Fabie vs. Lichauco

The burden of proof lies on the party claiming an easement under Article 541 of the Civil Code to prove that the apparent sign of the easement existed at the time the ownership of the two estates was separated by alienation. A property is presumed free from all incumbrances unless the contrary is proved, and the claimant must establish the factual basis of the easement with clear and convincing evidence.

The petitioner, Miguel Fabie y Gutierrez, owned property situated at 22 Calle San Jacinto, district of Binondo, Manila. The respondents, Julita Lichauco and the children of Francisco L. Roxas, owned adjoining properties on the right and left of the petitioner's entrance, respectively. Both properties originally belonged to Juan Bautista Santa Coloma, the common original owner, who constructed the buildings thereon. The properties were alienated in 1848, with the Lichauco property sold on October 31, 1848, and the petitioner's property sold on November 28, 1848. The dispute concerned the extent of easements that the respondents claimed over the petitioner's property, arising from the common ownership of the original proprietor.

Miguel Fabie y Gutierrez applied for the registration of his property at 22 Calle San Jacinto, Binondo, Manila, free from all incumbrances, with the exception of an easement of right of way he recognized as existing in favor of the estates of Julita Lichauco and Hijos de Roxas, which adjoined his property on the right and left of its entrance, respectively. The respondents claimed additional easements of light, view, and drainage in favor of their respective properties. Lichauco eventually reduced her opposition to the easements of right of way and of light and view.

Lichauco invoked Article 541 of the Civil Code, alleging that her property and that of the petitioner both came from Juan Bautista Santa Coloma, the original owner of both estates, who established upon the petitioner's estate not only the easement of right of way but also the easement of light and view. She claimed that when both properties were alienated in 1848, the apparent sign of the easement—a gallery with windows supported on columns erected on the petitioner's ground—was not removed, nor was it expressed in the instruments of alienation that such easement should be abolished. The Court examined the instrument of sale of the Lichauco property dated October 31, 1848, which described the house as having a frontage of 16 meters. An architect's certificate from September 13, 1869, confirmed the same measurement. However, the current plan showed the house with a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which 1 meter and 90 centimeters corresponded to the gallery in question. The Court concluded that the gallery was constructed after the 1848 alienation, as the increase in frontage corresponded almost exactly to the gallery's measurement, and no mention of the gallery appeared in any of the numerous documents describing the house, including the architect's certificate, the instrument of sale to Manuel Gonzalez Junquito, and the mortgage deed in favor of the Obras Pias.

The expert testimony offered by Lichauco did not weaken this conclusion, as the experts' estimates of the house's age did not reach back to 1848, and their testimony was inconsistent regarding the materials of the columns supporting the gallery. Furthermore, a letter from Manuel Gonzalez Junquito, who owned the house in 1889, stated that the house "was converted into a heap of ruins" and had yielded no income for three years, indicating that the house had undergone significant repairs or rebuilding that could have employed old materials giving it the appearance of greater age.

The heirs of Francisco L. Roxas claimed easements of light, view, and drainage. The Court noted that their opposition was not well-defined, as they stated at trial that they had no opposition to offer and only desired that the easement of right of way be clearly established. The Court of Land Registration assumed they claimed easements of light, view, and drainage. The parties entered into an agreement of facts stating that the Roxas house underwent alteration in early 1882 and ever since existed with "windows and views overlooking the lot of the petitioner, with balconies and eaves from which rainfall drops on the aforesaid lot." The Court interpreted this agreement strictly, finding that it did not state that the balconies were "over" the petitioner's lot, but only that the water from the projecting eaves fell on the lot. The Court held that the easement of view, being negative, could not have prescribed in favor of the respondents in the absence of any act of opposition by which they or their principals would have prohibited the petitioner from doing work that obstructed the balconies.

• Freedom of Property from Incumbrances: Petitioner maintained that his property is presumed free from all incumbrances unless the contrary is proved, and that the burden of proof lies on the respondents to establish the existence of the claimed easements.
• Non-Existence of the Gallery in 1848: Petitioner argued that the gallery constituting the alleged apparent sign of the easement of light and view did not exist at the time the ownership of the two estates was separated in 1848, as shown by the documentary evidence of the property's measurements and descriptions.
• Denial of Balconies Over the Lot: Petitioner denied that the word "balconies" in the agreement of facts was used as synonymous with projecting windows, and maintained that the balconies of the Roxas house were not "over" his lot but merely overlooked it.

• Application of Article 541: Lichauco argued that Article 541 of the Civil Code applied because her property and the petitioner's property came from the same original owner, and the apparent sign of the easement—the gallery with windows—existed at the time of the alienation of the properties in 1848.
• Positive Nature of the Easement of View: The Roxas heirs argued that the easement of view in their case was positive, not negative, because the windows had balconies projecting over the petitioner's lot, which constituted a real invasion of the petitioner's right and a positive act limiting his dominion.
• Prescription of the Easement: The Roxas heirs contended that the easement of view had prescribed in their favor, as the balconies had existed since 1882 without any opposition from the petitioner.

• Burden of Proof under Article 541: Whether Lichauco sufficiently proved that the gallery constituting the apparent sign of the easement of light and view existed at the time the ownership of the two estates was separated in 1848.
• Positive vs. Negative Easement of View: Whether the easement of view claimed by the Roxas heirs was positive or negative in nature, given the alleged projection of balconies over the petitioner's lot.
• Prescription of the Easement of View: Whether the easement of view claimed by the Roxas heirs had prescribed in their favor in the absence of any act of opposition by the petitioner or his predecessors.

• Burden of Proof under Article 541: No. Lichauco failed to prove that the gallery existed at the time of the separation of ownership in 1848. The documentary evidence showed that the house had a frontage of 16 meters in 1848 and 1869, while the current frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters included the 1 meter and 90 centimeters gallery, indicating the gallery was constructed after the alienation.
• Positive vs. Negative Easement of View: No. The agreement of facts did not state that the balconies were "over" the petitioner's lot, but only that water from the projecting eaves fell on the lot. The easement of view was therefore negative, not positive, as the erection of the balconies would constitute the lawful exercise of the respondents' right to construct within their own lot.
• Prescription of the Easement of View: No. As a negative easement, the easement of view could not have prescribed in favor of the respondents in the absence of any act of opposition by which they or their principals would have prohibited the petitioner from doing work that obstructed the balconies.

• Burden of Proof under Article 541: The Court reasoned that the instrument of sale of the Lichauco property in 1848 described the house as having a frontage of 16 meters, which was confirmed by the architect's certificate of 1869. The current plan showed a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, with 1 meter and 90 centimeters corresponding to the gallery. The Court found it evident that the frontage was increased by about 2 meters after the 1848 sale, and that the gallery constituted this increase. The Court further noted that the gallery was supported by columns erected on the petitioner's lot, meaning the house was erected partly on the owner's land and partly over the petitioner's lot, whereas in 1848 the entire building was erected over a lot belonging to the owner. The Court also observed that none of the numerous documents describing the house mentioned the gallery, despite the fact that some of them minutely described the house and mentioned the other gallery facing the street. The Court concluded that the gallery did not exist at the time of the 1848 alienation, and that Lichauco, who claimed the easement, was obliged to prove the gallery's existence at that time. The Court cited the settled doctrine that a property is assumed to be free from all incumbrance unless the contrary is proved, citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 7, 1864, and December 13, 1865.

• Positive vs. Negative Easement of View: The Court examined the agreement of facts, which stated that the Roxas house had "windows and views overlooking the lot of the petitioner, with balconies and eaves from which rainfall drops on the aforesaid lot." The Court held that the agreement did not state that the balconies were "over" the petitioner's lot or overlooking it, as claimed by the respondents. The Court reasoned that the projecting parts of a building may be constructed over the area of their own ground without invading the limits of the adjoining land. What actually fell over the petitioner's estate was the water dropping from the projecting eaves, which gave rise to the easement of drainage from the roof. The Court held that even under the respondents' theory, the easement of view would be negative and not positive, because the erection of the balconies would not constitute an invasion of the petitioner's right but the lawful exercise of the respondents' right to construct within their own lot.

• Prescription of the Easement of View: The Court applied Article 538 of the Civil Code, which provides that the time for prescription of negative easements begins to run from the day when the owner of the dominant estate, by means of a formal act, might have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could properly execute if the easement did not exist. Since the agreement of facts showed that no act of opposition was ever made by the respondents or their principals, the easement of view could not have prescribed in their favor. The Court likewise dismissed the claim for the easement of balconies (projiciendi), as it was based on the unproven supposition that the balconies were over the petitioner's lot.

• Presumption of Freedom from Incumbrances — A property is presumed to be free from all incumbrances unless the contrary is proved. The party claiming an easement bears the burden of proving its existence, and in the case of an easement arising from the common ownership of two estates under Article 541 of the Civil Code, the claimant must prove that the apparent sign of the easement existed at the time the ownership of the estates was separated by alienation.

• Positive vs. Negative Easements — A positive easement imposes on the owner of the servient estate the obligation to allow the owner of the dominant estate to do something on the former's property which the latter could not lawfully do if the easement did not exist. A negative easement prohibits the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist. The distinction determines the point from which the period of prescription begins to run.

• Prescription of Negative Easements — Under Article 538 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of negative easements begins to run, not from the date of the existence of the windows or balconies, but from the day when the owner of the dominant estate, by means of a formal act, might have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could properly execute if the easement did not exist. In the absence of such act of opposition, a negative easement cannot prescribe.

• "It is a settled doctrine of law that a property is assumed to be free from all incumbrance unless the contrary is proved." — This passage states the foundational presumption applied throughout the case, placing the burden of proof on the party claiming an easement.

• "The respondent who claims the said easement, basing her claim on the provision of article 541 of the Civil Code, is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent sign of the easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time the ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were separated, in October, 1848." — This passage articulates the specific burden imposed on a claimant under Article 541, requiring proof of the apparent sign's existence at the critical moment of separation of ownership.

• "And as said easement is negative, it cannot have prescribed in favor of the property of the respondents in the absence of any act of opposition, according to the agreement, by which they or their principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what constitutes the necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing the time required by law for the prescription of negative easements (Art. 538, Civil Code)." — This passage defines the rule for computing the prescriptive period for negative easements, emphasizing the necessity of an act of opposition as the starting point.

• Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 7, 1864, and December 13, 1865 — Cited as controlling authority for the settled doctrine that a property is presumed free from all incumbrances unless the contrary is proved, supporting the allocation of the burden of proof to the party claiming an easement.

• Article 541, Civil Code — Provides that the existence of an apparent sign of an easement between two estates established by the owner of both shall be considered, should one of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless the contrary is expressed in the instrument of alienation or the sign is removed before its execution. The Court applied this provision to require Lichauco to prove that the gallery existed at the time of the 1848 alienation.

• Article 533, Civil Code — Defines negative easements as those prohibiting the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist. The Court applied this provision to classify the easement of view claimed by the Roxas heirs as negative.

• Article 538, Civil Code — Provides that the time for prescription of negative easements begins to run from the day when the owner of the dominant estate, by means of a formal act, might have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could properly execute if the easement did not exist. The Court applied this provision to hold that the easement of view could not have prescribed in the absence of any act of opposition.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concurred.