Fernandez Krohn vs. Court of Appeals

The physician-patient privilege under Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is a personal disqualification that applies only to the physician, surgeon, or obstetrician; it does not extend to a third party who obtains the confidential information and seeks to testify about it.

Edgar Krohn, Jr. filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, alleging psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In support of his petition, Edgar sought to present and testify on a Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report prepared by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes concerning Ma. Paz. Ma. Paz objected, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient to bar both the testimony and the presentation of the report.

• Nature of the Action: Edgar Krohn, Jr. filed a petition for annulment of marriage against his wife, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, before the RTC of Makati, Branch 144, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-2906.
• The Psychiatric Report: In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing, resulting in a Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report prepared by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Edgar Krohn, Jr. secured a copy in 1975.
• Prior Ecclesiastical Proceedings: Edgar previously used the report to obtain a decree of nullity of his church marriage from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in 1978, which was confirmed in 1979.
• RTC Proceedings: During the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar attempted to testify on the contents of the psychiatric report. Ma. Paz's counsel objected on the ground of privileged communication between physician and patient.
• Petitioner's Position: Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation asserting a "continuing objection" and a "Statement for the Record" verifying her Answer's denial of psychological incapacity. She argued that allowing a third party (her husband) to testify would circumvent the privilege.
• Respondent's Position: Edgar contended the privilege applies only to the physician, not to him as a third party. He further argued that Ma. Paz had waived the privilege by previously consenting to its use in the ecclesiastical proceedings and by failing to specifically object to the report in her Answer on the ground of privilege.
• Lower Court Rulings: The RTC admitted the report, finding it material to the issue of psychological incapacity and that no timely objection on the ground of privilege was made. The CA dismissed the subsequent certiorari petition.

• Scope of Privilege: Petitioner argued that the rationale of the physician-patient privilege—to encourage full and confidential disclosure—should prohibit not only the physician but also any third party from testifying on privileged matters. To rule otherwise would "set a very bad and dangerous precedent" by abetting circumvention of the rule.
• Waiver: Petitioner maintained that she never waived the privilege. Her characterization of the report as "unfounded or irrelevant" in her Answer was not a waiver of the privilege objection.
• Statement for the Record: Petitioner asserted that her "Statement for the Record" was merely a verification under oath of her Answer's allegations and not an attempt to testify or amend her pleading, thus it should not have been stricken from the record.

• Literal Application of the Rule: Respondent countered that Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly disqualifies only the physician from testifying. Since he (the husband) was not the physician, the prohibition did not apply to him.
• Waiver by Conduct: Respondent argued that petitioner waived the privilege in two ways: (1) expressly, by giving unconditional consent to the report's use in the prior ecclesiastical proceedings; and (2) impliedly, by failing to object to the report's admissibility on the specific ground of privilege in her Answer, instead calling it "unfounded or irrelevant."
• Nature of the Statement: Respondent posited that the "Statement for the Record" was effectively an amendment to her Answer and was properly excluded for failure to comply with procedural rules for amendments.

• Privileged Communication: Whether the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient prohibits a third party (the patient's spouse) from testifying on the contents of a confidential psychiatric report prepared by a physician.
• Waiver of Privilege: Whether the petitioner waived the physician-patient privilege.
• Propriety of the Statement for the Record: Whether the trial court correctly ordered the "Statement for the Record" to be stricken off the record.

• Privileged Communication: The privilege was not successfully invoked. The requisites for the privilege, as laid down in Lim v. Court of Appeals, require that the person against whom the privilege is claimed be "one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics." Here, the person sought to be barred from testifying was the patient's husband, not the physician. Therefore, the prohibition did not apply. His testimony could not be considered a circumvention of the rule, as it would not carry the same force as the physician's testimony.
• Waiver of Privilege: The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the issue of waiver because the privilege was inapplicable to the third-party witness. However, the Court noted a critical procedural lapse: petitioner's counsel objected solely on the ground of privilege and failed to object on the ground that the testimony was hearsay. This failure constituted a waiver of the hearsay objection, allowing the evidence to be admitted.
• Propriety of the Statement for the Record: The issue was deemed too trivial to merit full attention. The allegations in the Statement were mere refutations of the respondent's claims, which could be properly addressed during trial through denial or disproval. The trial court's action to strike it off was not disturbed.

• Physician-Patient Privilege (Section 24(c), Rule 130, Rules of Court) — This rule creates a testimonial disqualification that prevents a physician or surgeon from testifying, without the patient's consent, on information acquired while attending to the patient in a professional capacity, which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the patient's reputation. The privilege is personal to the physician and does not extend to third parties who may have obtained the same information.

• "Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report." — This passage underscores the Court's strict, literal interpretation of the statutory privilege, limiting its scope to the enumerated professionals.
• "In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake." — This highlights the importance of raising all applicable objections at the trial level and the consequence of waiver for failure to do so.

• Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91114, September 25, 1992, 214 SCRA 273 — Cited as controlling authority that enumerates the specific requisites that must concur for the physician-patient privilege to be successfully invoked.

• Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court — The provision on disqualification by reason of privileged communication between physician and patient. The Court applied this provision strictly, holding that its plain language disqualifies only the physician, surgeon, or obstetrician from testifying.

• Justice Isagani A. Cruz
• Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
• Justice Jose C. Quiason
• Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (Ponente)