Fernandez vs. Dimagiba

A legacy is not impliedly revoked under Article 957(2) of the Civil Code when the testator alienates the bequeathed property to the legatee himself, as this indicates an advance compliance with the will rather than a change of intent; moreover, if the alienation is voidable due to vitiated consent, it cannot be considered a voluntary act expressing an intent to revoke.

Benedicta de los Reyes executed a will in 1930 instituting Ismaela Dimagiba as her sole heir. Years later, Benedicta executed deeds of sale conveying the major portion of her estate to Ismaela. These deeds were later annulled by the SC due to undue influence. After Benedicta's death, Ismaela sought to probate the 1930 will, but the intestate heirs opposed, claiming the prior conveyances impliedly revoked the will.

• Original Filing: Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Special Proceeding No. 831 (Petition for Probate)
• Lower Court Decision:
  • June 20, 1958: CFI admitted the will to probate but deferred resolution on estoppel and revocation.
  • July 27, 1959: CFI overruled the claim of estoppel, reserving the issue of implied revocation.
  • February 27, 1962: CFI resolved against the oppositors, holding the will unrevoked by the deeds of sale.
  • Appeal: Oppositors elevated the case to the CA (CA-G.R. No. 31221-R). CA affirmed the CFI, holding the probate decree had become final for lack of appeal and there was no legal revocation.
  • SC Action: Oppositors filed a Petition for Review to the SC.

• The 1930 Will: On October 22, 1930, Benedicta de los Reyes executed a will instituting Ismaela Dimagiba as her sole heir.
• The 1943-1944 Conveyances: On March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944, Benedicta executed deeds of sale conveying the major portion of her estate to Ismaela Dimagiba. No consideration was paid by Dimagiba for these transfers.
• Annulment of Conveyances: The 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were annulled by the SC on August 3, 1954 (in G.R. Nos. L-5618 & L-5620). The SC found that the conveyances were executed due to the moral influence and undue pressure originating from the confidential relationship between Benedicta and Ismaela.
• Petition for Probate: On January 19, 1955, Ismaela filed a petition for probate of the 1930 will.
• Opposition: Intestate heirs (Fernandez and the Reyeses) opposed the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent, estoppel by laches, and implied revocation due to the 1943-1944 conveyances.

• The CFI probate decree should be considered interlocutory because it failed to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation; appealing it prematurely would cause a multiplicity of suits.
• Ismaela Dimagiba is estopped from seeking probate due to laches.
• The 1930 will was impliedly revoked by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of conveyance, invoking paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 869 of the 1889 Code).

• The CFI probate decree was final and appealable; the oppositors' failure to appeal on time rendered it conclusive.
• Estoppel does not apply to probate proceedings because they are matters of public policy.
• The deeds of conveyance did not impliedly revoke the will because they were executed in favor of the legatee herself, indicating an advance fulfillment of the will rather than a change of intent, and the deeds were voidable due to undue influence anyway.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the CFI decree admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of a timely appeal.
  • Whether the CFI order overruling the claim of estoppel had become final.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the 1930 will was impliedly revoked by the testatrix's execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the legatee in 1943 and 1944 under Article 957(2) of the Civil Code.

• Procedural:
  • The probate decree is final and appealable. A probate decree definitively settles questions of the testator's capacity and the proper execution/witnessing of the will, irrespective of the intrinsic validity of its provisions. Under Rule 109, Sec. 1, an order allowing or disallowing a will is expressly appealable. Because the oppositors failed to appeal the probate decree on time, it became final and conclusive.
  • The estoppel issue is moot because estoppel cannot prevail against public policy. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy designed to protect the testator's expressed wishes, as evidenced by the mandatory duty imposed on custodians of wills under Rule 75.
• Substantive:
  • The will was not impliedly revoked. Article 957(2) is based on a presumed change of intention by the testator. When the subsequent alienation is made to the legatee herself, it indicates an advance compliance with the will, not an abandonment of the original intent.
  • Furthermore, because the 1943 and 1944 conveyances were annulled due to undue influence, the testatrix was not expressing her own free will in making them. A voidable alienation based on vitiated consent cannot demonstrate a voluntary intent to revoke a legacy. The phrase "even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract" in Art. 957(2) cannot be interpreted literally to include nullity arising from vitiated consent, as a will lacking free consent cannot produce a revocatory effect.

• Finality of Probate Decrees — A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning the capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. It is immediately final and appealable.
• Implied Revocation of Legacies (Art. 957(2)) — A legacy is impliedly revoked if the testator alienates the thing bequeathed, based on the presumed change of intention. However, two exceptions apply: (1) If the alienation is made to the legatee itself, it indicates advance compliance, not a change of intent; (2) If the alienation is voidable due to vitiated consent (undue influence, violence, intimidation), there is no free will, and thus no intent to revoke.
• Inapplicability of Estoppel to Probate — The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy designed to protect the testator's expressed wishes. Estoppel cannot be used to evade this public policy.

• Article 957(2), Civil Code of the Philippines (1950) (formerly Art. 869, Civil Code of 1889) — Provides that a legacy is without effect if the testator alienates the thing bequeathed, even if the alienation is later annulled. The SC held this did not apply because (1) the alienation was to the legatee herself, and (2) the annulment was based on undue influence, meaning no voluntary intent to revoke existed. The phrase on nullity of contract was construed not to apply to vitiated consent.
• Rule 109, Sec. 1, Rules of Court — Enumerates instances where appeal may be taken in special proceedings, specifically allowing appeal from an order allowing or disallowing a will. Applied to show the probate decree was final and appealable.
• Rule 75, Rules of Court — Imposes a duty on custodians of wills to deliver them to the court, with penalties for violation. Cited to emphasize the public policy nature of probate proceedings.