Fajardo vs. People

Illegal possession of firearms, though a malum prohibitum, requires animus possidendi or intent to possess; mere incidental possession without knowledge of or consent to the possession by another does not constitute the offense.

Petitioner Elenita Fajardo and Zaldy Valerio, her bodyguard and a former Philippine Army soldier who had gone AWOL, were charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The case arose from a police operation responding to citizen complaints about armed men indiscriminately firing guns at petitioner's residence in Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan. Both accused stipulated during pre-trial that they were not duly licensed firearm holders.

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) of the Aklan Police Provincial Office were dispatched by Provincial Director P/Supt. Edgardo Mendoza to respond to complaints from residents of Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner Elenita Fajardo were indiscriminately firing guns. Upon arrival, the responding team observed several persons scampering in different directions. They saw Zaldy Valerio, petitioner's bodyguard and a former Philippine Army soldier who had gone AWOL, holding two .45 caliber pistols and firing shots at the policemen before entering petitioner's house. Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts before entering the house and locking the main door.

To prevent a violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering the house but cordoned its perimeter, awaiting further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. Petitioner later emerged and attempted to negotiate the pull-out of police troops, but no agreement materialized. At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, SPO2 Clemencio Nava, posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge on top of the roof on two separate occasions and throw objects that landed near the wall of petitioner's house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and RMN DYKR radio announcer Jerome Vega as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two receivers of .45 caliber pistols — one model M1911A1 US with SN 763025, and another model M1911A1 US with a defaced serial number. The recovered receivers were surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel Tan, Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 from OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the RTC of Aklan.

The search warrant was served at 9:30 a.m. on August 28, 2002, with the barangay captain, a barangay kagawad, and members of the media as witnesses. The search of petitioner's house yielded two short magazines of an M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five live M16 ammunition (5.56 caliber), and fourteen live .45 caliber ammunition. Because petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing authority to possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, was filed against them. Both pleaded not guilty at arraignment on March 25, 2004. During pre-trial, they stipulated that the search warrant existed, that petitioner was the person subject thereof and a resident of the searched premises, that Valerio was in petitioner's house on the evening of August 27, 2002 but did not live there, that both were not duly licensed firearm holders, that the warrant was served on the morning of August 28, 2002, and that the accused were not arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military personnel despite the latter allegedly seeing them in possession of a firearm the prior evening.

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items, claiming they belonged to her brother Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant in the Philippine Army, and refused to sign the inventory prepared by the raiding team. She denied having a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband, arguing that this was implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse. The RTC and the CA both found that the police officers saw petitioner tucking a handgun in her waistband and Valerio holding two pistols before they entered the house, and that SPO2 Nava saw Valerio throw the receivers from the rooftop.

• Plain View Doctrine: Petitioner argued that the discovery of the two receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine because no valid intrusion was attendant.
• Lack of Possession: Petitioner argued that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers, and that there was no positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts.
• Lack of Knowledge or Consent: Petitioner argued that there was no proof that she had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.

• Plain View Doctrine: Whether the seizure of the two receivers of a .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner's house falls within the plain view doctrine and is admissible as evidence.
• Possession and Liability: Whether petitioner Elenita Fajardo may be held liable for illegal possession of part of a firearm (the two receivers) discarded by co-accused Valerio from the rooftop of her house.
• Duplicity of Offense: Whether the information charging petitioner and Valerio with duplicitous offenses under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, should result in quashal or may proceed to conviction.

• Plain View Doctrine: Yes. The receivers were seized in plain view and are admissible, the police having lawfully cordoned the house based on probable cause arising from the earlier sighting of petitioner and Valerio holding pistols, with SPO2 Nava inadvertently discovering the items thrown by Valerio from the rooftop.
• Possession and Liability: No. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she had physical or constructive possession of the receivers or animus possidendi, no witness having seen her hold the receivers before or during their disposal by Valerio.
• Duplicity of Offense: The information was duplicitous, but the failure of petitioner and Valerio to raise this issue during arraignment constituted a waiver, permitting conviction for as many offenses as charged.

• Plain View Doctrine: The Court applied the three requisites of the plain view doctrine as articulated in People vs. Doria and People vs. Go: (a) the law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The presence of SPO2 Nava and the other officers around the premises was justified by the earlier sighting of petitioner and Valerio respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before retreating into the house, engendering a reasonable ground to believe a crime was being committed and furnishing probable cause to cordon the house while awaiting daybreak to apply for a search warrant. From his position at the back of the house, SPO2 Nava inadvertently saw Valerio emerge on the rooftop on two occasions and throw suspicious objects. Given the earlier sighting of Valerio with a pistol, it was immediately apparent that the thrown objects might be contraband. The initial discovery was inadvertent even if the subsequent recovery was deliberate; the law merely requires that the officer observe that the item may be evidence of a crime, not that it be definitively identified as such at first sighting. The Court thus upheld the CA's admission of the receivers as evidence.

• Possession and Liability: Drawing on People vs. De Gracia, the Court distinguished between criminal intent and intent to possess (animus possidendi). While illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum in which good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses, the prosecution must still prove animus possidendi — the intent to possess — on the part of the accused. A temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm without animus possidendi does not constitute a violation. Applying these principles, the Court found that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the receivers. SPO2 Nava's testimony clearly showed that only Valerio was seen on the rooftop when the receivers were thrown. No witness saw petitioner holding the receivers before or during their disposal. At most, petitioner's possession was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioner's house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioner's participation, knowledge, or consent in Valerio's actions, she could not be held liable. The prosecution also failed to match the gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioner's waistband with any of the seized receivers; SPO1 Tan himself stated that Valerio was holding two guns when the police arrived, making it likely that the discarded receivers were components of Valerio's pistols rather than petitioner's. Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt, a standard that applies equally to mala in se offenses and malum prohibitum offenses. The constitutional presumption of innocence in petitioner's favor was not adequately overcome. As for Valerio, the prosecution proved both elements: the existence of the receivers (duly presented as Exhibits E and E-1 and identified by SPO2 Nava, corroborated by Vega) and the lack of license (established by SPO1 Tan's testimony and certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office).

• Duplicity of Offense: The information charged duplicitous offenses because the seized items were punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294 — the high-powered firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, and the part of a firearm (receivers) under paragraph 1. R.A. No. 8294 categorized firearms by firing power and caliber, imposing different penalties for each category, unlike the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty. An information for illegal possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified, and where numerous guns are confiscated, each must be sorted and grouped according to the categories in Section 1. Lumping all seized firearms in one information results in duplicitous charges. Ordinarily, this would merit quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to raise the issue during arraignment, constituting a waiver under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they could be convicted of as many offenses as charged.

• Plain View Doctrine — Objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. Three requisites must concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the admissibility of the two receivers discarded by Valerio, finding that the police officers lawfully cordoned the house based on probable cause, SPO2 Nava inadvertently discovered the thrown objects, and it was immediately apparent they might be contraband.

• Animus Possidendi in Illegal Possession of Firearms — While illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum in which good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses, the prosecution must still prove animus possidendi or intent to possess. Criminal intent (intent to commit a crime with the firearm) is distinct from intent to perpetrate the prohibited act (intent to possess). A temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm without animus possidendi does not constitute a violation. The Court applied this principle to acquit petitioner, whose possession of the receivers was at most incidental, as Valerio was the one in actual physical possession who discarded the receivers from the rooftop, and no evidence showed petitioner's knowledge of or consent to Valerio's actions.

• Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms — Two elements must be indubitably established: (a) the existence of the subject firearm, ammunition, or explosive, which may be proved by presentation of the item or by testimony of witnesses who saw the accused in possession; and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license or permit to possess, which may be established by testimony or certification from a PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit representative. By analogy, for illegal possession of part of a firearm: (a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and (b) the accused who possessed it does not have the license for the firearm to which the seized part corresponds.

• Duplicity of Offense and Waiver — Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except where existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Failure to raise the issue of duplicity during arraignment constitutes a waiver, and the accused may be convicted of as many offenses as are charged in the information.

• "But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses." — This passage frames the critical distinction between criminal intent and intent to possess (animus possidendi) in malum prohibitum offenses, which is central to the acquittal of petitioner.

• "Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed." — This is the canonical formulation of the animus possidendi requirement in illegal possession of firearms cases, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law." — This passage establishes that the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt applies equally to mala in se and malum prohibitum offenses.

• People vs. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994, 233 SCRA 716 — Primary authority on the animus possidendi requirement in illegal possession of firearms. The Court extensively quoted this case for the distinction between criminal intent and intent to possess, and for the rule that temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession without animus possidendi does not constitute the offense.
• People vs. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668 — Cited as controlling authority for the three requisites of the plain view doctrine.
• People vs. Go, 457 Phil. 885 (2003) — Cited for the recognized exceptions to the warrantless search and seizure rule and for the plain view doctrine.
• People vs. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 84857, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 158 — Cited for the rule that the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt applies to both mala in se and malum prohibitum offenses, and for the elements of illegal possession of firearms.
• Valeroso vs. People, G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 450 — Cited for the proposition that the testimony of a PNP representative or a certification suffices to prove the second element of illegal possession (lack of license).

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; applied as the constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule and the framework within which the plain view doctrine operates as a recognized exception.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Exclusionary rule providing that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding; the Court noted the exceptions to this rule, including seizure of evidence in plain view.
• Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294 — Penalizes unlawful possession of firearms, parts of firearms, and ammunition, with different penalties depending on the classification of the firearm by firing power and caliber. Paragraph 1 penalizes possession of low-powered firearms, parts of firearms, and ammunition with prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than P15,000.00. Paragraph 2 penalizes possession of high-powered firearms with prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of P30,000.00.
• Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except where existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Failure to raise duplicity during arraignment constitutes a waiver.
• Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court — Governs judicial admissions; applied to the accused's pre-trial stipulation that they were not duly licensed firearm holders.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.