Evasco, Jr. vs. Montanez

A local government unit's specifically delegated police power under its charter to regulate billboards takes precedence over the general provisions of the National Building Code, and an ordinance enacted pursuant to such delegated power is valid when it has a lawful subject and employs a lawful method, regardless of its consistency with the National Building Code.

The City Government of Davao, through its Sangguniang Panlungsod, approved Ordinance No. 092-2000 on August 8, 2000, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Construction, Repair, Renovation, Erection, Installation and Maintenance of Outdoor Advertising Materials and For Related Purposes." The ordinance prescribed standards for the location, design, size, quality of materials, construction, and maintenance of signs and sign structures within Davao City. Its stated policy was to safeguard people's life and property, keep premises clean and orderly, ensure public decency and good taste, and preserve harmonious aesthetic relationships between structures and their surroundings. The power to regulate billboards within the city's territorial jurisdiction was delegated by Congress to the city government through Republic Act No. 4354, the Revised Charter of the City of Davao, enacted on June 19, 1965, which vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of billboards and similar structures. Respondent Alex P. Montanez operated an outdoor advertising business under the name Ad & Promo Management (APM), constructing billboards in various areas within the city.

On August 8, 2000, the City Government of Davao, through its Sangguniang Panlungsod, approved Ordinance No. 092-2000, regulating the construction, repair, renovation, erection, installation, and maintenance of outdoor advertising materials. The ordinance prescribed standards for the location, design, size, quality of materials, construction, and maintenance of signs and sign structures, and its stated policy was to safeguard life and property, maintain orderly surroundings, ensure public decency, and preserve aesthetic harmony. Among its provisions, Section 7 prohibited billboards in residential zones and required adjacent billboards to maintain a 150-meter unobstructed line of sight, with billboards along highways to be located at least 10 meters away from property lines abutting the road right-of-way. Section 8 designated bridge approach areas within 200 meters of certain bridges as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and Samal Island. Section 37 established a schedule of fees for sign permits, and Section 45 authorized the City Engineer to remove illegally displayed advertising materials at the expense of the displaying party, with a 60-day period for owners to comply.

As early as 2003, the City Engineer of Davao City began sending notices of illegal construction to various outdoor advertising businesses, including Ad & Promo Management (APM), owned by respondent Alex P. Montanez, which had constructed billboards in different areas within the city. The City Engineer reminded these entities to secure sign permits or apply for renewals as required by Ordinance No. 092-2000. In February and March 2006, the City Engineer issued orders of demolition directing erring outdoor advertising businesses, including APM, to voluntarily dismantle their billboards within three days from receipt; otherwise, the city government would summarily remove the structures without further notice. In the orders dated March 17, 2006, summary removal was scheduled for March 30, 2006.

With the impending demolition of APM's billboard structures, respondent Montanez filed a petition for injunction and declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 092-2000 and the demolition order dated March 17, 2006 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City on March 28, 2006, docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. 31,346-06. Montanez claimed the ordinance was unconstitutional for being overbroad, vague, and inconsistent with the National Building Code. The RTC granted Montanez's application for a writ of preliminary injunction on April 17, 2006, restraining the City Engineer and City Administrator from implementing the demolition order.

Meanwhile, in response to damage caused by Typhoon Milenyo in September 2006, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 160 directing the DPWH to conduct nationwide inspections and abate hazardous billboards, and AO No. 160-A specifying legal grounds and procedures for abatement. Acting DPWH Secretary Ebdane issued NBCDO Memorandum Circular No. 3 directing all local government Building Officials to cease and desist from processing, issuing, and renewing billboard permits, prompting the city government to suspend all pending applications. In September 2008, the city government issued another demolition order, this time against Prime Advertisements & Signs (Prime), prompting the Davao Billboards and Signmakers Association, Inc. (DABASA) to intervene in the pending case on behalf of its members.

The RTC rendered its Decision on January 19, 2009, declaring Sections 7, 8, and 41 void and unconstitutional for being contrary to the National Building Code, and making the injunction permanent. Both parties moved for reconsideration, and the RTC issued a Joint Order on April 1, 2009, modifying its decision to declare Sections 7, 8, and 37 void and unconstitutional, deleting Section 41, and denying respondents' motion for reconsideration. The City Engineer appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the appeal in its Decision dated June 14, 2011, declaring Sections 7, 8, and 45 null and void while reinstating Section 41. After both parties moved for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals issued its Amended Decision on October 13, 2011, additionally declaring Section 37 null and void. The City Engineer then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

• Consistency with National Building Code (Section 7): Petitioner argued that Section 7 cannot be held inconsistent with Section 1002 of the National Building Code because the latter applies to all building projections in general, while signs and billboards are specifically governed by Chapter 20 of the Code.
• Aesthetic Regulation as Valid Police Power (Section 8): Petitioner maintained that under Section 458(a)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code, the city government has the power to regulate the display of signs for the purpose of preserving the natural view and beauty of the surroundings, and that aesthetic considerations do not constitute undue interference on property rights because they merely set limitations while still allowing construction beyond the setback.
• Insufficient Basis for Nullity (Section 37): Petitioner argued that when the Court of Appeals nullified Section 37, it did not state specific legal findings and bases supporting its nullity, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
• Authority to Remove and Procedural Error (Section 45): Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals went beyond its authority in invalidating Section 45 because the parties did not raise any issue as to its validity, and that the city engineer, mandated to act as the local building official, is empowered under the Local Government Code to perform duties and functions prescribed by ordinances, including causing the removal of structures found to have violated the ordinance.

• Contradiction with National Building Code (Section 7): Respondent maintained that Section 7 contradicts the National Building Code because while the latter does not impose a minimum setback from property lines abutting the road right-of-way, the ordinance requires a 10-meter setback.
• Invalid Exercise of Police Power (Section 8): Respondent argued that Section 8's establishment of "regulated areas" for aesthetic purposes is not a valid exercise of police power.
• Excessive and Confiscatory Fees (Section 37): Respondent contended that the fees required by Section 37 are excessive, confiscatory, and oppressive.
• Undue Delegation of Derivative Power (Section 45): Respondent argued that Section 45, insofar as it empowers the building official to cause the removal of erring billboards, constitutes an undue delegation of derivative power, as the National Building Code limits the building official's authority to the determination of ruinous and dangerous buildings and structures.

• Validity of Section 7: Whether Section 7 of Ordinance No. 092-2000, which requires a 10-meter setback for billboards from property lines abutting the road right-of-way, is inconsistent with and thus invalid under the National Building Code.
• Validity of Section 8: Whether Section 8 of Ordinance No. 092-2000, which designates "regulated areas" near bridges to preserve aesthetic views, is a valid exercise of police power or an undue interference with property rights.
• Validity of Section 37: Whether Section 37 of Ordinance No. 092-2000, which establishes fees for sign permits, is null and void.
• Validity of Section 45: Whether Section 45 of Ordinance No. 092-2000, which authorizes the City Engineer to remove illegally constructed advertising materials, is valid.

• Validity of Section 7: Yes. Section 7 is valid; the city government's specifically delegated police power under its charter takes precedence over the general provisions of the National Building Code, and the ordinance may impose stricter setback requirements.
• Validity of Section 8: Yes. Section 8 is valid; aesthetic regulation is a permissible component of police power when the local government has been expressly granted authority to regulate billboards, and the regulation employs reasonable measures.
• Validity of Section 37: Yes. Section 37 is valid; the Court of Appeals failed to state specific legal findings supporting its nullity, and the fee schedule is not shown to be excessive, confiscatory, or oppressive.
• Validity of Section 45: Yes. Section 45 is valid; the city engineer is empowered to perform duties prescribed by ordinances, and the removal authority is a reasonable implementing measure. However, the demolition orders issued by the City Engineer violated Section 45 by giving only three days instead of the prescribed 60-day period.

• Validity of Section 7: The power to regulate billboards within Davao City was directly and specifically delegated by Congress to the city government through Republic Act No. 4354, the Revised Charter of the City of Davao, which vested the Sangguniang Panlungsod with legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of billboards. This direct and specific grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in the National Building Code, which is a law of general application. The city government does not need to refer to the procedures laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power. Even if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements, the city government may impose stricter limitations because its police power originates from its charter and not from the National Building Code. The consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 and the National Building Code is therefore irrelevant to the validity of the former. Section 7's 10-meter setback requirement is a valid stricter limitation imposed pursuant to the charter-granted police power.

• Validity of Section 8: The ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power because it satisfies both requisites: a lawful subject and a lawful method. As to the lawful subject, the ordinance seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures to safeguard life and property, keep surroundings clean and orderly, ensure public decency and good taste, and preserve harmonious aesthetic relationships. As to the lawful method, Section 8 designates "regulated areas" near specified bridges and imposes additional requirements such as maximum billboard height and common base lines, which are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the ordinance's purposes and are not unduly oppressive. The Court accorded high respect to the Sangguniang Panlungsod's issuance, recognizing that the local council is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents. Aesthetic considerations, when pursued through reasonable measures within a specifically delegated police power, do not constitute undue interference with property rights.

• Validity of Section 37: The Court of Appeals declared Section 37 null and void without stating specific legal findings and bases supporting its nullity, violating Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that no decision be rendered without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Respondents' contention that the fees are excessive, confiscatory, and oppressive was not substantiated by the appellate court's reasoning. The fee schedule under Section 37 ranges from ₱5.00 for posters to ₱200.00 for building lines, with graduated rates based on display surface type and area, and cannot be characterized as so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. The Court will not be quick to invalidate an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive.

• Validity of Section 45: Section 45 validly authorizes the City Engineer, upon the Building Official's recommendation, to remove advertising materials found to be illegally constructed, giving owners 60 days from receipt of notice to comply. The city engineer is mandated to act as the local building official and, under the Local Government Code, is empowered to perform duties and functions prescribed by ordinances. The removal authority is a reasonable implementing measure for the ordinance's regulatory scheme. However, the Court observed that the demolition orders issued by the City Engineer on March 17, 2006 and September 25, 2008 violated Section 45 itself, because they required erring businesses to correct defects within only three days and scheduled summary removal shortly thereafter, rather than observing the 60-day reglementary period prescribed by the ordinance. This procedural deficiency in the demolition orders does not invalidate Section 45 but rather indicates that the orders were issued in contravention of the ordinance's own terms.

• Validity of Ordinances (Two Requisites) — An ordinance's validity shall be upheld if: (1) the local government unit possesses the power to enact an ordinance covering a particular subject matter and according to the procedure prescribed by law; and (2) the ordinance does not contravene the fundamental law of the land, an act of the legislature, or public policy, and is not unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. The Court applied both requisites to Ordinance No. 092-2000, finding that the city government possessed the power through its charter and that the ordinance did not contravene any law or policy.

• Presumption of Constitutionality of Ordinances — An ordinance is presumed constitutional and valid. This presumption may only be overcome by a showing of the ordinance's clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. A bare and unilateral declaration that an ordinance is unconstitutional, without pointing to any specific constitutional provision violated, is insufficient to overcome the presumption. The Court found that respondents failed to allege the specific constitutional provision violated by Ordinance No. 092-2000.

• Specific Grant Prevails Over General Law — When Congress directly and specifically delegates police power to a local government unit through its charter, that specific grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in another law of general application. The local government may impose stricter limitations because its police power originates from the specific charter grant and not from the general law. The Court applied this principle to hold that Davao City's charter-based power to regulate billboards prevailed over the National Building Code's general provisions.

• Valid Exercise of Police Power (Lawful Subject and Lawful Method) — An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful subject, such that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method, such that its implementing measures are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The Court found that Ordinance No. 092-2000 satisfied both requisites.

• Deference to Local Legislative Discretion — The local legislative authority has wide discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Courts accord high respect to the Sanggunian's issuance because the local council is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents. Acts of local officials must be upheld when performed squarely within the statutory authority granted and in the exercise of sound discretion.

• "With the aforementioned law, Congress expressly granted the Davao City government, through the Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures within its territorial jurisdiction." — This passage identifies the specific statutory source of Davao City's power to regulate billboards, establishing the foundation for the Court's ruling that the charter grant prevails over the National Building Code.

• "This direct and specific grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in another law of general application, in this case the National Building Code. Stated differently, the city government does not need to refer to the procedures laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power." — This is the ratio decidendi on the relationship between specific charter grants and general statutes, articulating the principle that a specific delegation of police power prevails over a general law.

• "To be clear, even if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements as to the construction and regulation of billboards, the city government may impose stricter limitations because its police power to do so originates from its charter and not from the National Building Code." — This passage clarifies that local governments with charter-granted police power may impose regulations stricter than those in general legislation, a principle significant for local government law.

• "The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory." — This articulates the standard of judicial review for reasonableness challenges to ordinances, emphasizing deference to local legislative discretion.

• City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289 (2005) — Cited by the Court of Appeals as basis for declaring Ordinance No. 092-2000 inconsistent with the National Building Code; the Supreme Court disagreed with this application and distinguished the case, holding that the specific charter grant to Davao City controlled over the general provisions of the National Building Code.
• People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443 (1958) — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that a local government cannot rely solely on aesthetics in justifying its exercise of police power; the Supreme Court implicitly rejected this limitation in the context of Davao City's charter-granted power.
• Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association, 385 Phil. 586 (2001) — Followed for the doctrine that while police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, Congress may delegate this power to local government units, which can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them.
• Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658 (2008) — Followed for the two-requisite test of ordinance validity and for the principle of according high respect to the Sanggunian's issuance as the body in the best position to determine constituents' needs.
• Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista, 762 Phil. 233 (2015) — Followed for the presumption of constitutionality of ordinances and the standard that an ordinance will not be invalidated as unreasonable unless its rules are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.
• Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Davao City, 122 Phil. 478 (1965) — Cited for the principle that a direct and specific grant of power takes precedence over requirements in a law of general application.
• Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City, 674 Phil. 637 (2011) — Followed for the proposition that regulation of billboards constitutes an exercise of police power validly delegated to local government units.

• Section 16(hh), Republic Act No. 4354 (Revised Charter of the City of Davao) — Vested the Sangguniang Panlungsod with legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of billboards and similar structures. The Court held this specific charter grant to be the source of Davao City's police power to regulate billboards, prevailing over the general provisions of the National Building Code.
• Section 458(a)(3)(iv), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Empowers the sangguniang panlungsod to regulate the display of and fix license fees for signs, signboards, or billboards. Petitioner cited this provision to support the city government's authority to regulate signs for aesthetic purposes.
• Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) — The general building code governing construction standards. The Court of Appeals held Ordinance No. 092-2000 invalid for inconsistency with this Code; the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Code's provisions are of general application and do not constrain Davao City's charter-granted power to impose stricter billboard regulations.
• Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Requires that no decision be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Petitioner invoked this provision to challenge the Court of Appeals' nullification of Section 37 without stating specific legal findings.
• Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45, Davao City Ordinance No. 092-2000 — The challenged provisions regulating billboard setbacks, regulated areas near bridges, sign permit fees, and removal of illegal advertising materials, respectively. All four sections were upheld as valid.

Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice; Francis H. Jardeleza, Associate Justice. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno and Associate Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam were on official leave.