Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

A lawyer who repeatedly and publicly imputes sinister motives to the courts, questions their impartiality and authority in pending cases through media statements, and persists in such conduct despite prior warning, may be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The finality of the Estrada vs. Arroyo decision precludes any relitigation of the legality of Arroyo's assumption to the presidency, and the attendance of justices at a presidential oath-taking constitutes an official function, not partisan political activity under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, former President of the Philippines, faced criminal charges before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565, and No. 26905). Atty. Alan Paguia entered his appearance as counsel de parte on May 19, 2003, replacing previously appointed counsel de officio. The legal backdrop includes the prior Supreme Court decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108), which upheld the legality of then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's assumption to the presidency following the events of January 20, 2001. Atty. Paguia's legal strategy centered on challenging the validity of that decision by arguing that the justices who rendered it had violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by engaging in partisan political activity, thereby rendering their ruling void.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, former President of the Philippines, was facing criminal charges before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565, and No. 26905. On May 19, 2003, Atty. Alan F. Paguia entered his appearance as counsel de parte for Estrada, filing an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan seeking to declare the appointment of counsel de officio functus officio and to dismiss all criminal cases against his client. During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on May 30, 2003, petitioner presented several portions of Justice Artemio Panganiban's book, "Reforming the Judiciary," to be made part of the evidence for the defense.

On June 9, 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the "truth" of the statements contained in Justice Panganiban's book in relation to the alleged prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices in Estrada vs. Arroyo. Petitioner likewise sought the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum to Justice Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., to testify on their participation in the proclamation of Arroyo as President on January 20, 2001. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion on July 2, 2003.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which he styled as a "Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon." According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing on June 11, 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan manifested bias and partiality against his client. He alleged that Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario used disrespectful language and that Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments, remarking that granting Estrada's motion would result in chaos and disorder. Prompted by these allegations of bias, Atty. Paguia filed a motion for disqualification of the Sandiganbayan justices on July 14, 2003.

On July 31, 2003, petitioner received two assailed resolutions: one dated July 28, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration, and another dated July 25, 2003 denying the motion for disqualification. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking the disqualification of all members of the Supreme Court, the vacation of the Sandiganbayan resolutions, and the dismissal of the criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Atty. Paguia argued that the justices had violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 rally and by authorizing Arroyo's assumption to the presidency, rendering the Estrada vs. Arroyo decision a "patent mockery of justice and due process." He further asserted that the unlawful acts of the justices were not acts of the Supreme Court but merely the wrongs of the individual justices. On September 23, 2003, the Court dismissed the petition and ordered Atty. Paguia to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. In his compliance dated October 10, 2003, Atty. Paguia repeated his claims of political partisanship against the Court. He had also made public statements in the media, including an article in the September 7, 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, wherein he continued to assail the validity of the Estrada vs. Arroyo decision and accuse the justices of having prejudged the case. The Court had previously warned Atty. Paguia on July 8, 2003, to desist from making similar submissions, but he persisted in his conduct.

• Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: Petitioner argued that all members of the Supreme Court should disqualify themselves from hearing the petition, because they had violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Arroyo to the Presidency, thereby prejudging any case that would assail the legality of that act.
• Nullity of Estrada vs. Arroyo: Petitioner contended that the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo was unconstitutional and void for violating his right to due process, asserting that the justices had already committed to the other party before the formal hearing was conducted.
• Unlawful Acts Not Acts of the Court: Petitioner maintained that the act of the justices, if unlawful, was not the act of the Supreme Court but merely the wrong or trespass of those individual justices, and that it would be absurd to allow the justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their unlawful act.
• Dismissal of Criminal Cases: Petitioner sought the dismissal of Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565, and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction.
• Bias and Partiality of Sandiganbayan Justices: Petitioner alleged that the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan exhibited bias and partiality against him, warranting their disqualification.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motions, thereby warranting the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65.
• Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: Whether the members of the Supreme Court should be disqualified from hearing the petition on the ground that they had engaged in partisan political activity under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Finality of Estrada vs. Arroyo: Whether the legality of Arroyo's assumption to the presidency could still be relitigated despite the finality of the Estrada vs. Arroyo decision.
• Conduct of Counsel: Whether Atty. Paguia's public statements and persistent attacks on the Court constituted conduct unbecoming a lawyer warranting disciplinary sanction.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: No. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: No. The attendance of justices at a presidential oath-taking constitutes an official function, not partisan political activity under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as defined by Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Finality of Estrada vs. Arroyo: No. The ruling in Estrada vs. Arroyo, being a final judgment, had long put to an end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency.
• Conduct of Counsel: Yes. Atty. Paguia was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court, having persisted in publicly impugning the integrity and authority of the Court despite prior admonition.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 requires a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal whose act is assailed. The Court found that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motions. The petition was dismissed for gross insufficiency in substance and utter lack of merit. Petitioner's contradictory posture — disclaiming the authority of the Supreme Court justices while simultaneously elevating a petition to that very Court — underscored the insufficiency of the petition.

• Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from engaging in "partisan political activities," which, as defined by Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, refers to acts designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate in an election, such as forming campaign organizations, holding political rallies, making speeches for or against a candidate, and soliciting votes. The Court held that the phrase "partisan political activities" in its statutory context relates to acts designed to cause the success or defeat of a particular candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy in an election. The taking of an oath of office by an incoming President before the Chief Justice is a traditional official function, and the presence of other justices at such an event is no different from their appearance at other official functions such as the State of the Nation Address. The justices' attendance at the EDSA 2 rally and at Arroyo's oath-taking did not constitute partisan political activity as defined by law.

• Finality of Estrada vs. Arroyo: The decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo had become final, conclusively settling the legality of Arroyo's assumption to the presidency. By seeking to relitigate the validity of that assumption, Atty. Paguia was "vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue." The finality of that judgment precluded any further judicial inquiry into the same question.

• Conduct of Counsel: Atty. Paguia violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that lawyers observe and maintain respect due to the courts and judicial officers. By liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, he sought to impede, obstruct, and pervert the dispensation of justice. He likewise violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from making public statements on pending cases tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. His continued public statements in broadcast and print media, including an article in the Daily Tribune, persisted despite the Court's prior warning on July 8, 2003. His obstinate display of defiance in his compliance with the show-cause order, repeating his earlier claims of political partisanship, demonstrated a refusal to heed the Court's admonition. Accordingly, the Court imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

• Finality of Judgments — A final judgment conclusively settles the issues litigated and precludes any further judicial inquiry into the same questions. The finality of the Estrada vs. Arroyo decision ended all questions pertaining to the legality of Arroyo's ascension to the presidency, and any attempt to relitigate the same issue was barred.

• Partisan Political Activity Under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct — "Partisan political activities," as used in Rule 5.10, refers to acts designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy in an election, as defined by Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The attendance of justices at a presidential oath-taking or other official state functions does not constitute partisan political activity, as such attendance is a traditional official function of the judiciary.

• Lawyer's Duty of Respect to Courts (Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility) — A lawyer must observe and maintain respect due to the courts and judicial officers. Imputing sinister and devious motives to the courts and questioning their impartiality, integrity, and authority constitutes conduct unbecoming a lawyer, as it impedes, obstructs, and perverts the dispensation of justice.

• Prohibition on Public Statements on Pending Cases (Rule 13.02, Code of Professional Responsibility) — A lawyer is prohibited from making public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Persistent violation of this rule despite prior admonition warrants disciplinary sanction, including indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

• "The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue." — This passage articulates the doctrine of finality of judgments as applied to the Estrada vs. Arroyo decision, foreclosing any relitigation of the legality of Arroyo's assumption to the presidency.

• "The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department." — This passage defines the scope of "partisan political activity" under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and distinguishes official judicial functions from prohibited partisan acts.

• "In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the suspension of Atty. Paguia, defining the kind of conduct that constitutes conduct unbecoming a lawyer under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Estrada vs. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108 — The controlling precedent on the legality of Arroyo's assumption to the presidency. The Court treated this decision as a final judgment that conclusively settled the question of presidential succession, precluding relitigation.

• In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595 — Cited for the proposition that criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness of a decision of the Court would be welcome, as well-founded criticism can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of errors. The Court distinguished good-faith criticism from Atty. Paguia's baseless and persistent attacks.

• Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347 — Cited by Atty. Paguia for the proposition that the unlawful act of a public officer is not the act of the public office. The Court did not adopt this argument in its reasoning.

• Rule 5.10, Code of Judicial Conduct — Prohibits judges from making political speeches, contributing to party funds, publicly endorsing candidates, or participating in other partisan political activities. The Court interpreted "partisan political activities" by reference to Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code and held that attendance at a presidential oath-taking is an official function, not partisan political activity.

• Section 79(b), Omnibus Election Code — Defines "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" as acts designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate, including forming organizations, holding rallies, making speeches, publishing campaign materials, and soliciting votes. The Court used this definition to determine that the justices' conduct did not fall within the prohibition.

• Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility — Mandates that a lawyer observe and maintain respect due to the courts and judicial officers and insist on similar conduct by others. Atty. Paguia's imputation of sinister motives to the Court was found to violate this canon.

• Rule 13.02, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits a member of the bar from making public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Atty. Paguia's media statements, including his article in the Daily Tribune, were found to violate this rule.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred.