Felix vs. Buenaseda

A temporary appointment in the civil service, such as Medical Specialist I (Temporary) in a government hospital, does not confer security of tenure; its non-renewal upon expiration is not dismissal but expiration of term, and a civil servant who accepts the temporary appointment without reservation and delays in asserting a claim is estopped and barred by laches.

Dr. Alfredo B. Felix was a physician at the National Center for Mental Health, formerly the National Mental Hospital, while respondents Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and Isabelo Bañez, Jr. served as Director and Administrator, respectively, of the same institution; the Civil Service Commission was impleaded as respondent. The controversy arose against the backdrop of the post-EDSA government reorganization under Executive Order No. 119 and Department of Health Orders No. 347 and No. 478, which required board certification for renewal of specialist positions and set guidelines for extensions where non-renewal would disrupt hospital services. Earlier jurisprudence, including Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, had set aside certain reorganizations for failure to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements, while De Guzman vs. CSC and Cruz vs. Primicias recognized that a void abolition leaves the incumbent deemed never to have ceased holding office.

Dr. Alfredo B. Felix passed the Physician’s Licensure Examinations given by the Professional Regulation Commission in June 1979 and joined the National Center for Mental Health, then the National Mental Hospital, on May 26, 1980 as a Resident Physician with an annual salary of P15,264.00. In August 1983 he was promoted to Senior Resident Physician, a position he held until the Ministry of Health reorganized the National Center for Mental Health in January 1988 pursuant to Executive Order No. 119. Under that reorganization, he was appointed to the position of Senior Resident Physician in a temporary capacity immediately after he and other employees of the NCMH allegedly tendered their courtesy resignations to the Secretary of Health. In August 1988 he was promoted to Medical Specialist I (Temporary Status), and that position was renewed the following year.

In 1988, the Department of Health issued Department Order No. 347, which required board certification as a prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions in various medical centers, hospitals, and agencies of the department. The order required specialists in DOH hospitals and branches to be recognized as Fellows of their respective specialty societies and/or Diplomates of their specialty boards, or both, in order to upgrade the quality of specialties through rigorous theoretical and clinical examinations given by recognized specialty boards and to keep up with international standards of medical practice. Upon representation of the Chiefs of Hospitals of various government hospitals and medical centers, then Secretary of Health Alfredo Bengzon issued Department Order No. 478, which provided guidelines for extension of appointments of Medical Specialist positions where termination of a medical specialist who failed to meet the board certification requirement might result in disruption of hospital services. The guidelines stated that Department Order No. 347, Section 4, would generally apply unless the Chief of Hospital requested exemption, certified that application would disrupt delivery of service, and submitted a plan of action lasting no more than three years for eventual phase-out of non-board-certified medical specialties; that a medical specialist recommended for extension must meet minimum criteria, including DOH medical specialist certification, at least three years of service prior to December 1988, and having applied for or taken the specialty board examination; that each recommendation for extension must be individually justified; and that recommendations would be evaluated on a case-to-case basis. Petitioner was one of the hundreds of government medical specialists adversely affected by Department Order No. 347 because he was not yet accredited by the Psychiatry Specialty Board, and under Department Order No. 478 any extension of his appointment remained subject to those guidelines.

On August 20, 1991, after reviewing petitioner’s service record and performance, the Medical Credentials Committee of the National Center for Mental Health recommended non-renewal of his appointment as Medical Specialist I, and he was informed of that decision on August 22, 1991. He was nevertheless allowed to continue in the service and to receive his salary, allowances, and other benefits even after being informed of the termination of his appointment. On November 25, 1991, an emergency meeting of the Chiefs of Service was held to discuss, among other matters, petitioner’s case. At that meeting, Dr. Vismindo de Grecia, petitioner’s immediate supervisor, pointed out petitioner’s poor performance, frequent tardiness, and inflexibility as among the factors responsible for the recommendation not to renew his appointment; with one exception, the other department heads present expressed the same opinion, and the overwhelming consensus was for non-renewal. The matter was thereafter referred to the Civil Service Commission, which on February 28, 1992 ruled that petitioner’s temporary appointment as Medical Specialist I could be terminated at any time and that any renewal of such appointment was within the discretion of the appointing authority. Consequently, in a memorandum dated March 25, 1992, petitioner was advised by hospital authorities to vacate his cottage since he was no longer with the NCMH, and he filed a petition with the Merit System Protection Board complaining of alleged harassment by respondents and questioning the non-renewal of his appointment.

In a decision rendered on July 29, 1992, the Merit System Protection Board dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. It found that the renewal of a temporary appointment upon or after its expiration is largely addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority; that petitioner was a temporary employee whose appointment expired on August 22, 1991; and that his re-appointment or renewal would be determined solely by the Secretary of the Department of Health upon the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Hospital III of the NCMH. Citing Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, the Board stated that the power of appointment is essentially a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide, and that it could not substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority or direct the latter to issue an appointment in petitioner’s favor. The Board found the Department Order secured by petitioner inconsequential because it merely allowed extension of tenure for a certain period but did not mandate renewal of the expired appointment. It likewise found petitioner’s allegation of harassment baseless, reasoning that the subsistence, quarters, and laundry benefits provided to him were connected with his employment with the NCMH and that, once his employment ties were severed, he lost his right to those benefits; the hospital management could therefore take steps to prevent him from continuously enjoying them, including occupancy of the cottage, after his cessation from office. The Board concluded that the actuations of Dr. Buenaseda and Lt. Col. Balez were not shown to be tainted with any legal infirmity.

The Civil Service Commission dismissed petitioner’s appeal in its Resolution dated December 1, 1992, and denied his motion for reconsideration in CSC Resolution No. 93-677 dated February 3, 1993. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the Commission’s holding that by submitting his courtesy resignation and accepting his temporary appointment he had effectively divested himself of security of tenure, and its failure to declare that the conversion of his permanent appointment to temporary was done in bad faith in the guise of reorganization and was thus invalid as violative of his right to security of tenure. The lower administrative bodies’ factual findings that mattered to the Supreme Court were that petitioner was a temporary employee, that his appointment expired on August 22, 1991, that renewal was discretionary, and that no harassment was shown.

• Invalid Reorganization and Security of Tenure: Petitioner assailed his dismissal as Medical Specialist I of the National Center for Mental Health as illegal and violative of the constitutional provision on security of tenure because his removal was made pursuant to an invalid reorganization.
• Courtesy Resignation and Temporary Appointment: Petitioner argued that the Civil Service Commission erred in holding that by submitting his courtesy resignation and accepting his temporary appointment he had effectively divested himself of security of tenure, considering the circumstances of such courtesy resignation and acceptance of appointment.
• Bad-Faith Conversion: Petitioner maintained that the conversion of his permanent appointment to temporary was done in bad faith in the guise of reorganization and was thus invalid, being violative of his right to security of tenure.

• Validity of Temporary Appointments: Respondent contended that petitioner’s temporary appointments after the reorganization pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 were valid and did not violate his constitutional right of security of tenure.
• Estoppel or Laches: Respondent argued that petitioner was guilty of estoppel or laches, having acquiesced to such temporary appointments from 1988 to 1991.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent maintained that the Civil Service Commission did not act with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the non-renewal of petitioner’s appointment at the National Center for Mental Hospital.

• Security of Tenure: Whether the non-renewal of petitioner’s appointment as Medical Specialist I (Temporary) violated his constitutional right to security of tenure.
• Validity of Conversion and Reorganization: Whether the conversion of petitioner’s permanent appointment to temporary pursuant to the government reorganization was invalid and done in bad faith in the guise of reorganization.
• Estoppel and Laches: Whether petitioner is estopped or barred by laches from assailing the non-renewal of his appointment and claiming security of tenure.
• Nature of Residency and Temporary Specialist Positions: Whether a resident physician or Medical Specialist I temporary appointment is permanent and carries security of tenure.

• Security of Tenure: No. A temporary appointment for a definite and renewable period does not confer security of tenure; its non-renewal is not a dismissal but an expiration of the appointee’s term.
• Validity of Conversion and Reorganization: No. The validity of the reorganization was not the real issue; the pertinent issue was the non-renewal of petitioner’s temporary appointment, and the change from permanent resident physician to temporary resident physician was necessary to rectify erroneous classification.
• Estoppel and Laches: Yes. Petitioner accepted the temporary appointment without objection and failed to assert his claim for an unreasonable time, so he is estopped and barred by laches.
• Nature of Residency and Temporary Specialist Positions: No. Residency connotes training and temporary status; residents enjoy security of tenure only to the extent that they periodically make the grade.

• Security of Tenure: The appointment was for a definite and renewable period. When it was not renewed, it did not involve dismissal but expiration of petitioner’s term. A temporary appointment can be terminated at any time, and any renewal is within the discretion of the appointing authority. The Court stressed that residency and resident physician positions are never permanent; residency connotes training and temporary status. Residents enjoy security of tenure only to the extent that they periodically make the grade. Petitioner accepted the temporary appointment as Medical Specialist I in August 1988 and did not object to its temporary nature. The non-renewal therefore did not violate his security of tenure.
• Validity of Conversion and Reorganization: The Court declined to make further pronouncements on the validity of the government reorganization of the Ministry of Health pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 because it was not the real issue. The pertinent issue was the non-renewal of petitioner’s temporary appointment as Medical Specialist I. In any event, the change in designation from permanent resident physician to temporary resident physician was necessary overall to rectify a ludicrous situation whereby some government resident physicians were erroneously classified as permanent despite the inherently temporary nature of the designation. The Department of Health’s attempts to streamline positions and conform to current standards of specialty practice were a step in a positive direction. A patient consulting a government physician of specialist rank should be assured that the physician possesses the minimum knowledge and skills required to fulfill the Hippocratic maxim to do patients no harm.
• Estoppel and Laches: At the time of petitioner’s promotion to Medical Specialist I (Temporary) in August 1988, he raised no objection about the change of position or the temporary nature of the designation. He made no attempt to oppose earlier renewals of his temporary Specialist I contracts in 1989 and 1990, demonstrating acquiescence to, if not unqualified acceptance of, the promotion. Whatever objections he had against the earlier change from permanent senior resident physician to temporary senior physician were neither pursued nor mentioned at or after his designation as Medical Specialist I (Temporary). He was therefore estopped from insisting upon a right or claim he had plainly abandoned when he enthusiastically accepted the promotion. His negligence to assert his claim within a reasonable time, coupled with his failure to repudiate the promotion to a temporary position, warranted the presumption, per Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, that he either abandoned his claim or declined to assert it. Public policy and convenience demand that any claim to any position in the civil service, permanent, temporary, or otherwise, or any claim to a violation of the constitutional provision on security of tenure, be made within a reasonable period of time. Failure to assert a claim or voluntary acceptance of another position in government without reservation leads to a presumption that the civil servant has either given up the claim or settled into the new position. This is the essence of laches.
• Nature of Residency and Temporary Specialist Positions: A residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty is never permanent. Residency connotes training and temporary status; it is the step taken by a physician after post-graduate internship and licensure prior to recognition as a specialist or sub-specialist. The accredited Psychiatrist goes through a stepladder process culminating in recognition as a fellow or diplomate of the Psychiatry Specialty Board. Because acceptance and promotion requirements are stringent, competitive, and based on merit, acceptance to a first-year residency program is no guarantee of completion; attrition rates are high, some programs are pyramidal, and promotion is based on merit and performance determined by periodic evaluations and examinations. Residents enjoy security of tenure only to the extent that they periodically make the grade. Petitioner’s insistence on being reverted to the status quo prior to the reorganizations was akin to a college student asking to be sent back to high school and staying there. From Senior Resident Physician, the next logical step was promotion to Medical Specialist I, which he accepted for salary, rank, prestige, and status, carrying professional responsibilities including keeping up with minimum requirements, current knowledge, and board certification. The evaluation by his peers and superiors showed deficiencies, and he was not board-certified at the time of non-renewal.

• Security of Tenure in Temporary Appointments — A temporary appointment in the civil service is for a definite and renewable period and does not confer security of tenure. Its non-renewal upon expiration is not a dismissal but an expiration of the appointee’s term, and renewal is within the discretion of the appointing authority. The Court applied this to petitioner’s Medical Specialist I (Temporary) appointment, holding that the CSC correctly ruled that the appointment could be terminated at any time and that non-renewal did not violate security of tenure.
• Laches and Estoppel in Civil Service Claims — Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either abandoned it or declined to assert it. A civil servant who voluntarily accepts another position in government without reservation and fails to assert a claim within a reasonable time is presumed to have given up the claim or settled into the new position. The Court applied this to petitioner, who accepted the temporary Medical Specialist I position in 1988 and did not object to renewals in 1989 and 1990, barring his claim.
• Nature of Residency and Specialist Positions — A residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty is never permanent; residency connotes training and temporary status. Residents enjoy security of tenure only to the extent that they periodically make the grade. The Court used this principle to reject petitioner’s claim that he should be reverted to his prior permanent resident physician status.
• Valid Abolition of Office — A valid abolition of an office neither results in a separation or removal, and if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The Court cited this principle from De Guzman vs. CSC and Cruz vs. Primicias but found the instant case different because petitioner’s pertinent appointment was temporary and his claim was barred by estoppel and laches.

• "A residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty is never a permanent one. Residency connotes training and temporary status." — This states the foundational rule on the nature of residency positions, which the Court used to reject petitioner’s claim to permanent security of tenure.
• "He is therefore estopped from insisting upon a right or claim which he had plainly abandoned when he, from all indications, enthusiastically accepted the promotion." — This is the Court’s ratio on estoppel, applied to petitioner’s acceptance of the temporary Medical Specialist I promotion without objection.
• "This is the essence of laches which is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." — This is the canonical definition of laches relied upon by the Court in barring petitioner’s claim.
• "The validity of the government reorganization of the Ministry of Health pursuant to E.O. 119 not being the real issue in the case at bench, we decline to make any further pronouncements relating to petitioner's contentions relating to the effect on him of the reorganization except to say that in the specific case of the change in designation from permanent resident physician to temporary resident physician, a change was necessary, overall, to rectify a ludicrous situation whereby some government resident physicians were erroneously being classified as permanent resident physicians in spite of the inherently temporary nature of the designation." — This passage defines the scope of the ruling: the Court refused to rule broadly on the reorganization and instead upheld the specific change to temporary status as necessary.

• Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 (1990) — Cited as the consolidated cases in which the Court set aside reorganizations because heads of departments and agencies relied on their own concepts of unlimited discretion instead of complying with the Constitution and statutes on reorganization. The Court noted the instant petition seemed similar but reached a different conclusion because of petitioner’s temporary appointment and laches.
• De Guzman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 106692, March 11, 1994 — Cited for the principle that a valid abolition of an office neither results in separation or removal, and that if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased holding office. The Court distinguished it because petitioner’s pertinent position was temporary and his claim was barred.
• Cruz vs. Primicias (cited in Mendoza vs. Quisumbing) — Cited as the source of the principle upheld in De Guzman vs. CSC that a valid abolition of an office neither results in separation or removal, and that a void abolition leaves the incumbent deemed never to have ceased holding office.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 35 (1968) — Cited for the presumption that a party who fails to assert a claim within a reasonable time has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. The Court applied this to petitioner’s failure to repudiate his temporary promotion.
• Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989 — Cited by the Merit System Protection Board for the rule that the power of appointment is essentially a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
• Cristibal vs. Melchor, 78 SCRA 174, 183 (1977) — Cited for the definition of laches, citing Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. The Court used the definition in rejecting petitioner’s claim.

• Constitutional provision on security of tenure — Petitioner invoked it to challenge his dismissal. The Court held it does not protect a temporary appointment for a definite and renewable period; non-renewal is expiration, not dismissal.
• Executive Order No. 119 — The reorganization of the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Mental Health was undertaken pursuant to this order. The Court declined to make further pronouncements on its validity because it was not the real issue, but noted the change from permanent resident physician to temporary resident physician was necessary to rectify erroneous classification.
• Department Order No. 347, Section 4 — Required board certification as a prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions in DOH medical centers, hospitals, and agencies, and required specialists to be recognized as Fellows and/or Diplomates. The Court noted it was issued to upgrade quality and keep up with international standards.
• Department Order No. 478 — Provided guidelines for extension of appointments of Medical Specialist positions where non-renewal of a non-board-certified specialist might disrupt hospital services. It required minimum criteria, individual justification, case-to-case evaluation, and a plan for eventual phase-out. The Court noted petitioner’s extension remained subject to these guidelines.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ.