Faypon vs. Quirino

The Court held that a candidate for elective provincial office does not lose his residence of origin merely by registering as a voter in another locality while pursuing studies, business, or professional avocations elsewhere, absent unequivocal proof of intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The residency requirement for provincial officials is satisfied by good faith residence, and prior voter registration in a different municipality or city cannot, by itself, establish disqualification on residency grounds.

Eliseo Quirino was proclaimed elected Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur in the elections held on November 13, 1951, securing 49,017 votes against petitioner Perfecto Faypon's 19,466 votes. Faypon filed a petition for quo warranto before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, alleging Quirino's ineligibility under Section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code due to failure to satisfy the one-year bona fide residency requirement in the province. The petition centered on Quirino's registration as a voter in Pasay City during 1946 and 1947, which Faypon contended legally severed Quirino's ties to his Ilocos Sur domicile. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

• Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, in June 1895. He departed for the United States in 1919 to pursue studies and returned to the Philippines in 1923. Upon his return, he taught at the University of the Philippines for four years, engaged in newspaper editing in Manila and Iloilo, served as executive secretary and general manager of the National Economic Protectionism Association (NEPA) from 1936 to December 31, 1951, and edited an official publication of the Manila Chamber of Commerce. The Court of Appeals found that respondent registered as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947, and subsequently owned and resided in a house in Quezon City. Petitioner's attempt to file an amended petition to allege an additional disqualification ground was made on the scheduled hearing date and was no longer pursued. The factual dispute narrowed to whether respondent's prolonged absence from Ilocos Sur and his Pasay City voter registration constituted abandonment of his domicile of origin, thereby rendering him ineligible for the provincial governorship he won in the 1951 elections.

• Petitioner maintained that respondent's registration as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947 legally implied he satisfied the constitutional and statutory residency requirements for that city, thereby constituting abandonment of his residence of origin in Ilocos Sur. Petitioner further argued that the statutory requirement of "bona fide residence" for provincial officers demands actual physical presence and intent distinct from municipal requirements, rendering prior precedents on municipal elections inapplicable to provincial contests. Petitioner initially raised a procedural challenge regarding the irregular constitution of the Court of Appeals division but abandoned this point before the Supreme Court.

• Respondent maintained that his prolonged absence from Ilocos Sur was solely for educational, professional, and business pursuits, which do not constitute abandonment of domicile under settled jurisprudence. Respondent contended that his Pasay City voter registration did not negate his animus revertendi to his birthplace, and that he retained his residence of origin in Ilocos Sur, thereby satisfying the one-year bona fide residency requirement for provincial office.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the alleged irregular designation of additional Justices to form a five-member Court of Appeals division violates the Court en banc resolution and warrants remand or invalidation of the appellate judgment.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the respondent's registration as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947 constitutes legal abandonment or loss of his residence of origin in Ilocos Sur, thereby disqualifying him from the office of Provincial Governor under Section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the alleged irregularity in the constitution of the Court of Appeals division does not affect its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Even assuming the designation violated the en banc seniority rotation rule, remanding the case would unnecessarily delay disposition to the detriment of public interest. The Supreme Court's plenary review of the judgment sufficiently protects petitioner's rights. Furthermore, the absence of a hearing before the newly constituted division does not void the judgment, because Rule 53, Section 1 expressly permits appellate adjudication by any justices who are members at the time of consideration, regardless of their presence at the date of submission.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the respondent did not lose his residence of origin. Determination of domicile depends on intention, inferred from acts and utterances, with the burden of proving abandonment resting preponderantly on the claimant. While a voter's registration oath implies residence in the registration locality, settled jurisprudence establishes that registration in a place other than one's domicile of origin does not automatically constitute abandonment. A citizen's absence for study, business, or profession does not sever ties to the birthplace absent positive proof of intent to abandon it. The Court rejected petitioner's distinction between municipal and provincial residency requirements, holding that "bona fide residence" applies equally to both, and prior voter registration elsewhere is insufficient to disqualify a provincial candidate. The Court distinguished Tanseco v. Arteche because the protestee therein made a judicial admission of abandoning his residence of origin, an admission wholly absent here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

• Residence of Origin / Domicile of Origin — The domicile acquired at birth remains until it is clearly abandoned and a new domicile is acquired through actual residence coupled with the intent to remain. Temporary absence for education, business, or profession does not constitute abandonment. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondent's extended stay in Manila and Quezon City for professional pursuits did not sever his domicile of origin in Ilocos Sur.
• Animus Revertendi — The intention to return to one's place of origin. The Court emphasized that the natural desire and attachment to one's birthplace must be overcome by positive, unequivocal proof of abandonment. Mere physical absence or voter registration in another locality is insufficient to rebut this presumption, as citizens often register elsewhere for practical electoral participation while retaining their intent to return home.

• "The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss." — This passage establishes the subjective test for domicile and places the evidentiary burden squarely on the party alleging disqualification, requiring more than mere physical absence or administrative registration to prove abandonment.
• "This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another." — The Court articulated the presumption of animus revertendi, clarifying that the law recognizes a natural human inclination to return to one's birthplace, which cannot be displaced without clear, affirmative evidence of intent to permanently relocate.

• Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil. 380 — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that registering as a voter in a different municipality does not cause loss of residence of origin for eligibility purposes.
• Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 — Followed for the principle that voter registration in another locality does not defeat eligibility based on residence of origin.
• Laurena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 — Relied upon to demonstrate that prior voter registration and candidacy in another municipality, without actual cancellation of origin domicile, does not constitute abandonment.
• Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 — Applied to show that working elsewhere and registering/voting in another province does not extinguish residence of origin when the intent to return remains.
• Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 — Distinguished because the protestee therein expressly admitted in a legal pleading that he had abandoned his residence of origin in favor of Manila, a judicial admission absent in the present case.
• Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 — Referenced to clarify that intent to change residence must be affirmatively established, contrasting with the present facts where no such intent was proven.

• Section 173, Republic Act No. 180 (as amended) — Governs the petition for quo warranto as the proper procedural vehicle for challenging a public officer's eligibility.
• Section 2071, Revised Administrative Code — Establishes the one-year bona fide residency requirement in the province for eligibility to the office of Provincial Governor.
• Section 2174, Revised Administrative Code — Cited by petitioner to argue a statutory distinction between municipal and provincial residency requirements; the Court rejected this interpretation as an unwarranted hair-splitting differentiation.
• Section 1, Article V, 1935 Constitution — Relates to the residency qualifications required for voter registration.
• Sections 98 and 109, Revised Election Code (R.A. No. 180) — Govern voter registration procedures and the residency oath, which petitioner argued implied automatic domicile change.
• Section 1, Rule 53, Rules of Court — Permits appellate courts to adjudicate cases based on justices who are members at the time of consideration, regardless of their presence at the date of submission, thereby validating the CA division's composition.
• Rule 46, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals judgment.