Estrada vs. Bersamin

A respondent in a preliminary investigation has no statutory or constitutional right to be furnished with copies of counter-affidavits filed by co-respondents; the right to examine evidence under Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is strictly limited to evidence submitted by the complainant, not evidence submitted by co-respondents.

The case arose from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam investigations where Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada was charged, along with several co-respondents including Janet Lim Napoles, with Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the Office of the Ombudsman.

• On November 25, 2013 and December 3, 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada copies of complaints filed by the National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito Baligod (OMB-C-C-13-0313) and by the Field Investigation Office (OMB-C-C-13-0397), respectively, charging him with Plunder under RA No. 7080 and violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
• Senator Estrada filed his counter-affidavits in both cases on January 9 and 16, 2014.
• Between December 9, 2013 and March 14, 2014, eighteen co-respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.
• On March 20, 2014, Senator Estrada filed a Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, citing Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
• On March 27, 2014, the Ombudsman issued an Order denying the Request, ruling that no provision entitles a respondent to be furnished all filings by other parties, and that respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits to the complainant, not to other respondents.
• On March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to indict Senator Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and eleven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
• On April 7, 2014, Senator Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution.
• On May 7, 2014, Senator Estrada filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
• On the same day (May 7, 2014), the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order furnishing Senator Estrada with copies of counter-affidavits of seven co-respondents (Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Figura, Buenaventura, and Sevidal) and directing him to comment within a non-extendible period of five days.
• On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman denied Senator Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution.

• The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his constitutional right to due process by denying his request for copies of co-respondents’ counter-affidavits.
• Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules grant him the right to examine all evidence submitted by the complainant and to have access to evidence on record, which includes counter-affidavits of co-respondents that contain incriminating allegations against him.
• There is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as a motion for reconsideration would be useless and could not prevent the filing of the information in court.
• The petition does not constitute forum shopping as the issues raised are distinct from those in the Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution.

• No law or rule requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of counter-affidavits of co-respondents; the right under Section 3(b), Rule 112 is limited to evidence submitted by the complainant.
• The petition is premature because Senator Estrada failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2014 Order before resorting to certiorari.
• The petition constitutes forum shopping because it raises the same issue of due process violation already raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution pending before the Ombudsman.
• The Ombudsman subsequently furnished Senator Estrada with copies of the requested counter-affidavits on May 7, 2014, curing any alleged defect.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy considering the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration before the Ombudsman and the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.
  • Whether the filing of the petition constitutes forum shopping.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Senator Estrada’s request to be furnished with copies of his co-respondents’ counter-affidavits.
  • Whether the denial violated Senator Estrada’s right to due process of law.

• Procedural:
  • The Petition for Certiorari is premature. Senator Estrada failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2014 Order before resorting to certiorari, and none of the recognized exceptions to this rule apply.
  • The petition constitutes forum shopping because Senator Estrada raised the same issue of denial of due process in his Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution pending before the Ombudsman while simultaneously filing the present petition, creating the possibility of conflicting rulings.
• Substantive:
  • The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4, Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules do not require the investigating officer to furnish a respondent with copies of counter-affidavits of co-respondents. The right is limited to examining evidence submitted by the complainant.
  • The constitutional due process standards in administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations) do not apply to preliminary investigations in criminal cases, which are statutory rights, not constitutional guarantees. Preliminary investigations require only a determination of probable cause based on likelihood of guilt, not substantial evidence.
  • The right to a preliminary investigation is merely statutory; it is not part of the "fundamental and essential requirements" of due process. The constitutional right of an accused to confront witnesses does not apply in preliminary investigations.
  • The Ombudsman fully complied with the Rules by furnishing Senator Estrada with copies of the complaint and supporting affidavits, and even went beyond legal duty by subsequently furnishing some co-respondents' affidavits.

• Statutory Nature of Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory right, not a constitutional guarantee. It is a component of due process in criminal justice but does not enjoy the same constitutional protection as trial rights.
• Limited Rights in Preliminary Investigation — A respondent in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine witnesses or to be furnished with counter-affidavits of co-respondents. The rights are limited to submitting counter-affidavits, examining evidence submitted by the complainant, and being present at clarificatory hearings without the right to examine or cross-examine.
• Ang Tibay Standards Distinguished — The due process requirements for administrative proceedings (right to hearing, substantial evidence, impartial tribunal) as articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations do not apply to preliminary investigations in criminal cases, which only require a determination of probable cause based on likelihood of guilt, not substantial evidence.
• Probable Cause Determination — Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. It does not require the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; hearsay evidence may be considered.

• "It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present."
• "The rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase 'due process of law'."
• "Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence."
• "The law can no longer help one who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance."
• "To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt."

• Paderanga v. Drilon — Cited for the fundamental principle that an accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine witnesses.
• Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations — Distinguished; its due process standards for administrative proceedings (substantial evidence, impartial tribunal) do not apply to preliminary investigations.
• Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes — Distinguished as involving administrative, not criminal, proceedings where different due process standards apply.
• Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman — Applied to hold that a party cannot claim denial of due process when given the opportunity to be heard but failed to take advantage of it.
• Webb v. De Leon — Cited for the nature of preliminary investigation as not part of trial.
• Crespo v. Mogul — Cited for the principle that once an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction and the preliminary investigation is terminated.
• Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Duterte v. Sandiganbayan — Distinguished as involving violations of the right to speedy disposition due to inordinate delay, not merely denial of access to documents.
• Lozada v. Hernandez — Cited for the principle that rights in preliminary investigation depend on statutory provisions, not the due process clause.
• GSIS v. Court of Appeals — Cited for amplifying Ang Tibay's requirement of an impartial tribunal, which does not apply to preliminary investigations.

• Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court — Defines the respondent's right to examine evidence submitted by the complainant.
• Section 4, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) — Provides that the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
• Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — Due process clause.
• Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution — Rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions; held not applicable during preliminary investigation.
• Republic Act No. 7080 — Plunder Law.
• Republic Act No. 3019 — Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Republic Act No. 6770 — The Ombudsman Act of 1989.

• Justice Leonen — Agreed with the dismissal but emphasized that preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding like administrative cases; the prosecutor merely determines if there is prima facie evidence to proceed to trial. He stressed that irregularities in preliminary investigation do not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan once information is filed, as the court makes an independent determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest.

• Justice Velasco, Jr. — Argued that the denial of access to co-respondents' counter-affidavits violated due process; the right to "access to evidence on record" under the Ombudsman Rules includes all evidence, regardless of source. He held the petition was not premature and did not constitute forum shopping, and that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion warranting remand for reinvestigation.
• Justice Brion — Joined Justice Velasco but wrote separately to emphasize that preliminary investigation is a substantive right and component of due process; the Ang Tibay standards should apply. He argued that the Ombudsman's refusal to furnish the affidavits constituted grave abuse of discretion and that the proper remedy was suspension of Sandiganbayan proceedings and remand for proper preliminary investigation.