Escuin y Batac vs. Escuin, et al.

A recognized natural child is entitled to one-third of the hereditary estate as his legal portion; a will that ignores him is void only to the extent it impairs that legitime, and partition may not proceed until all claims against the estate are finally settled and its obligations paid.

Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos, a native of Cavite, was the son of Francisco Escuin and the deceased Eugenia de los Santos. He was married to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and had a natural child, Emilio Escuin y Batac, by Julia Batac. His estate became the subject of settlement proceedings involving the widow, his father, and the natural child, with their respective claims governed by the Civil Code's provisions on testamentary succession, legitime, and administration of estates, and by the Code of Civil Procedure's provisions on claims against estates and appeals from commissioners.

Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos, a native of Cavite and the son of Francisco Escuin and the deceased Eugenia de los Santos, executed a will on January 19, 1899, before a notary public in Sevilla, Spain. He stated that he had been married about six months earlier to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and had no lawful descendants. He also had a natural child, Emilio Escuin y Batac, by Julia Batac. In clause three of the will, he provided that if he had a duly registered successor, that child would be his sole and universal heir; in clause four, if there should be no such heir, he named his father Francisco Escuin and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon as universal heirs, to divide the estate equally between them. The testator died on January 20, 1899.

The will was admitted to probate, and commissioners were appointed to consider claims against the estate. According to a report presented to the Court of First Instance on June 20, 1907, one claim was allowed in the amount of 3,696.50 pesetas. The attorney for the widow and the attorneys for the guardian of the minor appealed to the Court of First Instance from the commissioners' findings. The administrator thereafter proposed a partition of the estate. The estate was valued at P8,268.02; after deductions for the allowed credit of P1,321.40, the administrator's 10 percent remuneration of P826.80, and legal expenses of P1,105.01, a balance of P5,014.81 remained. The administrator proposed to divide this balance into three shares of P1,671.60 each, with the natural son taking as general heir, the widow taking as legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of the free disposition and as usufructuary of the other half, and Francisco Escuin taking the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by the widow.

On September 12, 1906, the representative of the minor objected in writing to the proposed partition and asked that it be disapproved and that the entire estate be adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac. In support, he presented a certified copy of the complaint, answer, and final judgment in civil case No. 3240 of the Court of First Instance. In that case, filed on January 12, 1905, the representative of the minor asked for an allowance for subsistence from the estate, a declaration that the minor was the natural child of the testator, a declaration that the minor as the only natural son was the general heir, a holding that the testator died without lawful ascendants or descendants, and a declaration that the designation of heirs in the will was null and void. The administrator denied the allegations. On September 30, 1905, the court found that Emilio Escuin y Batac was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos, had by Julia Batac; that the testator was the natural son of Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos and was recognized by his father; and that the minor was one of the heirs of the testator.

On October 30, 1906, the Court of First Instance, in view of the accounts and proposed partition, approved the accounts but disapproved the project of partition objected to by one of the parties in interest. The court expressed the opinion that a natural child was entitled to only one-fourth of the hereditary property, with the clause in the will annulled only insofar as the amount to be divided should be reduced, taking into account the share due to the natural son and the right of the father and the widow each to one-half of the remainder. Counsel for the minor excepted and appealed. On July 10, 1907, the representatives of the administrator and the minor stated in writing that the October 30, 1906 order did not constitute a final judgment of partition and requested the appointment of commissioners to present a new project of partition. On August 22, 1907, the attorney for the administrator requested the appointment of commissioners and the fixing of his remuneration. On August 24, 1907, the court held that the appointment of commissioners was unnecessary because the estate consisted of ready money and authorized the administrator to distribute the funds among the heirs in the amounts stated in the October 30, 1906 order. The minor's representative excepted and appealed.

The Court of First Instance's factual findings established the minor's status as the testator's recognized natural child and one of his heirs. The dispute on appeal concerned the proper disposition of the estate in light of that status, the pending claims against the estate, and the testamentary provisions naming the father and widow.

• Premature Partition: The representative of the minor argued that the partition of the hereditary funds could not be ordered while the appeals from the commissioners' resolution were pending and until all obligations of the estate had been paid, because the amount of the estate subject to division had not yet been determined.
• Right to Entire Estate: The representative of the minor maintained that because the testator ignored his recognized natural child and the designation of heirs was void, the minor, as general heir, was entitled to the entire estate.
• Objection to Proposed Partition: The representative of the minor objected to the administrator's proposed partition and asked that it be disapproved and that the entire estate be adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac.

• Finality of Commissioners' Decision: The appellee alleged that the decision of the commissioners had become final or was consented to by the parties in interest; the Court declined to consider the allegation because the record did not show it.

• Premature Partition: Whether the Court of First Instance could order partition or distribution of the estate while appeals from the commissioners' resolution on claims were pending and before all obligations of the estate had been paid.
• Legitime of Recognized Natural Child: Whether the recognized natural child, Emilio Escuin y Batac, was entitled to one-third of the estate as his legal portion.
• Validity of the Will and Partial Intestacy: Whether the testamentary designation of the father and widow was wholly void, making the natural child entitled to the entire estate under intestate succession, or whether the will remained valid as to the disposable two-thirds.
• Finality of Commissioners' Decision: Whether the appellee's allegation that the commissioners' decision had become final or was consented to could be considered on appeal.

• Premature Partition: No. Partition could not be ordered while the appeals from the commissioners' resolution were pending and until all obligations of the estate were paid; the net amount divisible among heirs had to be determined first under Article 1026 of the Civil Code and Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Legitime of Recognized Natural Child: Yes. The recognized natural child was entitled to one-third of the estate as his legal portion under Article 842 of the Civil Code, and the testamentary designation was void only to the extent it impaired that legitime.
• Validity of the Will and Partial Intestacy: No, the will was not wholly void. The testator could die partly testate and partly intestate; the will remained valid as to the disposable two-thirds, with the father and widow taking as legatees to the extent not impairing the natural child's legal portion.
• Finality of Commissioners' Decision: No. The record did not show that the commissioners' decision had become final or was consented to, so the allegation could not be considered.

• Premature Partition: The Court reasoned that while appeals from the report and resolution of the commissioners were pending in the lower court, partition of the hereditary funds could not be ordered even if the estate consisted of ready money, because the amount subject to division had not yet been determined. Article 1026 of the Civil Code provides that until all known creditors and legatees have been paid, the estate remains under administration. The Court cited the doctrine that only after payment of all obligations of the estate can the net amount divisible among the heirs be known. Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure likewise requires that after payment of debts, funeral charges, administration expenses, and allowances for maintenance, the court shall assign the residue to the persons entitled. Section 776 provides that upon appeal from the commissioners' resolution, the disputed claim stands for trial as an ordinary action, with the creditor as plaintiff and the estate as defendant; under Section 777, appeal to the Supreme Court is by bill of exception. Because the claims had not been finally resolved and the obligations had not been paid, there could be no inheritance to distribute.
• Legitime of Recognized Natural Child: The Court held that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, was the recognized natural child of the testator and his general heir under Article 807. As such, he was entitled to one-third of the estate, which is the legal portion of a natural child under Article 842. Because the testator ignored the minor in his will, the designation of heirs was annulled by operation of law insofar as it impaired the minor's legal portion. Legacies and betterments remained valid insofar as they were not illegal, since a testator cannot deprive heirs of their legal portions except in cases expressly indicated by law under Articles 763, 813, and 814.
• Validity of the Will and Partial Intestacy: The Court rejected the argument that the testator died intestate and that the natural child should inherit the entire estate under Article 939. A citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate under Article 764. The testator's wish to favor his father and wife with portions of his property was valid to the extent he had the right to dispose of them by will, provided the legal portion of his general heir was not impaired. The will was neither null, void, nor illegal as to the two-thirds of the property left to the father and wife; testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir are merely reduced insofar as they are illegal or excessive under Article 817. Thus, the father and widow were considered legatees under the will, and partition had to proceed on that basis.
• Finality of Commissioners' Decision: The record did not show that the decision of the commissioners had become final or was consented to by the parties in interest, nor was the point alleged and discussed in the first instance. Therefore, the appellee's allegation on this point could not be considered on appeal.

• Legitime of a Recognized Natural Child — Under the Civil Code, a recognized natural child is a general heir entitled to one-third of the estate as his legal portion under Article 842. A testamentary disposition that impairs this legitime is void only to the extent of the impairment; the will remains valid as to the portion the testator may freely dispose of. Applied: the minor was entitled to one-third, and the designation of the father and widow was reduced accordingly.
• Partial Intestacy — A person may die partly testate and partly intestate under Article 764. The annulment of a testamentary designation for impairing a compulsory heir's legitime does not render the entire will void or convert the succession into a total intestacy. Applied: the natural child could not claim the entire estate under Article 939; the will remained valid as to the disposable two-thirds.
• Payment of Estate Obligations Before Partition — Until all known creditors and legatees have been paid, the estate remains under administration under Article 1026, and the net amount divisible among heirs cannot be known. Partition may not be ordered while claims against the estate remain unresolved. Applied: the lower court erred in authorizing distribution before the appeals from the commissioners' resolution were finally decided.
• Appeal from Commissioners' Resolution — Under Sections 776 and 777 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a disputed claim against the estate is tried as an ordinary action, with the creditor as plaintiff and the estate as defendant, and the judgment is appealable by bill of exception. Applied: an ordinary action should have been brought, and the partition was premature while that claim remained pending.
• Reduction of Inofficious Testamentary Provisions — Testamentary provisions that impair the legal portion of a general heir are reduced insofar as they are illegal or excessive under Article 817. Applied: the will was upheld as to the disposable two-thirds, but the shares of the father and widow were subject to reduction to preserve the natural child's one-third legitime.

• "Until all the known creditors in the legatees have been paid, it shall be understood that the estate is under administration, says article 1026 of the Civil Code, and in conformity with this legal provision the supreme tribunal has established the doctrine that “only after payment of all obligations of the estate can the net amount divisible among the heirs be known.” (Decision of March 2, 1896.)" — This passage states the rule that estate obligations must be settled before the net hereditary estate can be determined, supporting the reversal of the premature partition.
• "So that by reason of the claims made by the creditor of the estate of Emilio Escuin de los Santos and by her natural son, duly recognize by his father, an ordinary action should have been brought before the Court of First Instance, from whose judgement appeal maybe taken to this court by means of the corresponding bill of exception under the provisions of section 777 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and while the ultimate decision in the matter of the said claims against the resolution of the commissioners has not become final, and until all the obligations of the estate have been paid, there can really be no inheritance, nor it can be distributed among the persons interested therein according to the will of the testator, or under the provisions of the law." — This excerpt explains the procedural necessity of resolving claims against the estate before any inheritance may be distributed.
• "that the said minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is the general heir of his natural father, the said testator who recognized him while living (art. 807, Civil Code), and in the present case is entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child (art. 842 of the said code); and for the reason that the minor was ignored by his natural father in his will, the designation of heirs made therein was, as matter of fact annulled by force of law, in so far as legal portion of the said minor was thereby impaired." — This is the core ruling on the natural child's status and one-third legitime.
• "Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs annulled and that the law recognizes the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of his natural father, as his lawful and general heir, it is not proper to assert that the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in order to establish the conclusion that his said natural recognized child is entitled to succeed to the entire estate under the provisions of article 939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch in accordance with the law a citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764, Civil Code)." — This excerpt rejects total intestacy and confirms that the will remains valid as to the disposable portion.

• Decision of March 2, 1896 — Cited by the Court for the doctrine that only after payment of all obligations of the estate can the net amount divisible among the heirs be known. The Court used it to support the rule that partition cannot proceed before estate obligations are settled.

• Article 1026, Civil Code — Provides that until all known creditors and legatees have been paid, the estate is under administration. Applied to bar partition before the estate's obligations were settled.
• Article 807, Civil Code — Cited for the status of the recognized natural child as general heir. Applied to the minor Emilio Escuin y Batac.
• Article 842, Civil Code — Fixes the legal portion of a natural child at one-third of the estate. Applied to award the minor one-third.
• Articles 763, 813, and 814, Civil Code — Provide that a testator cannot deprive heirs of their legal portions except in cases expressly indicated by law, while legacies and betterments are valid insofar as not illegal. Applied to uphold the will except as it impaired the minor's legitime.
• Articles 764 and 806, Civil Code — Cited among the provisions supporting the validity of the will as to the free disposable portion and the possibility of partial intestacy. Applied to reject total intestacy.
• Article 817, Civil Code — Requires reduction of testamentary provisions that impair the legal portion of a general heir insofar as they are illegal or excessive. Applied to reduce the shares of the father and widow.
• Article 939, Civil Code — Governs intestate succession. Cited and rejected as basis for awarding the entire estate to the natural child.
• Section 753, Code of Civil Procedure — Requires the court, after payment of debts and expenses, to assign the residue to the persons entitled. Applied to require determination of the net estate before partition.
• Section 776, Code of Civil Procedure — Provides that an appeal from the commissioners' resolution is tried as an ordinary action, with the creditor as plaintiff and the estate as defendant. Applied to the pending claims.
• Section 777, Code of Civil Procedure — Provides for appeal to the Supreme Court by bill of exception. Applied to the procedural posture of the claims.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.