Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals

The mere filing of a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review does not automatically divest the Regional Trial Court of its jurisdiction over the case, because appeal is perfected only upon the timely filing of the petition for review and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. However, a motion for new trial must be filed within the period for taking an appeal, and the fifteen-day period for filing such motion is non-extendible; a motion for new trial filed beyond this period is out of time and strips the movant of further relief.

The case arose from an unlawful detainer complaint filed by private respondent Concepcion Olivares against petitioner Atty. Jesus F. Fernandez, docketed as Civil Case No. 140953 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), Branch XV. The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action, and Olivares appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46, which reversed the MeTC decision. The dispute concerns the proper computation of the period for filing a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1 in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and the effect of filing a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on the trial court's jurisdiction.

Private respondent Concepcion Olivares filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner Atty. Jesus F. Fernandez on January 23, 1993, docketed as Civil Case No. 140953 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), Branch XV. The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. Olivares appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46, which reversed the MeTC in a decision dated May 2, 1994, ordering Fernandez to pay rental arrearages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

Fernandez received a copy of the RTC decision on June 28, 1994. On July 12, 1994, or fourteen days after receipt of the decision, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On November 29, 1994, Fernandez received an order denying his motion for reconsideration. On December 1, 1994, Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, which was granted; he received the resolution granting the extension on December 12, 1994.

In the meantime, on December 9, 1994, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial before the RTC, Branch 46, citing newly discovered evidence of receipts proving his rental payments. In view of this motion, Fernandez, through counsel, filed on December 29, 1994 in the Court of Appeals a Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, which the court duly noted in its resolution dated January 19, 1995. In an Order dated February 6, 1995, the RTC denied the Motion for New Trial, explaining that when Fernandez went to the Court of Appeals and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already attached.

Fernandez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its Order dated December 14, 1995. Fernandez filed a Motion to Reconsider the Order, while Olivares moved for the execution of the judgment of the RTC citing Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. In an Order dated January 30, 1996, the RTC granted the Motion for Execution and denied the Motion for Reconsideration. A writ of execution was issued by the RTC on January 31, 1996. This prompted Fernandez to file a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39655, before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated February 14, 1996, temporarily restrained the respondents from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution.

In a decision dated May 16, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the stance of the RTC, ruling that when Fernandez elected to file before the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file petition for review, he in effect opted to appeal the adverse decision of the RTC, and the Court of Appeals' assumption of appellate jurisdiction resulted initially in the issuance of the resolution granting the extension. Fernandez filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a resolution dated October 13, 1997, prompting the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: Fernandez argued that when he filed the motion for extension of time to file petition for review, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had not yet attached, such that his failure to file the petition itself would normally have the effect of rendering the decision of the lower court final and executory. He maintained that the RTC retained jurisdiction to entertain his motion for new trial.

• Timeliness of the Motion for New Trial: Fernandez argued that the trial court still had jurisdiction to rule on his motion for new trial as the jurisdiction it originally acquired had not yet been lost, since no appeal had been perfected and the records had not yet been transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Olivares argued that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as the motion for extension of time to file petition for review filed by Fernandez, is considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, and that the Court of Appeals had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person.

• Execution of Judgment: Olivares moved for the execution of the judgment of the RTC citing Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which provides that the decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by the Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: Whether the mere filing by petitioner of a motion for extension of time to file petition for review (which intention was later withdrawn) automatically divested the Regional Trial Court of its jurisdiction over the case, so as to preclude it from entertaining a motion for new trial.

• Timeliness of the Motion for New Trial: Whether Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed within the reglementary period.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: No. The mere filing of a motion for extension of time to file petition for review does not divest the RTC of its jurisdiction, because under Rule 42, Section 8(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, the appeal is deemed perfected only upon the timely filing of the petition for review and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. Since no appeal was perfected and the records had not been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new trial.

• Timeliness of the Motion for New Trial: No. Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed out of time. Under Rule 37, Section 1 in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, a motion for new trial must be filed within the period for taking an appeal, which is fifteen days from notice of the judgment. The fifteen-day period is non-extendible, and Fernandez filed his motion for new trial on December 9, 1994, beyond the period that expired on December 1, 1994.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: The Court acknowledged that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as a motion for extension of time to file petition for review, is considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. However, the Court noted that additional rules are required for jurisdiction to attach in an appellate court: (1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the time for doing so; (2) he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for doing so; (3) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (4) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time. The Court emphasized that under Rule 42, Section 8(a), the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. Since Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself, the Court of Appeals had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court further discussed the residual jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph, which allows the RTC to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. Considering that no appeal was perfected and the records had not yet been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the case had not attained the residual jurisdiction stage, and the trial court had not lost the jurisdiction it first acquired.

• Timeliness of the Motion for New Trial: The Court held that the resolution of the case hinges on the proper computation of the period to file a motion for new trial. Under Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial. Under Rule 41, Section 3, the appeal shall be taken within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and the period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. Fernandez received a copy of the RTC decision on June 28, 1994. He filed a motion for reconsideration fourteen days after receipt of the decision, on July 12, 1994. The motion was denied, and he had only the remaining one day to file a motion for new trial, which day fell on December 1, 1994. Since November 30, 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to December 1, 1994 to file the motion for new trial. Instead, he filed before the Court of Appeals on December 1, 1994 the motion for extension of time to file petition for review, and only on December 9, 1994 did he file the motion for new trial before the RTC. The Court held that the motion for new trial was filed out of time, as the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended. Citing Habaluyas vs. Japzon, Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Tung Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez, the Court reiterated that motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts lower than the Supreme Court, and the fifteen-day period is non-extendible.

• Perfection of Appeal — Under Rule 42, Section 8(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, an appeal to the Court of Appeals by petition for review is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. The mere filing of a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review does not perfect the appeal, and the trial court retains jurisdiction over the case until the appeal is perfected.

• Residual Jurisdiction of the Trial Court — Under Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to a petition for review, the RTC retains jurisdiction for specified instances: (1) to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; (2) to approve compromises; (3) to permit appeals of indigent litigants; (4) to order execution pending appeal; and (5) to allow withdrawal of the appeal. This residual jurisdiction is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case, which stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.

• Non-Extendible Period for Motion for New Trial — Under Rule 37, Section 1 in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, a motion for new trial must be filed within the period for taking an appeal, which is fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order. The fifteen-day period is non-extendible, and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed before any court lower than the Supreme Court.

• Interruption of the Period of Appeal — A motion for new trial or reconsideration suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be perfected. If the motion is denied, the movant has only the balance of the reglementary period within which to appeal.

• "The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees." — This passage states the controlling rule on perfection of appeal, which is central to the Court's determination that the Court of Appeals had not acquired jurisdiction over the case.

• "Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the Court of Appeals has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself. Withal, sans the petition, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals has acquired jurisdiction over the case as to say that the trial court is without authority to act on a motion for new trial." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning that the trial court retained jurisdiction to entertain the motion for new trial.

• "IN SUM, considering that a motion for new trial must be filed during the period for filing an appeal and that such period cannot be extended, Fernandez, by filing his motion for new trial beyond the period to appeal, had unwittingly sealed his fate and stripped himself of any further relief." — This passage states the ultimate ground for the denial of the petition, emphasizing the non-extendible nature of the period for filing a motion for new trial.

• Habaluyas vs. Japzon, G.R. No. 70895, 30 May 1981, 142 SCRA 208 — Controlling precedent establishing that motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts lower than the Supreme Court, and the fifteen-day period for filing such motions is non-extendible.

• Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73836, 18 August 1988, 164 SCRA 505 — Cited in reiteration of the rule in Habaluyas that the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible.

• Tung Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 141938, 02 April 2001, 356 SCRA 31 — Cited in reiteration of the rule in Habaluyas that motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme Court.

• Antiporda, Jr. vs. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 133289, 23 December 1999, 321 SCRA 551 — Cited for the general principle that a court must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits.

• Hongkong and Shanghai Bank vs. Catalan, G.R. No. 19590, 18 October 2004 — Cited for the rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief is considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

• Fores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil 746 (1918) — Cited for the rule that an appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person.

• Rule 37, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party. Applied to determine the period within which Fernandez could file his motion for new trial.

• Rule 41, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, and that the period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. Applied to compute the period for filing the motion for new trial.

• Rule 42, Section 8(a), Revised Rules of Court — Provides that upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner, and the RTC loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time. Applied to determine whether the Court of Appeals had acquired jurisdiction over the case.

• Rule 22, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. Applied in the computation of the period for filing the motion for new trial.

• Section 21, Revised Rules on Summary Procedure — Provides that the judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court, and the decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by the Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory. Cited by Olivares in moving for execution of the RTC judgment.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred.