Estate of Gliceria A. del Rosario vs. Severina Narciso, et al.

A will should not be denied probate on dubious grounds, and when the evidence is incomplete or insufficient to establish or disprove any essential fact in an appealed probate proceeding, the appellate court has the authority and obligation to remand the case for further proceedings so that the evidence may be completed. In probate cases, courts should disregard the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence to ensure that nothing less than the evidence of which the matter is susceptible is presented before a document purporting to be a will is probated or denied probate.

The case involves the settlement of the testate estate of Gliceria A. del Rosario, who died at an advanced age. The oppositors were divided into two groups: the "testate heirs," who stood to inherit under a prior will allegedly executed in 1956, and the "intestate heirs," who would inherit in case of intestacy. The will in question, Exhibit D, was purportedly executed on December 29, 1960. The oppositors did not question the authenticity of the will or the genuineness of the signatures appearing thereon; rather, the opposition centered on the alleged lack of testamentary capacity and supposed irregularities in execution, including the claim that the testatrix was blind or had defective eyesight and could not have read the will.

Gliceria A. del Rosario was an elderly woman, more than 91 years old at the time of the alleged execution of the will on December 29, 1960. She had undergone a cataract operation on her right eye in 1956 and was operated on her left eye for glaucoma on August 8, 1960 by Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis, her ophthalmologist, who had her under medical supervision from March 11, 1960 up to 1963. The purported will, Exhibit D, was opposed by several persons who were divided into "testate heirs" and "intestate heirs." The testate heirs claimed that the true will of the deceased was one executed on June 9, 1956 before Notary Public Jose Ayala, while the intestate heirs opposed probate on grounds including the physical appearance of the will, lack of testamentary capacity, inconsistencies in the testimonies of the attesting witnesses, and suppression of material evidence.

The oppositors Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento and Pascuala Narciso-Manahan specifically contended that from August 30, 1960 up to December 29, 1960, the testatrix was a blind woman for reading purposes and could not have read the will. The proponent presented the testimonies of three attesting witnesses — Francisco Decena, Francisco Lopez, and Vicente Rosales — who uniformly declared that the testatrix read the will silently in their presence before signing it. The intestate heirs presented Dr. Tamesis, who testified regarding the condition of the testatrix's eyes based on his clinical records. Dr. Tamesis's testimony was the primary basis for the Court's earlier decision disallowing the will.

Upon review in the motion for reconsideration, the Court re-examined Dr. Tamesis's testimony and found it to be ambiguous, equivocal, and incomplete. The Court noted that the doctor's testimony referred principally to the left eye, which he had operated on, and that his references to the right eye were based on "farfetched data" set down by his assistant. The Court also found that the notation of "20/60" which the doctor referred to was actually "20/40" as clearly visible in Exhibit 3-B, and that the doctor's statement that the notation was "not for near" referred to the fact that the notation was a record of visual acuity for distance vision on the Snellen chart, not a definite indication of reading capacity. The doctor never gave any direct evidence that the testatrix could not have read the will on December 29, 1960, and there was nothing in his records indicating that he had examined her for reading capacity anywhere near that date.

• Article 808 Application: Petitioner-appellee argued that Article 808 of the Civil Code applies solely to a blind testator and does not include one with defective eyesight or one who is illiterate or cannot read.
• Probative Value of Dr. Tamesis's Testimony: Petitioner-appellee contended that the testimony of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis, upon which the disallowance of the will was based, has no probative value because it is premised upon a grave factual error, is contradicted by his own clinical record, and is glaringly superficial and evasive.
• Testatrix's Capacity to Read: Petitioner-appellee maintained that the testatrix was not blind, that she could read, and that she did actually read the will in question, Exhibit D.
• New Trial: Petitioner-appellee prayed that, should the Court believe it necessary to reopen the case, a new trial be granted for the purpose of admitting additional evidence showing that the testatrix was not blind, could read, and did actually read the will.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Disallowance: The oppositors-appellants argued in their opposition to the motion that there were other considerations stated in the decision additionally supporting the conclusion that the testatrix was incapable of reading the will, such as the numerous typographical errors in the document and its informal and untidy appearance, which suggested that the testatrix might not have been capacitated to read the same.
• Grounds for New Trial: The oppositors-appellants contended that the alternative motion for new trial was not based on the ground of newly discovered evidence within the contemplation of Section 1 of Rule 53.

• Reading Capacity of Testatrix: Whether the evidence on record sufficiently established that Gliceria A. del Rosario could not have read the will, Exhibit D, on December 29, 1960, considering the condition of her eyes.
• Probative Value of Dr. Tamesis's Testimony: Whether the testimony of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis, upon which the disallowance of the will was based, had probative value sufficient to support the conclusion that the testatrix was incapable of reading the will.
• Remand for Further Proceedings: Whether the case should be remanded to the court a quo for reception of additional evidence on the issue of the testatrix's capacity to read the will.

• Reading Capacity of Testatrix: The evidence was insufficient to determine with fairness and justice whether the testatrix could have read the will on December 29, 1960. The direct evidence of the three attesting witnesses that the testatrix read the will silently in their presence stood uncontradicted by any direct evidence of the oppositors.
• Probative Value of Dr. Tamesis's Testimony: No. Dr. Tamesis's testimony was ambiguous, indefinite, equivocal, and even misleading on the vital issue of fact, and did not provide adequate basis for the conclusion that the right eye of the testatrix could or could not read on August 30, 1960, much less on December 29, 1960.
• Remand for Further Proceedings: Yes. The case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings to allow the parties to present additional, more definite, unequivocal, and convincing evidence on the pivotal question of whether the testatrix could have read the will before signing it.

• Reading Capacity of Testatrix: The Court reasoned that the evidence before it with respect to the capacity of the testatrix to read on December 29, 1960 consisted of, on the part of the appellee, direct evidence of the three attesting witnesses who uniformly declared that the testatrix read the will silently in their presence before signing, corroborated by court records and other documents; and on the part of the intestate heirs, only the testimony of Dr. Tamesis. The Court found that the doctor's testimony was vague as to whether he was testifying as a professional expert or from actual personal knowledge, and that he based his answers on "as far as my record is concerned" rather than on present or past recollection. The Court also noted that the doctor's reference to the "counting fingers" method referred only to the left eye, not the right eye, and that the doctor never gave any direct evidence that the testatrix could not have read the will on December 29, 1960.

• Probative Value of Dr. Tamesis's Testimony: The Court conducted a detailed examination of Dr. Tamesis's testimony and found several material defects. First, the Court re-examined Exhibit 3-B and found that the notation was actually "20/40," not "20/60" as the doctor had stated. Second, the doctor's answer that the notation was "not for near" was incomplete and susceptible of misinterpretation, as it referred to the fact that the notation was a record of visual acuity for distance vision on the Snellen chart, not a definite indication of reading capacity. Third, the doctor's prescription was only for distance vision, and no prescription was given for reading. Fourth, the doctor's testimony that the patient could "see only forms but not read" referred to the left eye, and his answer regarding the right eye — "the same, although the vision on the right eye is even better than the left eye" — was devoid of concrete information on the point at issue. The Court also noted that it is generally known that almost normal vision is usually restored after a successful cataract operation, and that the entry for September 22, 1960 on Exhibit 3-B indicated that the vision of the patient's right eye had improved to 20/30, approximating almost normal acuity.

• Remand for Further Proceedings: The Court held that the very existence of a purported testament is prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby. The Court emphasized that in probate cases, courts should disregard the ordinary rules of procedure and of evidence to the end that nothing less than the evidence of which the matter is susceptible should be inquired to be presented before a document purporting to be a will is probated or denied probate. Whenever the court has reasonable doubt as to the material facts concerning the proper execution of a will, it should take the initiative of requiring the parties to take the appropriate step to erase such doubt. The Court cited Section 3 of Rule 51, which expressly empowers the Court to order a new trial for reasons other than newly discovered evidence, such as when the court feels that the reception of additional evidence on some points is needed to clear doubts engendered by the evidence already in the record. The Court also relied on the affidavits of Dr. Gemeniano de Ocampo and Dr. Roberto N. Sunga attached to the motion, which sufficiently indicated that better evidence was available upon which the Court could decide the vital issue with a more satisfactory degree of certainty.

• Probate Proceedings Are Not Ordinary Adversary Proceedings — In probate proceedings, the courts should disregard the ordinary rules of procedure and of evidence to ensure that nothing less than the evidence of which the matter is susceptible is presented before a document purporting to be a will is probated or denied probate. Unlike adversary proceedings wherein the rule is that the party in whose favor the evidence preponderates should be awarded the palm of victory, probate proceedings are instituted so that the state may see to it that a testator's will, if duly executed, may be legalized. The courts, as agents of the state, should not stop short of being fully convinced that there has or has not been compliance with the formalities required by law in the execution of the testament. If the opposing parties leave material evidence unpresented or unclarified, and the court has reason to believe that better evidence exists, the court should call for more complete and clearer evidence.

• Duty of Appellate Court to Remand for Further Proceedings — When it appears to the appellate court that the evidence is incomplete or insufficient to either establish or disprove any essential fact in an appealed probate proceeding, it is not only within its authority, but more of an obligation on its part, to return the case for further proceedings so that the evidence may be completed and the court may be provided with adequate and concrete basis for deciding the issues of authenticity and due execution of the will with as much degree of certainty as all the attendant circumstances will permit.

• Prima Facie Validity of a Purported Will — The very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby. A purported will should not be denied legalization on dubious grounds, otherwise the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation.

• "Whenever the court has reasonable doubt as the material facts concerning the proper execution of a will, it should take the initiative of requiring the parties to take the appropriate step to erase such doubt." — This passage articulates the Court's view of the proactive role of courts in probate proceedings, which formed the basis for remanding the case for further evidence.

• "Unlike in adversary proceedings wherein the rule is that the party whose favor the evidence preponderates should be awarded the palm of victory, probate proceedings are instituted that the state may see to it that a testator's will, if duly executed, may be legalized, and the courts, as agents of the state, should not stop short of being fully convincing that there has been or has not been compliance with the requirements of the formalities required by law in the execution of the testament." — This passage distinguishes probate proceedings from ordinary adversary proceedings and explains the heightened duty of courts in probate cases.

• "The very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby." — This passage establishes the policy consideration that a will should not be denied probate on dubious grounds and that the state has an interest in effectuating a testator's wishes.

• Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 — Cited for the proposition that the probate of a will is indispensable and cannot be dispensed with or substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending public policy. The case also established that the presentation for authentication of a will does not prescribe.

• Testate Estate of Jovellana vs. Jovellana, 106 Phil. 1073 — Followed as controlling precedent for the proposition that when the appellate court cannot ascertain from meager evidence on record a material fact concerning the execution of a will, the case should be remanded to the trial court to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the controversial issue.

• Unson vs. Abella, 43 Phil. 494 — Cited for the proposition that what is decisive in probate proceedings is that the court is convinced by the evidence before it that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

• Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380 — Cited for the proposition that a testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution, neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; the proponent is not concluded by the testimonies of the attesting witnesses.

• Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742 — Cited in support of the principle that the court must be convinced by the evidence before it regarding the due execution of a will.

• Ramirez vs. Butte, 100 Phil. 635 — Cited in support of the principle that the court must be convinced by the evidence before it regarding the due execution of a will.

• Arroyo vs. Albay, L-15814, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 555 — Cited for the proposition that the dismissal of a petition for probate for non-appearance of petition counsel does not constitute res judicata.

• Article 808, Civil Code — The provision requiring that a testator who is blind or cannot read must have the will read to him before signing. The Court noted that the applicability of this provision to a testator with defective eyesight, as opposed to one who is completely blind, was a question that could be resolved when the case returns to the Court after further proceedings.

• Article 799, Civil Code — The provision establishing the presumption of soundness of mind of a testator in the absence of proof to the contrary, cited by the trial court in its decision.

• Article 800, Civil Code — The provision regarding the requirement of sound mind for testamentary capacity, cited by the trial court in its decision.

• Section 1, Rule 74, Rules of Court — Cited in Guevara vs. Guevara for the proposition that if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extra-judicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate.

• Section 4, Rule 75, Rules of Court — The provision penalizing a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos the failure of a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the court or the executor named therein, cited to emphasize the law's concern for the indispensability of probating a will.

• Section 5, Rule 75, Rules of Court — The provision allowing the detention of a custodian of a will who fails to deliver it to the court, cited to emphasize the law's concern for the indispensability of probating a will.

• Section 5, Rule 76, Rules of Court — The provision requiring that at least one attesting witness must testify even when the allowance of a will is not opposed.

• Section 11, Rule 72, Rules of Court — The provision stating that what is decisive in probate proceedings is that the court is convinced by the evidence before it that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.

• Section 1, Rule 53, Rules of Court — The provision regarding new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, which the Court noted was not the basis of the motion for reconsideration.

• Section 3, Rule 51, Rules of Court — The provision expressly empowering the Court to order a new trial for reasons other than newly discovered evidence, such as when the court feels that the reception of additional evidence on some points is needed to clear doubts engendered by the evidence already in the record.

Zaldivar, Fernando, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concurred.