Esquivel vs. Alegre

A supplemental judgment does not supersede, amend, or extinguish the original judgment; it merely bolsters or adds something to the primary decision and exists alongside it. The dispositive portion of a supplemental decision declaring certain persons successors-in-interest does not reverse or modify the merits of the original decision, which, once final, entitles the prevailing party to a writ of execution as a ministerial duty of the lower court.

The controversy originated from an unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 990) filed by Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno against the spouses Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto Esquivel in the City Court of Legaspi. The Alaurin spouses secured a final and executory judgment ordering the Esquivel spouses to vacate a 205‑square‑meter parcel of land (Lot No. 57, Legaspi Port District) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28. The Esquivel spouses challenged the title’s validity, but all courts—including the Supreme Court—upheld the ejectment, and the judgment became final on July 25, 1973. Before execution, the Esquivel spouses filed Civil Case No. 4883 (reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages, and preliminary injunction) before the Court of First Instance of Albay, and obtained an injunction. The Alaurin spouses sought certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-38826). During the hearing, the parties entered a joint manifestation agreeing to dismiss the certiorari and to try Civil Case No. 4883 on the merits, with the stipulation that “if the plaintiffs win … they shall be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction … otherwise, plaintiffs shall immediately vacate the premises and the defendants … restored to the possession of the land.” The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered trial. Following trial, the CFI dismissed Civil Case No. 4883 on October 29, 1975, dissolving the injunction. The Esquivel spouses appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Alaurin spouses sold the property to Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, who were impleaded via supplemental complaint. The trial court rendered a supplemental decision on July 31, 1979, declaring the Encinas spouses as successors-in-interest bound by the outcome of the appealed case. The original dismissal was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals and, on final review by the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 74339), the denial became final on October 6, 1986. The Esquivel spouses then moved for execution of the supplemental decision and took possession on May 23, 1987. A restraining order was issued against them, restoring the status quo. They subsequently filed a motion before the trial court praying for reconveyance and possession, which was denied in the orders challenged in this petition.

The Ejectment Case and Final Judgment:
Private respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno obtained a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 990 of the City Court of Legaspi, ordering petitioners Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto Esquivel to vacate Lot No. 57 (205 sq. m.) in Legaspi Port District, covered by OCT No. 28. The decision, which resolved the issue of prior possession in favor of the Alaurin spouses, was affirmed by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. By July 25, 1973, the ejectment judgment was final and executory.

The Reconveyance Suit (Civil Case No. 4883) and Joint Manifesto:
Before execution could proceed, the Esquivel spouses filed Civil Case No. 4883 on August 24, 1973, for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages, and preliminary injunction, against the Alaurin spouses and the City Sheriff. The trial court granted the injunction, prompting the Alaurin spouses to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari (G.R. No. L-38826). During the hearing, the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation agreeing to dismiss the certiorari, try Civil Case No. 4883 on the merits, and abide by the result: if the plaintiffs (Esquivel spouses) won, they would retain possession; otherwise, they would vacate and the defendants (Alaurin spouses) would be restored. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and directed the CFI to expedite trial. The Republic’s separate annulment suit (Civil Case No. 4602) against Alaurin’s title was dismissed on July 1, 1974. On October 29, 1975, the CFI Albay, Branch II, rendered a decision dismissing Civil Case No. 4883 and dissolving the preliminary injunction.

The Sale to the Encinas Spouses and Supplemental Complaint:
The Esquivel spouses appealed the dismissal. While the appeal was pending, the Alaurin spouses sold the property to Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 19, 1970, inscribed on OCT No. 28 on November 2, 1976. Petitioners filed a motion for leave to serve a supplemental complaint impleading the Encinas spouses. The trial court admitted the supplemental complaint. On July 31, 1979, the court rendered a supplemental decision declaring the Encinas spouses as successors-in-interest of the Alaurin spouses, bound by whatever result obtained in the appealed case. The Alaurin spouses’ certiorari against the supplemental decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeals and became final.

The Supplemental Decision and Finality of the Original Judgment:
The appeal from the original dismissal (AC-G.R. CV No. 01896) was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 10, 1986. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 74339). The petition was denied for lack of merit on July 2, 1986; the denial became final on October 6, 1986. Thus, the original decision dismissing the reconveyance suit attained finality.

Petitioners’ Attempt to Take Possession and the Contested Orders:
Invoking the supplemental decision, petitioners moved for execution and obtained an order from the trial court on December 2, 1986. On May 23, 1987, petitioner Cresenciana Atun took possession of the property. Private respondents filed a motion for contempt, which was denied, but the CFI Legaspi City, Branch X, issued a restraining order on June 8, 1987, commanding petitioners to vacate; police assistance was ordered to enforce the order. Petitioners then filed a motion on July 3, 1987, in Civil Case No. 4883 praying for reconveyance, cancellation of TCT No. 311, and immediate possession. Respondent Judge Angel M. Alegre denied the motion in the Order of July 21, 1987, stating the case had been decided against plaintiffs by the Supreme Court. A motion for reconsideration was denied on August 6, 1987, prompting the instant petition for certiorari.

• Effect of the Supplemental Decision: Petitioners maintained that the July 31, 1979 supplemental decision revised the original October 29, 1975 dismissal, tantamount to an amendment or reversal thereof, because the trial court found the evidence presented by supplemental plaintiffs preponderantly sufficient. They contended that the supplemental decision therefore superseded the original and entitled them to reconveyance and possession.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied their motion for reconveyance and possession, as the supplemental decision was already final and executory and should have been implemented.

• Nature of Supplemental Judgment: Respondents countered that a supplemental decision does not amend or supersede the original; it merely adds to it and exists alongside it. The dispositive portion of the supplemental decision only declared the Encinas spouses as successors-in-interest bound by the appealed case and did not disturb the original dismissal.

• Execution and Finality: Respondents argued that the original decision dismissing the complaint had become final and executory, and the prevailing parties—the Alaurin spouses and their successors—were entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution. The trial judge’s denial of petitioners’ motion merely enforced the final judgment and maintained the status quo, consistent with the parties’ joint manifesto.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents maintained that respondent judge acted within his ministerial duty to implement the final judgment, and that the issuance of the restraining order was proper to restore the parties to their rightful positions.

• Effect of Supplemental Decision: Whether the July 31, 1979 supplemental decision declaring the Encinas spouses as successors-in-interest modified, amended, or superseded the October 29, 1975 original decision dismissing Civil Case No. 4883, thereby entitling petitioners to reconveyance and possession.

• Effect of Supplemental Decision: The supplemental decision did not amend, revise, or supersede the original decision. A supplemental judgment does not take the place of or extinguish the existence of the original; it merely bolsters or adds something to the primary decision and exists side by side with it. The dispositive portion of the supplemental decision only declared Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas as successors-in-interest of Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, such that the outcome of the appealed case would be legally binding upon them. It did not adjudicate the merits of the original complaint for reconveyance and nullity of judgment, nor did it reverse the dismissal. Because the original decision dismissing the case had become final and executory on October 6, 1986, the prevailing parties (private respondents) were entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is a ministerial duty of the lower court. The restraining order of June 8, 1987 merely restored the status quo before petitioners’ unilateral taking of possession on May 23, 1987. No grave abuse of discretion attended respondent judge’s denial of the motion for reconveyance and possession.

• Distinction between Amended Judgment and Supplemental Judgment — An amended or clarified judgment involves a thorough restudy of the original and is an entirely new decision that supersedes the original. A supplemental judgment, by contrast, does not take the place of or destroy the existence of the original; it only bolsters or adds to the primary decision, existing side by side with it without extinguishing it. Applied here: the supplemental decision did not restudy the merits of the original dismissal and its limited declaration did not amend or reverse that dismissal.

• Finality of Judgment and Execution — Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution; issuance of such writ is a ministerial duty of the lower court, compellable by mandamus. The writ must conform to the judgment to be executed. Because the original decision had become final, the trial court correctly denied petitioners’ motion and maintained the status quo.

• “There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision … Following the Court's differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements.” — This passage defines the doctrinal distinction between amended and supplemental judgments.

• “The writ of execution must, however, conform to the judgment which is to be executed … which in this instant case, is the dispositive portion of the original decision in Civil Case No. 4883.” — Emphasizes that execution is limited to the terms of the original final judgment.

• Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 (1987) — Applied for the principles of res judicata on the issue of possession and for the rule that the trial court’s issuance of an order of execution is a ministerial duty once a higher court’s judgment is returned.

• Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964) and Sta. Romana v. Lacson, 104 SCRA 93 (1981) — Cited to define an amended judgment as an entirely new decision that supersedes the original.

• Aznar III v. Bernard, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988 — Relied on for the rule that a supplemental decision does not take the place of or extinguish the original; it exists side by side with it.

• Nunez v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 197 (1987); Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, G.R. No. 45875, June 30, 1988 — Cited for the principle that a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, which is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus.

• Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 (1982) — Applied for the requirement that a writ of execution must conform strictly to the judgment to be executed.

• Rule 39, Section 1, Rules of Court — Execution of final and executory judgments is a matter of right; the prevailing party is entitled to a writ, and its issuance is a ministerial duty. The trial court properly declined to order execution on the supplemental decision because the final and executory original judgment dismissed the complaint and was the operative disposition.

• Rule 10, Section 6, Rules of Court — Supplemental pleadings may be allowed to set forth transactions, occurrences, or events happening after the filing of the original pleading. The resulting supplemental judgment only supplements the original and does not supersede it, consistent with the decision’s holding that a supplemental decision exists side by side with the original.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.