Federico vs. COMELEC

A substitute candidate for one who withdrew must file the certificate of candidacy not later than the deadline prescribed by the Comelec (December 14, 2009 under Resolution No. 8678), which is distinct from and earlier than the midday-of-election-day deadline applicable only to substitution due to death or disqualification; a substitution effected after the withdrawal deadline is void, and any proclamation based thereon is null and may be annulled.

Edna Sanchez and private respondent Osmundo Maligaya were rival candidates for municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections, with Maligaya as the Liberal Party's official candidate. The 2010 elections were the first nationwide automated elections conducted under Republic Act No. 9369, which amended R.A. No. 8436 and empowered the Comelec to promulgate rules governing the automated election system, including deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy. To accommodate early ballot printing necessitated by automation, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8678, which set December 14, 2009 as the deadline for filing substitute COCs in cases of withdrawal, while allowing substitution due to death or disqualification up to midday of election day.

Edna Sanchez and Osmundo Maligaya were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Party's official mayoralty candidate. On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, Edna's husband and the gubernatorial candidate for Batangas, died. Two days later, on April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her certificate of candidacy for mayor and filed a new COC and Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance to substitute her deceased husband as gubernatorial candidate.

On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico filed his COC and CONA with the Office of the Election Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as the official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor in view of Edna's withdrawal. On May 7, 2010, the Comelec Law Department referred the relevant documents to the Comelec En Banc. On the same day, Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Federico's COC, arguing that the period to file substitute COCs had lapsed after December 14, 2009 pursuant to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. On May 8, 2010, the Comelec En Banc issued Resolution No. 8889, giving due course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty candidate, reasoning that the vacancy in the mayoralty race arose by reason of the death of Governor Sanchez, not by Edna's withdrawal.

By that time, the official ballots had already been printed. On election day, May 10, 2010, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." remained on the ballot and garnered the highest number of votes — 28,389 against Maligaya's 22,577. On May 11, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers printed a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates showing "SANCHEZ, Edna P." as the winning mayoralty candidate. This prompted Maligaya to file a Petition to Annul Proclamation of Edna Sanchez on May 20, 2010, which was later withdrawn and dismissed by agreement of the parties. A second print-out of the COCVP was then issued by the MBOC, bearing the same time and date as the first, but crediting the same 28,389 votes to Federico instead of Edna.

Upon learning of the second COCVP on May 27, 2010, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico on June 1, 2010, alleging the MBOC had issued a falsified and patently antedated second COCVP without reconvening, without notice, and without annulling the first COCVP. Federico raised the defenses that the petition was an erroneous remedy, lacked valid grounds, and was belatedly filed. The MBOC members claimed good faith, citing Comelec Resolution No. 8889. The Comelec First Division denied the petition on June 21, 2011 for having been filed out of time, but the Comelec En Banc granted Maligaya's partial motion for reconsideration on December 21, 2011, annulling Federico's proclamation on the ground that his substitution was invalid and the MBOC proceedings were illegal. Federico then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva sought to intervene, arguing that if Federico failed to qualify, Silva should succeed as mayor under Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

• Validity of Substitution: Federico maintained that he validly substituted Edna Sanchez pursuant to Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, which allows substitution not later than midday of election day regardless of the cause — death, disqualification, or withdrawal — and that he timely filed his COC on May 5, 2010, five days before the elections.
• Finality of Substitution: Federico argued that the validity of his substitution had already been decided with finality by the Comelec through Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to his COC and which he asserted was an operative fact binding on all parties.
• Validity of Resolution No. 8889: Federico asserted that Resolution No. 8889 was valid because the Comelec passed upon all matters and issues before it, and that after its issuance, it was in force and had to be complied with.
• Regularity of Proclamation: Federico argued that his proclamation was regular and done in accordance with law, as the votes cast for "SANCHEZ, Edna P." were legally considered votes for him.
• Timeliness of Petition: Federico contended that Maligaya's petition to annul his proclamation was filed out of time.
• Ineligibility of Maligaya: Federico argued that Maligaya could not validly be proclaimed as elected mayor because he was the losing candidate.

• Invalidity of Substitution: Maligaya countered that Federico's substitution was null and void because his COC and CONA were filed after December 14, 2009, the deadline prescribed under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 for substitution due to withdrawal.
• Illegality of Second COCVP: Maligaya argued that the generation of a second print-out of the COCVP bearing the same time and date with the same number of votes credited to Federico was questionable and a physical impossibility, since the CCS had already printed a COCVP with the name of Edna as the winner.
• Timeliness of Petition: Maligaya insisted that his petition had not prescribed, as the ten-day period should be reckoned from May 27, 2010, when he discovered the existence of the second COCVP, and not from May 11, 2010.
• Sole Qualified Candidate: The OSG, representing the Comelec, argued that Maligaya was the only mayoralty candidate left to be voted for given the withdrawal of Edna and Federico's invalid substitution, and thus was not a second placer but the sole and only placer, making the doctrine of the second placer inapplicable.

• Validity of Substitution: Whether Federico could validly substitute Edna Sanchez, who withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position, given that his COC was filed on May 5, 2010, after the December 14, 2009 deadline under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
• Timeliness of Annulment Petition: Whether Maligaya's Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico, filed on June 1, 2010, was filed within the prescribed ten-day period.
• Succession vs. Proclamation of Remaining Candidate: Whether Federico, if disqualified, should be succeeded by Intervenor Silva under Section 44 of the Local Government Code or replaced by Maligaya as the duly elected mayor.

• Validity of Substitution: No. Federico's substitution of Edna was invalid because Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 set December 14, 2009 as the deadline for filing substitute COCs in cases of withdrawal, a deadline distinct from the midday-of-election-day rule applicable only to death or disqualification.
• Timeliness of Annulment Petition: Yes. The petition was filed on time, the ten-day prescriptive period being properly reckoned from May 27, 2010, when Maligaya discovered the second COCVP, and not from May 11, 2010, the date of the first proclamation.
• Succession vs. Proclamation of Remaining Candidate: Maligaya, not Silva, was entitled to proclamation. Because Federico's substitution was void, Maligaya was the sole qualified candidate with the highest number of votes; there was no vacancy to trigger the succession rule under Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

• Validity of Substitution: Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code prescribes a uniform deadline of "not later than mid-day of the day of the election" for substitution regardless of cause. However, the Comelec, acting under the authority granted by R.A. No. 9369 to promulgate rules for the automated election system, issued Resolution No. 8678, which distinguished among the causes of substitution: substitution due to death or disqualification could be filed up to midday of election day, while substitution due to withdrawal had to be filed not later than December 14, 2009. The distinction was justified because withdrawal is voluntary and a candidate generally has sufficient time to withdraw before ballot printing begins, whereas death or disqualification may occur unexpectedly. When Edna withdrew her mayoralty candidacy on April 29, 2010 to substitute her deceased husband in the gubernatorial race, the deadline for substitution due to withdrawal had already lapsed. The party knew that fielding Edna as gubernatorial substitute would require her to withdraw as mayoralty candidate, yet no timely substitution was made. The sudden death of Governor Sanchez could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race. Federico's filing on May 5, 2010 was therefore beyond the prescribed deadline, rendering his substitution void. Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to Federico's COC, was itself void for contravening Resolution No. 8678; it was merely an administrative issuance based on forwarded documents, not the product of an adversarial proceeding, and Maligaya was not a party to it and thus not bound by it. A void judgment can never become final and may be assailed at any time.

• Timeliness of Annulment Petition: Maligaya became aware of the second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. The ten-day period under Section 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 8804 was properly reckoned from that date. His filing on June 1, 2010 was within the prescriptive period. The Court found Maligaya's account credible, noting that his prior filing of a petition to annul Edna's proclamation (SPC No. 10-022) demonstrated he had acted in good faith believing Edna was the proclaimed winner, and there was no reason for him to file against Edna if he had known Federico had been proclaimed. The surreptitious manner in which the second COCVP was generated supported the conclusion that Maligaya could not be penalized for belated filing. The Comelec's power to annul proclamations made in unauthorized proceedings, based on incomplete or tampered returns, or without proper notice falls within its statutory authority to supervise and control boards of canvassers.

• Succession vs. Proclamation of Remaining Candidate: Because Federico's substitution was invalid, he was never a legitimate candidate and his proclamation was void. With Edna's withdrawal and Federico's void substitution, Maligaya was the sole qualified candidate in the mayoralty race and received the highest number of votes among qualified candidates. He was therefore entitled to proclamation as duly elected mayor. Since there was no vacancy — Maligaya, not Federico, was the rightful winner — the rule on succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code could not be invoked by Intervenor Silva. The doctrine of the second placer did not apply because Maligaya was not a second placer but the only qualified candidate.

• Distinction in Deadlines for Substitution by Cause — Under Comelec Resolution No. 8678, the deadline for filing a substitute COC differs depending on the cause: substitution due to death or disqualification may be filed up to midday of election day, while substitution due to withdrawal must be filed not later than December 14, 2009. The distinction rests on the voluntary nature of withdrawal, which affords the candidate time to act before ballots are printed, versus the involuntary and unpredictable nature of death or disqualification. The Court applied this distinction to hold that Federico's substitution of Edna, who withdrew, was invalid because his COC was filed on May 5, 2010, well after the December 14, 2009 deadline.

• Void Judgment Never Becomes Final — A void judgment can never become final and executory and may be assailed at any time. The Court applied this principle to Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to Federico's COC in contravention of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. Because it was void, it could not serve as a source of any right for Federico, including the right to be voted for public office, and could be questioned notwithstanding its issuance.

• Non-Binding Effect of Administrative Issuances on Non-Parties — An administrative issuance that is not the product of an adversarial proceeding, where parties are not heard and allowed to adduce evidence, does not bind parties who had no participation therein. The Court held that Resolution No. 8889 was merely an administrative issuance based on documents forwarded to the Comelec, issued without notice to affected parties; thus, Maligaya, who was not a party to that proceeding, was not bound by it, and Federico could not invoke res judicata, which requires identity of parties.

• Null Proclamation Is No Proclamation — Where a proclamation is null and void, it is no proclamation at all, and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. The Court relied on this principle to sustain the Comelec's annulment of Federico's proclamation, which was based on an invalid substitution and an illegally generated second COCVP.

• Sole Qualified Candidate Entitled to Proclamation — When a substitution is invalid and the substitute is not a legitimate candidate, the remaining qualified candidate who receives the highest number of votes is entitled to proclamation. The Court applied this rule to proclaim Maligaya, who was the only qualified candidate after Edna's withdrawal and Federico's void substitution, rendering the doctrine of the second placer and the Local Government Code succession rule inapplicable.

• "In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law." — This passage articulates the Court's fundamental principle that statutory qualifications prevail over electoral popularity, justifying the annulment of a proclamation based on an invalid candidacy despite the votes received.

• "The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be wasted." — This passage explains the rationale for the Comelec's differentiated deadlines for substitution under Resolution No. 8678, distinguishing withdrawal from death or disqualification.

• "Indeed, a void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine that void judgments are perpetually open to attack, applied to strike down Resolution No. 8889 as void for contravening Comelec Resolution No. 8678.

• "Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation." — This passage defines the scope of the Comelec's continuing authority to annul void proclamations even after the proclaimed candidate has assumed office.

• Velasco vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590 — Cited for the principle that the law prevails over the will of the electorate when a conflict arises between material qualifications and electoral popularity.
• Ga, Jr. vs. Tubungan, G.R. No. 182185, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 739 — Cited for the doctrine that a void judgment can never become final and executory and may be assailed at any time.
• Duremdes vs. Comelec, 258-A Phil. 532 (1989) — Cited for the principle that a null proclamation is no proclamation at all and the Comelec retains the power to declare such nullity.
• Flauta, Jr. vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 504 — Cited for the Comelec's statutory power of supervision and control over boards of canvassers, including the authority to annul canvass or proclamations and invalidate unauthorized proceedings.
• Munder vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 194076, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 256 — Cited for the Comelec's constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
• Aratea vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012 — Cited in support of the proposition that the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as duly elected mayor when the substitute candidate's substitution is invalid.
• Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, October 9, 2012 — Cited alongside Aratea for the same proposition regarding proclamation of the candidate with the highest number of votes.

• Section 77, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Governs substitution of official candidates in case of death, disqualification, or withdrawal, allowing the substitute to file a COC "not later than mid-day of the day of the election." Federico invoked this provision to argue his substitution was timely, but the Court held that Comelec Resolution No. 8678 validly prescribed a different, earlier deadline for withdrawals in the context of automated elections.
• Section 13, Comelec Resolution No. 8678 — Sets differentiated deadlines for substitution: December 14, 2009 for withdrawals, and midday of election day for death or disqualification. The Court applied this provision to hold that Federico's substitution of Edna, who withdrew, was invalid because his COC was filed on May 5, 2010, after the December 14, 2009 deadline.
• Section 13, Republic Act No. 9369 — Amended R.A. No. 8436 and empowered the Comelec to set deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the automated election system. The Court relied on this provision to uphold the Comelec's authority to issue Resolution No. 8678 with its differentiated substitution deadlines.
• Section 12, Republic Act No. 9006 — Provides that in case of valid substitutions after official ballots have been printed, votes cast for substituted candidates shall be considered stray votes, and that substitute candidates should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as the substituted candidate. Cited to show legislative awareness of ballot-printing constraints in substitution cases.
• Section 6, Rule 4, Comelec Resolution No. 8804 — Prescribes a ten-day period for filing a petition to annul a proclamation, reckoned from the date of proclamation. The Court interpreted this period to run from the date Maligaya discovered the second COCVP, not from the date of the first proclamation.
• Section 44, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Governs permanent vacancies and succession in the offices of governor, vice-governor, mayor, and vice-mayor. Intervenor Silva invoked this provision to claim succession to the mayoralty, but the Court held it inapplicable because there was no vacancy — Maligaya, not Federico, was the rightful winner.

Sereno, C.J.; Carpio, J.; Velasco, Jr., J.; Leonardo-De Castro, J. (on leave); Brion, J.; Peralta, J.; Bersamin, J.; Del Castillo, J.; Abad, J.; Villarama, Jr., J.; Perez, J.; Reyes, J.; Perlas-Bernabe, J.; Leonen, J. — All concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.