Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. v. Cajigal

A judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure when the judge fails to personally conduct a judicial determination of probable cause under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court before arraignment, and when the judge grants a petition for bail without conducting the mandatory bail hearing, regardless of whether the prosecution objects; failure to resolve pending motions within the constitutionally mandated 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency.

Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc., through its representative Atty. Rommel V. Oliva, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Afable E. Cajigal, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, arising from the latter's handling of Criminal Case No. R-QZN-13-00488-CR, a qualified theft case against the complainant's former employee Ike R. Katipunan. The complaint charged the respondent with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, grave abuse of authority, and evident partiality. The Court of Appeals had previously found grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in granting the accused's motion for preliminary investigation in its May 30, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 132989. Respondent Judge was due for compulsory retirement on December 29, 2014, and invoked A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, which bars the filing of administrative complaints within six months before a judge's compulsory retirement.

An Information for qualified theft was filed against Ike R. Katipunan, the former Inventory Control Service Assistant of complainant Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. The case was raffled to Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Afable E. Cajigal. After the filing of the Information, respondent Judge did not set the case for arraignment or issue a warrant of arrest; instead, he granted the accused's Motion for Preliminary Investigation and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings. The Court of Appeals subsequently found grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in granting the motion for preliminary investigation in its May 30, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 132989.

When no resolution on the preliminary investigation issued despite the lapse of the 60-day period mandated under A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, complainant filed a Motion to Set Case for Arraignment. Upon comment of the accused, respondent Judge ordered the City Prosecution Office of Quezon City to conclude the on-going re-investigation, which thereafter affirmed the earlier finding of probable cause. On March 24, 2014, complainant filed a Motion for Issuance of a Hold Departure Order, which remained unresolved. The accused filed an Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, Recall of Warrant of Arrest, and Deferment of Proceedings on March 28, 2014, prompting complainant to file a Comment/Opposition and a Motion for Inhibition.

Respondent Judge arraigned the accused on June 9, 2014. However, instead of ordering the accused's commitment, and despite the offense being nonbailable, respondent Judge allowed the accused to go home. On June 13, 2014, the accused filed a Petition for Bail. During the bail hearing on June 24, 2014, respondent Judge found the filing premature and issued a warrant of arrest, but the accused was detained at the Criminal Investigation and Detention Unit of Central Police District rather than the Quezon City Jail. Respondent Judge then scheduled a bail hearing on June 30, 2014, despite a manifestation by complainant's counsel of his unavailability on that date.

During the June 30, 2014 bail hearing, respondent Judge declared the Petition for Bail submitted for resolution due to the absence of complainant's counsel, and on the same date issued an Order granting the bail petition and denying the motion for inhibition. Complainant further claimed that respondent Judge attempted to fast-track the proceedings by rescheduling the redirect examination of the prosecution's witness from February 17, 2015, as earlier agreed by the parties, to December 17, 18, and 22, 2014, in view of his impending retirement on December 29, 2014. Complainant filed the administrative complaint charging respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, grave abuse of authority, and evident partiality.

• Undue Delay in Resolving Motions: Complainant argued that respondent Judge was guilty of undue delay when he failed to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order within the 90-day period, or despite the lapse of nine months.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Preliminary Investigation: Complainant argued that respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he granted the accused's motion for preliminary investigation in violation of A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, since the accused was not a subject of a warrantless arrest or inquest proceedings.
• Grave Abuse of Authority — Release After Arraignment: Complainant argued that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of authority when he allowed the accused to go home after his arraignment for a nonbailable offense.
• Gross Ignorance and Evident Partiality — Grant of Bail: Complainant argued that respondent Judge was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and evident partiality in granting the petition for bail despite complainant's pending motion for reconsideration and/or motion to set the hearing to another date.
• Evident Partiality — Failure to Inhibit: Complainant argued that respondent Judge exhibited evident partiality when he failed to inhibit himself from further handling the case in view of his bias towards the accused.

• Performance of Judicial Functions: Respondent Judge countered that he should not be sanctioned for acts done in the performance of his functions as a judge, claiming the allegations were unfounded, malicious, and intended solely to harass and embarrass him and to cause undue delay in the release of his retirement benefits.
• Bar Under A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC: Respondent Judge invoked A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, which bars the filing of an administrative complaint within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge, noting the complaint was filed barely a week before his compulsory retirement on December 29, 2014.
• Justification for Delay on Hold Departure Order: Respondent Judge justified his failure to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order on the ground that the accused had already filed an omnibus motion, and that he set both motions for hearing to accord the prosecution and defense ample opportunity to exercise their right to due process.
• Justification for Release After Arraignment: Respondent Judge explained that there was yet no warrant issued for the arrest of the accused at the time of arraignment, and a petition for bail had been filed; hence, there was no reason to detain the accused.
• Lack of Prosecution Objection to Bail: Respondent Judge claimed that the order granting bail was not objected to by the public prosecutor during trial.
• Justification for Rescheduling: Respondent Judge claimed that he rescheduled the redirect examination to enable the prosecution to finish presenting its evidence prior to his retirement, and that the order was in line with the accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
• Lack of Personality of Complainant's Counsel: Respondent Judge posited that Atty. Oliva had no personality to file the administrative complaint because it was Atty. Elmar Malapitan who represented the complainant in the qualified theft case.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: Whether respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law and procedure in failing to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause before arraignment and in allowing the accused to go home after arraignment for a nonbailable offense.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Bail Hearing: Whether respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law in granting the petition for bail without conducting the required bail hearing.
• Gross Inefficiency — Delay in Resolving Motion: Whether respondent Judge was guilty of gross inefficiency in failing to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order within the 90-day reglementary period.
• Grave Abuse of Authority: Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of authority in his handling of the criminal case.
• Evident Partiality — Inhibition and Rescheduling: Whether respondent Judge exhibited evident partiality in denying the motion for inhibition and in rescheduling the redirect examination of the prosecution's witness.
• Preliminary Investigation Order: Whether respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law in granting the accused's motion for preliminary investigation.
• Personality to File Complaint: Whether Atty. Oliva lacked personality to file the administrative complaint.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: Yes. Respondent Judge was liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure for failing to personally conduct a judicial determination of probable cause under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, and for allowing the accused to go home after arraignment without the accused being in custody of the law.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Bail Hearing: Yes. Respondent Judge was liable for gross ignorance of the law in granting the petition for bail without conducting the mandatory bail hearing, the necessity of which is so basic that good or bad faith is immaterial.
• Gross Inefficiency — Delay in Resolving Motion: Yes. Respondent Judge was guilty of gross inefficiency for failing to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order beyond the 90-day period mandated by Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution.
• Grave Abuse of Authority: No. The charge of grave abuse of authority was not sustained; the Court found no basis for the charge as framed by the complainant.
• Evident Partiality — Inhibition and Rescheduling: No. Respondent Judge's denial of the motion for inhibition and rescheduling of the redirect examination were not indicative of bias or partiality, but were consistent with the exercise of sound discretion and the accused's right to speedy trial.
• Preliminary Investigation Order: No. While the order granting the motion for preliminary investigation may have been improper, it did not amount to gross ignorance of the law absent any showing of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice.
• Personality to File Complaint: No. There is no rule requiring one to be counsel of record in another case before filing an administrative complaint, and Atty. Oliva was in fact one of the counsels of record of the complainant in the qualified theft case.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: Upon setting a case for arraignment, the accused must have either been in the custody of the law or out on bail. The judge must conduct a personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the indictment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As held in Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda, a motion for judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence whether or not such a motion is filed. Respondent Judge should not have waited for the accused to file an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable cause. His failure to comply with this fundamental precept and his act of allowing the accused to go home after arraignment without bail constituted gross ignorance of the law and procedure. The Court cited Guillen vs. Judge Nicolas for the principle that by setting a case for arraignment, the judge must have found probable cause and should have examined the complainants and witnesses under oath through searching questions and answers preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Bail Hearing: A bail hearing is indispensable even if the prosecution does not interpose any objection or leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or denial hinges on whether the evidence of guilt is strong, and the determination of the strength of evidence is a matter of judicial discretion that resides with the judge, not the prosecutor. In order to properly exercise this discretion, the judge must first conduct a hearing. As held in Balanay vs. Judge White and Villanueva vs. Judge Buaya, granting bail without a hearing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing is required to consider the guidelines in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. The necessity of a bail hearing is so basic that respondent Judge ought to have known it, making good or bad faith immaterial. The absence of objection from the public prosecutor was of no consequence, as the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing, and judicial discretion cannot be ceded to the prosecutor.

• Gross Inefficiency — Delay in Resolving Motion: Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates that all cases and matters must be decided or resolved by lower courts within three months or ninety days from the date of submission. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise require judges to dispose of court business promptly. While respondent Judge had considerable discretion whether to issue or not to issue a hold departure order, this discretion did not relieve him of the mandatory duty to resolve the pending motion. As explained in Biggel vs. Judge Pamintuan, undue delay in the disposition of motions erodes faith and confidence in the judiciary and blemishes its stature. Respondent Judge's failure to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order constituted gross inefficiency warranting administrative sanction. This was not the first time respondent Judge was sanctioned; in Dulalia vs. Judge Cajigal, he had been admonished for undue delay in resolving motions.

• Grave Abuse of Authority: The Court found no merit in the charge of grave abuse of authority. The OCA had evaluated that respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not immediately issuing a warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending reinvestigation. The issuance of a warrant of arrest after a determination of probable cause is discretionary, not obligatory, upon the investigating judge.

• Evident Partiality — Inhibition and Rescheduling: The issue of voluntary inhibition under paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. While three of the four grounds cited in the motion for inhibition were grounds for administrative liability, these did not necessarily equate to bias or partiality. Respondent Judge's reasons appeared to be errors in judgment rather than bias. As held in Luciano vs. Hon. Mariano, to allege partiality is one thing, but to show a basis for it is quite another; the mere fact that a judge has erroneously ruled against a litigant does not create a decisive pattern of malice. The rescheduling of the redirect examination was consistent with the accused's right to a speedy trial under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as respondent Judge sought to enable the prosecution to complete its evidence before his retirement.

• Preliminary Investigation Order: While the order granting the motion for preliminary investigation may have been improper, as it was based on the accused's bare allegation of non-receipt of notice from the Office of the Prosecutor, it did not amount to gross ignorance of the law. There was no showing that respondent Judge issued the order due to fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith, or a deliberate intent to do injustice. As stressed in Office of the Court Administrator vs. Salise, unless acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice, a judge may not be held administratively liable. Moreover, complainant had already availed of a judicial remedy before the Court of Appeals, which favorably acted upon the petition.

• Personality to File Complaint: There is no rule requiring one to be counsel of record in another case before an administrative complaint can be filed or prosecuted. Furthermore, contrary to respondent Judge's assertion, Atty. Oliva was one of the counsels of record, as the records showed complainant was represented by Oliva Firme and Associates Law Firm, with Atty. Malapitan as the handling lawyer.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of official duties renders him liable. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it must be shown that the judge was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, or committed an error so egregious it amounted to bad faith. However, where the legal principle violated is so basic — such as the mandatory requirement of a bail hearing or the duty to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause — good or bad faith is immaterial, and the judge is liable regardless. The Court applied this doctrine to hold respondent Judge liable for failing to conduct a bail hearing and a judicial determination of probable cause, while absolving him for the arguably erroneous grant of a motion for preliminary investigation.

• Mandatory Bail Hearing — A bail hearing is indispensable in all petitions for bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and regardless of whether the prosecution objects or fails to adduce evidence. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion residing with the judge, not the prosecutor. The judge must conduct a hearing to properly exercise this discretion. The absence of prosecution objection is not a basis for granting bail, as the judge cannot presume the prosecutor knows what he is doing, and judicial discretion cannot be ceded to the prosecutor.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause — Under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence to determine probable cause. A motion for judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, as the judge is duty-bound to conduct this determination whether or not a motion is filed. Upon setting a case for arraignment, the accused must either be in the custody of the law or out on bail.

• Constitutional Duty of Prompt Disposition — Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates that lower courts decide or resolve all cases and matters within three months or ninety days from submission. Failure to resolve pending motions within this period constitutes gross inefficiency. A judge's discretionary power to grant or deny a motion does not excuse the mandatory duty to resolve it within the reglementary period.

• Voluntary Inhibition — Under paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, voluntary inhibition is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge and is primarily a matter of conscience. Errors in judgment, even if repeated against the same litigant, do not automatically constitute bias or partiality absent additional proof of malice. The presumption of good faith in favor of judicial actations prevails unless overcome by substantial evidence.

• "The absence of any objection from the prosecution in such cases is not a basis for the grant of bail for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the familiarity with the case. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for the gross ignorance finding on the bail issue, establishing that judicial discretion in bail matters cannot be delegated to the prosecutor.

• "To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence." — This quotation from Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda, adopted by the Court, defines the mandatory nature of the judge's duty to determine probable cause independently of any motion from the parties.

• "Indeed, it is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be [held] administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases." — This passage from Office of the Court Administrator vs. Salise states the governing standard for administrative liability of judges, distinguishing actionable gross ignorance from mere error.

• "Respondent Judge ought to know the difference between a judge's discretionary power to issue a hold departure order and his mandatory duty to resolve all kinds of motions within 90 days." — This passage captures the Court's reasoning on gross inefficiency, distinguishing between the discretionary act of granting a motion and the mandatory duty to resolve it within the reglementary period.

• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, January 30, 2018 — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that a judge is not administratively liable for erroneous acts absent fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice. Applied to absolve respondent Judge of gross ignorance for granting the motion for preliminary investigation.
• Sibulo vs. Judge Toledo-Mupas, 577 Phil. 110 (2008) — Followed for the principle that failure to recognize a basic law or rule does not automatically warrant liability for gross ignorance; what is significant is whether the actuation unreasonably defeated the purpose of the law and unfairly prejudiced the litigants.
• Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda, 640 Phil. 620 (2010) — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that a motion for judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, as the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence.
• Guillen vs. Judge Nicolas, 360 Phil. 1 (1998) — Followed for the principle that by setting a case for arraignment, the judge must have found probable cause and should have examined complainants and witnesses under oath through searching questions and answers preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest.
• Balanay vs. Judge White, 776 Phil. 1 (2016) — Cited as controlling authority for the indispensable nature of a bail hearing even when the prosecution does not object, and for the principle that judicial discretion in bail matters resides with the judge, not the prosecutor.
• Biggel vs. Judge Pamintuan, 581 Phil. 319 (2008) — Followed for the rationale behind the requirement of speedy disposition of cases and motions, and the explanation that undue delay erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
• Luciano vs. Hon. Mariano, 148 Phil. 177 (1971) — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that alleging partiality is different from showing a basis for it, and that erroneous rulings against the same litigant do not automatically establish malice.
• Dulalia vs. Judge Cajigal, 722 Phil. 690 (2013) — Cited as a prior administrative sanction against the same respondent Judge for undue delay in resolving motions, establishing a pattern of inefficiency.

• Section 15, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that all cases and matters must be decided or resolved by lower courts within three months or ninety days from the date of submission. Applied to hold respondent Judge liable for gross inefficiency in failing to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order beyond the 90-day period.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Requires that a warrant of arrest issue only upon probable cause determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses. Applied as the constitutional basis for the mandatory judicial determination of probable cause.
• Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Requires the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and supporting evidence to determine probable cause. Applied to establish respondent Judge's duty to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause before arraignment.
• Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Sets forth the guidelines for fixing the amount of bail, which the court must consider in a bail hearing whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. Applied to support the mandatory nature of bail hearings.
• Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Governs voluntary inhibition of judges, providing that a judge may disqualify himself for just or valid reasons in the exercise of sound discretion. Applied to uphold respondent Judge's denial of the motion for inhibition.
• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases. Applied to justify respondent Judge's rescheduling of the redirect examination as consistent with the accused's right to speedy trial.
• A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC — Classifies undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge and gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge, with corresponding penalties. Applied to determine the applicable penalties.
• A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC — Mandates the arraignment of the accused upon the lapse of the 60-day period for preliminary investigation. Referenced in the factual background.
• A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC — Bars the filing of an administrative complaint within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge. Invoked by respondent Judge but not addressed in the ruling.
• Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct — Mandates that a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Applied suppletorily to support the finding of gross inefficiency.
• Section 5, Canon 6, New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary — Directs judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. Applied to support the finding of gross inefficiency.

Leonardo-De Castro, J. (Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018), Jardeleza, J., and Gesmundo, J. (per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018), concurred. Tijam, J., was on official leave.