Estate of Tongco vs. Vianzon

The dead man's statute in section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not bar a widow from testifying in an action brought by the administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, because the action is not brought against the estate or upon a claim against it, and cross-examination on prohibited matters waives the objection; the article 1407 presumption that spousal property is conjugal yields to decisive proof that the property belongs exclusively to the wife.

Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon were spouses married on July 5, 1894. After Marcelino died on July 8, 1925, his niece Josefa Tongco was named administratrix of his intestate estate. The dispute implicated article 1407 of the Civil Code, which presumes all spousal property to be conjugal partnership property; section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the dead man's statute; and section 38 of Act No. 496, the Land Registration Law, which governed revision of decrees.

Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. Marcelino died on July 8, 1925, leaving Anastacia as his widow. Josefa Tongco, the deceased's niece, was named administratrix of his intestate estate.

Shortly before his death, Marcelino presented claims in a cadastral case asking that titles to certain properties be issued in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife. Corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death. The lots involved included Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491, covered by decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925 and original certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297, as well as lot No. 460.

The widow asserted that the property in dispute belonged exclusively to her, while the estate, represented by the administratrix, sought to have it assigned to Marcelino's estate. The trial judge found that the widow had proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, and further found that one-half of the value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani, amounting to P10, belonged to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco and had to appear in the estate inventory. On appeal, the estate challenged those findings and the trial judge's ruling that the widow was competent to testify.

• Competency of the Widow: Appellant argued that the widow's testimony should be discarded under section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it concerned matters of fact occurring before Marcelino Tongco's death and was offered against the administratrix of the estate; without her testimony, the article 1407 presumption of conjugal property and the Torrens titles would establish that the property belonged to the conjugal partnership or estate.
• Findings of Fact and Discretionary Power: Appellant assigned as errors the trial judge's findings of fact and exercise of discretionary power in the property case and the cadastral case.

• Competency of the Widow: Whether the widow Anastacia Vianzon was competent to testify despite section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits parties from testifying against an executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate of a deceased person as to matters occurring before the death.
• Ownership of the Disputed Property: Whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the estate of Marcelino Tongco or set aside as belonging exclusively to the widow, in light of the article 1407 presumption that all spousal property is conjugal partnership property and the Torrens titles.
• Findings of Fact and Discretionary Power: Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in his findings of fact and rulings, and in denying the motion for a new trial.

• Competency of the Widow: Yes. The widow was competent to testify. Section 383 applies only where the action or claim is against the estate; the actions here were not brought against the administratrix or upon claims against the estate, and cross-examination on prohibited matters waived the objection.
• Ownership of the Disputed Property: The property belonged exclusively to the widow. Although article 1407 presumes conjugal partnership property, the widow proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property belonged exclusively to her.
• Findings of Fact and Discretionary Power: No reversible error. The trial judge's findings and rulings were adhered to, and no prejudicial error was noted in the proceedings.

• Competency of the Widow: The dead man's statute uses "against" twice. The actions were not brought against the administratrix of the estate, nor upon claims against the estate. In the first case, the action was by the administratrix to enforce a demand by the estate. In the second, the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where, in one sense, there is no plaintiff and no defendant. The Court cited Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archibishop of Manila on the nature of cadastral proceedings and Fortis vs. Gutierrez Hermanos as in point by analogy; Maxilom vs. Tabotabo and Kiel vs. Estate of P. S. Sabert were distinguishable. The purpose of the statute is to guard against false testimony by a surviving party, but it was designed to aid in arriving at the truth, not to suppress it. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party cross-examined the interested person on prohibited matters. Thus the witness was competent.
• Ownership of the Disputed Property: Article 1407 creates a presumption that all property of the spouses is partnership property absent proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or wife. Even proceeding on that assumption, the widow proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, unless her testimony were disregarded. No reversible error was committed in denying the motion for a new trial because it was not certain that the motion rested on a legal foundation or that granting it would have changed the result.
• Findings of Fact and Discretionary Power: The assigned errors concerning findings of fact and the trial judge's discretionary power did not warrant reversal. The result was to adhere to the findings and rulings of the trial judge, and no prejudicial error was noted.

• Dead Man's Statute (Section 383, Code of Civil Procedure) — Prohibits parties or assignors of parties, or persons in whose behalf an action is prosecuted, from testifying against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person upon a claim or demand against the estate, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased. The purpose is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony by the surviving party, but the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and not to suppress it. The statute uses the word "against" twice and applies only where the action or claim is against the estate. Here, the actions were not brought against the administratrix or upon claims against the estate, so the widow was competent to testify.
• Presumption of Conjugal Partnership Property (Article 1407, Civil Code) — All property of the spouses is presumed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption is rebuttable; decisive and conclusive proof that the property belongs exclusively to the wife overcomes it. In this case, the widow's testimony proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the disputed property belonged exclusively to her.
• Nature of Cadastral Proceedings — In cadastral proceedings, in one sense there is no plaintiff and no defendant. This characteristic affects the application of the dead man's statute, because the statute is directed at actions or claims brought against an estate. The Court relied on Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archibishop of Manila for this point.
• Waiver of Dead Man's Statute by Cross-Examination — A waiver of the dead man's statute is accomplished when the adverse party undertakes to cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters. In this case, the adverse party cross-examined the widow on the prohibited matters, so the objection was waived.

• "The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the competency of the widow, explaining why section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not bar her testimony.
• "It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on ownership, holding that the article 1407 presumption was overcome by the widow's decisive proof of exclusive ownership.
• "Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters." — This passage establishes the waiver rule under the dead man's statute, an alternative ground for holding the widow competent to testify.
• "The result, therefore, must be to adhere to the findings and rulings of the trial judge. No prejudicial error is noted in the proceedings." — This passage states the standard of review applied to the trial judge's findings of fact and discretionary rulings, leading to affirmance.

• Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archibishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120 (1920) — Cited for the nature of cadastral proceedings, supporting the conclusion that the dead man's statute did not apply because cadastral proceedings lack a plaintiff and defendant in the ordinary sense.
• Fortis vs. Gutierrez Hermanos, 6 Phil. 100 (1906) — Cited as in point by analogy on the application of the dead man's statute.
• Maxilom vs. Tabotabo, 9 Phil. 390 (1907) — Cited as distinguishable from the present case on the application of the dead man's statute.
• Kiel vs. Estate of P. S. Sabert, 46 Phil. 193 (1924) — Cited as distinguishable; the Court noted that the distinction appears at page 197 of the decision.
• Stair vs. McNulty, 133 Minn. 136 (1916) — Cited for the rule that cross-examination of an interested person on prohibited matters waives the objection under the dead man's statute.
• Whitney vs. Fox, 166 U.S. 637 (1897) — Cited among the authorities on the dead man's statute.

• Article 1407, Civil Code — Presumes that all property of the spouses is conjugal partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The Court assumed the presumption but held that the widow proved decisively and conclusively that the disputed property belonged exclusively to her.
• Section 383, Code of Civil Procedure — The dead man's statute, which prohibits parties from testifying against an executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate of a deceased person as to matters occurring before the death. The Court held it did not bar the widow's testimony because the actions were not brought against the estate or upon claims against it, and because cross-examination on prohibited matters waived the objection.
• Section 38, Act No. 496 — The Land Registration Law provision invoked by the trial court to annul the decrees and original certificates of title for lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491 and to order new decrees and certificates in the name of Anastacia Vianzon as exclusive property. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Avanceña, C.J.; Johnson, J.; Street, J.; Villamor, J.; Johns, J.; Romualdez, J.; Villa-Real, J.