Estacion vs. Bernardo

An employer is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by his employee under Article 2180 of the Civil Code unless he proves that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, which requires more than mere possession of a driver's license by the employee—the employer must carefully examine the applicant's qualifications, experience, and record of service. The Court also held that when the plaintiff's negligence is merely contributory and not the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, damages shall be mitigated, and the negligent parties—including the owner and driver of the other vehicle—are jointly and severally liable.

Petitioner Larry Estacion was the registered owner of an Isuzu cargo truck driven by his employee, Bienvenido Gerosano. Respondent Noe Bernardo was a passenger of a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo and driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera. The case involves claims for damages arising from quasi-delict under Articles 2176, 2179, and 2180 of the Civil Code, as well as the application of Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which prohibits drivers from allowing persons to ride on running boards, step boards, or mudguards of motor vehicles while in motion.

On the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe Bernardo was traveling home to Dumaguete from Cebu. At Tampi, he boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720, driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera and owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo. Noe sat on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. When an old woman wanted to ride from San Jose, Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Niño, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between kilometers 13 and 14, the Fiera slowed down and stopped by the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by petitioner Larry Estacion and driven by Bienvenido Gerosano, traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where Noe was standing. The impact crushed Noe's legs and feet against the Fiera, causing him to fall to the ground. A passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center, where his lower left leg was amputated.

Police investigation reports showed that Noe was one of 11 passengers of the Fiera who suffered injuries; that when the Fiera stopped to pick up a passenger, the cargo truck bumped the rear left portion of the Fiera; and that only one tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on the road. Investigator Mateo Rubia drew a sketch showing the relative positions of the two vehicles, their distances from the shoulder of the road, and the skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck measuring about 48 feet.

On February 18, 1993, Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict against Estacion as the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano. Noe alleged that the proximate cause of his injuries was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and Estacion's negligence in the selection of a reckless driver and for operating a vehicle that was not roadworthy. Estacion and Gerosano filed their Answer denying the material allegations and filed a third party complaint against Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, alleging that the reckless imprudence of Quinquillera and his clear violation of traffic rules was the proximate cause of the accident.

Gerosano testified that he was driving the truck at about 40 kilometers per hour; that the Fiera was behind him but overtook him upon reaching the curve and blocked his way; and that he was 10 meters from the Fiera prior to the impact when he applied the brakes and tried to evade the Fiera but still hit it. The trial court found that the truck was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was truly driving at 40 kilometers per hour and was 10 meters from the Fiera, he had more than enough time to slacken his speed and avoid hitting it. The 48-foot skid mark and the extent of damage to the truck—broken windshield and damaged hood—further supported the finding of fast driving. The trial court also found that the faulty brakes of the truck caused the accident, as only one tire mark was found, which meant the brakes were not aligned.

The trial court ruled that Gerosano's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the incident, that Estacion was negligent in maintaining his vehicle and in the selection and supervision of his driver, and that Estacion and Gerosano were solidarily liable. The trial court dismissed the third party complaint. Only Estacion appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto. Estacion then filed the petition for review before the Supreme Court.

• Due Diligence of a Good Father of a Family: Petitioner contended that he established that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection of his employees but also in maintaining his truck roadworthy and in good operating condition.
• Negligence of the Fiera Driver and Owner: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in exonerating Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, whose negligence was the proximate cause of Noe's injuries; that Quinquillera overtook the cargo truck on the curve and suddenly cut into the latter's lane; that due to overloading, Gerosano was not able to see the brake lights of the Fiera when it suddenly stopped; and that overloading violates traffic rules and regulations, triggering the presumption of negligence under Article 2185 of the Civil Code.
• Contributory Negligence of Respondent Noe: Petitioner argued that Noe's act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera was in itself negligence on his part.
• Apportionment of Liability: Petitioner argued that assuming he and his driver were not entirely blameless, the negligence of Quinquillera was sufficient basis for delineating respective liabilities vis-à-vis their degree of negligence consistent with Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

• Factual Issues Beyond Review: Respondent Noe alleged that the first and second issues raised by petitioner are factual in nature and beyond the ambit of a petition for review.
• Presumption of Negligence: Respondent Noe argued that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of negligence and thus is liable for the negligence of his driver Gerosano.
• Third Issue Addressed to Co-Respondents: Respondent Noe argued that the third issue regarding the liability of Bandoquillo and Quinquillera is best addressed to those respondents.

• Proximate Cause and Negligence of the Fiera Driver: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera from liability when their negligence was allegedly the proximate cause of respondent Noe's injuries.
• Due Diligence in Selection and Supervision of Employee: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
• Due Diligence in Maintaining Roadworthiness: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee and in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition.
• Contributory Negligence of Respondent Noe: Whether respondent Noe's act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera constituted contributory negligence warranting mitigation of damages.

• Proximate Cause and Negligence of the Fiera Driver: Partially. The Court found merit in petitioner's claim that respondent Quinquillera was negligent for allowing overloading and for permitting Noe to stand on the Fiera's rear portion in violation of Section 32(c) of Republic Act No. 4136, and that respondent Bandoquillo, as employer, was presumed negligent for failing to rebut the presumption. However, the Court affirmed that Gerosano's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
• Due Diligence in Selection and Supervision of Employee: No. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of his driver under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, having failed to examine Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience, and service records.
• Due Diligence in Maintaining Roadworthiness: No. There was no proof that petitioner exercised diligence in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy, as there was no record of the alleged routine check-up conducted one day before the mishap.
• Contributory Negligence of Respondent Noe: Yes. Respondent Noe's act of standing on the left rear carrier of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight, constituting contributory negligence, and damages were mitigated on a 20-80 ratio.

• Proximate Cause and Negligence of the Fiera Driver: The Court found that the issue of negligence is factual in nature, and as a rule, factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive. However, the Court found cogent reason to review the factual findings to conform to the evidence on record. The Court agreed with the lower courts that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed with faulty brakes, as evidenced by the 48-foot skid mark, the single tire mark indicating misaligned brakes, and the extent of damage to the truck. The Court rejected petitioner's claim that the Fiera driver suddenly stopped after overtaking, noting that the sketch showed a distance of 145 feet from the curve to the tire mark, meaning the Fiera did not stop immediately after the curve. However, the Court found that Quinquillera was negligent in allowing overloading and in permitting Noe to stand on the rear portion of the Fiera, in violation of Section 32(c) of Republic Act No. 4136, which provides that no driver shall allow any person to ride on the running board, step board, or mudguard of his motor vehicle while in motion. Since Quinquillera was negligent, a presumption of negligence arose against his employer Bandoquillo, which was not rebutted. Thus, the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the third party complaint.

• Due Diligence in Selection and Supervision of Employee: The Court applied Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Citing Yambao vs. Zuñiga, the Court clarified that the "diligence of a good father" means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, and that for an employer to avoid solidary liability, he must present adequate and convincing proof of such diligence. The Court found that petitioner failed to show that he examined Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience, and service records. Gerosano testified that petitioner was his first employer in Dumaguete, that he was accepted on the very day he applied, that his driver's license was issued in Mindanao, and that he did not present any document of his driving record. The Court also held that petitioner's accompaniment of Gerosano in his first two trips did not conclusively establish due diligence in supervision, as petitioner failed to show that he formulated training programs and guidelines on road safety for his driver.

• Due Diligence in Maintaining Roadworthiness: The Court found no proof that petitioner exercised diligence in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition. While petitioner's mechanic testified that he made a routine check-up on October 15, 1982, one day before the mishap, and found the truck operational, there was no record of such inspection.

• Contributory Negligence of Respondent Noe: The Court agreed with petitioner that Noe's act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera was in itself negligence. Citing Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court defined contributory negligence as conduct on the part of the injured party contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. The Court found that Noe's act of standing on the left rear carrier showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight. Applying Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the plaintiff's negligence is only contributory, the plaintiff may recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded, the Court distributed the damages on a 20-80 ratio, following Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus, 20% was deducted from the actual and moral damages awarded. The Court further held, citing Tiu vs. Arriesgado and Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, that petitioner, Gerosano, Bandoquillo, and Quinquillera are jointly and severally liable for the 80% of the damages as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

• Diligence of a good father of a family in employer liability — Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer is presumed negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee and may be relieved of liability for the employee's quasi-delict only upon proof that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family. This requires more than the employee's mere possession of a professional driver's license; the employer must carefully examine the applicant as to his qualifications, experience, and record of service, and must show that he formulated training programs and guidelines on road safety for his employees. In this case, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption because he accepted Gerosano on the very day he applied, did not require documentation of his driving record, and presented no evidence of training programs or road safety guidelines.

• Contributory negligence — Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, when the plaintiff's negligence is only contributory and the immediate and proximate cause of the injury is the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The Court applied a 20-80 ratio in apportioning damages, requiring the contributory negligent plaintiff to bear 20% of the damages.

• Joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors — When the negligence of the driver of the vehicle on which the plaintiff was riding concurs with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, causing an accident, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages, regardless of whether the liability of one springs from contract and the other from quasi-delict. The Court applied this doctrine in holding petitioner, Gerosano, Bandoquillo, and Quinquillera jointly and severally liable for 80% of the damages.

• Violation of traffic regulations as negligence — Section 32(c) of Article III of Republic Act No. 4136 provides that no driver shall allow any person to ride on the running board, step board, or mudguard of his motor vehicle for any purpose while the vehicle is in motion. A driver's act of permitting a passenger to hang on the rear portion of a vehicle in a dangerous position creates undue risk of harm and constitutes negligence, giving rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver's employer.

• "The 'diligence of a good father' referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thus, when an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection." — This passage from Yambao vs. Zuñiga, quoted by the Court, defines the standard of diligence required of employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and establishes the presumption of negligence that the employer must rebut.

• "Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service." — This passage, also from Yambao vs. Zuñiga, articulates the specific requirements for due diligence in the selection of employees, which the Court applied to find petitioner liable.

• "When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded." — This is the text of Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which the Court applied to reduce the damages awarded to respondent Noe by 20% due to his contributory negligence.

• "Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages." — This passage from Viluan vs. Court of Appeals, quoted in Tiu vs. Arriesgado, establishes the basis for holding all negligent parties jointly and severally liable regardless of the source of their liability.

• Yambao vs. Zuñiga, G.R. No. 146173, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 266 — Controlling precedent on the meaning of "diligence of a good father of a family" under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, requiring employers to carefully examine applicants' qualifications, experience, and record of service, and to formulate training programs and guidelines on road safety.
• Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987, 148 SCRA 353 — Followed as the basis for apportioning damages on a 20-80 ratio where the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
• Tiu vs. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, September 1, 2004, 437 SCRA 426 — Followed for the rule that the owner and driver of the vehicle on which the plaintiff was riding and the owner and driver of the other vehicle are jointly and severally liable for damages.
• Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals — Cited in Tiu vs. Arriesgado for the rule of joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors.
• Viluan vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that it makes no difference whether liability springs from contract or from quasi-delict; the drivers and owners of both vehicles are jointly and severally liable.
• Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 374, 388 (1996) — Cited for the definition of contributory negligence.
• Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990, 189 SCRA 88, 93 — Cited for the rule that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.
• Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 293 — Cited for the underlying precept of Article 2179 on contributory negligence.
• Tugade, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 258, 280-281 (2003) — Cited for the rule that the employer is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by his employee and may be relieved only upon proof of due diligence.

• Article 2176, Civil Code — The general provision on quasi-delicts, providing that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. This is the basis of respondent Noe's complaint for damages.
• Article 2179, Civil Code — Provides that when the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages; but if his negligence was only contributory, the plaintiff may recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The Court applied this provision to reduce the damages by 20% due to respondent Noe's contributory negligence.
• Article 2180, Civil Code — Provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and that this responsibility ceases when the employer proves that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Court applied this provision to hold petitioner liable for the negligence of his driver Gerosano.
• Article 2185, Civil Code — Provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. Petitioner invoked this provision against respondent Quinquillera for overloading the Fiera.
• Section 32(c), Article III, Republic Act No. 4136 (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code) — Prohibits drivers from allowing any person to ride on the running board, step board, or mudguard of a motor vehicle while in motion. The Court found respondent Quinquillera negligent for permitting respondent Noe to stand on the rear portion of the Fiera in violation of this provision.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson, no part), Ynares-Santiago, J., Callejo, Sr., J., and Chico-Nazario, J. (on leave), concurred in the decision.