Feria vs. Court of Appeals

The loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case after conviction does not render the judgment void, invalidate the commitment, or authorize release through habeas corpus; the proper remedy is reconstitution of judicial records, which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense. A final judgment of a court with jurisdiction over the offense and the accused is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus unless void for lack of jurisdiction.

Norberto Feria y Pacquing was convicted of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 60677 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, and had been under detention since May 21, 1981. The applicable procedural framework includes Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on habeas corpus, Rule 120 on criminal judgments, and Act No. 3110 and Rule 135, Section 5(h), on reconstitution of judicial records.

Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing was convicted in Criminal Case No. 60677 for Robbery with Homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona. He had been under detention since May 21, 1981. After four years of trial, the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment ("habang buhay") in a promulgation handed down in 1985; the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon attested that the conviction was on January 11, 1985. According to the RTC Branch 9 order, petitioner admitted in open court that a decision was read to him sentencing him to life imprisonment.

On June 9, 1993, petitioner sought transfer from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City. The Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of RTC Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer could not be effected without submission of the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to inquiries by petitioner's counsel, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 2, attested that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appeared to have been lost or destroyed in the fire that occurred at the second and third floors of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.

On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, RTC Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment was illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court issued the writ and ordered the case raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC Manila, which heard the case. After hearing, Branch 9 dismissed the petition on November 15, 1994. In its order, the trial court found it clear and indubitable that petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678, and Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867; in Criminal Case No. 60677, the accused admitted in open court that a decision was read to him sentencing him to life imprisonment.

Petitioner's own Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order dated June 8, 1993 stated that he was charged with Robbery with Homicide; that after four years of trial, the court found him guilty and gave him a life sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; that after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told his counsel that the accused had the right to appeal; that whether the de oficio counsel appealed was beyond his comprehension because the last time he saw counsel was when the decision was promulgated; and that every time there was a change of Warden at the Manila City Jail, attempts were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer to the Bureau of Corrections could be effected, but all in vain. Public respondents presented a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting that petitioner was convicted of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985, and a certified true copy of the People's Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court found the fact of conviction sufficiently established by petitioner's admissions and the official records; it also noted that the same incident which gave rise to the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm, the records of which could assist in the reconstitution of the present case.

• Absence of Valid Judgment: Petitioner argued that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
• Due Process: Petitioner contended that his continued detention without a valid judgment is violative of his constitutional right to due process.
• Reconstitution Burden: Petitioner argued that the reconstitution of official records lost or destroyed should be initiated by the Government and its organs, which are in custody of such records, rather than by the prisoner whose liberty is restrained.
• Reliance on Ordonez: Petitioner invoked Ordonez vs. Director of Prisons, claiming that the ruling in Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons that reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense had been modified or abandoned, and that it is not the fault of prisoners that the records cannot now be found.

• Sole Inquiry in Habeas Corpus: The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the sole inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner.
• Conviction by Final Judgment: Public respondents maintained that they had more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner's continued incarceration, namely, his conviction by final judgment.
• No Discharge Under Rule 102: Under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
• Proper Remedy: Petitioner's remedy is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial records.
• Evidentiary Support: Public respondents presented a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of Judge Rosalio A. De Leon attesting to petitioner's conviction on January 11, 1985, and a certified true copy of the People's Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, containing a news article on the conviction.

• Legality of Continued Detention Despite Lost Records: Whether, under the peculiar circumstances where the records of conviction were lost, petitioner's continued incarceration is justified under the law.
• Court of Appeals Resolution as Basis for Incarceration: Whether the Court of Appeals' resolution affirming the denial of petitioner's petition for habeas corpus is, in contemplation of law, a judgment or substitute judgment that can be utilized as a sufficient basis for his incarceration.
• Initiative in Reconstitution: Whether the reconstitution of official records lost or destroyed should be initiated by the Government and its organs, which are in custody of such records, or by the prisoner whose liberty is restrained.

• Legality of Continued Detention Despite Lost Records: Yes. The loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case after conviction does not render the judgment void, invalidate the commitment, or authorize release via habeas corpus; the conviction was established by petitioner's judicial admissions and official records.
• Court of Appeals Resolution as Basis for Incarceration: The Court of Appeals resolution is not the legal basis for incarceration; the subsisting final judgment of conviction is. The appellate decision merely affirmed the denial of habeas corpus and allowed transfer to the Bureau of Corrections without the missing requirements, without prejudice to reconstitution.
• Initiative in Reconstitution: Reconstitution may be initiated by either petitioner or public respondents. It is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense, and may be pursued under Act No. 3110 or the court's inherent power under Rule 135, Section 5(h).

• Legality of Continued Detention Despite Lost Records: Habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and to secure examination of the cause of detention. It may be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in restraint, the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or an excessive penalty has been imposed. Petitioner anchored his claim on the first ground, asserting that continued detention without a copy of a valid judgment violated due process. The records and the hearing, however, sufficiently established the fact of conviction. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to life imprisonment. The RTC Branch 9 order dated October 17, 1994 found that petitioner admitted in open court that a decision was read to him sentencing him to life imprisonment. His Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order dated June 8, 1993 stated that he was charged with Robbery with Homicide, that after four years of trial the court found him guilty and gave him a life sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985, and that attempts to secure the Commitment Order had been in vain. These declarations were admissible against him under Section 23 of Rule 130, and his judicial admissions did not require proof under Section 4 of Rule 129 absent a showing of palpable mistake or denial. The Monthly Report dated January 1985 of Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the conviction on January 11, 1985, was an entry in official records and prima facie evidence under Section 44 of Rule 130. The People's Journal article was hearsay twice removed and had no probative value unless offered for another purpose; it was admissible only as evidence that the publication existed. Since the return showed a lawful ground for detention, the burden was on petitioner to prove illegal restraint, and the return was prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint under Section 13 of Rule 102. Section 4 of Rule 102 prohibited discharge where the person is in custody under process issued by a court or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record with jurisdiction, and expressly did not authorize discharge of a person convicted or suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. Gomez vs. Director of Prisons controlled: the mere loss or destruction of the record does not invalidate the judgment or commitment or authorize release. No showing was made that petitioner appealed his conviction, so the judgment had become final and executory. A judgment of a court with jurisdiction over the offense and the accused is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus unless void for lack of jurisdiction; petitioner raised no jurisdictional issue. Reyes vs. Director of Prisons was inapplicable because release there rested on the absence of a sentence by a tribunal duly established by competent authority during enemy occupation, not on the absence of copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. Thus, continued detention was justified.
• Court of Appeals Resolution as Basis for Incarceration: The legal basis for petitioner's incarceration was not the Court of Appeals resolution but the final judgment of conviction, which remained valid despite the loss of its records. The habeas corpus inquiry concerned whether there was legal basis to detain petitioner, and the public respondents sufficiently showed such basis. The Court of Appeals merely affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, with the modification that petitioner could be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections without submission of the Mittimus, Decision, and Information, without prejudice to reconstitution. That modification did not convert the appellate resolution into a substitute judgment of conviction; it addressed the practical difficulty of transfer while preserving the remedy of reconstitution.
• Initiative in Reconstitution: The proper remedy was reconstitution of the judgment under Act No. 3110, the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases under Section 5(h) of Rule 135. Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether pending or finished; finished cases are as important as pending ones as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. Petitioner's complaint that the Government took no initiative did not warrant release. Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons reiterated that reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense. Ordonez vs. Director of Prisons was misplaced because the grant of habeas corpus there was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations, with the government failing to show a valid conviction, pending charges, or any legitimate cause for detention. Here, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, had already been convicted. Moreover, the same incident that gave rise to the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm, whose records could assist in reconstitution. Thus, either petitioner or public respondents could initiate reconstitution.

• Habeas Corpus Is Not a Substitute for Appeal or Collateral Attack on a Valid Final Judgment — Habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and to secure examination of the cause of detention. It may be availed of where a judicial proceeding has deprived a person of a constitutional right resulting in restraint, where the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or where an excessive penalty has been imposed. It cannot, however, be used to collaterally attack a judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the offense and the accused; such a judgment is subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus only if void for lack of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner raised no jurisdictional issue, and the judgment of conviction was final and executory.
• Loss or Destruction of Records After Conviction Does Not Invalidate the Judgment or Authorize Release — The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction does not render the judgment of conviction void, invalidate the commitment, or warrant release via habeas corpus. The proper remedy is reconstitution of judicial records. The Court applied this doctrine because the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 were lost or destroyed after petitioner had been convicted, and his conviction was established by judicial admissions and official records.
• Reconstitution of Judicial Records Is a Shared Duty and Is Not Limited to Pending Cases — Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they pertain to pending or finished cases, because finished cases serve as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. Reconstitution may be initiated under Act No. 3110 or under the inherent power of courts under Rule 135, Section 5(h). It is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense. The Court thus rejected petitioner's claim that only the Government could initiate reconstitution and distinguished Ordonez vs. Director of Prisons, where records were lost before Informations were filed.
• Judicial Admissions Do Not Require Proof and May Be Contradicted Only on Narrow Grounds — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof; it may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Admissions as to relevant facts may also be given in evidence against the party who made them. Petitioner's open-court admission and his Urgent Motion statements established his conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
• Official Records Are Prima Facie Evidence; Newspaper Articles Are Hearsay Twice Removed — Entries in official records are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Newspaper articles, by contrast, are hearsay twice removed and are inadmissible and without probative value unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The Monthly Report of Judge Rosalio A. De Leon was prima facie evidence of petitioner's conviction, while the People's Journal article was admissible only to show that the publication existed.
• Burden in Habeas Corpus Where Detention Is Under Lawful Authority — The burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner. If the return sets forth process that on its face shows good ground for detention, or if the detention is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint, and the petitioner must prove that the restraint is illegal. Because public respondents showed a conviction by final judgment, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

• "The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense." — This opening passage states the core ratio decidendi: loss of records after conviction does not void the judgment or justify habeas corpus release, and reconstitution is the proper remedy shared by prosecution and defense.
• "The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner’s release." — Quoted by the Court from Gomez vs. Director of Prisons, this formulation is the controlling precedent applied to reject petitioner's habeas corpus claim.
• "When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus." — This passage defines the limited scope of habeas corpus as a collateral attack and explains why petitioner's final conviction could not be challenged in the proceeding.
• "There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated." — This passage supports the rule that reconstitution extends to finished cases and justifies the remedy despite the case having been decided.

• Gomez vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on it for the rule that the mere loss or destruction of the record of a case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment, or authorize the prisoner's release.
• Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947) — Followed. It established that reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense, which defeated petitioner's argument that only the Government should initiate reconstitution.
• Ordonez vs. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994) — Distinguished. The grant of habeas corpus there was premised on loss of records prior to the filing of Informations and the government's failure to show a valid conviction, pending charges, or any legitimate cause for detention; here, the records were lost after conviction.
• Reyes vs. Director of Prisons — Distinguished. Release in that case was ordered because it did not appear that the prisoner had been sentenced by a tribunal duly established by competent authority during the enemy occupation, not because copies of the decision and information were missing.
• Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 746, 749-750 (1948) — Cited for the grounds for habeas corpus and for the rule that a judgment, order, or decree of a court with jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus unless void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Yatco vs. Cruz, 6 SCRA 1078, 1081 (1962) and Wee Bin vs. Republic, 100 SCRA 139, 149 (1980) — Cited to support the inherent power of courts to reconstitute the records of their finished cases.
• Erlanger & Galinger vs. Exconde, 93 Phil. 894, 900 (1953) — Cited for the rule that judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to pending or finished cases.
• State Prosecutors vs. Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 113 (1995) — Cited for the rule that newspaper articles are hearsay twice removed and are inadmissible and without probative value unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

• Rule 120, Sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court — Define "judgment" in criminal cases and prescribe its form and contents. Petitioner invoked these provisions to argue that no valid judgment existed, but the Court held that the loss of the records did not invalidate the conviction or authorize release.
• Rule 102, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that the writ shall not be allowed, or the person shall not be discharged, if the person is in custody under process issued by a court or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record with jurisdiction, and expressly does not authorize discharge of a person convicted or suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. This provision barred petitioner's release.
• Rule 102, Section 13, Rules of Court — Provides that if the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return is prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. The public respondents' showing of conviction made the return prima facie valid, placing the burden on petitioner to prove illegality.
• Rule 130, Section 23, Rules of Court — Provides that the declaration of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Petitioner's admissions of his conviction were admissible under this provision.
• Rule 129, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof and may be contradicted only by showing palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Petitioner's judicial admissions were thus binding absent such a showing.
• Rule 130, Section 44, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in official records are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Monthly Report of Judge Rosalio A. De Leon was admitted under this provision.
• Rule 135, Section 5(h), Rules of Court — Recognizes the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases. This, together with Act No. 3110, supplied the proper remedy.
• Act No. 3110 — The general law governing reconstitution of judicial records. The Court identified it as one of the remedies for the lost or destroyed records of Criminal Case No. 60677.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.