Fedillo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

A pre-existing illness, such as pulmonary tuberculosis, is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act when the nature of the employment aggravated it; the claimant is relieved of proving causation because the law presumes compensability, and an x-ray or laboratory report is not indispensable to support the claim.

Solfrido Fedillo was employed by Antonio Esteban as a truck driver, and the Workmen's Compensation Commission and its Sub-Regional Office No. VI in Bacolod City administered his claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 3428, as amended. The Act provides compensation for personal injury from accident arising out of and in the course of employment, illness directly caused by employment, sickness resulting from the nature of employment, and sickness aggravated by the nature of employment. The Commission reviewed awards rendered by the Workmen's Compensation Unit.

Solfrido Fedillo was employed by Antonio Esteban as a truck driver sometime in 1972. He was not known to have been suffering from any illness at the time of employment. His job was to drive trucks used in hauling sugar cane. The nature of his work exposed him to heat, rain, dust, and other elements of nature while working in the fields. Strenuous effort was sometimes called for, especially in fixing a truck whenever it broke down. When busy with his work, particularly during the milling seasons, he could not eat his meals on time.

Sometime in January 1973, Fedillo experienced body weakness, pain in his joints, dizziness, and coughing at night. He consulted a doctor about his illness. He was subjected to an x-ray examination by Dr. Alexander Araneta and was found suffering from "PTB Moderately Advanced, Active." As a result, he was advised to stop working. Nevertheless, he continued working until October 31, 1973, when he was compelled to stop because of his illness.

Fedillo filed a claim for sickness benefits with the Social Security System, with the respondent employer certifying as to the payment of premiums. The sickness claim was based on "an illness of PTB advance (sic)." He likewise filed a notice of sickness and claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Bacolod City on December 4, 1973. The notice was transmitted to the respondent by the Office of the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Bacolod City on December 15, 1973 through registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 3543. The claim was not controverted by respondent, who did not file any answer to the claim.

The Workmen's Compensation Unit, through Referee Pacifico V. Militante, rendered a decision in favor of Fedillo. After the decision, Fedillo's counsel filed a Rejoinder and Manifestation claiming that he was entitled not only to benefits under Section 18 for nonscheduled disability but also under Section 14 on account of his loss of earnings effective October 31, 1973, when he was no longer able to work because of his illness. Private respondent filed a Motion for New Hearing, which was denied for lack of merit. The case was elevated to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which found the evidence insufficient to support the claim, reversed the decision appealed from, and dismissed the case for lack of merit.

• Section 14 Benefits: Petitioner asserted entitlement to compensation under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act for loss of earning capacity from the time he was forced to stop working due to his work-connected illness.

• Non-Compensability / Work-Connection: Respondent argued that petitioner's illness was not work-connected and therefore non-compensable because, by the very nature of pulmonary tuberculosis as a lingering illness taking years to develop, incubate, and become active, petitioner could not possibly have contracted the disease while working for respondent over a short period of only one year from 1972 to 1973.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Respondent argued that the evidence submitted by petitioner was insufficient to support his claim because no x-ray, no physical examination of petitioner, and no evaluation by the Workmen's Compensation Commission physician was made.

• Compensability of Pre-Existing Illness: Whether an illness contracted prior to employment, but which is discovered and disables the employee only during employment, is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence submitted by petitioner sufficiently substantiates the claim despite the absence of an x-ray, physical examination, or evaluation by the Workmen's Compensation Commission physician.
• Section 14 Benefits: Whether petitioner is entitled to compensation under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act for loss of earning capacity from the time he was forced to stop working due to his work-connected illness.

• Compensability of Pre-Existing Illness: Yes. A pre-existing illness is compensable when the nature of the employment aggravated it; Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act covers sickness aggravated by the nature of employment, and the legal presumption of compensability favors the claimant.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Strict rules of evidence do not apply in workmen's compensation cases; probability, not certainty, is the touchstone, and substantial evidence suffices. The physician's report, sworn statement, SSS claim, uncontroverted claim, and undisputed work stoppage substantiate the claim, and an x-ray or laboratory report is not indispensable.
• Section 14 Benefits: Yes. Petitioner suffered loss of earning capacity from October 31, 1973, when he was forced to stop working and remained under treatment, entitling him to temporary total disability benefits under Section 14.

• Compensability of Pre-Existing Illness: The Court recognized that by the very nature of tuberculosis, petitioner could not have instantly acquired the illness, citing Leonardo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, and Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission. However, the pre-existence of an illness is not a ground for disallowance of claims for compensation benefits under Vicente vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission. Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 3428, as amended, provides that injury or sickness is compensable as personal injury from accident arising out of and in the course of employment, illness directly caused by the employment, sickness which is the result of the nature of the employment, and sickness aggravated by the nature of the employment. Petitioner's case falls under the rule on aggravation: where the claimant's disabling disease was aggravated by the nature of his work, he is entitled to compensation. If employment contributes to the development of the disease even in a small degree, the claim is compensable, and the claimant is relieved of the burden of causation due to the legal presumption of compensability in his favor. The Court found that petitioner's working conditions—exposure to heat, rain, dust, strenuous effort, and irregular meals—aggravated his ailment. Medical science establishes that tuberculosis is latent and becomes active under favorable conditions such as too much physical exertion without rest, exposure to excessive heat and cold, lack of good food, and contact with persons suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. Except for contact, these conditions were present, weakening petitioner's resistance or reactivating the latent infection. Compensability could not be denied.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The evidence presented consisted of an undated consultation with Dr. Alexander Araneta showing petitioner suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis moderately advanced, active; a premium certification showing the amount of premiums paid to the Social Security System; and petitioner's affidavit dated October 31, 1973 stating the circumstances under which he contracted the disease. Respondent argued that no x-ray, physical examination, or evaluation by the Commission physician was made. In workmen's compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable, and probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the claim is based is probable. The substantial evidence rule, not the preponderance of evidence rule, governs compensability. The physician's report, taken with petitioner's sworn statement, the SSS claim, the uncontroverted claim for workmen's compensation benefits, and the undisputed fact that he had to stop working because of sickness, sufficed to substantiate the claim. The report was part of the record and there was no showing that it was false or erroneous. Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act allows the Commissioner to receive as evidence reports of attending examining physicians. It was error for the Commission not to give credence to Dr. Araneta's findings in light of the corroborative evidence. An x-ray or other laboratory report is not necessarily an indispensable prerequisite to compensation; the physician's report does not require the attachment of x-ray or laboratory findings for credibility, and their absence will not invalidate the diagnosis. From the attending physician's report, it can be logically inferred that a previous x-ray examination was made. The Court reiterated that when an illness supervenes in the course of employment, there is a presumption that it arose out of or was at least aggravated in the course of the employment, and this legal presumption can be overcome only by substantial evidence by the employer. Because respondent failed to controvert the claim, the evidence remained unrebutted under Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the unbroken line of cases from Victoria's Milling Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission to Tortal vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission.

• Section 14 Benefits: The object of the law in allowing compensation during temporary disability under Section 14 is to compensate the employee for what he might have earned during the period of treatment for his injury. Petitioner was forced to stop working on October 31, 1973 and was, from then on, under treatment. He was unable to return to work. He thus suffered loss of earning capacity from that date, entitling him to compensation under Section 14 for temporary total disability.

• Aggravation Rule in Workmen's Compensation — A pre-existing illness is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act when the nature of the employment aggravated it. It is enough that the employment contributed to the development of the disease even in a small degree. The Court applied this rule to pulmonary tuberculosis aggravated by the working conditions of a truck driver exposed to heat, rain, dust, strenuous exertion, and irregular meals.
• Legal Presumption of Compensability — When an illness supervenes in the course of employment, there is a presumption that it arose out of or was at least aggravated in the course of the employment. This legal presumption can be overcome only by substantial evidence by the employer. The Court applied the presumption because the claim was uncontroverted and respondent failed to rebut the evidence.
• Substantial Evidence and Probability in Workmen's Compensation — Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in workmen's compensation cases; probability, not certainty, is the touchstone, and the substantial evidence rule, not the preponderance of evidence rule, governs compensability. The Court applied this standard to uphold the claim based on the physician's report, sworn statement, SSS claim, and uncontroverted evidence.
• Non-Indispensability of X-ray or Laboratory Report — An x-ray or other laboratory report is not necessarily an indispensable prerequisite to compensation. A report of an attending examining physician may be received as evidence and used as proof of the fact in dispute, and the absence of x-ray or laboratory findings will not invalidate the diagnosis. The Court applied this rule in crediting Dr. Araneta's report.
• Section 14 Temporary Total Disability — Compensation during temporary disability under Section 14 is intended to compensate the employee for what he might have earned during the period of treatment for his injury. The Court applied this to petitioner's loss of earning capacity from October 31, 1973, when he was forced to stop working and remained under treatment.
• Effect of Failure to Controvert — Under Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a claim that is not controverted leaves the evidence unrebutted. The Court applied this rule because respondent did not file any answer to the claim.

• "However, the pre-existence of an illness is not a ground for disallowance of claims for compensation benefits" — This states the controlling rule that a pre-existing condition does not bar recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was central to rejecting respondent's objection that petitioner could not have contracted tuberculosis during his short employment.
• "Thus, if employment contributes to the development of the disease even in a small degree, the claim is compensable and the claimant under the Workmen's Compensation Act is relieved of showing the burden of causation due to the legal presumption of compensability in his favor" — This is the ratio decidendi on the aggravation rule and the legal presumption of compensability, which the Court applied to petitioner's pulmonary tuberculosis.
• "In workmen's compensation cases, the strict rules of evidence are not applicable" — This defines the relaxed evidentiary standard governing workmen's compensation claims and supports the Court's reliance on the physician's report and other corroborative evidence despite the absence of an x-ray or physical examination.
• "We have categorically ruled that an x-ray or some other laboratory report is not necessarily an indispensable prerequisite to compensation." — This is the canonical formulation on the sufficiency of medical evidence in workmen's compensation cases, which the Court used to reject the Commission's finding of insufficient evidence.

• Vicente vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 9 SCRA 825 — Cited for the rule that the pre-existence of an illness is not a ground for disallowance of claims for compensation benefits.
• Gragasin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 85 SCRA 222 — Cited as one of the cases holding that where the claimant's disabling disease was aggravated by the nature of his work, he is entitled to compensation under the Act.
• Valencia vs. Republic of the Philippines, 83 SCRA 713 — Cited for the rule that if employment contributes to the development of the disease even in a small degree, the claim is compensable and the claimant is relieved of the burden of causation by the legal presumption of compensability.
• Ulibas vs. Republic of the Philippines, 83 SCRA 819 — Cited with Valencia for the same legal presumption of compensability.
• San Valentin vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160 — Cited for the rule that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in workmen's compensation cases and that probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.
• Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329 — Cited with San Valentin for the non-application of strict rules of evidence.
• Galceran vs. Secretary of Labor, 115 SCRA 300 — Cited for the substantial evidence rule in determining compensability of an injury or illness.
• Vallo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 73 SCRA 623 — Cited for the rule that reports of attending examining physicians may be received as evidence under Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
• National Development Corporation vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861, 864 — Cited with Vallo for the same procedural rule on physician reports.
• Flores vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 71 SCRA 633 — Cited for the rule that an x-ray or other laboratory report is not an indispensable prerequisite to compensation.
• Mercado vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 81 SCRA 730 — Cited for the non-indispensability of x-ray or laboratory reports and for the presumption that an illness supervening in the course of employment arose out of or was aggravated by the employment, rebuttable only by substantial evidence.
• Victoria's Milling Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 108 Phil. 1208 — Cited as the start of an unbroken line of cases holding that an uncontroverted claim must stand.
• Tortal vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 124 SCRA 211 — Cited as the end of that unbroken line on uncontroverted claims.
• Leonardo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 581 — Cited for the nature of tuberculosis as a latent illness that is not instantly acquired, while pre-existence does not bar compensation.
• Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 92 SCRA 320 — Cited for the favorable conditions that activate latent tuberculosis.
• Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 547 — Cited with Villones for the same medical proposition.
• Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Perez and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 11 SCRA 797 — Cited for the principle that working conditions may aggravate an ailment.
• Lorenzo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Philippine Glass Manufacturing Co. Inc., 81 SCRA 430, 440 — Cited for the same aggravation principle.

• Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act 3428, as amended — Provides the grounds for compensation, including personal injury from accident arising out of and in the course of employment, illness directly caused by employment, sickness resulting from the nature of employment, and sickness aggravated by the nature of employment. The Court applied the aggravation ground to petitioner's pulmonary tuberculosis.
• Section 14, Workmen's Compensation Act — Governs compensation during temporary disability and is intended to compensate the employee for what he might have earned during the period of treatment. The Court applied it to petitioner's loss of earning capacity from October 31, 1973.
• Section 18, Workmen's Compensation Act — Pertains to compensation for nonscheduled disability. The Workmen's Compensation Unit awarded benefits under this section, and the Supreme Court ordered payment under Sections 14 and 18.
• Section 31, Workmen's Compensation Act — Provides for attorney's fees. The Court ordered private respondent to pay P600.00 to Atty. Pedro Requieron under this section.
• Section 45, Workmen's Compensation Act — Governs the effect of failure to controvert a claim. The Court applied it because respondent did not file any answer, leaving the evidence unrebutted.
• Section 49, Workmen's Compensation Act — Provides that the Commissioner may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute the reports of attending examining physicians. The Court applied it to uphold the credibility of Dr. Araneta's report.
• Section 55, Workmen's Compensation Act — Pertains to administrative fees. The Workmen's Compensation Unit awarded P25.00 under this section, and the Supreme Court ordered payment of P61.00 to the Ministry of Labor and Employment as administrative fee.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and De la Fuente, JJ., concurred. Teehankee (Chairman) concurred in the result. Relova, J., took no part.