Estrada vs. Badoy

A judge who seeks publicity by appearing on television to report an internal office matter, in defiance of a prior directive to cease media interviews, commits conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Sandiganbayan; and a judge who unreasonably delays resolving a time-sensitive motion, rendering the votes of co-members inconsequential, incurs undue delay in rendering an order.

The two consolidated administrative cases arose from the conduct of Sandiganbayan Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, who were members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan handling Criminal Case No. 26558 — the plunder case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, his son Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, and Atty. Edward Serapio under Republic Act No. 7080. Justice Badoy chaired the Division, with Justices De Castro and Ricardo M. Ilarde (retired) as members. The first administrative matter (A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC) was initiated by the Supreme Court motu proprio based on media reports of Justice Badoy's unusual conduct. The second (A.M. No. SB-02-10-J) was filed by former President Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, and their defense counsel — Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, and Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola, Delia H. Hermoso, and Raymund P. Fortun — charging both justices with multiple administrative offenses arising from pre-trial and trial incidents.

On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, went to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live interview on the news program Saksi, where he announced the loss of a Resolution he had penned in connection with the plunder case against former President Estrada. The event drew widespread media attention, with newspapers carrying facetious headlines such as "Ambulance rushes Badoy — to TV Station" and "Unorthodox Behavior." Acting on these media reports, the Supreme Court directed Justice Badoy to show cause why he should not be administratively charged. In his compliance, Justice Badoy explained that three days prior to the incident, he could not find his Resolution ordering that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo. He had requested the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct an investigation, but to no avail. Agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and claimed that he sold it for a fee, he decided to go to GMA-7 to report its loss so the public would know he is honest. He chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very sick and cold, intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview. Notably, just three weeks prior, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had strictly ordered Justice Badoy to cease and desist from holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving interviews to the media on any matter related to the controversy.

The second administrative case arose from incidents during the pre-trial and trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 before the Sandiganbayan Third Division. On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial conferences, the Sandiganbayan furnished the parties with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their signatures. The defense panel — composed of Atty. Saguisag (lead counsel), Justice Cuevas, and Attys. Flaminiano, Carao, Jr., Verzola, and Hermoso — refused to sign it on three grounds: there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial Order; they were not given ample time to read it; and it incorporated a statement that they admitted the existence of certain exhibits although there was no such admission. During an argument between Justice De Castro and Justice Cuevas, Atty. Saguisag intervened and argued simultaneously with Justice Cuevas. Despite Justice De Castro's request to wait for his turn, Atty. Saguisag persisted, prompting her to bang the gavel twice and order him to stop arguing. Justice Badoy then ordered four sheriffs to take Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom. Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the assailed portion of the Pre-trial Order could be deleted, and the prosecution manifested its acquiescence. However, Atty. Flaminiano objected, insisting that the defense needed more time to study the Pre-trial Order. Notwithstanding the objection, Justice Badoy terminated the pre-trial and set the trial proper on October 1, 3, and 4, 2001, and thereafter every Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday at 1:00 in the afternoon.

On October 1, 2001, the defense lawyers did not appear. Determined to proceed, Justice Badoy appointed Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Pison, counsel for accused Atty. Serapio, to represent the Estradas. Former President Estrada objected, insisting on his right to choose his counsel. Both Atty. Acut and Atty. Pison declined due to a possible conflict of interest. As a last recourse, Justice Badoy appointed lawyers from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel de officio for the Estradas. Feeling aggrieved, former President Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, and all their counsel of record filed the administrative complaint charging Justices Badoy and De Castro with dishonesty and misrepresentation for incorporating the exhibit admission statement in the Pre-trial Order; oppression and gross misconduct for ejecting Atty. Saguisag; violation of Supreme Court rules for setting hearings three times a week without prior consultation; denial of the right to counsel for appointing PAO lawyers; and a penchant for late rulings, citing four instances of delayed resolutions. Justice Badoy retired from the Judiciary on October 19, 2002, during the pendency of these cases.

• Dishonesty and Misrepresentation: Complainants argued that respondents incorporated in the Pre-trial Order a statement that the defense admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit A up to Exhibit C-45 and its submarkings as to its existence, notwithstanding the fact that they did not admit the same.
• Oppression and Gross Misconduct: Complainants contended that respondents committed oppression and gross misconduct by ordering Atty. Saguisag to be taken out of the courtroom.
• Violation of Supreme Court Rules: Complainants asserted that respondents violated Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars by setting the hearing of the plunder case three times a week at one o'clock in the afternoon without prior consultation with defense counsel.
• Denial of Right to Counsel: Complainants charged that respondents denied the accused's right to counsel by appointing PAO lawyers as counsel de officio during the hearing of October 1, 2001.
• Penchant for Late Rulings: Complainants alleged that respondents demonstrated a pattern of late rulings, citing four specific instances including the release of a Resolution denying Jinggoy Estrada's Motion to Quash after office hours on the eve of arraignment, the release of a Resolution denying the Petition to Recuse on the scheduled date of pre-trial, the failure to resolve a Motion to Cancel the October 1 hearing, and the delayed release of a Resolution denying Jinggoy Estrada's Motion to Administer the Oath of Office.

• On the Pre-trial Order (Justice De Castro): Justice De Castro explained that the court merely relied on the parties' Joint Stipulations of Facts and on the notes of five stenographers recording the pre-trial conferences, and that when complainants called attention to the assailed statement, she immediately ordered its deletion.
• On the Ejection of Atty. Saguisag (Justice De Castro): Justice De Castro maintained that it was Atty. Saguisag's contumacious conduct of loudly speaking simultaneously with Atty. Cuevas that prompted the order for him to leave the courtroom.
• On the Hearing Schedule (Justice De Castro): Justice De Castro stated that they consulted the complainants before setting the hearing three times a week, resulting in the revision of trial settings embodied in the court's Order dated September 14, 2001.
• On the PAO Appointment (Justice De Castro): Justice De Castro asserted that the appointment of three PAO lawyers was intended to provide the accused with adequate legal assistance during the hearing.
• On Late Rulings (Justice De Castro): Justice De Castro explained that they resolved the accused's three motions to quash only on July 9, 2001 because the parties' last pleading was filed only on July 5, 2001.
• On the Pre-trial Order (Justice Badoy): Justice Badoy maintained that the Pre-trial Order had not prejudiced the accused since they were not obliged to sign it and were free to object to the presentation of any evidence during trial.
• On the Ejection of Atty. Saguisag (Justice Badoy): Justice Badoy argued that he ordered Atty. Saguisag to leave because he ignored Justice De Castro's repeated order to stop arguing.
• On the Hearing Schedule (Justice Badoy): Justice Badoy stressed that the court was merely complying with the Speedy Trial Act in setting hearings three times a week.
• On Late Rulings (Justice Badoy): Justice Badoy explained that he released the Resolution on the Motion for Recusation earlier than intended because he was informed that the Estradas would use its pendency as a ground for postponement; and that the delay on the oath-taking motion was due to his searching for a justification to grant the request, including requesting rules from the BJMP and BOC. He also noted that with the plunder case equivalent to 500% of his workload, his total load reached 600% while his support staff remained at the same level.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction over the administrative cases notwithstanding Justice Badoy's retirement from the Judiciary.
• Conduct Unbecoming a Justice: Whether Justice Badoy's act of going to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station aboard an ambulance to report the loss of a Resolution constitutes conduct unbecoming a Justice.
• Dishonesty and Misrepresentation: Whether respondents committed dishonesty and misrepresentation by incorporating in the Pre-trial Order a statement that the defense admitted certain exhibits.
• Oppression and Gross Misconduct: Whether respondents committed oppression and gross misconduct in ordering Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom.
• Hearing Schedule: Whether respondents violated Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars by setting the hearing three times a week at one o'clock in the afternoon without prior consultation with defense counsel.
• Right to Counsel: Whether respondents violated the accused's right to counsel by appointing PAO lawyers as counsel de officio.
• Undue Delay: Whether Justice Badoy incurred undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion to be allowed to administer the oath of office to his mother.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The retirement of Justice Badoy did not divest the Court of jurisdiction, as jurisdiction that attached at the time of filing was not lost by the respondent's cessation from office.
• Conduct Unbecoming a Justice: Yes. Justice Badoy's act of rushing to a television station aboard an ambulance to report the loss of a Resolution constitutes conduct unbecoming a Justice, classified as a light charge under Section 10 of Rule 140.
• Dishonesty and Misrepresentation: No. Respondents were not guilty, as the Pre-trial Order copied verbatim the Joint Stipulations of Facts, and respondents immediately ordered the deletion of the assailed statement upon objection.
• Oppression and Gross Misconduct: No. The evidence did not prove oppression or misconduct; however, both justices were admonished for failing to exhibit judicial temperament, as they should have cited Atty. Saguisag in direct contempt rather than ordering his physical removal.
• Hearing Schedule: No. The setting of hearings three times a week was in order, being in accordance with the Speedy Trial Act and the continuous trial system mandated by administrative circulars; the requirement of consultation does not mean the court must secure the parties' approval before setting dates.
• Right to Counsel: No. The appointment of PAO lawyers satisfied the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel, as a PAO lawyer is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, or counsel whose interest is adverse to the accused.
• Undue Delay: Yes. Justice Badoy incurred undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion to administer the oath of office, a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140, as he submitted the Resolution to his members at 4:45 P.M. when the oath-taking was scheduled at 2:00 P.M., rendering their votes inconsequential.

• Jurisdiction: Citing Perez vs. Abiera, the Court held that jurisdiction which attached at the time of filing the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice, as it would allow a judge or public official to commit abuses during his last days in office knowing he would soon be immune from administrative penalties. Public policy requires the Court to assert and maintain jurisdiction over members of the judiciary for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service.

• Conduct Unbecoming a Justice: Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and should behave so as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary. The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provide that justice should not be bounded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those who administer it, and a judge should not seek to be spectacular or sensational. Justice Badoy's conduct in rushing to a television station to report the loss of a Resolution — an internal office matter — was pure vanity and could not be countenanced. His claim that the Resolution might have been stolen and sold was a wild conjecture that dragged innocent parties as possible culprits. If lawyers are prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case, with more reason should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity. The fact that Chief Justice Davide had, just three weeks prior, strictly ordered Justice Badoy to cease and desist from giving media interviews further punctuated his indiscretion.

• Dishonesty and Misrepresentation: Dishonesty connotes a disposition to deceive, while misrepresentation means a statement made to deceive or mislead; both imply an intention to deceive. Complainants failed to prove that respondents acted with deceit or malice. The Pre-trial Order stated verbatim the Joint Stipulations of Facts submitted by both parties, and when complainants objected to the assailed statement, respondents immediately ordered its deletion. The transcript of stenographic notes confirmed that Justice De Castro explained the court simply copied verbatim every document found on record pertaining to the pre-trial conference, without adding or subtracting. On the refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section 2, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that all agreements or admissions during pre-trial be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel; a party who signs the Joint Stipulation of Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order, and if he believes it is not an honest representation, he must specify his objections so the court may modify it.

• Oppression and Gross Misconduct: Oppression is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer who, under color of office, wrongfully inflicts bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; misconduct implies wrongful intention, and gross misconduct requires a corrupt act or persistent disregard of legal rules. No evidence proved these charges. Atty. Saguisag did not utter disrespectful remarks, but he kept speaking simultaneously with Justice Cuevas and refused to yield to the court's repeated order to stop. While this constrained respondents to lose their cool, what they should have done was cite him in direct contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than ordering sheriffs to physically remove him. Citing Romero vs. Valle, Jr. and Echano vs. Sunga, the Court stressed that a judge's role must be one of temperance, patience, and courtesy. Both respondents were admonished for failing to exhibit judicial temperament. Atty. Saguisag, for his part, was also faulted for failing to observe the respect due to the magistrates pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Hearing Schedule: The continuous trial setting was in order not only because the case was of national concern but more importantly because the accused were detained. Administrative Circular No. 3-90 mandated the continuous trial system to minimize delay from piecemeal trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable, and the court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial. The "consultations" referred to do not necessarily mean the court must secure the parties' approval before setting hearing dates; to rule otherwise would subject the trial system to the control of the parties and their counsel. The 1:00 P.M. schedule was also proper, as the schedule of hearings is a matter at the discretion of the trial judge, and a court may even hold night sessions.

• Right to Counsel: A PAO lawyer is considered independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution, as he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Citing People vs. Bacor, the Court ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused.

• Undue Delay: Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Justice Badoy knew the oath-taking was scheduled at 2:00 P.M. of June 29, 2001, yet he submitted the Resolution to his members at 4:45 P.M., rendering their votes inconsequential. Even Justices De Castro and Ilarde annotated on the Resolution that the matter had become moot and academic before it reached them. While the Court commended Justice Badoy's persistence in searching for precedents, he should not have delayed resolving the motion. This constituted undue delay in rendering an order, a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140.

• Retention of Jurisdiction Despite Retirement — The Supreme Court retains jurisdiction over administrative cases against judges and other officials under its supervision even after the respondent has retired or ceased to hold office, provided the jurisdiction attached at the time of filing. A contrary rule would allow officials to commit abuses in their last days in office knowing they would soon be immune. Applied in this case to uphold jurisdiction over Justice Badoy despite his retirement on October 19, 2002. (From Perez vs. Abiera)

• Conduct Unbecoming a Justice — A judge commits conduct unbecoming a Justice when he seeks publicity by appearing on television to report an internal office matter, in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (avoiding impropriety and the appearance of impropriety) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics (justice should not be bounded by individual idiosyncrasies; a judge should not seek to be spectacular or sensational). Classified as a light charge under Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, punishable by a fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00 and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.

• Judicial Temperament — A judge's role in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience, and courtesy (Rule 3.04, Code of Judicial Conduct). When confronted with contumacious conduct by counsel, a judge should invoke contempt powers under Rule 71 rather than resorting to physical ejection or displays of anger. Failure to maintain judicial temperament warrants admonition even absent a finding of oppression or gross misconduct.

• Continuous Trial and Consultation — Under Section 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable. The "consultations" with prosecutor and defense counsel required before setting continuous trial dates do not mean the court must secure the parties' approval; to rule otherwise would subject the trial system to the control of the parties. The schedule of hearings is a matter at the discretion of the trial judge.

• PAO Lawyer as Independent Counsel — A PAO lawyer qualifies as independent counsel under the Constitution because he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is adverse to the accused. The assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel. (From People vs. Bacor)

• Undue Delay in Rendering Orders — A judge must dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within required periods (Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Submitting a Resolution to co-members at 4:45 P.M. when the relevant event was scheduled at 2:00 P.M., thereby rendering their votes inconsequential, constitutes undue delay. Classified as a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140, punishable by suspension or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.

• "Judges, like ordinary mortals, are subject to human limitations. At times, the great tides of perturbing and overwhelming emotions engulf them. Notwithstanding so, they are expected to be 'cerebral men' who can control their confounding emotions and idiosyncratic inclinations. Otherwise, they will be held answerable for their conduct." — Opening passage framing the Court's expectation that judges must regulate their emotions despite human frailty, setting the analytical framework for evaluating the respondents' conduct.

• "If lawyers are prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse public opinion for or against a party, with more reason should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity. Judges are not actors or politicians who thrive by publicity. Publicity undermines the dignity and impartiality of a judge." — The ratio decidendi for the conduct unbecoming charge against Justice Badoy, articulating the principle that judges must not seek publicity and that publicity undermines judicial dignity.

• "The 'consultations' referred to in the foregoing provisions does not necessarily mean that the court has to secure first from the prosecution and defense their approval before it can set the date of hearing. To rule otherwise is to subject our trial system to the control of the parties and their counsel." — The Court's interpretation of the consultation requirement under Section 2, Rule 119, clarifying that courts retain discretion over hearing schedules and are not subject to party veto.

• "The members of the bench and the bar ought to be reminded that the people expect from them a sense of shared responsibility in the administration of justice — a crucial factor in the speedy and fair disposition of cases. Each of them must do his share for in the last analysis the quality of justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among them." — Closing passage emphasizing the shared responsibility of bench and bar in the administration of justice, frequently cited in subsequent judicial ethics jurisprudence.

• Perez vs. Abiera, 64 SCRA 302 (1975) — Controlling precedent on the retention of administrative jurisdiction despite the respondent's retirement or cessation from office. The Court relied on this case to uphold its jurisdiction over Justice Badoy notwithstanding his retirement on October 19, 2002.

• Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that judicial officers are given contempt powers to hold counsel to proper appreciation of their duties, and that a judge should cite counsel in contempt rather than indulging in tantrums. Applied to find that Justices Badoy and De Castro should have cited Atty. Saguisag in direct contempt instead of ordering his physical removal.

• Echano vs. Sunga, 102 SCRA 738 (1981) — Followed. A judge who lost his cool during an argument in his sala and called the sheriff to take away the arguing attorney was admonished to be more prudent and restrained. Applied by analogy to admonish both justices for failing to exhibit judicial temperament.

• People vs. Bacor, G.R. No. 122895, April 30, 1999 — Followed. Established that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel for the accused. Applied to reject the charge of denial of right to counsel.

• Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 165 (1992) — Cited (concurring opinion of Justice Cruz) for the principle that a judge should not be moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the administration of justice.

• Tabao vs. Butalid, 262 SCRA 559 (1996) — Cited for the principle that bare allegations without sufficient evidence cannot support a charge of deceit or bad faith. Applied to dismiss the dishonesty and misrepresentation charges.

• Secretary of Justice vs. Bullecer, 56 SCRA 24 (1974) — Cited for the definition of gross misconduct as a judicial act that is corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.

• Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and should behave so as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary. Applied to find Justice Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice for his television appearance.

• Rule 3.04, Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that a judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to all lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. Applied to admonish both justices for failing to exhibit judicial temperament.

• Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Applied to find Justice Badoy guilty of undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion.

• Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires lawyers to observe the respect due to the courts. Applied to fault Atty. Saguisag for failing to comply with the court's order to stop arguing.

• Section 2, Rule 118, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that all agreements or admissions made during pre-trial shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against the accused. Applied to uphold the requirement that parties sign the Pre-trial Order.

• Section 4, Rule 118, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines the contents of a Pre-trial Order, including recitals of actions taken, agreements, admissions, facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Applied to confirm the Pre-trial Order's function.

• Section 2, Rule 119, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Mandates continuous trial until terminated, with the court to set cases after consultations with prosecutor and defense counsel. Applied to uphold the three-times-a-week hearing schedule and to clarify that "consultations" do not require party approval.

• Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Section 1) — Governs direct contempt punished summarily, including misbehavior in the presence of the court. Applied to indicate that respondents should have cited Atty. Saguisag in direct contempt rather than ordering his physical removal.

• Section 10, Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court (as amended) — Classifies conduct unbecoming a Justice as a light charge, punishable by a fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00 and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. Applied to penalize Justice Badoy for the ambulance incident.

• Section 9, Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court (as amended) — Classifies undue delay in rendering an order as a less serious charge, punishable by suspension or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Applied to penalize Justice Badoy for delay in resolving the oath-taking motion.

• Administrative Circular No. 3-90 (January 31, 1990) — Mandated all trial courts to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system. Applied to uphold the hearing schedule set by respondents.

• Circular No. 56-92 — Pertains to the speedy disposition of criminal cases with detention prisoners. Applied to support the setting of hearings three times a week given that the accused were detained.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.