, invoked to bar appeal, contemplates non-appealable decisions of government agencies ordinarily appealable to the CSC, inapplicable where the complaint involving CSC-NCR employees was directly instituted with the CSC after Ombudsman referral. Section 47, Book V, Title I of the Revised Administrative Code on non-appealability covers only department secretaries' or agency heads' decisions imposing suspension not exceeding 30 days or fine not exceeding 30 days' salary, not CSC dismissals for lack of prima facie case. Section 48(2) is silent on non-appealability of such dismissals, while Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Rule 43, Section 1, and Section 73, Rule 13 of the RRACCS expressly grant the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final CSC judgments, decisions, resolutions, and orders.
• Standing of Private Complainant: Reliance on Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and related cases limiting appeal to the party adversely affected is unavailing, that view having been overruled in Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy. Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia holds that nothing bars appeal of an exonerating decision and that preventing the government or private offended party from appealing would undermine the campaign against corruption, malfeasance, and misfeasance. Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania recognizes that the CSC's right to appeal does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases, of which the present case is one. Sections 73 and 71 of the RRACCS use the generic term party and, in both old and amended versions, extend the right to question dismissals for lack of prima facie case to the complainant, unlike Sections 56 and 111 which specifically use party adversely affected.
• Due Process and Formal Charge: Under Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, administrative due process requires hearing, consideration of evidence, substantial evidentiary support, decision on disclosed record evidence, independent consideration, and reasoned resolution of issues. The record shows no Formal Charge under Rule 5, no Answer under Rule 6, and no Formal Investigation under Rule 8 of the RRACCS before liability was imposed. Following Salva vs. Valle, wanton disregard of civil service procedure cannot be countenanced, and even a motion for reconsideration cannot cure absence of formal charge and investigation. At most, the CA could have ruled that a prima facie case existed and remanded for CSC proceedings.
• Liability for Simple Neglect of Duty: While the length of CSC-NCR delay is undisputed, liability does not ipso facto attach to LSD members whose employment commenced much later than institution or submission for resolution. Under Navarro vs. Commission on Audit, the right to speedy disposition under Section 16, Article III applies to all parties before judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies but is flexible, weighed by length of delay, reasons, assertion of the right, and prejudice. Responsibility for such delay lies on the CSC as an institution, which here admitted the violation yet sufficiently explained through heavy caseload data, carry-over cases, cases ripe for resolution, and pending cases from 2012 to 2014 that delay after Fernandez assumed office was not attributable to her.

• Rule 45 — questions of law vs. questions of fact and exceptions — A question of fact exists when doubt concerns truth or falsehood of alleged facts; a question of law exists when doubt concerns what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions of fact may exceptionally be reviewed where there is grave abuse of discretion, speculation, manifestly mistaken inference, misapprehension of facts, conflicting findings, findings beyond issues or contrary to admissions, overlooked undisputed facts, contrariety with trial court findings, undisputed facts, or findings premised on absence of evidence contradicted by record. Applied to sustain cognizability where due process violation and conflicting CSC and CA findings were alleged.
• Appeal from CSC to CA under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Rule 43 — The CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of the CSC, implemented by Rule 43 covering quasi-judicial agencies including the CSC and echoed in Section 73, Rule 13 of the RRACCS. Applied to hold that a CSC dismissal for lack of prima facie case is appealable by petition for review, not barred by provisions on non-appealable short suspensions or fines by department heads.
• Standing of private complainant to appeal exoneration — Prior doctrine limiting CSC appeals to the party adversely affected was overruled in Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy; Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia and Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania recognize the private offended party's standing in appropriate cases to appeal erroneous exonerating decisions. Applied to uphold Maaliw's petition for review where the RRACCS used the generic term party in Sections 71 and 73.
• Administrative due process — Ang Tibay rights and RRACCS formal charge requirement — Administrative proceedings must respect the seven Ang Tibay rights, implemented through Formal Charge under Rule 5, Answer under Rule 6, and Formal Investigation under Rule 8 of the RRACCS; absent formal charge and investigation, the respondent lacks chance to defend and truth cannot be reasonably ascertained, following Salva vs. Valle. Applied to void the CA's direct finding of guilt, limiting the appellate court at most to a prima facie finding with remand.
• Right to speedy disposition of cases as flexible and institutional — Section 16, Article III guarantees speedy disposition before all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies to any party, but the right is weighed by (1) length of delay, (2) reasons for delay, (3) assertion or failure to assert the right, and (4) prejudice, following Navarro vs. Commission on Audit. Applied to attribute the 14-year CSC-NCR delay to the Commission as an institution, justified by docket volume and limited personnel, rather than to an employee who joined years later.

• "If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case" — States the Section 48(2) procedure for complaints by other persons, central to holding that such dismissals are not listed as non-appealable.
• "There is nothing in the law that bars an appeal of a decision exonerating a government official or an employee from an administrative charge." — Reiterates the Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia rule supporting the private complainant's standing to appeal an exoneration.
• "Without a formal charge and proper investigation on the charges imputed on the respondent, the respondent did not get the chance to sufficiently defend herself; and more importantly, the petitioner, the CSC and the courts could not have had the chance to reasonably ascertain the truth which the CSC rules aim to accomplish." — Quotes Salva vs. Valle to void the CA's guilt finding for want of RRACCS procedure.

• Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy, 366 Phil. 86 (1999) — Controlling precedent overruling Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission, Navarro vs. Civil Service Commission, Export Processing Zone Authority, and Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission on non-reviewability of exonerations.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia, 437 Phil. 289 (2002) — Followed to recognize the private offended party's right to appeal an erroneous administrative exoneration in support of the anti-corruption campaign.
• Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania, 456 Phil. 273 (2003) — Followed to hold that the CSC's right to appeal does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from elevating the decision.
• Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salvaña, 736 Phil. 123 (2014) — Cited as the source of petitioner's abandoned party-adversely-affected argument, clarified through its citation of Dacoycoy.
• Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) — Controlling formulation of seven primary rights in administrative proceedings applied to find denial of hearing.
• Salva vs. Valle, 707 Phil. 402 (2013) — Followed to hold that absence of formal charge and investigation violates due process and cannot be cured by motion for reconsideration.
• Navarro vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 238676, November 19, 2019 — Followed on speedy disposition factors and institutional responsibility for delay, applied to absolve petitioner where CSC explained caseload causes.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limits petitions for review on certiorari to questions of law; applied to sustain the petition as raising legal issues on remedy, due process, and liability.
• Section 48(2), Book V, Title I, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 — Provides dismissal if no prima facie case is found on complainant's sworn statements and evidence, otherwise requiring written notice of charges and answer; applied as silent on non-appealability of such dismissals.
• Section 47, Book V, Title I, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 — Declares non-appealable certain department secretary or agency head decisions imposing suspension not exceeding 30 days or fine not exceeding 30 days' salary; held inapplicable to CSC dismissals for lack of prima facie case.
• Section 9(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; Section 1, Rule 43, Rules of Court; Section 73, Rule 13, RRACCS — Confer and implement CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final CSC decisions via petition for review; applied to uphold Maaliw's remedy.
• Sections 56, 71, 72, Rule 13 and Rule 1, Section 4(s), RRACCS — Define party adversely affected and regulate motions for reconsideration and elevation from CSC Regional Offices and the CSC; applied to distinguish generic party standing from limited party-adversely-affected instances.
• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees speedy disposition of cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies; applied to assess delay but attribute it institutionally rather than personally.
• Republic Act No. 6713 and Rule 3, Section 4 of its IRR — Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards invoked as basis for neglect charge; held not breached by petitioner on the facts.

Hernando, J. (Acting Chairperson), Zalameda, J., and Marquez, J., concurred. Bernabe, J., was on official business.