Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz

Mere physical separation between spouses, without the husband's intent to forsake the wife entirely and permanently, does not constitute legal abandonment under Article 178 of the Civil Code sufficient to justify separation of conjugal partnership properties. The husband's continued financial support of the wife and children, coupled with his continued management of the conjugal properties, negates any intent of perpetual separation. Abuse of powers of administration under Article 167 requires willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the partnership, not merely failure to inform the wife of business progress.

The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz and the defendant Severino de la Cruz were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938, and had six children. During their coverture, they acquired substantial real properties and business enterprises, including the Philippine Texboard Factory, with total conjugal assets valued at over P1,021,407.68 as of December 31, 1959. The Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership govern the rights of spouses over properties acquired during the marriage, with Articles 167 and 178 providing extraordinary remedies to the wife in cases of abuse of administration and abandonment, respectively.

The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938, and had six children born between 1939 and 1948. During their coverture, they acquired seven parcels of land in the Bacolod Cadastre assessed at P45,429 and three parcels in the Silay Cadastre assessed at P43,580, all registered in their names. They were also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets valued at P496,006.92 as of December 31, 1956, including the Philippine Texboard Factory, which yielded a net gain of P90,454.48 for 1957. As of December 31, 1959, the total assets of their various enterprises were valued at P1,021,407.68, not including the Top Service Inc., of which the defendant had been president since its organization in 1959 with a paid-up capital of P50,000, P10,000 of which he contributed.

The defendant started living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan instead of in the conjugal home. Since 1955, the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although he paid short visits during which the spouses engaged in brief conversations. After 1955 up to the time of trial, the defendant never visited the conjugal abode, and when he was in Bacolod, the plaintiff was denied communication with him. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had abandoned her and their children to live in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. She testified that in 1949 she began to suspect illicit relations between her husband and Nenita, which suspicion was confirmed in 1951 when she found an unsigned note in a pocket of one of her husband's polo shirts written by Nenita asking "Bering" to meet her near the church. She confronted her husband, who tore the note even as he admitted his amorous liaison with Nenita, then vowed to forsake his mistress. Subsequently, in November 1951, she found in the iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, also written by Nenita, in which the sender signed as "D" and expressed hope that the addressee "Darling" could join her in Baguio. The plaintiff enplaned for Baguio but learned that Nenita had already left for Manila.

Celia Bañez, a cook employed in the home of the spouses from May 15, 1955 to August 15, 1958, testified that she saw the defendant in the place only once during her entire employment, although the plaintiff herself testified that in 1955 the defendant "used to have a short visit there," implying more than one visit. The defendant denied having abandoned his wife and children but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the action, he started to live separately from his wife. He claimed his intention was not to abandon his wife and children but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman, and because at home he could not concentrate on his work. Since 1953, he stayed in Manila for some duration to manage their expanding business and look for market outlets for their texboard products. From the time he started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his laundry, which declaration was not rebutted.

The defendant denied ever maintaining a mistress in Manila, claiming he came to know Nenita Hernandez when she was barely 12 years old but had lost track of her thereafter. He denied having destroyed the alleged note or having seen the letter exh. C before trial. On the matter of alleged abuse of administration, the plaintiff declared that the defendant refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their various business concerns, and although she did not allege or prove that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred that he might squander and dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his concubine. The defendant countered that he applied his industry to the management and expansion of their business concerns, building from a single cargo truck to the Speedway Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press, the Philippine Texboard Factory, and other enterprises worth over a million pesos, as proved by his balance sheets and profit and loss statements for 1958 and 1959. Marcos V. Ganaban, manager of the Philippine Texboard Factory, corroborated that the plaintiff had been drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly since 1950, given personally by the defendant or by the witness in his absence.

• Abandonment: The plaintiff argued that the defendant's physical separation from the conjugal abode since 1955, his failure to visit the conjugal home, and his alleged cohabitation with a concubine in Manila constituted abandonment in law justifying separation of conjugal partnership properties under Article 178 of the Civil Code.
• Abuse of Administration: The plaintiff argued that the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform her of the state of their business enterprises constituted abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, warranting division of the matrimonial assets under Article 167 of the Civil Code.
• Risk of Dissipation: The plaintiff averred that although she did not allege or prove that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, her husband might squander and dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his concubine, hence the urgency of separation of property.

• Denial of Abandonment: The defendant denied having abandoned his wife and family, averring that he never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission that he was giving her around P500 a month for support, and that his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office totaling P1,200 to P1,500 a month.
• Justification for Separation: The defendant claimed that when he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, his intention was not to abandon his wife and children but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous, and because at home he could not concentrate on his work.
• Denial of Concubinage: The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila, claiming that his constant presence in Manila was required by the pressing demands of an expanding business, and that the allegation of his wife that he had a concubine was based on mere suspicion.
• Denial of Mismanagement: The defendant argued that he applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his time to the management, maintenance, and expansion of their business concerns, building from a single cargo truck to business enterprises worth over a million pesos, and that he had steadily expanded the income and assets of said enterprises from year to year.

• Abandonment: Whether the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constituted abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties under Article 178 of the Civil Code.
• Abuse of Administration: Whether the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises constituted such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets under Article 167 of the Civil Code.

• Abandonment: No. The defendant was not guilty of abandonment of his wife, as there must be real abandonment and not mere separation, requiring not only physical estrangement but also financial and moral desertion with the intention of perpetual separation. The defendant's continued financial support of his wife and children negated any intent not to return to the conjugal abode.
• Abuse of Administration: No. The defendant did not abuse his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as there was absolutely no evidence that he squandered the conjugal assets, and mere refusal or failure to inform the wife of the progress of family businesses does not constitute abuse of administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

• Abandonment: The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by Article 178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least one year require real abandonment, not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. The concept of abandonment in Article 178 may be established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to the wife, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support. Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of abandonment if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The word "abandon" means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly, with the emphasis on the finality and publicity with which something is put in the control of another, giving up absolutely with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. To constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. In the case at bar, the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently, as the record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a concubine, the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favor of the plaintiff's thesis, as the proof that Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the defendant and that they were living as husband and wife in Manila is altogether too indefinite, aside from the uncorroborated statement of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to connect authorship of exh. C with Nenita.

• Abuse of Administration: There is absolutely no evidence to show that the defendant squandered the conjugal assets; upon the contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a million pesos. The lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of administration. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife, nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. If there is only physical separation between the spouses, engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, the wife's petition for separation of property must be denied. Courts must exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property. A judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets where there has been no real abandonment may altogether slam shut the door for possible reconciliation.

• Abandonment under Article 178 of the Civil Code — To constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be real abandonment and not mere separation; the abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion, with absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, and with the intention of perpetual separation. The husband's continued financial support of the wife and children negatives any intent not to return to the conjugal abode and resume marital duties and rights. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the defendant's continued support of his family despite his absence from the conjugal home negated any intent of permanent abandonment.

• Abuse of Administration under Article 167 of the Civil Code — For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife, nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the defendant's failure to inform the wife of business progress, without evidence of dissipation or waste, did not constitute abuse of administration.

• Policy of Preserving the Union of Spouses — The basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property. Courts must exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal properties, as a judgment ordering division of conjugal assets where there has been no real abandonment may altogether slam shut the door for possible reconciliation.

• "To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion." — This passage articulates the controlling definition of abandonment under Article 178, distinguishing mere physical separation from legal abandonment requiring both physical and financial/moral desertion.

• "Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term 'abandonment', if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife." — This passage establishes the standard for determining abandonment, emphasizing that continued management of conjugal properties and continued support negate a finding of abandonment.

• "For 'abuse' to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter." — This passage defines the standard for abuse of administration under Article 167, requiring willful and utter disregard of partnership interests rather than mere negligence or inefficiency.

• "Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property." — This passage articulates the policy consideration underlying the Court's reluctance to order separation of conjugal properties, emphasizing the law's preference for preserving family unity.

• People vs. Schelske, 154 N.W. 781, 783 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that a husband who, after leaving his wife, continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child, was not guilty of abandonment, which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their support negatived such intent.
• In re Hoss' Estate, 257 NYS 278 — Cited for the definition of "abandon" as meaning to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly, and for the ruling that a father did not abandon his family where the evidence disclosed that he almost always gave his wife part of his earnings during the period of their separation.
• Garcia vs. Manzano, 103 Phil. 798 — Cited for the proposition that separation of property may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code, consistent with the policy of discouraging a regime of separation.

• Article 178, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that if the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of property. The Court applied this provision in determining whether the defendant's separation from the plaintiff constituted legal abandonment.
• Article 167, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that in case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on the petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. The Court applied this provision in determining whether the defendant's failure to inform the wife of business affairs constituted abuse of administration.
• Article 190, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage. The Court cited this provision in support of the policy discouraging a regime of separation.
• Article 191, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides for the causes for which separation of property may be ordered by the court. The Court cited this provision in noting that separation of property may only be ordered for causes specified therein.
• Article 2208, paragraphs 6 and 11, Civil Code of the Philippines — Empowers courts to grant counsel's fees in actions for legal support and in cases where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees should be recovered. The Court relied on this provision in affirming the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, though reduced to P10,000.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred.