Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Utex) vs. Noriel

Article 258 of the Labor Code makes a certification election mandatory once a petition is verified to be supported by the written consent of at least thirty percent (30%) of all employees in the bargaining unit; the Bureau of Labor Relations has no authority to refuse the election and instead direct renegotiation and ratification of a supplemental collective bargaining agreement.

Petitioner Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Utex) and respondent Universal Textile Mills Workers Union-ALU were contending labor organizations at Universal Textile Mills, Inc. Respondent Carmelo C. Noriel was the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor, the administrative agency then entrusted with enforcement of the Labor Code's certification-election provisions. Article 258 of the Labor Code governed the requisites for a certification election and made it mandatory for the Bureau to conduct one upon verified support of at least thirty percent (30%) of the employees in the bargaining unit. The controversy arose in the context of a struggle between an incumbent union with a collective bargaining contract and a rival union seeking to replace it.

Petitioner Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Utex) and respondent Universal Textile Mills Workers Union-ALU were rival labor organizations at Universal Textile Mills, Inc. Respondent Carmelo C. Noriel was the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor. The controversy concerned the representation of the workers in the collective bargaining unit at Universal Textile Mills, Inc., where respondent Union had an existing collective bargaining agreement with management.

Even before the sixty-day freedom period, petitioner filed a petition for certification election. In the meantime, a supplemental contract extending the existing collective bargaining agreement between management and respondent Union was entered into and presumably ratified by more than a majority of the workers in Universal Textile Mills, Inc. Respondent Noriel expressly admitted that petitioner's petition for certification election was supported by the signatures of 1,070 employees, more than 30% of the labor force in the collective bargaining unit.

Notwithstanding that admission, respondent Noriel issued the assailed decision of September 29, 1977. The decision recognized the effectivity and validity of the May 28, 1976 agreement between respondent Union and Universal Textile Mills for the first year of its duration covering 1977. It also directed respondent Union to renegotiate with management the benefits and other conditions of employment for the second and third years of the contract within three months from receipt of the resolution and to submit the renegotiated benefits to the workers for acceptance and ratification through a secret balloting to be supervised by his Office. The refusal to require the certification election was sought to be justified on pragmatic considerations.

The failure of respondent Noriel to abide by the express mandate of Article 258 of the Labor Code and the rules promulgated for its applicability, as well as the ambiguous and novel aspects of the assailed decision, prompted the petition for certiorari. The decisive factual premise for the Supreme Court was respondent Noriel's own admission that the petition had the support of 1,070 employees, more than 30% of the bargaining unit.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner assailed respondent Noriel's decision and alleged grave abuse of discretion because, despite respondent Noriel's express admission that the petition for certification election was supported by the signatures of 1,070 employees—more than 30% of the labor force in the collective bargaining unit—the decision refused to order a certification election.
• Mandatory Character of Article 258: Petitioner maintained that Article 258 of the Labor Code is categorical and mandatory, so that once the statutory requisite is satisfied, the certification election must be held.
• Unlawful Alternative Procedure: Petitioner challenged respondent Noriel's refusal to require the certification election and his adoption of an unorthodox approach—recognizing the supplemental collective bargaining agreement and directing renegotiation and ratification—as contrary to the Labor Code and the rules promulgated for its applicability.

• Pragmatic Considerations: Respondent Noriel sought to justify the refusal to require the certification election on pragmatic considerations.
• Protested Ratification and Consent: Respondent Noriel maintained that the ratification of the collective agreement was being protested and could be threshed out in an appropriate hearing before a Med-Arbiter, and that the issue on the consent requirement could best be resolved by an appreciation of FFW's evidence.

• Mandatory Certification Election: Whether Article 258 of the Labor Code mandates the conduct of a certification election once a petition is supported by at least thirty percent (30%) of the employees in the bargaining unit.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Noriel committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to order a certification election despite his express admission that the petition had the support of 1,070 employees, more than thirty percent (30%) of the bargaining unit.
• Scope of Authority of the Bureau of Labor Relations: Whether respondent Noriel exceeded his authority under Article 258 by directing respondent Union to renegotiate benefits for the second and third years of the supplemental collective bargaining agreement and submit them for ratification, instead of conducting the certification election.
• Effect on Existing Collective Bargaining Contract: Whether the existing supplemental collective bargaining contract between respondent Union and Universal Textile Mills should remain in force pending the certification election and the conclusion of a new collective bargaining agreement.

• Mandatory Certification Election: Yes. Article 258 is categorical and mandatory; once the petition is verified to have the support of at least thirty percent (30%) of the employees in the bargaining unit, the certification election must be granted.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. Certiorari lies; the refusal to order the election despite the express admission of the 30% support was grave abuse of discretion and tainted with a serious jurisdictional defect.
• Scope of Authority of the Bureau of Labor Relations: No. The Bureau's authority under Article 258 is limited to conducting the certification election and certifying the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative; it cannot direct renegotiation and ratification in lieu of the election.
• Effect on Existing Collective Bargaining Contract: Yes. The existing supplemental collective labor contract should be left undisturbed and strictly complied with until a new collective bargaining contract is concluded with the labor organization chosen after the certification election.

• Mandatory Certification Election: Article 258 provides that any petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by written consent of at least 30% of all employees in the bargaining unit; upon receipt and verification, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election to determine the representative and certify the winner as exclusive bargaining representative. The language is one of command. The Court found that respondent Noriel himself admitted that the petition was supported by 1,070 employees, more than 30% of the labor force. Because the statutory requisite was satisfied, the certification election had to be held. The Court cited its consistent rulings, including People vs. Mapa, and emphasized that the law cannot be any clearer, so the judiciary's first duty is to yield obedience to what is ordained.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The refusal to order the certification election despite the admitted 30% support was grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari lies. While an administrative agency entrusted with enforcement of a regulatory statute has discretion, such discretion is not unbounded; where the Labor Code sets limits, they must be observed. Respondent Noriel's failure to abide by the categorical requirement of Article 258 was plain and manifest, and his assailed order was bereft of support in law. To countenance it would foil the statutory scheme; the order was tainted with a serious jurisdictional defect, warranting the corrective authority of the Supreme Court.
• Scope of Authority of the Bureau of Labor Relations: Article 258's last sentence defines the Bureau's authority once a certification election is conducted: it must certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all employees in the unit. That is the extent and scope of respondent Noriel's authority. He could not go further by directing respondent Union to renegotiate benefits for the second and third years of the contract and submit them to the workers for ratification through a secret balloting supervised by his Office, especially without the certification election mandated by law. The alternative procedure had no support in law and could not be justified by pragmatic considerations.
• Effect on Existing Collective Bargaining Contract: Although the supplemental collective bargaining contract contained provisions beneficial to labor, the Court ruled that the workers should not be prejudiced by the struggle between contending unions. Until a new collective bargaining contract is concluded by the labor organization chosen after the certification election, the existing collective labor contract as supplemented should be left undisturbed and its terms strictly complied with. This followed the doctrine in Vassar Industries Employees Union vs. Estrella, where an interim collective bargaining agreement with more favorable terms was allowed to continue in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining representative was chosen and a new agreement concluded.

• Mandatory certification election under Article 258 — Once a petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization is supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all employees in the bargaining unit, upon receipt and verification, it is mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election to determine the representative and certify the winner as exclusive bargaining representative. The Court applied this because respondent Noriel admitted that the petition had 1,070 signatures, more than 30% of the bargaining unit.
• Administrative discretion bounded by statute — Administrative agency discretion is not unbounded; where a regulatory statute sets limits, the agency must observe them. The Bureau's authority under Article 258 is limited to conducting the certification election and certifying the winner; respondent Noriel exceeded that authority by ordering renegotiation and ratification instead.
• Plain meaning rule and duty to apply the law — The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law; construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The Court applied Article 258 according to its plain, imperative language, citing People vs. Mapa, Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, and Director of Lands vs. Abejas.
• Certiorari for jurisdictional defect and grave abuse of discretion — An administrative order contrary to an express statutory mandate and without support in law is tainted with a serious jurisdictional defect, warranting certiorari. The Court applied this to nullify respondent Noriel's September 29, 1977 decision.
• Interim collective bargaining agreement remains undisturbed — Pending the certification election and the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement, the existing collective bargaining contract as supplemented remains in full force and effect and must be strictly complied with, following Vassar Industries Employees Union vs. Estrella.

• "The language of Article 258 of the Labor Code is categorical and mandatory. It should follow then that once the statutory requisite is satisfied, the certification election must be held." — This states the core holding: the statutory 30% support requirement triggers a mandatory duty to hold a certification election.
• "No administrative agency can ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The language used is one of command. Once it has been verified that the petition for certification election has the support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be granted." — This defines the mandatory character of Article 258 and rejects administrative discretion to refuse the election once the requisite is verified.
• "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." — This is the Court's canonical statement of the plain meaning rule, quoted from Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico and used to justify applying Article 258 according to its express terms.
• "until the conclusion of a new collective bargaining contract entered into by it and whatever labor organization may be chosen after the certification election, the existing collective labor contract as thus supplemented should be left undisturbed." — This preserves the existing supplemental collective bargaining contract during the pendency of the certification election and until a new agreement is concluded.

• People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 — Cited for the principle of unyielding obedience to the plain and explicit phraseology of the applicable statute; the Court followed its approach in construing Article 258.
• Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, L-42115, January 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 132 — Cited as part of the line of decisions holding that the Bureau may order a certification election; the Court noted it went further by recognizing discretionary authority to order an election even when the 30% requirement is not met.
• Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504 (1913) — The leading case for the rule that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law, and that construction and interpretation come only after application is impossible or inadequate.
• Director of Lands vs. Abejas, 64 Phil. 428 (1937) — Cited to reiterate that where the law is clear, the Court cannot over-emphasize the necessity of adherence.
• Vassar Industries Employees Union vs. Estrella, L-46562, March 31, 1978 — Cited for the doctrine that an interim collective bargaining agreement continues in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining representative is chosen and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement are concluded.
• Scout Ramon V. Albano vs. Noriel, L-48347, October 3, 1978 — Cited as the latest of at least seven decisions enforcing the mandatory character of the certification election once the statutory requisite is satisfied.

• Article 258, Labor Code — Requisites for certification election. Any petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least thirty percent (30%) of all employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the unit. Applied: because respondent Noriel admitted that the petition had the support of 1,070 employees, more than 30% of the bargaining unit, the certification election was mandatory and his refusal was unlawful.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ concur.