Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

A congressional candidate's lease of a residence in the district where they seek election, without owning property there, does not negate compliance with the one-year residency requirement, provided there is substantial evidence of animus manendi and a bona fide transfer of domicile.

Petitioner Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of the First Legislative District of Laguna, declaring a leased townhouse in Sta. Rosa City as his residence for one year and two months. His domicile of origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna (Fourth District), where he previously ran for provincial offices, and he also owned a house in Cabuyao, Laguna (Second District). Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente challenged petitioner's eligibility, alleging material misrepresentation regarding residence and claiming the Sta. Rosa lease was a sham executed solely to meet the constitutional residency requirement.

• Certificate of Candidacy and Proclamation: Petitioner declared residence at a Sta. Rosa City townhouse for one year and two months. He won the election by a margin of 35,000 votes and was proclaimed on June 27, 2007.
• Quo Warranto Proceedings: Private respondent presented Barangay Health Workers (BHWs) who testified they rarely saw petitioner at the Sta. Rosa address, and a notary public who attested to infirmities in the lease contract. Petitioner presented his lessor, neighbors, the HOA president, and the barangay chairman, who all confirmed his residence. Petitioner also presented business records showing he and his wife operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003, and school records showing his children attended school there since 2005.
• HRET Findings: The HRET found the lease contract defective, noting it was not notarized properly and was executed by petitioner's brother-in-law. The HRET emphasized that leasing, rather than buying, property negated the concept of permanency required to prove abandonment of domicile of origin.
• Evidence of Domicile Transfer: Petitioner had previously purchased a property in Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa, which he rented out. In early 2006, he leased the Villa de Toledo townhouse while constructing a new home. On April 21, 2007, he and his wife purchased a lot in Villa de Toledo and built a residence where the family moved.

• Burden of Proof: The HRET erroneously shifted the burden to petitioner to prove abandonment of his domicile of origin; the quo warranto petitioner bore the burden of proving disqualification.
• Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping: The HRET should have been bound by the COMELEC's prior dismissal of the disqualification case; the subsequent quo warranto constitutes forum shopping.
• Unconstitutional Property Requirement: The HRET effectively added a property qualification by ruling that leasing a residence, rather than owning one, negated animus manendi.
• Validity of Lease and Residency: Formal defects in the lease do not void the agreement, and the lessor confirmed occupancy. The totality of evidence proves a bona fide transfer of residence.
• Credibility of Witnesses: The HRET ignored material witnesses for petitioner and erroneously relied on BHWs who could not have observed petitioner's presence twenty-four hours a day.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction: The HRET is the sole judge of House members' qualifications under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution. A quo warranto before the HRET is not forum shopping because it is distinct from a pre-election COMELEC case.
• Factual Findings on Residency: The HRET correctly found the lease contract fabricated and defective. Petitioner lacked animus manendi because he leased rather than bought property, and BHW testimonies disproved his physical presence in the district.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition despite a prior COMELEC ruling, and whether such filing constitutes forum shopping.
• Residency Requirement: Whether petitioner complied with the one-year residency requirement under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution, and whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in evaluating his domicile.

• Jurisdiction: The HRET exercises exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to the qualifications of proclaimed House members. A quo warranto action before the HRET is not forum shopping even if the COMELEC previously ruled on the candidate's qualifications, as the two bodies exercise distinct jurisdictions at different stages.
• Residency Requirement: The HRET committed grave abuse of discretion. The Constitution requires only residence, not property ownership; emphasizing leasehold status over ownership imposes an unconstitutional property qualification. Substantial evidence—including businesses, children's schooling, and eventual lot purchase—proved petitioner's bona fide transfer of domicile to Sta. Rosa by February 2006. The burden of proving disqualification rests on the quo warranto petitioner, who failed to show that petitioner retained a domicile other than Sta. Rosa during the one-year period preceding the election.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals — Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members, exercising jurisdiction only after a candidate has been proclaimed and taken office.
• Domicile by Choice — To acquire a new domicile by choice, three elements must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) intention to remain there (animus manendi), and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).
• No Property Requirement for Elective Office — The Constitution requires only residence in the district for at least one year preceding the election. Requiring property ownership as an indicium of permanence of domicile imposes an unconstitutional property qualification.
• Burden of Proof in Quo Warranto — The petitioner in a quo warranto case bears the burden of proving the ineligibility of the proclaimed winner, specifically that the winner lacked residence in the district for the year preceding the election.

• "There is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district... To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement."
• "It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement."
• "When the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears... that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected."

• Frivaldo v. COMELEC — Followed; electoral laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate, and doubts must be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility.
• Perez v. COMELEC — Followed; a lease contract is sufficient proof of change of residence, and voter registration in another district does not prove abandonment of new domicile.
• Gallego v. Vera — Followed; the purpose of residency is to ensure familiarity with the constituency; weak evidence of non-residence must yield to the electorate's will.
• Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v. COMELEC — Distinguished; in those cases, there was no other material reason for the candidate to lease in the district except to fulfill the residency requirement.
• Mallari v. Alsol — Followed; lack of notarization does not necessarily nullify a contract or render it void ab initio.
• Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives — Followed; the HRET is the sole judge of contests relating to the qualifications of House members.

• Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Prescribes the qualifications for Members of the House of Representatives, including being a resident of the district for not less than one year immediately preceding the election. Applied to determine petitioner's eligibility.
• Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Grants the HRET sole jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members. Applied to establish the HRET's exclusive jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition.
• Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court — Defines burden of proof. Applied to place the burden on the quo warranto petitioner to prove the ineligibility of the proclaimed winner.

Reynato S. Puno (CJ), Antonio T. Carpio, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama Jr.