Esquivel vs. COMELEC

The ten-day period for filing an election protest under Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code is suspended during the pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy or a certiorari petition challenging the proclamation, and begins to run only from notice of the final resolution of that prior proceeding.

In the January 30, 1980 local elections, Apolinario R. Esquivel (Nacionalista Party) and Elpidio O. Cucio (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) contested the mayoralty of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. On February 1, 1980, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Esquivel mayor-elect. Cucio petitioned the Commission on Elections, which, on March 25, 1980, set aside the proclamation upon finding the board illegally constituted, ordered a new board to canvass, and directed that the COMELEC copy of the election returns be used. A recanvass was conducted, and Cucio was proclaimed mayor-elect on March 27, 1980. Esquivel immediately challenged the second proclamation in the Supreme Court and secured a temporary restraining order that prevented Cucio from taking office, leaving Esquivel in continued possession of the mayoralty.

The Election and Initial Proclamation: Esquivel and Cucio were the official candidates for mayor of Palayan City in the January 30, 1980 local elections. The City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Esquivel mayor-elect on February 1, 1980.

COMELEC’s Annulment and Cucio’s Proclamation: Cucio challenged the proclamation before the COMELEC, which, in a resolution dated March 25, 1980, found the board to have been illegally constituted. The COMELEC ordered the constitution of a new City Board of Canvassers, a recanvass using the COMELEC copy of the election returns, and a subsequent proclamation of the winners. The new board convened and proclaimed Cucio mayor-elect on March 27, 1980.

Esquivel’s Certiorari and the Restraining Order: The day after Cucio’s proclamation, on March 28, 1980, Esquivel filed a petition for certiorari and injunction in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 53475), seeking to annul the proclamation and to enjoin Cucio from taking his oath of office. The Court issued a temporary restraining order on the same day, prohibiting Cucio from taking his oath or, if already taken, from assuming the position of mayor. As a result, Esquivel continued to hold and discharge the office of mayor from March 27 until October 14, 1980, when the Court dismissed his petition and lifted the restraining order.

Dismissal of Certiorari and Filing of Election Protest: The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 53475 held that the COMELEC’s March 25, 1980 resolution was not issued with grave abuse of discretion, and that Esquivel had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not first bringing his complaint against the board of canvassers’ actuations to the COMELEC. Esquivel received notice of the dismissal on October 15, 1980. On October 24, 1980, he filed with the COMELEC a joint petition for annulment of proclamation (PP Case No. 180-A) and an election protest ad cautelam (E.P. Case No. 80-107).

Cucio’s Motion to Dismiss: Cucio opposed the election protest, raising the inconsistency between an action for annulment of proclamation and an election protest, and asserting that the protest was filed beyond the ten-day period under Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code, counted from March 27, 1980. The COMELEC deferred resolution and later, after dismissing the annulment case, ordered the protest to proceed jointly with Cucio’s own earlier protest (EPC No. 80-16). Cucio then elevated the jurisdictional issue to the Supreme Court.

• Late Filing and Loss of Jurisdiction: Cucio argued that Esquivel’s election protest (E.P. No. 80-107) was filed only on October 24, 1980, more than seven months after his proclamation on March 27, 1980, and thus far beyond the ten-day mandatory period prescribed by Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code. He maintained that the ten-day period is jurisdictional and could not be extended, and that the COMELEC therefore lacked authority to take cognizance of the protest.

• Absence of Justifiable Suspension: Cucio submitted that the pendency of Esquivel’s certiorari petition in G.R. No. 53475 did not toll the running of the period because no express suspension was granted by the Supreme Court and the statute makes no provision for interruption.

• Suspension of the Prescriptive Period: Esquivel contended that the ten-day period should be computed from October 15, 1980, when he received notice of the Supreme Court’s dismissal of his certiorari petition. He argued that from March 27 to October 14, 1980, he was in lawful possession of the office by virtue of the restraining order, making it illogical and unjust to require him to file an election protest for an office he was already occupying. The statutory period was thus suspended during the pendency of the certiorari case.

• Due Process and Lack of a Fresh-Period Grant: Esquivel also argued that his protest was filed within ten days of the dismissal of the prior case, and that a strict reading of Section 189 that would bar his protest would effectively deprive him of his right to due process, especially since the Supreme Court’s resolution in G.R. No. 53475 did not explicitly grant him a fresh ten-day period but such a period was implicit in the circumstances and in prior rulings of the Court.

• Timeliness of Election Protest: Whether Esquivel’s election protest (E.P. Case No. 80-107), filed on October 24, 1980, was seasonably filed within the ten-day period prescribed by Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code, given that his earlier certiorari petition challenging Cucio’s proclamation was pending and he remained in office under a restraining order for nearly seven months.

• Timeliness of Election Protest: The election protest was timely filed. The ten-day period under Section 189 was suspended during the pendency of Esquivel’s certiorari petition (G.R. No. 53475) and the effectivity of the Supreme Court’s restraining order. From March 27, 1980, when Cucio was proclaimed, until October 14, 1980, when the certiorari petition was dismissed and the restraining order lifted, Esquivel was in possession of the office of mayor. Requiring him to file an election protest while he was already holding the office would have been “illogical and absurd.” He had no cause or reason to seek such recourse during that period. The prescriptive period therefore began to run only upon his receipt of the notice of dismissal on October 15, 1980. The protest filed on October 24, 1980, fell well within ten days from that date. This conclusion was directly supported by Bacayo v. COMELEC, which held that the pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy suspends the ten-day statutory period for filing an election protest, and by Valenzuela v. COMELEC, which granted the losing party in a pre-proclamation controversy a period of ten days from notice of the resolution of dismissal to file a regular election protest or quo warranto suit. The Court further observed that to deny Esquivel recourse to an election protest merely because the resolution in G.R. No. 53475 did not explicitly grant a ten-day period would effectively deprive him of due process.

• Suspension of the Period for Filing an Election Protest During a Pre-Proclamation Controversy — Where a candidate timely challenges a proclamation through a pre-proclamation case or a certiorari petition and, by virtue of a restraining order or similar process, remains in possession of the office, the ten-day period under Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code for filing a regular election protest is suspended. The period resumes and begins to run only from the date the candidate receives notice of the final dismissal or resolution of the prior proceeding, and the candidate is entitled to a full ten days from that notice to institute the election protest. The rule rests on the logic that one who is already holding the office and is actively contesting the adverse proclamation has no reason to file a simultaneous election protest, and on the principle that the period should not run while the controversy that could moot the need for a protest remains unresolved. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to treat Esquivel’s protest, filed within ten days of notice of the dismissal of his certiorari petition, as seasonably filed despite the lapse of more than seven months from Cucio’s proclamation.

• “From March 27 until October 14, 1980, when said restraining order was lifted, Esquivel had assumed and discharged the office of mayor of Palayan City. Under this factual setting, it would have been illogical and absurd for Esquivel to have filed an election protest over an office which he himself was occupying at the time.”
• “The suspension of the 10-day statutory period for the filing of an election protest until such time as the Commission on Elections has finally decided the pending pre-proclamation controversy is but logical and just, since if the protestant prevails in the pre-proclamation controversy, there would be no further need for him to file a regular election protest.” (quoting Bacayo v. COMELEC)
• “To deny Esquivel recourse to an election protest because of an evident oversight in Our resolution of October 14, 1980 in G.R. No. 53475 to specifically grant him a period of 10 days within which to file such protest, would be to effectively deprive him of the fundamental right of due process.”

• Bacayo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 53499, Resolution — Followed as controlling precedent. The Court held that the COMELEC’s resolution suspending the prescriptive period for filing election protests while a pre-proclamation case is pending was not an encroachment on legislative power and was “logical and just.”
• Valenzuela v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 53532, July 25, 1980 — Followed. The case granted a losing party in a pre-proclamation controversy a ten-day period from receipt of the dismissal resolution to file a regular election protest or quo warranto suit, reinforcing the suspension doctrine.
• Abalos v. Domingo, G.R. No. 52665, Resolution of February 29, 1980 — Cited as the earliest instance where the Court deemed suspended the ten-day period during a pending pre-proclamation controversy.

• Section 189, 1978 Election Code — Mandates that a sworn petition contesting the election of any city official be filed with the Commission on Elections by any candidate for the same office within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The provision was interpreted as directory in the sense that its ten-day period may be suspended during the pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy or a related judicial challenge, in line with the principle that the law should not compel an absurdity and must respect due process.

Teehankee, J., Aquino, J., Abad Santos, J., De Castro, J., Melencio-Herrera, J., Plana, J., Vasquez, J., Relova, J., and Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurred.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, J., Concepcion Jr., J., and Guerrero, J., took no part.