Esteves vs. Bitong

The filing of a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional before the Supreme Court may review, via certiorari, a resolution of a COMELEC Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, through certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections; the proper mode is to elevate the Division's resolution to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration, and only the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves and private respondent Reynaldo Teh Bitong were rival candidates for the position of municipal mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Aurora in the 14 May 2007 national and local elections. The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to sit en banc or in two divisions and to promulgate its rules of procedure to expedite the disposition of election cases, with all such cases heard and decided in division and motions for reconsideration decided by the Commission en banc. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 5(c), Rule 3, provide that any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc.

Petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves and private respondent Reynaldo Teh Bitong were candidates for municipal mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Aurora in the 14 May 2007 elections. On 15 May 2007, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor, having garnered 3,342 votes against petitioner's 3,294 votes, a margin of 48 votes.

On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora, docketed as EPC No. 99 and raffled to Branch 96 presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren. The RTC issued a precautionary protection order directing the Municipal Treasurer and Election Officer of Casiguran to safeguard the integrity of all ballot boxes, lists of voters, and other election paraphernalia, and to bring them before the court. Private respondent filed an answer, which the RTC admitted in an Order dated 2 August 2007; in the same order, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of private respondent's counter-protest for non-payment of filing fee and ordered the creation of revision committees.

On 6 September 2007, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election protest, arguing that it was defective in form and substance because it did not specify the precincts where fraud and irregularities were committed. On 8 September 2007, the RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent then filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to nullify the RTC Order and to dismiss the election protest for failure to comply with Section 11(f), Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, which requires a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the protested precincts.

After hearing private respondent's application, the COMELEC Second Division issued a TRO on 6 December 2007 directing Judge Soluren to desist from further proceeding with EPC No. 99. Petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 180792, which the Court dismissed on 15 January 2008 for procedural deficiencies. On 29 February 2008, the COMELEC Second Division issued the assailed resolution nullifying the 8 September 2007 RTC Order and dismissing EPC No. 99, with Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissenting. Before the issuance of the assailed resolution, the third member of the Second Division, Presiding Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr., had retired from the service. Petitioner then filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction of the COMELEC Division: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC (Second Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
• Constitutional Majority Vote Requirement: Petitioner argued that the challenged resolution did not comply with the constitutional requirement that it must be decided by a majority vote of all the members of the Commission.
• Purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC: Petitioner argued that the challenged resolution negated the spirit and very purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.

The decision does not recount the specific arguments raised by the respondents in defense of the COMELEC resolution. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, only the private respondent is required to appear and defend the case, both on his own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent COMELEC, and prayed that the COMELEC be excused from filing the required comment.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies / Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition may be given due course when the petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc before resorting to the Supreme Court.
• Jurisdiction of the COMELEC Division: Whether the COMELEC (Second Division) has jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
• Constitutional Majority Vote Requirement: Whether the challenged resolution complied with the constitutional requirement that it be decided by a majority vote of all the members of the Commission.
• Purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC: Whether the challenged resolution negated the spirit and very purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies / Motion for Reconsideration: No. The petition was dismissed for being premature. The filing of a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional before the Supreme Court may review a Division resolution via certiorari, and the petition did not allege that such a motion was filed.
• Jurisdiction of the COMELEC Division: Not reached. Because the petition was dismissed on the ground of prematurity for failure to file a motion for reconsideration, the Court did not rule on the merits of this issue.
• Constitutional Majority Vote Requirement: Not reached. The Court did not rule on this issue because the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.
• Purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC: Not reached. The Court did not rule on this issue because the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies / Motion for Reconsideration: The Court cited Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which states that all election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution, and that any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court held that under these constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Citing Ambil vs. Commission on Elections, the Court held that its power of review of COMELEC rulings is limited only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final resolution of its Division; the Supreme Court has no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. Pursuant to Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a resolution issued by a Division must first be elevated to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court cited Alcosero vs. NLRC for the settled rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution, or decision of the tribunal, board, or office is, subject to well-recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari, the rationale being that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board, or office an opportunity to rectify errors before resort to the courts. Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows review of a Division resolution by the COMELEC en banc, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was premature. The petition did not allege that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The Court cited Palomado vs. NLRC for the rule that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioner's own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. Citing Joson III vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before seeking judicial intervention to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. Citing Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. vs. Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association - Federation of Free Workers, the Court held that the premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

• Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — A litigant must first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before seeking judicial intervention, in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner's direct resort to the Supreme Court was premature because he failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, which is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.
• Motion for Reconsideration as Condition Sine Qua Non — The filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution, or decision of a tribunal, board, or office is, subject to well-recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari. The rationale is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board, or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc was fatal to his petition.
• Limited Review of COMELEC Division Resolutions — The power of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the proper mode for the petitioner was to elevate the Division's resolution to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.

• "Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case: the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the motion for reconsideration requirement before the Supreme Court may review a COMELEC Division resolution.
• "As held in Ambil v. Commission on Elections, the power of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections." — This passage defines the scope of the Supreme Court's review power over COMELEC rulings, limiting it to en banc decisions.
• "The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution or decision of the tribunal, board or office is, subject to well-recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for requiring a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent to certiorari.

• Ambil vs. Commission on Elections, 398 Phil. 257 (2000) — Controlling precedent establishing that the Supreme Court's power of review of COMELEC rulings is limited to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not those of its Divisions.
• Repol vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161418, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 321 — Cited for the rule that failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
• Baytan vs. COMELEC, 444 Phil. 812 (2003) — Cited for the proposition that all election cases shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and motions for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
• Alcosero vs. NLRC, 351 Phil. 368 (1998) — Cited for the settled rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari.
• Palomado vs. NLRC, 327 Phil. 472 (1996) — Cited for the rule that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Joson III vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160562, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 360 — Cited for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. vs. Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association - Federation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 142666, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 45 — Cited for the rule that the premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

• Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and shall promulgate its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases, with all such cases heard and decided in division, and motions for reconsideration decided by the Commission en banc. Applied to require the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc before resorting to the Supreme Court.
• Section 7, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Provides that each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from submission for decision or resolution, and that any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. Applied to establish the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the motion for reconsideration requirement.
• Section 5(c), Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc, except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. Applied to require the petitioner to elevate the Division's resolution to the COMELEC en banc.
• Section 11(f), Rule 2, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC (2007) — Requires an election protest or petition for quo warranto to specifically state a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the protested precincts. This was the provision private respondent invoked in his motion to dismiss the election protest.
• Section 5, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that only the private respondent is required to appear and defend the case, both on his own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent. Applied by the OSG in moving that the COMELEC be excused from filing a comment.
• Rule 64, Rules of Civil Procedure — Identified as the mode by which a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Ruben T. Reyes, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Arturo D. Brion concurred in the decision.

• Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (COMELEC Second Division) — The decision notes that Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a dissenting opinion to the assailed COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 29 February 2008, which nullified the RTC Order and dismissed EPC No. 99. The text does not provide the substance of this dissenting opinion.