Español vs. Formoso

The use of falsified or forged documents in filing a case is contumacious conduct constituting indirect, not direct, contempt, and may be punished only after a written charge and an opportunity to be heard; a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of records of another case to establish the falsity.

Judge Dolores L. Español was the presiding judge of RTC Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Benito See and Marly See were the president and treasurer of Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., while Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso was its counsel until March 13, 2001. The case tests the contempt power of a trial court and its authority to take judicial notice of records from another branch.

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. bought from Evanswinda Morales a 33,130-square-meter parcel of land in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in Morales’s name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. TCT No. T-278479 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in Sharcons’s name. When Sharcons’s workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua prevented them, claiming that the Mapuas owned the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163 was registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979. On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00, impleading spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City as defendants. In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Español issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, had used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title. The Order declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. It described the case as a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations through the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel, Atty. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales, the geodetic engineer, and some government officials and employees responsible for processing and issuing spurious or falsified titles. It directed that appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito See, Marly See, and Evanswinda C. Morales and forwarded copies to the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice; as to Atty. Formoso, it forwarded a copy to the Bar Confidant’s Office, Supreme Court. It also declared Benito See, Marly See, and Atty. Formoso in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents, ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest, and fixed ten days of detention at the Dasmariñas Municipal Jail. The Order further cancelled TCT No. T-511462, allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, as spurious, having been derived from TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989; cancelled Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 as spurious; directed copies to the Registry of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Dasmariñas, Cavite; and dismissed Civil Case No. 2035-00 with prejudice, while dismissing the private defendants’ counterclaims without prejudice to their rightful course of action.

Petitioner stated that, in determining the merits of Sharcons’s complaint for quieting of title, she “stumbled” upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge’s Decision declaring that Sharcons’s TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor. On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents, and they were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest, but petitioner denied them outright. Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. The CA found that the Tagle Decision had not been offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00. Respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by the CA. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA Resolution of November 15, 2001.

Petitioner then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision dated September 12, 2001 and Resolution dated November 15, 2001.

• Use of Falsified Documents: Petitioner maintained that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act.

• Direct Contempt: Whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.
• Judicial Notice: Whether petitioner erred in taking judicial notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92 rendered by another RTC branch.
• Mootness of Habeas Corpus: Whether the petition challenging the CA Decision granting the writ of habeas corpus has become moot because respondents were released on bail.

• Direct Contempt: Yes. The use of falsified documents is contumacious but constitutes indirect, not direct, contempt; under Rule 71, Section 3, it requires a written charge and an opportunity to be heard.
• Judicial Notice: Yes. Courts cannot take judicial notice of the contents of records of another case, even if tried or pending in the same court; the Tagle Decision was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00.
• Mootness of Habeas Corpus: Yes. The petition became moot because respondents were released on bail; a person discharged on bail is not restrained of liberty so as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

• Direct Contempt: Contempt is an act or conduct tending to interfere with the business of the court, by refusal to obey a lawful order or by disrespect to the dignity of the court that tends to interfere with or hamper orderly proceedings and lessens efficiency. Courts have inherent power to punish contempt because respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Rule 71, Section 1 defines direct contempt as misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities, refusal to be sworn or to answer, or refusal to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required; it may be summarily adjudged and punished. Narcida vs. Bowen characterized direct contempt as an act done in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice, a contumacious act done facie curiae and punishable summarily without hearing. Rule 71, Section 3, on the other hand, defines indirect contempt as punishable only after a written charge has been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment and to be heard by himself or counsel; it includes improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The SC agreed that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act, but held that it constitutes indirect, not direct, contempt, because it is improper conduct degrading the administration of justice. Santos vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt and is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. A contempt proceeding is not a civil action but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction, and the modes of procedure and rules of evidence are assimilated as far as practicable to criminal prosecutions. Thus, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration; she should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.

• Judicial Notice: Rule 129, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for mandatory judicial notice, including the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. However, Gener vs. De Leon held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and, on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint. The CA did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.

• Mootness of Habeas Corpus: The petition challenging the CA Decision granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become moot. Respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by the CA. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty, and a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

• Contempt of Court — Contempt is an act or conduct tending to interfere with the business of the court, by refusal to obey a lawful order or by disrespect to the dignity of the court that tends to interfere with or hamper orderly proceedings and lessens efficiency. Courts have inherent power to punish contempt to preserve respect for the judicial institution. In this case, the SC used the direct/indirect distinction to invalidate the summary contempt order.
• Direct Contempt — Direct contempt is misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities, refusal to be sworn or to answer, or refusal to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required; it is done facie curiae and may be summarily adjudged and punished without hearing. The SC held that respondents’ act of filing a complaint with alleged falsified documents was not done in the court’s presence and thus was not direct contempt.
• Indirect Contempt — Indirect or constructive contempt is perpetrated outside the sitting of the court and includes improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. It may be punished only after a written charge is filed and the respondent is given an opportunity to comment and to be heard by himself or counsel. The SC held that the use of falsified documents in filing a complaint falls under this category.
• Use of Falsified Documents as Indirect Contempt — The imputed use of a falsified document, more so where its falsity is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt and is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. It is not punishable summarily as direct contempt.
• Contempt Proceedings Are Criminal in Nature — A contempt proceeding is not a civil action but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction; the modes of procedure and rules of evidence are assimilated as far as practicable to those in criminal prosecutions. This is why the RTC had to charge and hear respondents before punishing them.
• Judicial Notice of Records of Other Cases — Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. The SC held that Judge Español improperly relied on the Tagle Decision from another RTC branch without it being offered in evidence.
• Habeas Corpus and Bail — A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of liberty; a person discharged on bail is not restrained of liberty so as to be entitled to the writ. The SC held that the challenge to the CA’s grant of habeas corpus had become moot after respondents posted bail.

• “We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt.” — The SC accepted that using falsified documents is contumacious but rejected the RTC’s direct-contempt characterization.
• “the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings.” — Quoting Santos vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, the SC held that the alleged use of falsified documents required the ordinary indirect-contempt procedure.
• “courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court.” — The SC used this rule to reject the RTC’s reliance on the Tagle Decision from another branch.
• “A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.” — The SC held that the challenge to the CA’s grant of habeas corpus had become moot after respondents posted bail.

• In re Jones, 9 Phil. 347 (1907) — Cited for the definition of contempt of court as an act or conduct tending to interfere with the business of the court or showing disrespect to its dignity.
• Narcida vs. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365 (1912) — Cited for the characterization of direct contempt as an act done in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice, punishable summarily.
• Santos vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 58532, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 472 — Controlling precedent: the imputed use of a falsified document, especially where the falsity is not apparent on its face, is merely indirect contempt and requires charge and hearing.
• Gener vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631 — Controlling precedent: courts cannot take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even if tried or pending in the same court.
• Tan Me Nio vs. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil. 944 (1916) — Cited for the rule that a person discharged on bail is not restrained of liberty so as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
• In re Mison, Jr. vs. Subido, G.R. No. 27704, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 30 — Cited for the rule that a contempt proceeding is a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.
• Lee Yick Hon vs. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548 (1921) — Cited for the rule that the modes of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to criminal prosecutions.

• Rule 71, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines direct contempt as misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings, including disrespect, offensive personalities, refusal to be sworn or to answer, or refusal to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required; allows summary punishment by fine or imprisonment. The SC held it did not apply because respondents’ alleged use of falsified documents occurred in filing a complaint, not in the court’s presence.
• Rule 71, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines indirect contempt and requires a written charge and an opportunity to comment and be heard before punishment; includes improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The SC applied it to the use of falsified documents and held that a hearing with notice was required.
• Rule 129, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court — Mandatory judicial notice includes official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. The SC held it did not authorize the RTC to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of another case, such as the Tagle Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92.