Esposo vs. Epsilon Maritime Services, Inc., et al.

A seafarer's claim for total and permanent disability benefits fails where the complaint is filed before the 120-day (or extended 240-day) period for the company-designated physician's assessment, where the seafarer fails to submit to a post-employment medical examination within three working days from repatriation, and where work-relatedness and existence of the illness during employment are not established by substantial evidence.

Esposo was a seafarer continuously hired by Epsilon Maritime Services, Inc., a local manning agency, for and in behalf of its foreign principal W-Marine, Inc., as Chief Engineer since September 8, 2011. His last engagement was under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment dated October 25, 2012 for six months as Chief Engineer. Claims for a seafarer's disability benefits are governed by the Labor Code, the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), and any applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondents in the case are Epsilon, W-Marine, and Mr. Elpidio C. Jamora.

Esposo had been continuously hired by Epsilon, for and in behalf of its foreign principal W-Marine, as Chief Engineer since September 8, 2011. He was last hired on October 25, 2012 under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment for six months, with a basic monthly salary of US$2,550.00, 44 hours of work per week, overtime of US$1,170.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$765.00 per month, and point of hire in Makati City. Prior to this, he underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination on October 19 and October 25, 2012, and was declared fit to work albeit with the recommendation, “Hypertension Controlled with medication.” On November 22, 2012, he boarded the vessel M/V W-ACE. On June 20, 2013, he returned to the Philippines after his contract expired. On October 2, 2013, he filed a complaint for payment of disability benefits with the Labor Arbiter.

According to Esposo, sometime in the last week of April 2013, while performing his duties onboard the vessel, he felt uncomfortable and experienced severe chest pains, dizziness, difficulty of breathing, severe headache, and persistent perspiration. He reported the matter to the Master of the vessel but was advised to wait for his repatriation since his contract was about to end. His discomfort continued, and he was repatriated on June 20, 2013. The following day, he reported to Epsilon for his post-employment medical examination, but Epsilon merely informed him to take a rest and wait for their call. Due to his deteriorating condition, he sought medical examination and treatment from an independent physician, Dr. Romeo J. Santos of the Philippine Heart Center. In a Medical Certificate dated June 22, 2013, he was diagnosed with Coronary Heart Disease with a recommendation to undergo further tests. Subsequently, a Medical Certificate dated November 7, 2013 found him suffering from “S/P ACBG–4vessel” and declared him unfit to work from October 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. Esposo claimed that Epsilon never communicated with him nor provided him with medical attention or financial assistance, compelling him to shoulder all expenses for his examinations, medications, and hospitalization. Alleging that his health condition did not improve despite the lapse of more than 120 days and that he had been found unfit for seafaring duties by his independent physician, he filed a complaint for disability benefits, permanent disability compensation under the CBA, sickness allowance for 130 days, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and other benefits.

Respondents averred that during Esposo's entire stay onboard the vessel, he never complained of, suffered from, nor requested medical assistance for any health concerns except for one incident on December 17, 2012 involving “skin burn” as reflected in the vessel logbook. Towards the expiration of his contract, Esposo executed a Resignation Report dated April 29, 2013, requesting to be repatriated due to the impending expiration of his contract on May 21, 2013. After completion of his contract, he signed off from the vessel and arrived in Manila on June 20, 2013. Without submitting himself for mandatory post-employment medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines, he filed the complaint.

The LA found that Esposo failed to substantiate his allegation that he reported to Epsilon for post-employment medical examination within three working days upon his return, and that he had no reason to seek such examination because he was not medically repatriated. The LA also credited the medical logbook showing only a single instance of skin burn on December 17, 2012, and found that Esposo failed to prove he experienced physical discomfort onboard and reported it to the Master. The NLRC, on the other hand, gave credence to Esposo's claim that he submitted himself for medical examination within 72 hours from repatriation, albeit to a private physician, and reasoned that his illness could not have been acquired between June 20, 2013 and June 22, 2013. The CA found that Esposo was repatriated for a finished contract and not for medical reasons, which undermined his claim of illness onboard the vessel.

• Finality and Execution of NLRC Decision: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the NLRC decision although it had already become final and executory, there being no appeal provided by law therefrom.
• Satisfaction of Judgment: Petitioner faulted the CA for not dismissing respondents' petition when respondents had voluntarily settled the judgment award during conciliation and pre-execution proceedings before the NLRC.
• Illness During Employment: Petitioner maintained that his employment contract had not yet expired when he felt symptoms of his cardiovascular disease in the last week of April 2013, including severe headache, chest pain, dizziness, rapid pulse beat, and persistent perspiration.
• Medical Repatriation: Petitioner argued that he was medically repatriated because the Master of the vessel advised him to wait for his repatriation upon the expiration of his employment contract so that he could be properly taken care of medically in Manila.
• Post-Employment Medical Examination: Petitioner claimed that he reported to respondents' office on June 21, 2013 but was not properly attended to, forcing him to submit himself for immediate medical attention to Dr. Romeo Santos at the Philippine Heart Center because respondents were unresponsive to his request for immediate medical attention.
• Total Unfitness: Petitioner asserted that on account of the by-pass operation, he was already totally unfit for work and could no longer perform the usual physical, strenuous, and stressful activities that are the usual function of seafarers.

• No Medical Complaint During Employment: Respondents averred that during Esposo's entire stay onboard the vessel, he never complained of, suffered from, nor requested medical assistance for any health concerns except for one incident on December 17, 2012 involving “skin burn” as reflected in the vessel logbook.
• Resignation Report: Respondents averred that towards the expiration of his contract, Esposo executed a Resignation Report dated April 29, 2013, requesting to be repatriated due to the impending expiration of his contract on May 21, 2013.
• Failure to Submit to Post-Employment Medical Examination: Respondents averred that after completion of his contract, Esposo signed off from the vessel and arrived in Manila on June 20, 2013, but without submitting himself for mandatory post-employment medical examination within three days from his arrival, he filed the complaint.
• Subsequent Employment: Respondents attached a POEA-certified OFW Information showing that Esposo was processed for employment on February 10, 2014, or within the maximum extended period of 240 days from his repatriation, negating his claim of total and permanent disability.

• Finality and Satisfaction of Judgment: Whether the CA erred in taking cognizance of and granting respondents' Rule 65 petition despite the NLRC decision having become final and executory and the judgment award having been satisfied.
• Prematurity: Whether Esposo's complaint for total and permanent disability benefits was prematurely filed.
• Mandatory Post-Employment Medical Examination: Whether Esposo's failure to submit to a company-designated physician within three working days from repatriation barred his claim.
• Work-Relatedness and Compensability: Whether Esposo's cardiovascular illness was work-related and existing during his employment, and thus compensable under the POEA-SEC.
• Entitlement to Benefits: Whether Esposo is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, and attorney's fees.

• Finality and Satisfaction of Judgment: No. The NLRC decision did not become final because respondents timely filed a Rule 65 petition; the satisfaction of judgment was without prejudice and Rule XI, Section 14 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure allows restitution upon reversal.
• Prematurity: Yes. The complaint was filed 104 days after repatriation, before the 120-day period, extendible to 240 days, for the company-designated physician to assess the seafarer's disability.
• Mandatory Post-Employment Medical Examination: Yes. Failure to submit to a company-designated physician within three working days from repatriation, without justifiable cause, forfeits the right to claim benefits under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC.
• Work-Relatedness and Compensability: No. Esposo failed to prove by substantial evidence that his illness was work-related and existed during the term of his employment.
• Entitlement to Benefits: No. Due to the premature filing, breach of the mandatory reporting requirement, and lack of substantial evidence, the claim for total and permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, and attorney's fees fails.

• Finality and Satisfaction of Judgment: A judgment or order becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, without an appeal being perfected or a motion for reconsideration being filed. The period or manner of appeal from the NLRC to the CA is governed by Rule 65, pursuant to St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, and Section 4 of Rule 65 allows the petition to be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment or resolution sought to be assailed. Respondents timely filed their Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, so the issuance of an Entry of Judgment by the NLRC could not render the petition moot and academic. As to the satisfaction of judgment, the Satisfaction of Judgment with Urgent Motion to Lift Garnishment contained a categorical caveat that the prayer for lifting the garnishment was without prejudice to the pending petition with the CA. Rule XI, Section 14 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure expressly recognizes restitution where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the CA or the Supreme Court. Thus, the satisfaction by respondents of the NLRC judgment award did not prejudice the proceedings before the CA, and the CA correctly refused to dismiss the petition on this ground.

• Prematurity: Entitlement to disability benefits of seafarers is governed by law, contract, and the applicable medical findings. The material legal provisions are Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, in relation to Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, and the relevant contracts are the POEA-SEC and the CBA, if any. Under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, permanent total disability includes temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules. Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that income benefit shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days, except where the injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability. This must be read with Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, which provides that upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall the period exceed 120 days. The Court has held that for a claim for total and permanent disability benefits to prosper, any of the enumerated circumstances must obtain, including failure of the company-designated physician to issue a declaration after 120 days, lapse of 240 days without certification, or conflicting assessments between the company-designated physician and the seafarer's physician or third doctor. In this case, Esposo was repatriated on June 20, 2013, and filed the complaint 104 days thereafter, or on October 2, 2013. He filed before the lapse of the initial 120-day period, which may even be extended to 240 days on justifiable grounds. The company had no occasion to refer Esposo to its designated physician for assessment because he never submitted himself to the company physician for medical examination. The medical certificate dated June 22, 2013 from Dr. Santos did not provide Esposo with a cause of action against respondents. While a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, this is on the assumption that there is already a certification by the company-designated physician as to his fitness or disability which he disagrees with. It is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing a seafarer's disability, and there is a procedure to contest his findings. Moreover, respondents attached a POEA-certified OFW Information showing that Esposo was processed for employment on February 10, 2014, or within the maximum extended period of 240 days from his repatriation. The authenticity and data in this evidence remained undisputed by Esposo, whose Reply was silent on the matter. This cast serious doubt on his allegations that he was totally unfit for work. Prior to his subsequent engagement, Esposo underwent a PEME and was found fit for sea duty; otherwise, he would not have been hired. In Oriental Shipmanagment Co., Inc. vs. Nazal, the Court dismissed the claim of a seafarer who was able to secure a seafaring job after his repatriation.

• Mandatory Post-Employment Medical Examination: The company was not able to assess Esposo's illness because he failed to submit himself for medical examination within the required three-day post-repatriation period under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC. The provision states that the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the benefits. In Jebsens Maritime, Inc., and/or Alliance Marine Services, Ltd. vs. Undag, the Court explained that within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to determine if the illness was work-related or not; after that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness. To ignore the rule would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits and would be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness. Considering Esposo's allegations that he had been suffering symptoms of his illness while onboard the vessel, he should have submitted himself to Epsilon for referral to a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation on June 20, 2013, or until June 22, 2013. Esposo's claim that he immediately reported to Epsilon for medical examination but was not provided medical attention did not inspire belief. The records were bereft of any proof that he reported to Epsilon. Being a veteran seafarer knowledgeable in employers' obligations under compensation laws, he must have known that bare allegations are hardly the required substantial evidence to warrant an award of disability benefits. His self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations were insufficient. In labor cases, substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion, is required. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; the evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent. The CA and the LA both concluded that Esposo did not submit himself to Epsilon for post-employment medical test, while the NLRC gave credence to Esposo's claim without discussion as to how it arrived at its conclusion. Thus, it was reasonable to lean favorably toward the CA's and LA's findings. Having failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements, Esposo's claim for disability benefits must fail, notwithstanding that he was examined by a private physician within the three-day period. Under the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is required to assess a seaman's disability. For the seaman's claim to prosper, it is mandatory that he should be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC. Hence, for failing to comply with the three-day reporting requirement, Esposo effectively forfeited his right to claim disability benefits as expressly provided under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC.

• Work-Relatedness and Compensability: Even if the requirement were dispensed with, Esposo still failed to show that his illness was work-related and compensable. For disability to be compensable under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. The 2000 POEA-SEC defines “work-related illness” as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Section 32-A provides that for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) the seafarer's work must involve the risks described; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Cardio-vascular diseases are explicitly listed by Section 32-A(11) as occupational diseases when contracted under the conditions therein set. The following conditions must be met: (a) if the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work; (b) the strain of the work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship; and (c) if a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. Hence, although cardio-vascular diseases are listed as occupational diseases, to be compensable under the POEA-SEC, all of the four general conditions for occupational diseases under Section 32, plus any one of the conditions listed under Section 32-A for cardio-vascular diseases, must be proven to have obtained and/or be obtaining. Moreover, the same must be work-related and must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment. In this case, Esposo failed to substantially prove his claim that his illness was work-related or that it was existing during the time of his employment with Epsilon. He failed to show that his illness was known to have been present during his employment or that the nature of his work brought an acute exacerbation thereof as required under Section 32-A(11)(a). Although there was no dispute that he was suffering from a cardio-vascular disease at the time he filed the complaint, no proof was presented that such illness subsisted prior to the expiration of his employment contract or even up to the day of his repatriation. Much as he claimed that as early as April 2013, during his employment, he was already feeling severe chest pains and other discomfort, Esposo never presented any written note, request, or record about any medical condition to that effect or any medical check-up, consultation, or treatment prior to his repatriation. Respondents submitted a copy of the Medical Vessel Logbook showing that the only time Esposo complained of a medical condition was on December 17, 2012, when he reported experiencing “skin burn.” It was difficult to believe that Esposo merely neglected to enter in the vessel logbook or sought assistance for his “severe chest pain, dizziness, difficulty of breathing, severe headache and persistent perspiration,” which sounded much graver than a simple skin burn. Respondents also presented Esposo's “Resignation Report” dated April 29, 2013, where he categorically affirmed that his health condition was not the cause of the termination of his employment contract and hence his repatriation. The fact alone that Esposo was repatriated due to the termination of his contract and not due to a medical condition already weighed strongly against his claims. The Court had ruled that repatriation for an expired contract belies a seafarer's submission that his ailment was aggravated by his working conditions and that it was existing during his term of employment. Neither could the Court subscribe to the NLRC's ratio that Esposo's June 22, 2013 medical certificate obtained from a private physician outweighed all evidence and arguments proving that his illness was not work-related nor subsisting during his employment and that he failed to submit himself to a company-designated physician. The medical certificate did not prove the work-causation or work-aggravation of Esposo's disease. Neither did it prove that Esposo, prior to proceeding to a private doctor, asked for, and was refused, medical attention by respondents. While the test of proof in compensation proceedings is merely probability, and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusions of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inferences and speculations. In Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. vs. De Leon, the Court overturned the factual conclusions that whatever causative circumstances led to the seafarer's permanent disability must have transpired during his employment, and rejected the deduction that the illness subsisted during the seafarer's employment from medical reports and certifications issued after such employment and disembarkation. The tribunals should have gone beyond their inferences and determined the duties of the seafarer and the nature of his injury to validly draw a conclusion that he labored under conditions that would cause his purported permanent and total disability. Hence, given Esposo's utter lack of evidence to support his claim that he was already suffering his illness when he was onboard respondents' vessel and that his illness was work-related, as against the undisputed documentary evidence of respondents belying such claims, coupled with the established fact that he was not medically repatriated, he cannot be compensated for his illness.

• Entitlement to Benefits: In sum, Esposo cannot be awarded the total and permanent disability benefits that he seeks. His complaint was filed prematurely, he was in breach of his contractual obligation to submit to a company-designated physician within the required period, and he failed to prove by substantial evidence the compensability of his illness. While the Court commiserated with Esposo, it could not ignore the fatal flaws of his case and grant his claims, lest a clear injustice be caused to respondents. Consistent with the purposes underlying the formulation of the POEA Contract, its provisions must be applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in favor of the seafarers, for it is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into effect. This exhortation cannot, however, be taken to sanction the award of disability benefits and sickness allowances based on flimsy evidence and/or even in the face of an unjustified non-compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA Contract.

• Seafarer Disability Benefits — 120/240-Day Rule and Company-Designated Physician — Entitlement to disability benefits of seafarers is governed by law, contract, and the applicable medical findings. The company-designated physician is entrusted with the task of assessing a seafarer's disability, whether total or partial, due to injury or illness during the term of employment. Under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, permanent total disability includes temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; the period may be extended to a maximum of 240 days on justifiable grounds. Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC provides that upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall the period exceed 120 days. In this case, the complaint was filed 104 days after repatriation, before the 120-day period and before any company-designated physician assessment, rendering the claim premature.

• Enumerated Circumstances for Total and Permanent Disability Benefits — A claim for total and permanent disability benefits may prosper only if any of the following circumstances obtains: (a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address temporary total disability, hence justifying an extension to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician; (c) the company-designated physician declared that the seafarer is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion; (d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that the seafarer is partially permanently disabled but other doctors whom he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and (h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods. None obtained in this case because Esposo filed his complaint before the 120-day period and never submitted himself to the company-designated physician.

• Mandatory Post-Employment Medical Examination — Under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the benefits. The rationale is that within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to determine if the illness was work-related or not; after that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness. Esposo failed to comply, and his examination by a private physician within the three-day period did not satisfy the requirement because it is the company-designated physician who is required to assess a seaman's disability.

• Work-Relatedness and Existence During Employment — For disability to be compensable under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. The 2000 POEA-SEC defines “work-related illness” as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) the seafarer's work must involve the risks described; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Cardio-vascular diseases are listed as occupational diseases under Section 32-A(11) when contracted under the conditions therein set. Esposo failed to prove work-relatedness and existence during employment by substantial evidence.

• Substantial Evidence in Labor Cases — In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion, is required. Whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; the evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Esposo's self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations were insufficient, especially against respondents' documentary evidence.

• Finality, Execution, and Satisfaction of Judgment — A judgment or order becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, without an appeal being perfected or a motion for reconsideration being filed. The period or manner of appeal from the NLRC to the CA is governed by Rule 65, and the petition may be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment or resolution sought to be assailed. A timely Rule 65 petition prevents the NLRC decision from becoming final and executory. Satisfaction of judgment without prejudice to a pending petition does not moot the petition, and Rule XI, Section 14 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure allows restitution where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the CA or the Supreme Court. The CA correctly took cognizance of respondents' petition and refused to dismiss it on the ground of satisfaction.

• Subsequent Employment and Total Disability — A seafarer who was able to secure employment as a seaman with another vessel after his disembarkation undermines a claim of total and permanent disability. Before deployment, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was found fit to work and healthy; otherwise, he would not have been hired. In Oriental Shipmanagment Co., Inc. vs. Nazal, the Court dismissed the claim of a seafarer who was able to secure a seafaring job after repatriation. In this case, the POEA-certified OFW Information showing Esposo was processed for employment on February 10, 2014, within 240 days from repatriation, cast serious doubt on his claim of total unfitness.

• "For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits." — This passage states the mandatory post-employment medical examination requirement and the consequence of forfeiture under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, which was the basis for denying Esposo's claim.
• "In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion, is required. The oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence." — This passage defines the quantum of proof required in labor cases and explains why Esposo's bare allegations could not support his claim for disability benefits.
• "Hence, although cardio-vascular diseases are listed as occupational diseases, still, to be compensable under the POEA-SEC, all of the four (4) general conditions for occupational diseases under Section 32, plus any one (1) of the conditions listed under Section 32-A for cardio-vascular diseases, must nonetheless be proven to have obtained and/or be obtaining. Moreover, the same must be work-related and must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment." — This passage sets out the requisites for compensability of cardiovascular diseases under the POEA-SEC, which Esposo failed to establish by substantial evidence.
• "If Nazal was able to secure an employment as a seaman with another vessel after his disembarkation in November 2001, how can there be a case against the petitioners, considering especially the lapse of time when the case was instituted? How could Nazal be accepted for another ocean-going job if he had not been in good health? How could he be engaged as a seaman after his employment with the petitioners if he was then already disabled?" — This passage, quoted from Oriental Shipmanagment Co., Inc. vs. Nazal, illustrates the doctrinal significance of subsequent employment in negating a claim of total and permanent disability.

• St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 356 Phil. 811 (1998) — Established that the period or manner of appeal from the NLRC to the CA is governed by Rule 65, which was the basis for the CA's jurisdiction over respondents' Petition for Certiorari.
• Oriental Shipmanagment Co., Inc. vs. Nazal, 710 Phil. 45 (2013) — The Court dismissed the claim of a seafarer who was able to secure a seafaring job after his repatriation; applied to doubt Esposo's claim of total unfitness in light of the OFW Information showing subsequent employment processing.
• Jebsens Maritime, Inc., and/or Alliance Marine Services, Ltd. vs. Undag, 678 Phil. 938 (2011) — Explained the rationale for the three-day mandatory reporting requirement and was also cited for the substantial evidence requirement in labor cases.
• Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. vs. Esguerra, 671 Phil. 56 (2011) — Held that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with assessing a seaman's disability, and that the POEA-SEC's liberal application cannot sanction the award of benefits based on flimsy evidence or unjustified non-compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.
• Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. vs. De Leon, 804 Phil. 279 (2017) — Held that conclusions of courts must be based on real evidence, not speculation; rejected the inference that a seafarer's illness was work-related merely from the length of service and post-employment medical reports.
• Status Maritime Corporation vs. Doctolero, 803 Phil. 453 (2017), citing C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Taok, 691 Phil. 521 (2012) — Enumerated the circumstances under which a claim for total and permanent disability benefits may prosper.
• Villanueva vs. Baliwag Navigation, Inc., 715 Phil. 299 (2013) — Held that repatriation for an expired contract belies a seafarer's submission that his ailment was aggravated by his working conditions and that it was existing during his term of employment.
• De Leon vs. Maunlad Trans, Inc., 805 Phil. 531 (2017) — Held that for disability to be compensable under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: the injury or illness must be work-related, and it must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
• Villamor vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 800 Phil. 269 (2016) — Held that while the test of proof in compensation proceedings is merely probability, and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusions of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inferences and speculations.
• Panganiban vs. Tara Trading Shipmanagement Inc., 647 Phil. 675 (2010) — Held that substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; the evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent.
• New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. Despabeladeras, 747 Phil. 626 (2014) — Held that a seafarer's right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC assumes that there is already a certification by the company-designated physician as to his fitness or disability which he disagrees with.
• Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Solid Homes, Inc., 607 Phil. 14 (2009) — Held that a judgment or order becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, without an appeal being perfected or a motion for reconsideration being filed.
• Dela Rosa vs. Michaelmar Philippines, Inc., 664 Phil. 154 (2011) — Cited for the rule that the petition under Rule 65 may be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment or resolution sought to be assailed.
• Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 220002, August 2, 2017, 834 SCRA 279 — Cited for the rule that entitlement to disability benefits of seafarers is governed by law, contract, and the applicable medical findings.
• Medina vs. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990); Pascual vs. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) — Cited for the recognized exceptions to the rule limiting a Rule 45 petition to questions of law, allowing the Court to review conflicting factual findings.

• Articles 191 to 193, Labor Code — Govern entitlement to disability benefits of seafarers, in relation to the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. Article 192(c)(1) provides that permanent total disability includes temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules. Applied to show that Esposo's complaint, filed only 104 days after repatriation, was premature.
• Section 2, Rule X, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation Implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code — Provides that income benefit shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days, except where the injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability, in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. The System may declare total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability. Applied to the 120/240-day period for assessment.
• Section 20-B(3), POEA-SEC — Provides that upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall the period exceed 120 days. It also requires the seafarer to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return, except when physically incapacitated, in which case written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed compliance. Failure to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement results in forfeiture of the right to claim the benefits. Applied to bar Esposo's claim.
• Section 20-B, POEA-SEC — Provides that the liabilities of the employer arise when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. Applied to require that the injury or illness be work-related and exist during the term of employment.
• Section 32-A, POEA-SEC — Provides that for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) the seafarer's work must involve the risks described; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Applied to require proof of the general conditions for occupational diseases.
• Section 32-A(11), POEA-SEC — Lists cardio-vascular diseases as occupational diseases when contracted under the conditions therein set: (a) if the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work; (b) the strain of the work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship; and (c) if a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. Applied to show that Esposo failed to prove any of the conditions.
• Definition of Terms, par. (12), 2000 POEA-SEC — Defines “work-related illness” as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Applied to require that Esposo's cardiovascular disease satisfy the listed conditions for compensability.
• Rule 65, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that the petition may be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment or resolution sought to be assailed. Applied to hold that respondents timely filed their Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
• Rule XI, Section 14, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure — Provides that where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the Labor Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such orders of restitution of the executed award, except wages paid during reinstatement pending appeal. Applied to hold that respondents' satisfaction of the NLRC judgment did not prejudice the CA proceedings.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur. J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.