Feliciano vs. Pasicolan

The constitutional right to bail may be invoked only by a person who is under arrest, detention, or otherwise deprived of his liberty; one who remains at large and has not surrendered to the authorities is not entitled to have the court fix the amount of bail. The definition of bail as security for the release of a person in the custody of the law (Rule 110, sec. 1, Rules of Court) limits the scope of the constitutional guarantee.

On 24 October 1958, an amended information was filed in Criminal Case No. 1984 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, charging petitioner Pablo Feliciano and seventeen others with the capital offense of kidnapping with murder, and a warrant for petitioner’s arrest was issued. Upon learning of the charge and the warrant, petitioner, fearing that he might fall into the hands of irresponsible police officers and wishing to avoid disgrace and humiliation, went into hiding.

• The Criminal Charge: Pablo Feliciano was one of eighteen persons accused of kidnapping with murder in an amended information filed on 24 October 1958 before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. A warrant for his arrest was issued upon the filing of the information.

• Petitioner’s Flight: Upon learning of the information and the warrant, petitioner went into hiding. His counsel stated that petitioner feared falling into the hands of irresponsible police officers and sought to avoid the disgrace and humiliation of arrest and incarceration. Petitioner remained at large at all times relevant to the proceedings.

• Motion to Fix Bail: On 30 October 1958, petitioner’s wife, through counsel, filed a motion in the criminal case requesting that the court fix bail at P10,000 for petitioner’s release pending trial. The motion was filed while petitioner was still in hiding; he had not surrendered or been arrested.

• Opposition and Dismissal: The Provincial Fiscal opposed the motion, arguing that it was premature because petitioner had not yet been taken into custody. After hearing, respondent Judge, then presiding the court, dismissed the motion on the ground that petitioner had no right to seek admission to bail while his arrest or surrender was still pending.

• Constitutional Right to Bail: Petitioner argued that under Article III, Section 1(16) of the Constitution, “all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong,” and that the phrase “all persons” has been interpreted to cover all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet charged, citing Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756. He maintained that his right to have bail fixed did not depend on physical arrest.

• Ministerial Duty and Mandamus: Petitioner contended that, given the constitutional mandate, respondent Judge had a legal duty to rule on the merits of the motion to fix bail, and that the judge’s refusal to do so constituted a failure to perform a duty imposed by law, which may be compelled by mandamus.

• Prematurity and Lack of Right: Respondent Fiscal opposed the motion below and, in the mandamus proceeding, maintained that the right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty. Bail, as defined under Rule 110, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law. Since petitioner had not been arrested and remained at large, he was not entitled to the remedy, and the motion was correctly dismissed.

• Availability of Bail to a Person at Large: Whether a person charged with a capital offense who remains at large and has not surrendered or been arrested may invoke the constitutional right to bail and have the court fix the amount of bail for his provisional liberty.

• Mandamus to Compel Ruling on Motion for Bail: Whether mandamus lies to compel a trial judge to decide on the merits a motion to fix bail filed by an accused who has not been arrested or otherwise placed in the custody of the law.

• Availability of Bail to a Person at Large: The right to bail accrues only when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The constitutional mandate that all persons shall be bailable before conviction, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that only those who have been arrested, detained, or otherwise restrained will ever have occasion to seek its benefits. The definition of bail under Rule 110, Section 1 — “security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law” — confirms this requirement. Petitioner, having gone into hiding and remaining a free man, was not within the purview of the bail provision. The trial court therefore correctly dismissed the motion to fix bail.

• Mandamus to Compel Ruling: Because petitioner had no subsisting right to bail while at large, no correlative duty to fix bail on the merits existed on the part of respondent Judge. Mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a clear legal duty; it will not issue where the right sought to be enforced has not yet accrued. The petition was premature and devoid of merit.

• Right to Bail — Accrual upon Custody or Deprivation of Liberty — The constitutional guarantee of bail before conviction, while broad, may be invoked only by a person who is under arrest, detention, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure the release of one in custody; it would be incongruous to grant bail to a person who is free. The right does not attach, and no application for bail may be entertained, while the accused remains at large. This doctrine is anchored on the definition of bail under Rule 110, Section 1 and on the principle that only a person under actual restraint may seek the remedy. The case reiterates the rule in Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, and Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405.

• “The right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law.’ (Rule 110, section 1), and evidently the accused do not come within its purview.” — Quoting Manigbas vs. Luna, this passage distills the ratio decidendi, stressing that custody is a condition precedent for any application for bail.

• Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 — Followed and applied as controlling authority for the rule that the constitutional provision on bail, while referring to “all persons,” applies only to those who have been arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of their liberty; the right arises from the moment of arrest or restraint, not before.

• Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405 — Quoted with approval for the doctrine that a petition for mandamus to compel the fixing of bail is premature where the accused are not under custody, because the right to bail accrues only upon arrest or deprivation of liberty and bail is intended for the release of one in custody.

• Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 — Cited by petitioner but distinguished; the Court did not repudiate its holding that “all persons” includes those not yet formally charged, but clarified that the right remains contingent on actual restraint of liberty.

• Article III, Section 1(16), 1935 Constitution — Guarantees that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The provision was interpreted as being operative only upon arrest or deprivation of liberty; its invocation requires that the applicant be under custody.

• Rule 110, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law. This definition was treated as the statutory anchor for the requirement that an applicant for bail must first be under some form of restraint.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ.