Espiritu vs. Melgar

A provincial governor is empowered under Section 63 of the Local Government Code to place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension pending investigation of administrative charges, and a regional trial court has no jurisdiction to enjoin such suspension where the official has not exhausted administrative remedies. The office or body invested with the power of removal or suspension is the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause, and its action will not be disturbed absent flagrant abuse.

Petitioner Benjamin I. Espiritu was the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, while private respondent Nelson B. Melgar was the Municipal Mayor of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. The Local Government Code vests in the provincial governor the power to preventively suspend an elective municipal official and in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan jurisdiction over complaints against such official. The case concerns the exercise of that statutory suspension power and the authority of the Regional Trial Court over a challenge to it.

On April 11, 1991, Ramir Garing of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government charging Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service. The charge alleged that on or about 4:30 in the afternoon of March 26, 1991, in Naujan, Melgar, with abuse of official function, attacked, assaulted, and used personal violence upon Garing by boxing and kicking him, inflicting physical injuries, and ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail without filing any charges until he was released the following day, March 27, 1991, at about 8:30 in the morning. An identical letter-complaint was filed with Governor Benjamin I. Espiritu accusing Melgar of the same violations and requesting that the mayor be placed under preventive suspension pending investigation. A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action Center, Office of the President, was forwarded to Governor Espiritu with a request for prompt action.

On April 22, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the complaint, which was docketed as Adm. Case No. 91-01. On May 22, 1991, Melgar submitted his answer. He recounted that at around 6:30 in the evening of March 26, 1991, while he was in the middle of his speech at the Naujan Public Gymnasium during the Jose L. Basa Memorial graduation ceremonies, loud and intermittent clapping erupted from one of the people in attendance. He paused, the clapping stopped, he resumed his speech, and the clapping started again. The audience was visibly disturbed, and he ended his speech and instructed a policeman to investigate the culprit, who turned out to be Ramir Garing. According to Melgar, Garing was drunk, and he did not hurt him, as shown by a medical certificate that contradicted Garing's affidavit. He was informed that Garing was momentarily placed in custody for his own protection because he was drunk, and that an open knife (balisong) was taken from him. After Garing had sobered up, he was told to go home, but he refused and only did so the following morning. Melgar stated that charges could have been filed against Garing under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code and for possession and concealment of a deadly weapon, but he instructed his policemen not to file charges. He attached affidavits of witnesses to his answer.

After evaluating the complaint and its supporting documents, as well as the Mayor's answer and the affidavits of his witnesses, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No. 55 on May 9, 1991, recommending to the Provincial Governor that Mayor Melgar be preventively suspended for forty-five (45) days pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. On May 23, 1991, Mayor Melgar filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint, which Garing opposed. On June 6, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan denied the motion to dismiss through Resolution No. 72. Meanwhile, pursuant to the recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Resolution No. 55, Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under preventive suspension on May 28, 1991, on the ground that there was reasonable ground to believe that Melgar had committed the acts stated in the complaint and affidavit of Ramir Garing, corroborated by the affidavits of Lydia V. Garing, Nelson Tabor, and Javier Dagdagan. Mayor Melgar received the Order of Suspension on June 3, 1991.

Mayor Melgar forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order in the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. R-5003, alleging that the order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic, and arbitrary abuse of power by the Governor. On June 24, 1991, RTC Judge Marciano T. Virola issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of Suspension. The RTC stated that it was more inclined to believe the answer under oath of Mayor Melgar and the sworn statements of his witnesses attached to the answer in the administrative case than the complaint under oath in the administrative case. It found no reason to doubt the sworn statements of the numerous public school teachers and members of the PNP, and it noted that the medical certificate issued in connection with the complainant's treatment tended to corroborate Melgar's theory and contradict that of the complainant. The abrasions on the right arm of the complainant tended to show that he was held tightly by the PNP because he was then drunk, in possession of a balisong knife, and causing serious disturbance, and not because he was boxed and kicked by Melgar. Governor Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or for reconsideration, which Judge Virola denied on July 16, 1991. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

• Statutory Power to Suspend: Petitioner argued that, as Provincial Governor, he is empowered by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective municipal official.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that he did not commit grave abuse of discretion in placing respondent Mayor under preventive suspension; if at all, his error was an error of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
• RTC Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that, by express provision of Section 61 of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over complaints against any elective municipal official; on the other hand, Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 withdraws from regional trial courts jurisdiction over cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of any person, tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Thus, by practically deciding the administrative case on the merits, the respondent court acted without jurisdiction.
• Remedy of Appeal: Petitioner argued that respondent Mayor had a remedy of appeal under Section 66 of the Local Government Code.

• Arbitrary Abuse of Power: Respondent Mayor alleged that the order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic, and arbitrary abuse of power by the Governor.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction stopping the Provincial Governor from implementing an order of preventive suspension against an elective municipal mayor pending investigation of administrative charges.
• Authority to Impose Preventive Suspension: Whether Section 63 of the Local Government Code authorizes the Provincial Governor to place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether the Mayor's direct filing of a petition in the Regional Trial Court, instead of seeking relief from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, was premature.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Governor committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the preventive suspension.
• Effect of the Served Suspension: Whether the Mayor is deemed reinstated after the 60-day preventive suspension was served under the Court's Temporary Restraining Order.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: No. The Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss it, because the Mayor failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the matter fell within the administrative suspension power.
• Authority to Impose Preventive Suspension: Yes. Section 63 of the Local Government Code authorizes the provincial governor to preventively suspend an elective municipal official at any time after issues are joined and any statutory ground exists.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No. The Mayor's direct recourse to the courts was premature; he should have first sought relief from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Governor acted pursuant to Section 63 and the recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; absent flagrant abuse, the office or body invested with suspension power is the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause.
• Effect of the Served Suspension: Yes. Because the 60-day preventive suspension was maintained by the Court's Temporary Restraining Order and already served, the Mayor is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: The Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss it. The Mayor's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature; relief should first have been sought from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government. The petition invoked Section 61 of the Local Government Code, which vests the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with jurisdiction over complaints against elective municipal officials, and Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which withdraws from regional trial courts jurisdiction over cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of any person, tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. By practically deciding the administrative case on the merits, the RTC acted without jurisdiction.

• Authority to Impose Preventive Suspension: Section 63, Chapter IV of the Local Government Code provides that preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. It may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. The provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro was therefore authorized to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at any time after issues had been joined and any of the statutory grounds existed. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence; preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Because Mayor Melgar believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts. His direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature. The Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrant disciplinary action. However, as a general rule, the office or body invested with the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. Unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed. The Governor's exercise of the statutory suspension power was not shown to be a flagrant abuse.

• Effect of the Served Suspension: Since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on August 6, 1991, and therefore had already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him under Section 63, paragraph (3), of the Local Government Code.

• Preventive Suspension of Elective Local Officials — Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be imposed by the provincial governor on an elective municipal official at any time after the issues are joined when any of the following grounds exists: (a) reasonable ground to believe that the respondent committed the act or acts complained of; (b) strong evidence of culpability; (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants; or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days, and upon expiration the suspended official is deemed reinstated without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. The Court applied this provision to uphold Governor Espiritu's suspension of Mayor Melgar.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — A party must first seek relief from the administrative body before resorting to the courts; direct recourse to the courts is premature. The Court applied this doctrine to Mayor Melgar, who should have sought relief from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government instead of filing a petition in the Regional Trial Court.

• Jurisdiction over Administrative Complaints against Elective Municipal Officials — The Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over complaints against elective municipal officials, and the regional trial court cannot interfere by deciding the administrative case on the merits. The Court relied on this principle, together with Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to hold that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003.

• Sole Judge of Necessity and Sufficiency of Cause — The office or body invested with the power of removal or suspension is the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. Unless a flagrant abuse of that power is shown, public policy and separation of powers require that its action be left undisturbed. The Court applied this rule to the Governor's preventive suspension order.

• Separation of Powers and Public Policy — Courts should not disturb the action of the office or body invested with the power of removal or suspension absent a showing of flagrant abuse, in deference to public policy and the principle of separation of powers. The Court invoked this principle to reject the Regional Trial Court's interference with the Governor's suspension order.

• "Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official." — This states the statutory authority under Section 63 of the Local Government Code and identifies the provincial governor as the proper officer to suspend an elective municipal official.

• "There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence (Nera vs. Garcia and Elicaño, 106 Phil. 1031). Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456)." — This is the ratio for upholding preventive suspension even before the administrative charges are heard on the merits.

• "Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature (Aboitiz & Co. Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265; Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 937; Manuel vs. Jimenez, 17 SCRA 55; Bongcawil vs. Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte, 10 SCRA 327; The Phil Veterans Affairs Office vs. Fariñas, et al., AC-G.R. SP No. 05937, July 5, 1985; Bonafe vs. Zurbano, 131 SCRA 9)." — This applies the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine and explains why the Mayor's resort to the Regional Trial Court was premature.

• "However, in this particular case, since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6, 1991, and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him (Sec. 63, subpar. 3, Local Government Code)." — This states the final effect of the served suspension and the Mayor's reinstatement without prejudice to the administrative investigation.

• Nera vs. Garcia and Elicaño, 106 Phil. 1031 — Cited to support the rule that suspending an officer before the charges are heard and before an opportunity to prove innocence is not improper.
• Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 — Cited to explain that preventive suspension is allowed to prevent the respondent from hampering the investigation through influence over possible witnesses.
• Aboitiz & Co. Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265 — Cited among the authorities for the exhaustion of administrative remedies; direct recourse to the courts was premature.
• Attorney General vs. Doherty, 13 Am. Rep. 132 — Cited, through 17 R.C.L. Sec. 233, for the rule that the office or body invested with the power of removal or suspension is the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause.

• Section 63, Chapter IV, Local Government Code — Provides that preventive suspension may be imposed by the provincial governor on an elective municipal official; sets the grounds and the 60-day limit; and states reinstatement after expiration. Applied to uphold Governor Espiritu's suspension of Mayor Melgar and to deem Melgar reinstated after the suspension was served.
• Section 63, paragraph (3), Local Government Code — At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him. Applied because the 60-day suspension was maintained by the Court's Temporary Restraining Order and already served.
• Section 61, Local Government Code — Cited in the petition as vesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with jurisdiction over complaints against elective municipal officials. Relevant to the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.
• Section 19(c), Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 — Cited in the petition as withdrawing from regional trial courts jurisdiction over cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of any person, tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Relevant to the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.