Espineli vs. People

Circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction where the proven circumstances form an unbroken chain pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others; and a witness’s testimony that an out-of-court declarant made a statement is admissible as an independently relevant statement when offered merely to prove that the statement was made, not its truth.

On June 24, 1997, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, charging Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo “Danny” Espineli, together with Sotero Paredes and three unidentified persons, with murder. The Information alleged that on or about December 15, 1996 in Imus, Cavite, the accused, armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, attacked, assaulted, and shot Alberto Berbon y Downie, inflicting multiple gunshot wounds on his head and different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death. Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and, when arraigned on July 7, 1997 with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.

In the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto, a 49-year-old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of his body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car. Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon of the National Bureau of Investigation arrested and took into custody Romeo Reyes for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. NBI Agent Dave Segunial interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing, whereby Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and an armalite, respectively, and that petitioner told Paredes, “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.” Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14, 1997; thereafter, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.

The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon, testified that sometime in the third week of February 1997, Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward consequence that might result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death of her husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of ₱1,500.00 and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection program. This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back. Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao, testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1, 1996; he later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by the police officers. Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body, and that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.

Petitioner did not adduce evidence for his defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. As no action whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision. While the case was pending, on August 26, 1998, petitioner escaped from detention.

No prosecution witness saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated. The Court of Appeals relied on the following circumstances: (1) in the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes, “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” before boarding a red car, with Sotero holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol; (2) the red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for ₱10,000.00 in September 1996; (3) the victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day on December 15, 1996 by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and (4) post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity, and characteristics of which indicated that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly an armalite rifle and a .22 caliber pistol.

• Hearsay and Confrontation: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should not have admitted, considered, and given probative value to Exhibit “A,” the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Romeo Reyes, because Reyes was not presented in court to confirm, affirm, and authenticate the contents of his sworn statement, resulting in the denial of petitioner’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.
• Inadmissible Circumstantial Evidence: Petitioner maintained that he was convicted based on unproven, inadmissible circumstantial evidence.
• Failure of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that he should have been acquitted.
• No Direct Evidence: Petitioner emphasized that, as found by the courts below, there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime, and he asked the Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence, which he believed failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sworn Statement Must Be Disregarded: Petitioner averred that the sworn statement should not have been given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant, and all circumstances emanating from or included in the sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking evidentiary and probative value.

• Concurrence with Petitioner: The Office of the Solicitor General, representing respondent People of the Philippines, concurred with petitioner and recommended his acquittal.
• Failure of Proof: Respondent argued that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Admissibility of Reyes’s Sworn Statement: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in admitting and giving probative value to the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Romeo Reyes despite Reyes not being presented in court to confirm, affirm, and authenticate its contents, allegedly violating petitioner’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support petitioner’s conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Qualifying Circumstances and Crime: Whether petitioner is guilty of murder or homicide, and whether abuse of superior strength and nighttime were proven.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: Whether the penalty imposed and the civil liability awards were proper.

• Admissibility of Reyes’s Sworn Statement: No. The testimony of NBI Agent Segunial on Reyes’s sworn statement was admissible as an independently relevant statement because it was offered to establish that Reyes made the statement, not the truth of its contents; the hearsay rule did not apply.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The circumstantial evidence satisfied Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, as the proven circumstances formed an unbroken chain pointing to petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
• Qualifying Circumstances and Crime: No qualifying circumstances were proven. Petitioner is guilty only of homicide, not murder, because abuse of superior strength was not shown and nighttime was not alleged in the Information.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: The penalty was proper. The Court of Appeals’ indeterminate sentence was affirmed; civil indemnity and actual damages were upheld, moral damages of ₱50,000.00 were added, and 6% interest per annum on all damages from finality until fully paid was imposed; loss of earning capacity was not awarded.

• Admissibility of Reyes’s Sworn Statement: Under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to facts known of personal knowledge; hearsay is evidence whose probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness. However, when the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish that the statement, or its tenor, was made, the hearsay rule does not apply; this is the doctrine of independently relevant statements. NBI Agent Segunial testified that he investigated Reyes and reduced his statement into writing, and that Reyes narrated hearing petitioner tell Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and seeing them armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite before boarding a red car. The testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the statement but only to establish that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration. Segunial admitted that he was incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’s statement. Thus, the statement was admissible as an independently relevant statement. Moreover, Reyes’s written statement was notarized before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI, and under Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a notarized document may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of due execution. Gutierrez vs. Mendoza-Plaza held that a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; petitioner presented no such evidence. The Court of Appeals did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’s sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court allows circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent; conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The Court of Appeals found four circumstances: (1) in the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was heard telling Sotero “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” before boarding a red car, with Sotero holding an armalite rifle and petitioner armed with a .45 caliber pistol; (2) the red car was identified by Rodolfo as the same car he had sold to Sotero for ₱10,000.00 in September 1996; (3) Alberto was fatally shot later that day by unidentified gunmen who fled riding a red car; and (4) the post-mortem examination showed multiple gunshot wounds indicating high-powered guns, possibly an armalite rifle and a .22 caliber pistol. The Court scrutinized the evidence and found it sufficient. The NBI Agent’s testimony was admissible as an independently relevant statement; Rodolfo’s identification of the red car clearly and convincingly proved it was the same car used in the killing; Alberto was shot and the gunmen fled in that red car; Dr. Lagat’s findings corroborated the use of high-powered guns; and petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was pending was a strong indication of guilt. The concordant combination and cumulative effect of these circumstances satisfied Section 4, Rule 133 and constituted an unbroken chain of events. The trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of credibility, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect, as held in People vs. Villasan.
• Qualifying Circumstances and Crime: The Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner guilty only of homicide. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. However, none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated, so abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Nighttime cannot serve as an aggravating circumstance because the time of the commission of the crime was not alleged in the Information. The penalty prescribed by law for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. With no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum should be within reclusion temporal in its medium term, which has a duration of fourteen years, eight months, and one day to seventeen years and four months, while the minimum should be within prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. The Court of Appeals’ imposition of an indeterminate prison term of ten years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum is in order.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: The Court of Appeals correctly imposed ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity but failed to award moral damages. Moral damages are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide; thus, the award of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is proper. The actual damages awarded by the trial court and upheld by the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed because the itemized medical and burial expenses were duly supported by receipts and other documentary evidence. No award for loss of earning capacity was granted, and rightly so: although Sabina testified as to the monthly salary of the deceased, the same remained unsubstantiated. Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and the exceptions find no application in this case. In conformity with current policy, interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all monetary awards for damages from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

• Circumstantial Evidence Sufficiency — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent; they must form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold petitioner’s conviction for homicide based on the Court of Appeals’ four circumstances and his escape from detention.
• Independently Relevant Statements — The hearsay rule does not apply when a statement is offered not to prove the truth of the fact asserted therein but merely to establish that the statement, or its tenor, was made. The statement is then admissible as an independently relevant statement. The Court applied this doctrine to NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony recounting Reyes’s sworn statement, which was offered to prove that Reyes made such narration, not that the narration was true.
• Notarized Documents; Prima Facie Presumption of Authenticity and Due Execution — A notarized document may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of due execution under Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution that must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The Court applied this to Reyes’s sworn statement, which was notarized before an NBI supervising agent and not rebutted by petitioner.
• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. It cannot be appreciated where no witness saw how the killing was perpetrated. The Court applied this to hold that the killing was homicide, not murder.
• Nighttime as Aggravating Circumstance — Nighttime cannot serve as an aggravating circumstance where the time of the commission of the crime was not alleged in the Information. The Court applied this to reject nighttime as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance.
• Moral Damages in Murder or Homicide — Moral damages are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. The Court applied this to award ₱50,000.00 moral damages to the victim’s heirs.
• Loss of Earning Capacity — An award for loss of earning capacity cannot be granted in the absence of documentary evidence, except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The Court applied this to deny the award because the deceased’s monthly salary was unsubstantiated and the exceptions did not apply.

• “for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent x x x.” — This states the standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, requiring consistency with guilt and inconsistency with innocence.
• “conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.” — This is the unbroken-chain formulation applied to uphold petitioner’s conviction.
• “Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.” — This defines hearsay and the independently relevant statement exception applied to NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony.
• “These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.” — This states the basis for the mandatory award of moral damages in murder or homicide, applied to award ₱50,000.00.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as the basis for transferring petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
• People vs. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 860 (1999) — Cited for the rule that circumstantial evidence must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.
• People vs. Abdulah, 596 Phil. 870, 876 (2009) — Cited for the unbroken-chain standard: conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld if the circumstances lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
• People vs. Manchu, 593 Phil. 398, 406 (2008) — Cited for the principle that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt.
• People vs. Osianas, 588 Phil. 615, 627 (2008) — Cited for the definition of circumstantial evidence as evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference drawn by the fact-finder from established evidence.
• People vs. Gaffud, Jr., 587 Phil. 521, 530 (2008) — Cited for the requisites of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.
• Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 672 (2002) — Cited for the hearsay rule and the exception for independently relevant statements.
• People vs. Gumimba, 545 Phil. 627, 652 (2007) — Cited for the admissibility of an independently relevant statement where the fact that the statement was made is relevant and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.
• Gutierrez vs. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807, 817 — Cited for the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Villasan, 618 Phil. 240, 251 (2009) — Cited for the rule that the trial court’s factual findings, including credibility assessments, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect.
• People vs. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 437-438 — Cited for the mandatory award of moral damages upon the death of the victim in murder or homicide.
• People vs. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182, 202 — Cited for the rule that loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded absent documentary evidence, except for self-employed or daily wage workers earning less than the minimum wage.

• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this to uphold petitioner’s conviction.
• Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness can testify only to facts known of personal knowledge, except as otherwise provided; hearsay is excluded. The Court applied this in holding that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony on Reyes’s sworn statement was not hearsay because it was offered to prove that the statement was made, not its truth.
• Section 30, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that a notarized document may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of due execution. The Court applied this to Reyes’s sworn statement.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide and punishes it with reclusion temporal. The Court applied this to affirm petitioner’s conviction for homicide and the penalty imposed.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of petitioner’s sentence, with the maximum within reclusion temporal medium and the minimum within prision mayor.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Jose Portugal Perez, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.