Estate of Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc.

When a special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general terms while a general statute (the Labor Code) treats the same subject in particular terms, the particular provisions of the general statute prevail; thus, disputes involving the interpretation or implementation of a collective bargaining agreement—even those filed by overseas Filipino workers—fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code, not the Labor Arbiter under Section 10 of R.A. 8042.

Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers, Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., as a seaman on a contractual basis since 1986. He was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), which served as the collective bargaining agent for GCI's seafarers. A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existed between AMOSUP and GCI, containing provisions on death benefits (Article 20(A)1 and Article 20(A)2) and a dispute settlement clause (Article 13.1) requiring unresolved disputes over CBA interpretation to be settled through negotiation, conciliation, or voluntary arbitration. As an overseas Filipino worker, Nelson's employment was also governed by R.A. 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) and the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.

Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers, Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., beginning in 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun, on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed aboard petitioners' vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle. At the time of his employment, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), which served as the collective bargaining agent for GCI's seafarers.

On August 13, 2000, twenty-five days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. His widow, Merridy Jane P. Dulay, thereafter sought death benefits through the grievance procedure provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI. On January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was declared "deadlocked" as respondents refused to grant the benefits sought.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. She claimed entitlement to the aggregate sum of US$90,000.00 pursuant to Article 20(A)1 of the CBA. Three days later, on March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelson's brother, received ₱20,000.00 from respondents pursuant to Article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification" acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability. Merridy Jane contended that the ₱20,000.00 already received should be considered an advance payment of the total claim of US$90,000.00.

Respondents countered that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action because no employer-employee relationship existed between GCI and Nelson at the time of his death, as his contract had already been completed. They further argued that Nelson had no claims for sick leave allowance or medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract, and that the widow was not entitled to death benefits because respondents were liable only "in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract" and the cause of death was not work-related. Respondents admitted liability only under Article 20(A)2 of the CBA, which they claimed had already been discharged. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow and ordered payment of ₱4,621,300.00, the equivalent of US$90,000.00 less ₱20,000.00, though it found the proximate cause of death was not work-related. The NLRC affirmed the grant of death benefits but reversed the finding on proximate cause. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that jurisdiction belonged to the voluntary arbitrator, not the Labor Arbiter, because the case essentially involved the interpretation and application of CBA provisions.

• Jurisdiction under R.A. 8042: Petitioner contended that Section 10 of R.A. 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers.
• Amendment of Labor Code: Petitioner argued that Section 10 of R.A. 8042 amended Article 217(c) of the Labor Code, which otherwise confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

• Jurisdiction under the Labor Code: Respondents insisted that Article 217(c) and Article 261 of the Labor Code remain the governing provisions with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements, and that under these provisions, jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators.
• No employer-employee relationship at time of death: Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because no employer-employee relationship existed between GCI and Nelson at the time of his death, his contract having been completed.
• No entitlement to death benefits: Respondents argued that the widow was not entitled to death benefits because they were liable only "in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract," and the cause of death was not work-related. They admitted liability only under Article 20(A)2 of the CBA, which had already been discharged.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case, such that jurisdiction properly belongs to the voluntary arbitrator.

• Jurisdiction: No. The Court of Appeals did not err. Jurisdiction over the case belongs to the voluntary arbitrator, not the Labor Arbiter, because the dispute involves the interpretation or implementation of the CBA—a matter specifically governed by Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code, which prevail over the general money-claim jurisdiction provision of Section 10 of R.A. 8042.

• Jurisdiction: While R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers, Section 10 thereof speaks only in general terms of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment." It contains no specific provision addressing jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code, by contrast, are specific in vesting original and exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes in the voluntary arbitrator. The case thus presents a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general terms, while the general statute (the Labor Code) treats the same subject in particular terms; under this principle, the particular provisions govern. The basic issue raised by the widow—which CBA provision applies to death benefits—clearly involves interpretation or implementation of the CBA. Moreover, Article 13.1 of the CBA itself provides that disputes over the interpretation or application of the agreement shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation, or voluntary arbitration, and it is settled that when parties have validly agreed on a grievance procedure, that procedure should be strictly observed. This interpretation is further reinforced by Rule VII, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 8042 (as amended by R.A. 10022), which expressly states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code," and by Section 29 of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers, which provides that where parties are covered by a CBA, claims shall be submitted to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. These administrative rules, promulgated by DOLE and DFA in consultation with the relevant legislative committees, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect. The result is also consistent with the constitutional policy under Article XIII, Section 3, promoting the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, and with Article 211 of the Labor Code, which emphasizes the primacy of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes.

• General vs. Special Statute Rule (Particular over General) — When a special statute refers to a subject in general terms and a general statute treats the same subject in particular terms, the particular provisions of the general statute govern. Applied here: Section 10 of R.A. 8042 (special law) generally covers money claims of overseas Filipino workers, but Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code (general law) specifically address jurisdiction over CBA interpretation disputes; the specific provisions control.

• Binding Force of Administrative Rules — Rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to great respect, partaking of the nature of a statute. Applied here: the DOLE-DFA implementing rules of R.A. 8042 and the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions both specify that CBA-covered seafarer disputes go to voluntary arbitration.

• Strict Observance of Agreed Grievance Procedure — When parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and submitting disputes to voluntary arbitration, that procedure should be strictly observed. Applied here: Article 13.1 of the CBA between GCI and AMOSUP expressly provides for voluntary arbitration of interpretation disputes.

• State Policy on Voluntary Arbitration — The State shall promote the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, as mandated by Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and Article 211 of the Labor Code.

• "Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular." — This passage articulates the controlling interpretive principle: the particular provisions of the Labor Code on CBA interpretation disputes prevail over the general money-claim jurisdiction of R.A. 8042, forming the ratio decidendi of the case.

• "It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect." — This statement reinforces the Court's reliance on the DOLE-DFA implementing rules and the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions, both of which confirm that CBA-covered seafarer disputes fall under voluntary arbitration.

• "It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed." — This passage establishes the principle that the parties' own CBA dispute-settlement clause (Article 13.1) must be honored, independently supporting the referral to voluntary arbitration.

• Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 11 — Cited as support for the principle that when a special statute refers to a subject in general and the general statute treats it in particular, the particular provisions govern.

• Vivero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 268 — Cited for the doctrine that when parties have validly agreed on a grievance procedure and voluntary arbitration, that procedure should be strictly observed.

• ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251 — Cited for the principle that administrative rules and regulations interpreting the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.

• Landbank of the Philippines vs. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012 — Cited in conjunction with ABAKADA for the same proposition on the binding force of administrative regulations.

• Navarro III vs. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 260 — Cited in support of the state policy to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes.

• Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) — Vests Labor Arbiters of the NLRC with original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including damages. The Court held this provision speaks in general terms and does not specifically address CBA interpretation disputes.

• Article 217(c), Labor Code — Provides that cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. The Court found this provision specific and controlling.

• Article 261, Labor Code — Vests the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators with original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. The Court applied this as the jurisdictional basis for referring the case to voluntary arbitration.

• Article 13.1, CBA between GCI and AMOSUP — Provides that disputes over the interpretation or application of the CBA shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation, or voluntary arbitration. The Court relied on this clause as the parties' own agreement to submit disputes to voluntary arbitration.

• Rule VII, Section 7, Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 8042 (as amended by R.A. 10022) — States that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code." The Court found this implementing rule consistent with and reinforcing its interpretation.

• Section 29, POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels — Provides that where parties are covered by a CBA, claims or disputes shall be submitted to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator; only in the absence of a CBA may parties opt for NLRC jurisdiction. The Court relied on this as administrative confirmation of the proper jurisdictional framework.

• Article XIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that the State shall promote the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation. The Court invoked this as constitutional support for its ruling.

• Article 211, Labor Code — Declares state policy to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining and voluntary arbitration as modes of settling labor disputes. The Court cited this as statutory reinforcement of the constitutional policy.

Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.