Eusebio vs. Eusebio

The Court held that a domicile of origin is retained until a new domicile of choice is established by clear and satisfactory proof of three essential elements: capacity to choose and freedom of choice, physical presence at the place chosen, and intention to stay therein permanently. Mere presence in a location for health reasons, even with knowledge that one will never return home, does not effect a change of domicile. Furthermore, the rule granting exclusive jurisdiction to the court first taking cognizance of estate settlement proceedings applies only when two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction; it does not apply when the first court lacks jurisdiction because venue was improperly laid.

Andres Eusebio had been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga for over seventy years, where he maintained his home and properties. Suffering from a heart condition and receiving treatment from his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who resided in Quezon City, the decedent purchased a house and lot at 889-A España Extension, Quezon City on October 29, 1952. While transferring his belongings to this property, he suffered a stroke, was taken to his son's residence, and subsequently confined at the UST Hospital in Manila, where he died on November 28, 1952 without ever having stayed in the Quezon City house.

• Andres Eusebio died on November 28, 1952 at the UST Hospital in Manila of acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease at the age of seventy-four.
• He had been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga for over seventy years, where he maintained his home and other properties, and where some of his children continued to reside.
• On October 29, 1952, less than a month before his death, he purchased a house and lot in Quezon City to be near his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who was treating him for his heart condition.
• He never stayed or slept in the Quezon City property; while transferring his belongings thereto, he suffered a stroke and was taken first to his son's residence and then to the hospital.
• On November 26, 1952, two days prior to his death, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with Concepcion Villanueva at the UST Hospital.
• In the deed of sale for the Quezon City property (Exhibit 2), executed on October 29, 1952, the decedent stated his residence as San Fernando, Pampanga; the residence certificates he used were also issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
• The marriage contract (Exhibit 1) executed on November 26, 1952 likewise stated his residence as San Fernando, Pampanga.
• On November 4, 1953, the oppositors filed a separate petition for settlement of the intestate estate in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957 on November 17, 1953.
• On December 14, 1953, Eugenio Eusebio and other children of the decedent by his first marriage moved to dismiss the Pampanga proceedings, citing the pendency of the Rizal case; the motion was granted on December 21, 1953.

• Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio maintained that the decedent had decided to reside in Quezon City for the rest of his life, and that the purchase of the house and lot therein, coupled with the transfer of his belongings, manifested a clear intent to establish a new domicile.
• He argued that the oppositors lacked the personality to intervene because they had failed to establish their filiation as illegitimate children of the decedent.
• He contended that by cross-examining witnesses, the oppositors had effectively submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, notwithstanding their formal objection thereto.

• Respondents Amanda Eusebio, et al. argued that the decedent remained domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga at the time of his death, rendering the venue in the CFI Rizal improper.
• They maintained that the purchase of the Quezon City property was solely for health reasons—to be near his treating physician—and did not indicate any intent to reside there permanently.
• They asserted that they were entitled to object to venue and establish their relationship to the decedent without submitting to the court's jurisdiction, as their appearance was limited specifically to contest jurisdiction.
• They argued that the trial court erred in rejecting Exhibits 1 and 2, which constituted documentary evidence of the decedent's continued residence in San Fernando.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the oppositors, by appearing solely to contest jurisdiction and cross-examining witnesses, submitted to the jurisdiction of the CFI Rizal.
  • Whether the trial court properly rejected Exhibits 1 and 2 on the ground that the oppositors lacked personality to intervene.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the decedent was domiciled in Quezon City or San Fernando, Pampanga at the time of his death.
  • Whether the CFI Rizal had jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate given the venue objection.

• Procedural:
  • The Court held that the oppositors did not submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court by appearing solely to contest jurisdiction and object to venue. The record showed that counsel expressly limited his participation to questioning jurisdiction, and the trial court's contrary conclusion was inconsistent with its own findings that the oppositors refused to submit.
  • The Court ruled that the oppositors were entitled to establish facts tending to prove both their alleged relationship to the decedent (which would give them standing to object) and the improper venue without submitting to jurisdiction. The trial court erred in rejecting Exhibits 1 and 2, as these documents were admissible and relevant to the issue of domicile regardless of the oppositors' status as heirs.
• Substantive:
  • The Court found that the decedent remained domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga at the time of his death. The presumption in favor of retaining the domicile of origin, which is particularly strong, was not overcome by satisfactory proof. The decedent lacked the requisite intent to reside permanently in Quezon City; the purchase of property there was motivated by health concerns and did not constitute establishment of a new domicile.
  • The Court held that the CFI Rizal lacked jurisdiction because venue was improperly laid. The rule granting exclusive jurisdiction to the court first taking cognizance applies only when two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction. It does not apply when the first court lacks jurisdiction due to improper venue, as jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the will of the parties or by the fortuity of being first to file in an improper court.

• Domicile of Choice — Defined as requiring three essential elements: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the decedent had not acquired a domicile in Quezon City because the element of intent to reside permanently was absent; the move was solely for health reasons and he never actually occupied the property.
• Presumption of Continuance of Domicile — Established that a domicile once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, with the burden of proof resting upon those alleging a change. The Court emphasized that this presumption is particularly strong when the existing domicile is the domicile of origin, which the decedent had maintained for over seventy years.
• Domicile for Health Reasons — Recognized that presence in a place merely for one's health, even coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able to return home due to illness, does not commonly effect a change of domicile. The Court applied this principle to the decedent's presence in Quezon City.
• Exclusive Jurisdiction in Settlement of Estates — Interpreted Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court to mean that the court first taking cognizance of estate settlement proceedings exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts only when the courts involved have concurrent jurisdiction. The rule does not apply when the first court lacks jurisdiction because venue was improperly laid, as jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by prior filing.

• "A domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained." — Cited from Minor and the Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, used to establish the presumption favoring the retention of the domicile of origin and placing the burden of proof on those alleging a change.
• "Domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health, even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." — Cited from Beale, applied to reject the claim that the decedent's move to Quezon City established a new domicile.
• "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts... [but] evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law." — Used to explain that the first-in-time rule does not apply when the first court lacks jurisdiction due to improper venue.

• Velilla v. Posadas, 62 Phil. 624 — Cited as authority for the three essential requisites of domicile of choice: capacity, physical presence, and intention to remain permanently.
• Zuellig v. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220 — Cited alongside Velilla regarding the requisites for establishing a domicile of choice.
• In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78 — Cited for the principle that a domicile once acquired is retained until another is gained.
• Shenton v. Abbott, Md., 15 A. 2d. 906 — Cited for the principle that presence in a location solely for health reasons does not change domicile.
• U.S. v. Knight, D.C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129 — Cited alongside Shenton regarding the effect of health-related presence on domicile.
• Taciana Vda. De Borja v. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955) — Cited to support the procedure that when venue is contested in proceedings filed in multiple courts, the court first taking cognizance decides the venue issue, and if venue is improper, the case should be dismissed.

• Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court — Governs venue in the settlement of estates of decedents; provides that the court of the province where the decedent resides at the time of death has jurisdiction, and that the court first taking cognizance exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of others, provided that jurisdiction is contested only on appeal or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
• Civil Code of the Philippines — Referenced regarding the rights of illegitimate children to succeed from the decedent (implied in the discussion of personality to intervene).