Fajardo vs. San Miguel Foods, Inc.

A motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be granted where special or compelling circumstances exist, such as the abrupt abandonment by counsel of minimum wage workers who relied in good faith on his assurances, thereby depriving them of due process. The 60-day reglementary period, while generally inextendible, is subject to recognized exceptions grounded on substantial justice and the particular equities of each case.

Petitioners Catalino E. Fajardo, George T. Prudencio, Norberto L. Gubian, Jayson R. Sanguyo, Gaudioso A. Bacsal, Jr., Ireneo L. Loyola, Danton B. Nuevo, Jr., Joey M. Calimlim, Juanito M. Sorosoro, Jr., and Jhoemar G. Fajardo were laborers who, between 2005 and 2006, were engaged by Bataan Mariveles Port Services Corporation and assigned at B-MEG Plant 1 of San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) in Mariveles, Bataan. In 2008, they were absorbed by Hua Tong Far East Inc. (Hua Tong) but continued their assignments at SMFI's plant. On June 18, 2019, SMFI informed Hua Tong that it would not renew their business relationship, resulting in the dismissal of all petitioners on December 31, 2019. Petitioners claimed SMFI was their real employer and Hua Tong was a mere labor-only contractor.

Between 2005 and 2006, petitioners were engaged by Bataan Mariveles Port Services Corporation as laborers holding various positions and assigned at B-MEG Plant 1 of San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) in Mariveles, Bataan. In 2008, they were absorbed by Hua Tong Far East Inc. (Hua Tong) but continued their assignments at SMFI's plant. On June 18, 2019, SMFI informed Hua Tong that it would no longer renew their business relationship upon expiration of their agreement at the end of the year. Consequently, on December 31, 2019, all petitioners were dismissed from employment.

On January 19, 2021, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, full back wages, and regularization against SMFI and Hua Tong before the NLRC arbitration branch, alleging that SMFI was their real employer and Hua Tong was a mere labor-only contractor. Executive Labor Arbiter Roderick Q. Almeyda dismissed the complaint on October 25, 2021, declaring SMFI and Hua Tong engaged in legitimate toll feedmilling excluded from Department Order No. 174, or in the alternative declaring Hua Tong a legitimate contractor, while ordering Hua Tong to pay separation pay and nominal damages. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC, which denied the appeal on July 21, 2022 and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the NLRC on September 30, 2022.

The NLRC resolution was received by petitioners on October 11, 2022 through their then counsel, Atty. Geneses R. Abot, giving them a 60-day period or until December 10, 2022 to perfect a petition for certiorari with the CA. On December 5, 2022, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time with the CA, praying for an additional 30 days or until January 10, 2023. They explained that Atty. Abot had not prepared any petition despite their previous arrangement and their advance payment of docket and other lawful fees. They alleged that they agreed to meet Atty. Abot at his office on November 28, 2022, but he failed to appear, prompting them to seek new counsel. On January 10, 2023, through new counsel R.R. Ranion and Partners, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari via registered mail.

The CA denied the motion for extension on January 16, 2023, reasoning that the excuse was patently insufficient because petitioners did not exert enough effort to secure new counsel and did not rush to meet the deadline. Their motion for reconsideration was denied on May 26, 2023. Salary records submitted to the Court showed that petitioners were minimum wage workers.

• Abandonment by Counsel: Petitioners maintained that their former counsel, Atty. Abot, after giving assurances regarding the preparation of their petition, suddenly abandoned them by failing to appear at a scheduled meeting on November 28, 2022 and by not preparing any draft petition despite advance payment of docket and other lawful fees.
• Compelling Circumstances: Petitioners argued that as minimum wage workers unfamiliar with the intricacies of procedural rules, their failure to immediately secure new counsel upon learning of Atty. Abot's abandonment should not be construed as lack of effort, and that this constituted a compelling circumstance warranting an extension of time.
• Deprivation of Due Process: Petitioners contended that the CA's dismissal deprived them of their right to due process and their day in court, particularly given their good-faith reliance on counsel's assurances.

• Propriety of Extension: Whether the CA erred in denying petitioners' Motion for Extension of Time to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, given the circumstances of alleged abandonment by their former counsel.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Whether the compelling circumstances of petitioners—minimum wage workers allegedly abandoned by their counsel—justify the relaxation of the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari.

• Propriety of Extension: Yes. The CA erred in denying the motion for extension, as the circumstances constituted compelling reasons justifying relaxation of the reglementary period under recognized exceptions to strict observance of procedural rules.
• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: Yes. The petitioners' status as minimum wage workers, their good-faith reliance on counsel's assurances, and the resulting deprivation of due process constituted special or compelling circumstances warranting the relaxation of the 60-day period under Rule 65.

• Propriety of Extension: While the general rule under Section 4 of Rule 65 requires that a petition for certiorari be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment or resolution assailed, and this period is generally inextendible, the rules do not prohibit all extensions without regard to the particularities of each case. Citing Labao vs. Flores, the Court enumerated recognized exceptions including most persuasive and weighty reasons, compelling circumstances, the merits of the case, a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party, lack of any showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory, and the interests of substantial justice and fair play. A motion for extension of time, while not absolutely prohibited in a petition for certiorari, must be anchored on special or compelling reasons and is left to the sound discretion of the court. The CA's reasoning that petitioners did not try hard enough to meet the deadline was found erroneous.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules: While the general rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes or negligence of counsel, exceptions exist: (1) when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. A perusal of petitioners' salary records showed they were minimum wage workers without the luxury of readily switching from one lawyer to another and unfamiliar with the intricacies of procedural rules. Their failure to immediately secure new counsel upon learning of Atty. Abot's alleged abandonment should not be construed as lack of effort. This constituted a compelling circumstance to allow them the opportunity to be heard by the CA. The Court emphasized that strict application of the rules should not frustrate justice, and that courts must strike a balance between speedy disposition of cases and the right of litigants to be heard. The Court stressed that its ruling was not a judgment on the merits of the labor claims, which remained within the CA's sound discretion.

• Exceptions to Strict Observance of the 60-Day Period for Certiorari — Under Section 4 of Rule 65, a petition for certiorari must be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution assailed. While this period is generally inextendible, recognized exceptions include: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. The Court applied exceptions (4), (6), and (11) to the facts, finding that petitioners' circumstances as minimum wage workers abandoned by counsel constituted compelling circumstances warranting relaxation.

• Exceptions to the Rule that a Client is Bound by Counsel's Negligence — The general rule that a client is bound by the mistakes or negligence of counsel admits of exceptions: (1) when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. The Court applied the first and third exceptions, finding that the alleged abandonment by counsel deprived minimum wage workers of due process and that the interests of justice required relaxation.

• "However, the rules do not prohibit any and all extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari without regard to the particularities of each case." — This passage articulates the Court's position that while the 60-day period for certiorari is generally inextendible, it is not absolute, and courts may consider extensions based on the specific circumstances of each case.

• "Indubitably, the adage that 'those who have less in life should have more in law' is not an empty platitude, especially when there is a grave possibility that the less privileged, having relied in good faith on the assurances of a lawyer, were abruptly abandoned and were deprived their right to due process." — This passage captures the equitable rationale underlying the Court's decision to relax procedural rules in favor of minimum wage workers who were allegedly abandoned by their counsel.

• "Verily, our courts and tribunals should strike a balance between public policy and necessity—that of putting an end to litigation speedily, and yet, harmonizing such necessity with the right of litigants to an opportunity to be heard." — This passage states the guiding principle for balancing the need for speedy disposition of cases against the right to due process, which the Court applied to justify the extension.

• Labao vs. Flores, 649 Phil. 213 (2010) — Controlling authority cited for the proposition that while the 60-day period for certiorari is inextendible, recognized exceptions exist. The Court reproduced the enumerated exceptions from this case as the framework for evaluating whether relaxation was warranted.
• Fluor-Daniel, Inc.-Philippines vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., 866 Phil. 626 (2019) — Cited for the general rule that a petition for certiorari must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution complained of.
• Tan vs. People, 925 Phil. 268 (2022) — Cited for the principle that the rules do not prohibit all extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari without regard to the particularities of each case.
• Conche vs. People, G.R. No. 253312, March 1, 2023 — Cited for the exceptions to the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes or negligence of counsel.
• Government Service Insurance System vs. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc., 426 Phil. 111 (2002) — Cited for the principle that if strict application of the rules would frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court may relax procedural rules to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The Court applied this provision as the general rule, but recognized exceptions based on compelling circumstances.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle through which petitioners elevated the CA resolutions to the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari.
• Canon VI, Section 2, A.M. No. 22-09-01 (Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability) — Pursuant to this provision, the Court referred the matter of Atty. Abot's alleged abandonment to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation on possible administrative liability.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on official business.