Esguerra vs. Gonzales-Asdala

A judge cannot be held civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for official acts performed in the exercise of judicial functions within jurisdiction and in good faith, and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is properly dismissed when filed before the availability of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a pending motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Perla S. Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian employed as Chief Dietitian of the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City. Respondents J. Walter Thompson Company (Phils.), Inc. (JWT) and AGL Market Research, Inc. (AGL) are Philippine corporations engaged in advertising and market research, respectively. On 15 May 2000, AB Food and Beverages Philippines, the manufacturer of Ovaltine, engaged JWT to handle its advertising and promotional requirements. AGL, in turn, conducted market research activities in connection with JWT's advertising campaigns. The dispute arose from AGL's invitation to PHC nutritionists to participate in what was represented as a confidential study, which turned out to be the taping of a television commercial for Ovaltine featuring Esguerra's candid endorsement.

On 14 May 2003, AGL, through its Director/General Manager Nicanor G. Aguirre, wrote a letter to the Philippine Heart Center inviting nutritionists to participate in a study, assuring that all information generated would be kept completely confidential. An AGL representative indicated that a talent fee of ₱20,000 would be paid to the nutritionist chosen to appear in a commercial to be subsequently shot. Esguerra showed up at the Cravings Restaurant in San Juan on 16 May 2003 to participate in the supposed study. The first stage consisted of an interview comparing two unnamed products, the second having evidently higher nutrients, during which she was asked whether she would endorse the higher-nutrient product. In the second stage, she was taken inside a room, asked additional questions by another lady while a man representing JWT focused a video-camera on her, and then asked to uncover and discover the product she preferred to endorse. Her candid reaction was that it was Ovaltine, and the incident was recorded on video. As she emerged, a third lady asked her to sign a piece of paper described as relating to the taping. Because she was in a hurry, Esguerra signed the document, which appeared to be a contract of agreement, but wrote at the side thereof that clearance from the PHC Director must first be obtained before any commercial could be shown to the public, and she verbally informed the third lady of this condition.

On 16 June 2003, at about noontime, an Ovaltine commercial aired on television featuring Esguerra, including the portion of her interview videotaped on 16 May 2003. There had been no prior advice from JWT or AGL that she had been selected to appear, nor was the required clearance from the PHC Director secured, nor was any talent fee paid. That same afternoon, Esguerra called JWT Account Director Joef Peña to protest, wrote a letter on 17 June 2003 to JWT (copy furnished AGL) demanding immediate pull-out of the commercial, and furnished the PHC Director and her Association with copies to explain that the commercial was not of her volition. JWT responded on 24 June 2003, officially informing her for the first time of her selection and offering remuneration of ₱5,000. Esguerra, through counsel, wrote a second letter on 4 July 2003 demanding immediate cessation of the airing and payment of the agreed ₱20,000 talent fee. Despite these protests, the commercial continued to be broadcast daily.

Esguerra filed an Amended Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against JWT and AGL, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and raffled to RTC-Branch 87, presided by Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala. After nearly three weeks without her application for injunctive relief being set for hearing, Esguerra filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibition on 26 August 2003, asserting that Judge Asdala's failure to act swiftly displayed partiality and bias. RTC-Branch 87 issued an Order on 28 August 2003 denying the application for preliminary injunction, finding that Esguerra failed to show a material and substantial right invaded and that the action for damages would adequately compensate her injuries. Judge Asdala later explained that no summary hearing was conducted because there was no verified application for TRO on record, summons and complaint were not served on all defendants, and the essential time element was deemed waived when Esguerra filed her amended complaint only on 7 August 2003.

Without waiting for resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Esguerra filed a petition before the Court of Appeals seeking certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Meanwhile, Judge Asdala inhibited herself on 18 September 2003, and the case was re-raffled to RTC-Branch 215, presided by Judge Maria Luisa Quijano-Padilla. On 10 October 2003, Esguerra informed RTC-Branch 215 that the commercial had ceased airing and she was desisting from asking for the TRO, with reservation to revive. She later claimed the airing resumed and reinstated her application; RTC-Branch 215 granted a TRO on 14 November 2003 and a writ of preliminary injunction on 8 June 2004. The Court of Appeals, proceeding with Esguerra's still-pending petition, dismissed it on 31 March 2005, finding certiorari premature and holding Judge Asdala not liable for damages. Esguerra's motion for reconsideration was denied on 12 July 2005.

• Prematurity of Certiorari Petition: Esguerra asserted that her petition before the Court of Appeals was not premature because she had no other efficacious remedy, and that the question of Judge Asdala's liability for damages survived the withdrawal of her application for injunctive relief and the judge's inhibition.
• Judicial Liability for Damages: Esguerra maintained that Judge Asdala could and should have issued the TRO as early as 1 August 2003, since summons were served on 29 July 2003 and the case was raffled on 31 July 2003, and that the judge's dilly-dallying caused the commercial to be shown 110 additional times, entitling her to damages of ₱2.2 million, plus costs and attorney's fees.
• Delay in Ruling on Motion for Inhibition: Esguerra argued that Judge Asdala also delayed ruling on her Motion for Inhibition, compounding the damage caused by the failure to act on the TRO application.
• Mootness: Esguerra insisted that her petition could not be moot and academic because the issue of Judge Asdala's liability survived the withdrawal of the injunction application and still needed resolution.

• Mootness: Whether or not the case had become totally moot and academic.
• Judicial Liability for Damages: Whether or not the public respondent Judge Asdala may be held liable for damages.
• Quantum of Damages: What is the amount of damages that should be awarded.

• Mootness: Yes. The question of whether RTC-Branch 87 properly denied the application for preliminary injunction/TRO became moot and academic when Esguerra withdrew her application, and her subsequent reinstatement before RTC-Branch 215, which actually granted the relief, could not revive the grounds for the certiorari petition.
• Judicial Liability for Damages: No. Judge Asdala acted within her jurisdiction and in the exercise of her judicial functions; absent proof of bad faith, gross ignorance, or malicious intent, a judge cannot be held liable for damages for erroneous official acts.
• Quantum of Damages: None. No damages were awarded, the petition having been denied in full.

• Mootness: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Esguerra's petition because, at the time it was filed, her motion for reconsideration of the 28 August 2003 Order was still pending before RTC-Branch 87, demonstrating that a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available — a threshold requirement of Rule 65 that Esguerra failed to satisfy. Furthermore, Esguerra subsequently withdrew her application for preliminary injunction/TRO, rendering the question of whether RTC-Branch 87 properly denied it moot and academic. A declaration on a moot question would be of no practical use or value, as courts will not determine questions in which no actual interests are involved. Her reinstatement of the application before RTC-Branch 215, which actually granted the TRO and preliminary injunction, could not serve as the basis for the pending certiorari petition, since that petition assailed the denial by RTC-Branch 87 — a different branch and a different ruling. Using the favorable action of RTC-Branch 215 as basis for the petition would be repugnant to the fundamental due process to which Judge Asdala was entitled.

• Judicial Liability for Damages: Judge Asdala's Order dated 28 August 2003 was rendered in the exercise of her official function as Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 87, which had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and all its incidents. Under settled doctrine, judges cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal, or administrative — for official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith and within jurisdiction. Liability attaches only when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. The records contain no evidence that Judge Asdala was moved by bad faith, ill will, or malicious intent. Her reasons for denying the application were clearly stated in her Order, applying the basic requirements for entitlement to injunctive relief as laid down in jurisprudence and finding that Esguerra's application failed to comply. Bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; it is not presumed, and the party alleging it bears the onus of proof. Additionally, under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the public respondent in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is not meant to incur personal liability for official actions, and costs awarded in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only. Finally, Esguerra was still litigating her civil case against JWT and AGL before RTC-Branch 215, where she prayed for compensation for the same damages from the airing of the commercial, making her claim against Judge Asdala suspiciously appear to be an attempt to recover double compensation.

• Quantum of Damages: No amount of damages could be awarded because the petition was denied in its entirety. The Court of Appeals' dismissal was proper, and no basis existed to hold Judge Asdala liable. The civil case against JWT and AGL remained pending before RTC-Branch 215, where Esguerra could pursue her claim for damages arising from the airing of the commercial.

• Judicial Immunity from Liability for Official Acts — Judges are not liable to respond in a civil action for damages, nor administratively responsible, for acts done in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction, so long as they act in good faith. Liability attaches only when the judge acts fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance, or with evident bad faith. Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent of ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith. Bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and is not presumed. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Judge Asdala could not be held liable for damages, there being no evidence of bad faith, ill will, or malicious intent in her denial of Esguerra's application for injunctive relief.

• Prematurity of Certiorari — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner must show, on pain of dismissal, that resort to the extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of such remedy. Filing a certiorari petition while a motion for reconsideration is still pending before the lower court renders the petition premature and dismissible. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm the CA's dismissal, as Esguerra filed her petition before the Court of Appeals while her motion for reconsideration of the 28 August 2003 Order was still pending before RTC-Branch 87.

• Moot and Academic Doctrine — Courts will not determine a moot question or consider issues in which no actual interests are involved. A case becomes moot when there is no longer a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration would be of no practical use or value. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Esguerra's withdrawal of her application for preliminary injunction/TRO rendered moot the question of whether RTC-Branch 87 properly denied it, and her subsequent reinstatement before RTC-Branch 215 — which granted the relief — could not revive the grounds for the certiorari petition.

• "Judges cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance, may they be held criminally or administratively responsible." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on judicial immunity, defining the conditions under which a judge may or may not be held liable for official acts, and is the ratio decidendi for the Court's ruling that Judge Asdala could not be held liable for damages.

• "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." — This passage provides the canonical formulation of bad faith in the context of judicial liability, distinguishing it from mere error or negligence, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on judicial immunity.

• "It does well for Esguerra to remember that at the threshold of every special civil action under Rule 65, the person seeking the writs must be able to show, on pain of dismissal of his petition, that his resort to such extraordinary remedy is justified by the 'absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.'" — This passage states the jurisdictional prerequisite for certiorari under Rule 65 and explains why the Court of Appeals was compelled to dismiss Esguerra's petition.

• Ang vs. Quilala, 444 Phil. 742 (2003) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the doctrine that judges are not liable for damages or administratively responsible for acts done in the exercise of judicial functions within their legal powers and jurisdiction, absent gross error, bad faith, or malicious intent. Though an administrative case, the Court found its pronouncements equally relevant to the instant certiorari proceeding where civil compensation from a judge was additionally sought.
• Kho vs. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 140 (2002) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that a case becomes moot when there is no more justiciable controversy and a declaration would be of no practical use or value.
• Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 337 Phil. 654 (1997) — Followed. Cited in support of the mootness doctrine.
• Contreras vs. Judge Solis, 329 Phil. 376 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the principle that judges are not liable for official acts done in good faith within jurisdiction, citing in turn Valdez vs. Valera, 171 Phil. 217 (1978).
• Gatmaitan vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 149226, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 591 — Followed. Cited for the rule that bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• Sesbreño vs. Igonia, A.M. No. P-04-1791, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 243 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that bad faith is not presumed and the party alleging it bears the onus of proof.

• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court (Petition for Certiorari) — Provides that certiorari is available when a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to hold that Esguerra's petition was properly dismissed because a motion for reconsideration was still pending.
• Section 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court (Petition for Prohibition) — Provides the conditions for prohibition, mirroring the certiorari requirement of absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Applied in conjunction with Section 1 to dismiss the prohibition aspect of Esguerra's petition.
• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court (Petition for Mandamus) — Provides that mandamus lies when a tribunal unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Applied to the mandamus aspect of Esguerra's petition, which was likewise dismissed.
• Section 5, Rule 65, Rules of Court (Respondents and Costs) — Provides that in petitions relating to acts or omissions of a judge, costs awarded in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge impleaded as public respondent. Applied to support the conclusion that Judge Asdala was not meant to incur personal liability for her official actions.
• Section 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court (Grounds for Preliminary Injunction) — Sets forth the requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction: that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, that the act complained of would probably work injustice, or that a party is doing or threatening acts in violation of the applicant's rights. Applied by Judge Asdala in her 28 August 2003 Order to deny Esguerra's application, a ruling the Supreme Court found neither manifestly unjust nor constitutive of gross ignorance.
• Section 4(d), Rule 58, Rules of Court — Provides that a summary hearing on a TRO application shall be conducted within 24 hours after the sheriff's return of service, subject to the condition that summons, complaint, and verified application have been properly served on adverse parties. Applied by Judge Asdala to justify the non-conduct of a summary hearing, given the defective service and absence of a verified application.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Ruben T. Reyes concurred.