Estacio vs. Estacio

Adult children may be included in the stay-away directive of a protection order issued under Republic Act No. 9262 when the offender commits violence against the victim through or by using those adult children, as Section 8(d) of the law authorizes courts to designate "any family or household member" as a beneficiary of the stay-away relief, and the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children defines family members to include descendants regardless of age.

Roberto Estacio and Ma. Victoria Estacio were married on January 2, 1978 and had three children — Manuel Roberto, Maria Katrina Ann, and Sharlene Mae — all of whom were adults at the time of the controversy. The dispute arose in the context of domestic violence within the marital relationship, with Victoria alleging physical, verbal, and psychological abuse by Roberto. The legal framework governing the case is Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, a social legislation enacted to address domestic violence through, among other remedies, the issuance of protection orders — barangay, temporary, and permanent — designed to safeguard victims from further harm and facilitate their recovery of autonomy.

Roberto Estacio and Ma. Victoria Estacio were married on January 2, 1978 and had three children — Manuel Roberto, Maria Katrina Ann, and Sharlene Mae — all of whom were adults at the time of the controversy. The marital relationship was marred by Roberto's physical and verbal abuse of Victoria, witnessed by their children. His threats to kill her were so serious that the children advised their mother to leave the conjugal home, fearing for her life. Roberto also sent the children text messages manifesting his intent to commit suicide.

On December 7, 2011, Victoria filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City a petition seeking a permanent protection order under Republic Act No. 9262, with an urgent prayer for a temporary protection order. Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an ex-parte Temporary Protection Order prohibiting Roberto from threatening or committing acts of violence, from directly or indirectly harassing or communicating with Victoria, directing him to remove himself from the residence where Victoria lived, to stay away from Victoria and her children and other household members, and to cease and desist from using or going near any firearm. In his Answer, Roberto denied the allegations and prayed for damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses by way of counterclaim.

The RTC's January 18, 2012 Order modified the Temporary Protection Order to specifically name the three adult children — Manuel Roberto, Maria Katrina Ann, and Sharlene Mae — as persons from whom Roberto must stay away, noting that he would use them "to find a way to communicate to, and/or physically reach" Victoria. The modified order set a two-kilometer radius for the stay-away directive and a 500-meter exclusion from the gates of Marcelo Green Village. This order was extended several times during the trial. On February 20, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision making the protection order permanent.

Roberto appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he did not oppose the permanent protection order itself but questioned certain terms — particularly the inclusion of his adult children and the two-kilometer radius. He argued that "children" under Section 3(h) of RA 9262 covers only those below eighteen years old or those incapable of taking care of themselves. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision on March 19, 2014, ruling that Section 8(d) does not limit protection orders to women and their children but includes "any designated family or household member," and that the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children defines family members to include "parents and children" and "descendants" without age limitation. The appellate court found from Victoria's testimony that Roberto used their children to harass her — when he could not reach her directly, he sent their children degrading messages about their mother and copy-furnished Victoria, such as the text message: "[B]akit ninyo kinakampihan [ang] nanay nyo samantalang siya ay isang puta, siya ay magnanakaw." The children were also found to have been subjected to psychological violence, having witnessed Roberto's physical and verbal abuse of Victoria. Roberto then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

• Statutory Definition of "Children": Petitioner argued that when the alleged acts occurred, their children were already past eighteen years old, and thus the acts could not fall under the definition of "violence" under RA 9262 because Section 3(h) defines children as those under eighteen or older but incapable of protecting themselves. He conceded that adult children may be included in a stay-away directive but insisted the present case did not justify the law's application.
• Need for Separate Factual Determination: Petitioner maintained that the factual basis for a stay-away directive covering adult children must be determined separately from the issue of whether the wife is entitled to relief, as the family relations between husband and wife and those between father and children are related but ultimately independent of each other.
• Restorative Justice and Family Preservation: Petitioner argued that a stay-away directive judicially severs family relationships by removing physical presence among family members, and that restorative justice demands a rigorous determination of circumstances in each case, with doubts resolved in favor of preserving what remains of family relations. He cited Republic vs. Molina to support the proposition that actions resulting in severing family relations require rigorous judicial determination.
• Consent Requirement: Petitioner claimed that Section 11 of the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children requires the consent of any designated family member included in a protection order, and that their children never consented, as they wished to remain neutral.
• Proposed Harmonizing Interpretation: Petitioner proposed that adult children can only fall within the ambit of the law when (a) filing for protection orders on their mother's behalf, (b) included in the protection order provided they are also household members of their mother, or (c) included even if not household members, provided it would safeguard their mother from further harm, minimize disruption in her daily life, and facilitate her ability to independently regain control over her life.

• Statutory Coverage of Adult Children: Respondent argued, citing Section 8(d) of RA 9262 and the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, that the court can designate family members as beneficiaries of protection orders, including adult children. She maintained that there was undisputed evidence showing petitioner directly and indirectly harassed and inflicted psychological violence on his own children.
• Legislative Intent: Respondent cited congressional records to posit that the legislative intent behind RA 9262 was to cover children regardless of age, and that applying protection orders only to children below eighteen would suppress the law's purpose.
• Factual Nature of the Determination: Respondent countered that petitioner's claim — that the issue of who is covered by a protection order must be determined separately from whether the petitioning party is entitled to it — involves a factual determination outside the Supreme Court's power of review.
• Restorative Justice Misplaced: Respondent asserted that petitioner's reliance on restorative justice is misplaced, as restorative justice entails that offenders acknowledge their transgression, which petitioner had not done.
• Liberal Construction: Respondent cited Go-Tan vs. Tan and maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the liberal construction rule in ruling that family members can include adult children.

• Scope of Stay-Away Directive: Whether the adult children of Roberto and Victoria Estacio may be included in the stay-away directive under the Permanent Protection Order issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262.
• Consent Requirement: Whether the consent of designated family or household members is required before they may be included in a stay-away directive under Section 8(d) of RA 9262.
• Applicability of Restorative Justice: Whether the principle of restorative justice precludes the inclusion of adult children in a permanent protection order.
• Applicability of Republic vs. Molina Guidelines: Whether the guidelines in Republic vs. Molina regarding the severance of family relations apply to protection order proceedings.

• Scope of Stay-Away Directive: Yes. Adult children may be included in the stay-away directive, as Section 8(d) of RA 9262 authorizes courts to designate "any family or household member" without distinguishing by age, and the Rule defines family members to include descendants as a class.
• Consent Requirement: No. The consent requirement under Section 8(k) of RA 9262 applies only to reliefs not specifically enumerated in the law — i.e., the catch-all provision — and not to stay-away directives under paragraph (d), which are already specifically designed and granted by the law.
• Applicability of Restorative Justice: No. Restorative justice in the context of RA 9262 pertains to features that support victim protection and offender rehabilitation, such as counseling and treatment programs — not to the exclusion of family members from protection orders.
• Applicability of Republic vs. Molina Guidelines: No. Molina concerns petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, not protection orders, and its guidelines on the severance of marriage and family relations are wholly inapplicable to protection order proceedings.

• Scope of Stay-Away Directive: Neither RA 9262 nor the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children distinguishes children by age when referred to as covered by protection orders. Section 8(d) of the law simply provides "designated family or household member[s]" as possible beneficiaries. Section 4(c) of the Rule defines "members of the family" to include "husband and wife, parents and children, the ascendants or descendants, brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood, whether living together or not." Thus, when the law speaks of family members in the context of protection orders, it covers descendants as a whole class — even those no longer considered "children" under Section 3(h). Petitioner's insistence on a conflict between Section 3(h) and Section 8(d) is more imaginary than real, as courts have the discretion to designate family members who will be included, provided the designation serves the remedy's purpose: to safeguard the victim from further harm, minimize disruptions in her daily life, and let her independently regain control over her life. Petitioner himself conceded that adult children may be included if in line with these objectives. The law mandates liberal construction to advance its objectives, as applied in Go-Tan vs. Tan, where the Court allowed parents-in-law to remain impleaded as respondents because they conspired with the husband to inflict violence on the wife. Here, Roberto both directly and indirectly inflicted violence on Victoria — when he could not get any response from her, he used their children to contact and harass her, sending them demeaning messages about their mother and copy-furnishing Victoria. This conduct constitutes coercive control, recognized as a form of psychological violence under RA 9262. Whether Roberto committed acts of violence directly against his children is beside the point; that the children were exploited so he could indirectly harass Victoria is sufficient basis for their inclusion.

• Consent Requirement: Section 8(k) of RA 9262 requires the consent of family and household members only when a court grants a relief not mentioned in the law. It is a catch-all provision giving courts the space to devise reliefs responsive to the peculiar circumstances of each case. The consent requirement is a measure to ensure that reliefs ultimately granted are beneficial and protective of the affected persons' interests. This requirement is not necessary for specific reliefs already designed and granted by the law under paragraphs (a) to (j) of Section 8, including stay-away directives under paragraph (d). The same is replicated in the last paragraph of Section 11 of the Rule.

• Applicability of Restorative Justice: Restorative justice, as defined in Philippine law, is a principle requiring a process of resolving conflicts with maximum involvement of the victim, the offender, and the community. The Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children expressly states in Section 2 that it shall be liberally construed to promote the law's objectives pursuant to restorative justice, one of which is to ensure that both the offender and the offended party are given proper treatment. Protection orders have a dual function: protective reliefs aimed at preventing continuous harm, and rehabilitative features such as Section 11(k) of the Rule, which requires respondents to receive professional counseling. Restorative justice in this context does not preclude the inclusion of family members in protection orders; rather, it supports both the protection of victims and the rehabilitation of offenders through intervention programs. The Court added a directive requiring petitioner to undergo professional counseling, consistent with this framework.

• Applicability of Republic vs. Molina Guidelines: Republic vs. Molina concerns a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, not a protection order. The guidelines laid down in Molina on the severance of marriage and family relations must be read in the context of marriage nullity proceedings and are wholly inapplicable to protection order proceedings. The Constitution's and the law's regard for the protection of the family does not amount to a toleration of violence. RA 9262 does not intend to sever familial ties but to preserve and harmonize the family by protecting its members from violence and threats to their safety and security. When the husband employs psychological violence, the law steps in to protect the wife and the children, and the remaining members are regarded as the family to be protected.

• Liberal Construction of RA 9262 — Republic Act No. 9262 expressly mandates liberal construction to advance its objectives of protecting and ensuring the safety of victims of violence against women and children. Courts are bound to interpret its provisions in a manner that advances the intent behind the law. In this case, liberal construction supported the inclusion of adult children in the stay-away directive, as the law's purpose is to protect the victim from further violence, including violence committed indirectly through family members.

• Coercive Control as Psychological Violence — Coercive control is recognized as a form of psychological violence under RA 9262, though not expressly mentioned. It pertains to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic deprivation. In this case, Roberto's use of their children to harass Victoria — sending them degrading messages about their mother and copy-furnishing Victoria — constituted coercive control and psychological violence, justifying the children's inclusion in the protection order.

• Dual Function of Protection Orders — Protection orders under RA 9262 serve a dual function: (1) protective, aiming to prevent continuous harm to the woman, her children, or other household members, and (2) restorative, through rehabilitative features such as requiring the offender to undergo professional counseling and treatment programs. The Court applied this doctrine by amending the permanent protection order to require petitioner to receive professional counseling.

• Consent Requirement Limited to Catch-All Reliefs — The consent requirement under Section 8(k) of RA 9262 applies only to reliefs not specifically enumerated in the law — i.e., the catch-all provision for "such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary." Consent is not required for specific reliefs already designed and granted under paragraphs (a) to (j) of Section 8, including stay-away directives under paragraph (d).

• "A stay-away directive in a protection order may cover members of the household, including a couple's common children, if it is shown that the offender commits violence against the victim through the household members." — This is the opening sentence of the decision and encapsulates the core holding: that adult children may be included in a stay-away directive when the offender uses them as instruments of violence against the victim.

• "Neither Republic Act No. 9262 nor the Rule distinguishes children as to their age when they are referred to as being covered by protection orders. Notably, Section 8(d) of Republic Act No. 9262 simply provides 'designated family or household member[s]' as the possible beneficiaries of protection orders." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the statutory interpretation question, clarifying that the law's text does not impose an age limitation on family members covered by stay-away directives.

• "Thus, whether petitioner committed acts of violence directly against his children is beside the point. That the children were exploited so that he could indirectly harass respondent is sufficient basis for their inclusion in the stay-away directive." — This articulates the principle that indirect violence through family members suffices to justify their inclusion in the protection order, even absent direct violence against those members.

• "The Constitution's and the law's regard for the protection of the family does not amount to a toleration of violence." — This passage defines the relationship between constitutional family protection and anti-violence legislation, rejecting the argument that protection of the family as an institution precludes protective measures that separate violent offenders from other family members.

• Garcia vs. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) — Controlling precedent upholding the constitutionality of RA 9262 against an equal protection challenge, founded on substantial distinctions arising from the unequal power relationship between men and women. Cited for the proposition that the law is valid social legislation and for the scope of reliefs in protection orders, which are broadened to ensure the victim is afforded all remedies necessary to curtail the perpetrator's access.

• Go-Tan vs. Tan, 588 Phil. 532 (2008) — Followed precedent establishing that violence may be committed against a woman directly or indirectly by an offender through other persons, and that courts must liberally construe RA 9262 to advance its protective objectives. The Court allowed parents-in-law to remain impleaded as respondents because they conspired with the husband to inflict violence. Applied in this case to justify the inclusion of adult children whom the offender used as instruments of harassment.

• Republic vs. Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Distinguished and held inapplicable. Molina laid down guidelines for the severance of marriage and family relations in the context of petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, not protection order proceedings.

• Republic vs. Manalo, 831 Phil. 33 (2018) — Cited for the observation that marriage laws envision the family in its traditional sense, reinforcing an idea of the family that is far from the realities of many couples and children.

• Tani-De La Fuente vs. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017) — Cited for the recognition that coercive control is a form of psychological violence under RA 9262, though not expressly mentioned in the law.

• Section 8(d), Republic Act No. 9262 — Authorizes courts to direct the respondent to stay away from the petitioner and any designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court. Applied as the primary statutory basis for including adult children in the stay-away directive, the provision not distinguishing beneficiaries by age.

• Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines "children" as those below eighteen years of age or older but incapable of taking care of themselves. Petitioner argued this definition should limit the scope of protection orders, but the Court held that this provision does not conflict with Section 8(d), which uses the broader term "designated family or household member."

• Section 3(a)(C), Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines "psychological violence" as acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering, including intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse, and causing the victim to witness physical, sexual, or psychological abuse of a family member. Applied to characterize Roberto's coercive control through the children as psychological violence.

• Section 8(k), Republic Act No. 9262 — Catch-all provision allowing courts to grant "such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary," provided the petitioner and any designated family or household member consents. Held to apply only to reliefs not specifically enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (j), and thus the consent requirement does not apply to stay-away directives under paragraph (d).

• Section 4(c), Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC) — Defines "members of the family" to include "husband and wife, parents and children, the ascendants or descendants, brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood, whether living together or not." Applied to establish that family members covered by protection orders include descendants as a class, without age limitation.

• Section 11, Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC) — Replicates the reliefs available under Section 8 of RA 9262, including stay-away directives under paragraph (d), and adds paragraph (k) requiring the respondent to receive professional counseling. Applied as the procedural framework for the protection order reliefs and the Court's amendment requiring petitioner to undergo counseling.

• Section 41, Republic Act No. 9262 — Provides for counseling and treatment of offenders by the DSWD, including rehabilitative counseling and, when necessary, psychiatric treatment or confinement. Served as statutory basis for the Court's directive requiring petitioner to undergo professional counseling.

• Section 2, Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC) — Mandates liberal construction of the Rule to promote its objectives pursuant to the principles of restorative justice. Applied to support the liberal interpretation extending protection order coverage to adult children.

Justices Gesmundo, Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan concurred.