Fenix vs. Court of Appeals

A judge may dismiss a criminal case outright when the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; such dismissal is a valid exercise of judicial authority under Section 6(a), Rule 112, and is not grave abuse of discretion where the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence, including counter-affidavits and exculpatory affidavits. Also, no illegal detention exists where the supposed victim consents to the confinement, because lack of consent is a fundamental element of serious illegal detention.

The petitioners, Wilson Fenix, Rez Cortez, and Angelito Santiago, were charged together with Samuel Ong with serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge concerned events at the San Carlos Seminary in June 2005, where Ong had sought sanctuary after making public an audio tape concerning the 2004 presidential elections. The legal backdrop includes the constitutional requirement that probable cause for a warrant of arrest be personally determined by the judge, as implemented by Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

In a Complaint Affidavit dated 15 June 2005, Technical Sergeant Vidal D. Doble, Jr., a member of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, charged petitioners Wilson Fenix, Rez Cortez, and Angelito Santiago, together with former National Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Samuel Ong, with serious illegal detention committed on 10-13 June 2005. Attached to the referral were affidavits of Doble's witnesses, including Marietta C. Santos, his companion during the alleged illegal detention. According to Doble, on the morning of 10 June 2005, Santiago brought him to the San Carlos Seminary, Guadalupe, Makati City, where they met Cortez and Bishop Teodoro C. Bacani, Jr. While there, Doble heard Ong over the radio making a press statement about an audio tape of a conversation between then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and a Commission on Elections commissioner regarding the alleged rigging of the 2004 presidential elections.

On the afternoon of the same day, Ong arrived at the seminary and told Doble that the latter would be presented to the media as the source of the audio tape. From there, Ong and his men allegedly transferred Doble from one room to another and closely monitored and guarded his movements. When Doble approached Santiago and said "PARE, AYOKO NA, SUKO NA KO," Santiago allegedly told him to stay put and not go out of the room. On the morning of 13 June 2005, Doble informed a group of priests who had gone to his room that he was being held against his will. The priests brought him to another room in another building away from Ong and his men. At about 2:30 in the afternoon, Doble was fetched by Bishop Socrates Villegas and turned over to the custody of ISAFP in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

In his counter-affidavit, Cortez denied the allegations. He averred that he stayed at San Carlos Seminary from noon of 10 June 2005 to the afternoon of the following day to provide moral support for Ong, and that during his stay he met Doble and Santos only once in the presence of Bishop Bacani. Ong also submitted a counter-affidavit. According to Ong, sometime in March 2005, Santiago gave him an audio tape from Santiago's friend, Doble; the tape was a product of a wiretap of calls made to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, and several of those calls had been made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Before making the tape public, Ong looked for someone who could arrange sanctuary for him and Doble. Ong was introduced to Cortez, who arranged for them to be accommodated at San Carlos Seminary on 10 June 2005.

Ong denied that armed men guarded Doble during their three-day stay. He claimed that he and Santiago were unarmed, while Doble had his .45-caliber pistol; all were free to roam around the seminary. Around noon of 13 June 2005, Ong was informed that Bishop Socrates Villegas fetched Doble upon the request of a woman claiming to be Doble's wife, as well as their two children. Ong was later brought out of the seminary by Bishop Bacani and other bishops and taken to a safehouse in the south. Santiago essentially corroborated Ong's statements. Annexed to their counter-affidavits were an Affidavit dated 23 July 2005 executed by Santos and an Affidavit dated 10 August 2005 executed by Bishop Bacani.

In her affidavit, Santos recanted all her previous affidavits supporting Doble's complaint. She said she was only made to sign the affidavits at the ISAFP office. She made clear that she and Doble had voluntarily sought sanctuary in San Carlos Seminary on 10 June 2005, and that at no point were their movements restricted or closely monitored; they were transferred from room to room only as a safety measure after an ISAFP agent had been seen around the premises. In his affidavit, Bishop Bacani narrated that he agreed to give sanctuary to Ong and his group at Bahay Pari on 10 June 2005. The group included Doble and Santos, whom he assumed was Doble's wife. At no time did the two intimate that they were being detained against their will; rather, they feared that government forces would find them. Bishop Bacani also stated that no armed guards accompanied Doble and Santos in their room during their stay at Bahay Pari.

The panel had found probable cause and did not give serious consideration to the counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago, allegedly because they failed, despite notice, to appear and affirm those counter-affidavits before the panel; it also took note of Cortez's admission that he had gone to the seminary to give moral support to Ong. The RTC found no justifiable reason why the panel did not give serious consideration to the counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago, and recognized the importance of Santos's recantation. It held that, other than Doble, Santos was the one who truly knew about the incident because she was with him the whole time. The RTC noted that recantations are generally looked upon with disfavor, but found no showing that Santos's recantation was attended by intimidation, threat, or promise of reward. It also found no reason to ignore Bishop Bacani's affidavit, regarding him as a disinterested witness with personal knowledge of the circumstances, and noted that there was no evidence or allegation regarding Fenix's involvement in the alleged detention.

• Personal Evaluation of Probable Cause: Petitioners urged the RTC to personally evaluate the panel's Resolution and all pieces of evidence, especially Bishop Bacani's affidavit, to determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
• Dismissal for Lack of Probable Cause: Petitioners maintained that the RTC properly dismissed Criminal Case No. 05-1768 for lack of probable cause, considering the counter-affidavits, Santos's recantation, and Bishop Bacani's affidavit.
• Late Filing of the OSG Petition: Petitioners moved for dismissal of the OSG's petition for certiorari before the CA for late filing, invoking Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which allows no extension except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The OSG, as petitioner before the CA, argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 05-1768; the CA agreed, ruling that the RTC delved into evaluation of evidence that should await a full-blown trial.
• Substantial Justice Despite Late Filing: The CA admitted the OSG's petition and denied the motion to dismiss for late filing, citing the interest of substantial justice and the need to correct a patent injustice committed against the People through the precipitate dismissal.
• OSG's Later Position: In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment before the Supreme Court, the OSG abandoned its previous legal theory and prayed that the petition be given due course, opining that the RTC acted within Section 6(a), Rule 112 and committed no grave abuse of discretion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 05-1768.
• Judicial Power to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause: Whether a judge may dismiss a criminal case when the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
• Evaluation of Counter-Affidavits and Exculpatory Evidence: Whether the RTC properly considered the counter-affidavits, Santos's recantation, and Bishop Bacani's affidavit in determining probable cause.
• Serious Illegal Detention: Whether probable cause existed for serious illegal detention where the alleged victim consented to the confinement and the evidence showed no unlawful restraint.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The CA erred; the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.
• Judicial Power to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause: Yes. Under Section 6(a), Rule 112, a judge may dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
• Evaluation of Counter-Affidavits and Exculpatory Evidence: Yes. The RTC properly considered the counter-affidavits, recantation, and Bishop Bacani's affidavit; the panel's disregard of them was grave abuse of discretion.
• Serious Illegal Detention: No. The elements were not established because lack of consent is fundamental and the evidence showed Doble and Santos voluntarily sought sanctuary.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The CA's finding of grave abuse was reversed. The RTC's dismissal was not an unlawful intrusion into executive functions. Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, probable cause for a warrant of arrest must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses. Section 6(a), Rule 112 implements this by allowing the RTC judge to personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence, dismiss the case if the evidence clearly fails to establish probable cause, issue a warrant if probable cause exists, or order additional evidence in case of doubt. The judge's determination has a different objective from the prosecutor's: the judge asks whether facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe an offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested, while the prosecutor determines whether facts engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the respondent probably guilty. The judge is not compelled to follow the prosecutor's certification; under People vs. Inting, the report, affidavits, transcripts, and supporting documents assist the judge. The RTC considered only evidence already passed upon by the panel, but unlike the panel, it gave weight to the counter-affidavits, recantation, and Bishop Bacani's affidavit. The panel's act of resolving the complaint primarily on Doble's evidence despite timely counter-affidavits was grave abuse; had the RTC adopted the panel's conclusion in toto, it would have been party to that grave abuse. Thus, the RTC validly exercised its power without grave abuse. The Court also deemed it unnecessary to delve into the late filing of the CA petition, although it did not approve of nonobservance of rules, because the CA's grant of due course paved the way for final resolution.

• Judicial Power to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause: The ruling rests on the constitutional and procedural authority of the judge. The power is strictly circumscribed because it appears in the Bill of Rights. When Informations are filed, judges must focus on their constitutional mandate to order detention of a person rightfully indicted or shield a person from facing a criminal charge not committed by him, not on anxiety over stepping on executive toes. Section 6(a), Rule 112 expressly allows immediate dismissal if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. The dismissal must be based on records that readily show uncontroverted and established facts that unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged, as stated in De los Santos-Dio vs. CA. The RTC met this standard.

• Evaluation of Counter-Affidavits and Exculpatory Evidence: The panel's rejection of the counter-affidavits because Ong and Santiago did not subscribe and swear to them before the panel was unjustified. Under Section 3(a) and (c), Rule 112, counter-affidavits may be subscribed and sworn before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oaths or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. The counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago, Santos's recantation, and Bishop Bacani's affidavit were all subscribed and sworn before government prosecutors. The failure of Ong and Santiago to appear before the panel did not justify exclusion of their duly submitted counter-affidavits and annexes. Section 3(e), Rule 112 provides that the investigating officer "may" set a hearing if there are facts and issues to clarify; the clarificatory hearing is optional, not indispensable. It aids the prosecutor in determining probable cause but does not accord validity to the preliminary investigation, and its absence does not render proceedings void. Under Section 3(d), the prosecutor may resolve a complaint based only on the complainant's evidence if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not submit a counter-affidavit. The panel's disregard of timely counter-affidavits was grave abuse.

• Serious Illegal Detention: The elements of serious illegal detention under Article 267 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) the individual kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injury is inflicted or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female, or a public officer. Under People vs. Soberano, holding a person for an illegal purpose necessarily implies unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, coupled with a willful intent to confine the victim. Lack of consent is a fundamental element; involuntariness of the seizure and detention is the essence of the crime. There is no illegal detention where the supposed victim consents to the confinement. Bishop Bacani's disinterested narration showed that Doble and Santos voluntarily sought sanctuary at Bahay Pari, were not seized or detained against their will, were free to leave, and feared government forces rather than petitioners or Ong. The contents of Bishop Bacani's statement were neither controverted nor denied by Doble or his witnesses; some points were corroborated by Doble himself and by Santos's recantation. The RTC correctly found no probable cause to order arrest.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for Warrant of Arrest — Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, probable cause for a warrant of arrest must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The judge's determination is distinct from the prosecutor's: the judge determines whether facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, while the prosecutor determines whether facts engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the respondent is probably guilty. The judge is not bound by the prosecutor's certification.

• Power of the RTC to Dismiss a Criminal Case for Lack of Probable Cause — Section 6(a), Rule 112 allows the RTC judge, within ten days from filing of the complaint or information, to personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence. The judge may (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if probable cause exists; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt. Dismissal is proper when the records readily show uncontroverted and established facts that unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.

• Consent Negates Illegal Detention — Serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code requires, among others, that the offender kidnaps or detains another or otherwise deprives the latter of liberty, and that the detention is illegal. The act of holding a person for an illegal purpose implies unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, coupled with a willful intent to confine the victim. Lack of consent is fundamental, and involuntariness of the seizure and detention is the essence of the crime. There is no illegal detention where the supposed victim consents to the confinement.

• Optional Clarificatory Hearing and Valid Subscription of Counter-Affidavits — Under Section 3(e), Rule 112, the investigating officer "may" set a hearing if there are facts and issues to clarify; the clarificatory hearing is optional and not indispensable to the validity of the preliminary investigation. Under Section 3(a) and (c), Rule 112, counter-affidavits may be subscribed and sworn before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oaths or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Failure of the respondent to appear at a clarificatory hearing does not justify exclusion of duly submitted counter-affidavits.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by Prosecutors in Disregarding Counter-Affidavits — A prosecutor's resolution of a complaint primarily on the complainant's evidence despite the timely submission of counter-affidavits is grave abuse of discretion. Had the RTC adopted such a resolution in toto, it would have been party to the grave abuse. This doctrine supports the RTC's independent evaluation of evidence for probable cause.

• "In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, We uphold the power of judges to dismiss a criminal case when the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest." — States the core holding of the decision and frames the Court's affirmance of the RTC's dismissal.
• "Indeed, under the above-cited provision, judges may very well (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record has clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest upon a finding of probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause." — Enumerates the three options available to a judge under Section 6(a), Rule 112.
• "Given that principle, there is no illegal detention where the supposed victim consents to the confinement." — Articulates the doctrine that consent negates illegal detention, which the Court applied to the facts.
• "The panel's act of resolving the complaint against petitioners and Ong primarily on the basis of Doble's evidence, and in spite of the timely submission of the counter-affidavits, was clearly committed with grave abuse of discretion." — Identifies the prosecutorial error that justified the RTC's independent evaluation of probable cause.

• People vs. Inting, 265 Phil. 817 (1990) — Cited for the rule that the judge is not compelled to follow the prosecutor's certification of probable cause; the report, affidavits, transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification are material in assisting the judge to make his determination.
• People vs. Soberano, 346 Phil. 449 (1997) — Cited for the elements and nature of illegal detention: holding a person for an illegal purpose implies unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, coupled with a willful intent to confine the victim; lack of consent is fundamental, and there is no illegal detention where the supposed victim consents.
• De los Santos-Dio vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 178947 & 179079, June 26, 2013, 699 SCRA 614 — Cited for the standard that a court's dismissal of a case for lack of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest must be done when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause, meaning the records readily show uncontroverted and established facts that unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
• People vs. Siongco, 637 Phil. 488 (2010) — Cited for the elements of serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
• De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 515 Phil. 702 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the conduct of a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating prosecutor, as evidenced by the word "may" in Section 3(e), Rule 112.
• Crespo vs. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Cited for the rule that once a complaint or information has been filed, the disposition of the case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, subject only to the qualification that its action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
• Mendoza vs. People, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 647 — Cited for the rule that judges have no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; that falls under the office of the DOJ Secretary.
• Allado vs. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 192 — Cited for the definition of the judge's probable cause determination: existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
• Agdeppa vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 293 — Cited for the prosecutor's determination of probable cause: existence of facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
• People vs. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, G.R. No. 162144-54, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264 — Cited for the three options of the judge under Section 6(a), Rule 112: dismiss, issue warrant, or order additional evidence.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Court relied on this to affirm the judge's personal determination of probable cause.
• Section 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Court — Requires the RTC judge, within ten days from filing of the complaint or information, to personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence; allows immediate dismissal if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; allows issuance of a warrant if probable cause exists; and allows an order for additional evidence in case of doubt.
• Section 3(a) and (c), Rule 112, Rules of Court — Provides that affidavits and counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oaths or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. The Court used this to reject the panel's exclusion of counter-affidavits not sworn before the panel.
• Section 3(e), Rule 112, Rules of Court — Provides that the investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to clarify. The Court held that the clarificatory hearing is optional and its absence does not invalidate the preliminary investigation or justify exclusion of submitted counter-affidavits.
• Section 3(d), Rule 112, Rules of Court — Allows the investigating prosecutor to resolve a complaint based only on the evidence presented by the complainant if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit a counter-affidavit within the prescribed period.
• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Court enumerated its elements and applied them to find no probable cause because the alleged victims consented and were not unlawfully restrained.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that no extension of time to file a petition shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days. Petitioners invoked this against the OSG's late filing before the CA, but the Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve because the CA's grant of due course paved the way for final resolution.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.