Escribano vs. Avila

Republic Act No. 4363, in specifying the provincial or city fiscal and the municipal court of the city or capital of the province as officers who may conduct the preliminary investigation of written defamation cases, did not withdraw from the Court of First Instance its authority to conduct such preliminary investigation. The enumeration was intended to divest ordinary municipal courts of that power to prevent out-of-town libel suits, and the Court of First Instance’s power is derived from the constitutional provision on probable cause and issuance of warrants.

Jose Escribano was the mayor of Tacurong, Cotabato, while Salipada K. Pendatun was a congressman and governor-elect of Cotabato; Judge David P. Avila presided over the First Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The controversy implicated the preliminary-investigation authority of that court under the charter of Cotabato City (Republic Act No. 2364, as amended by Republic Act No. 3332) and Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, which governs venue and preliminary investigation in written defamation cases. Libel by radio is treated as written defamation under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Rule 112, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows a Court of First Instance, upon a complaint filed directly with it, either to refer the complaint to the municipal judge or to conduct the preliminary examination and investigation itself.

Jose Escribano was the mayor of Tacurong, Cotabato, now the province of Sultan Kudarat, while Salipada K. Pendatun was a congressman and the governor-elect of Cotabato. On August 26, 1968, Escribano allegedly said in a speech broadcast by a radio station in Cotabato City that “Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live (fixed) in this province.” On September 25, 1968, Pendatun filed directly with the Court of First Instance of Cotabato a complaint for libel against Escribano, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5283. The complaint was subscribed and sworn to before Judge David P. Avila and was supported by the affidavit of Acting Governor Simeon Datumanong.

Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. In orders dated March 5, 20, and 27, 1969, Judge Avila ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary investigation and received complainant’s evidence. On March 29, 1969, Judge Avila found that Pendatun’s evidence had “established a probable cause to believe that” libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano “probably committed the same.” He ordered Escribano’s arrest, fixed bail at three thousand pesos, and referred the case to the city fiscal of Cotabato for the filing of the corresponding information. A warrant of arrest was issued on March 31, and sometime before April 16 the city fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano.

On April 1, 1969, Escribano filed with the Supreme Court special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition against Judge Avila and Pendatun, praying that Judge Avila’s orders be set aside. Respondents were required to answer the petition, and no restraining order was issued. On April 18, Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila’s order of March 29, 1969. On August 10, 1970, the Supreme Court issued a resolution restraining Judge Avila from proceeding with the arraignment of Escribano.

• Exclusive City Fiscal Authority: Petitioner argued that under the charter of Cotabato City, Republic Act No. 2364, as amended by Republic Act No. 3332, Section 23(f) and (g), the city attorney is empowered to investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws and city ordinances, prepare the necessary informations or complaints, and have charge of the prosecution of all crimes triable in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato and the municipal court of the city; he cited Sayo vs. Chief of Police, Montelibano vs. Ferrer, and Guerrero vs. Ferrer for the proposition that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
• Article 360 as Amended by Republic Act No. 4363: Petitioner maintained that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, provides that preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written defamations shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted, and that these provisions do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written defamations.

• Rule 112, Section 13: Respondent countered that Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court allows the Court of First Instance, upon a complaint filed directly with it without previous preliminary examination and investigation, either to refer the complaint to the municipal judge for preliminary examination and investigation or to conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously; if it finds reasonable ground to believe that the defendant committed the offense, it may issue a warrant of arrest and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information.

• Preliminary Investigation of Libel by Radio: Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City, or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city.

• Preliminary Investigation of Libel by Radio: Yes. The Court of First Instance of Cotabato has authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; the city attorney’s power under the Cotabato City charter is not exclusive, and Republic Act No. 4363 did not withdraw that authority from the Court of First Instance.

• Preliminary Investigation of Libel by Radio: The amendatory law’s purpose was to prevent complainants in written defamation cases from harassing the accused through out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts. Because the mischief intended to be removed is an important factor in statutory construction, the enumeration in Republic Act No. 4363 of the public officers and courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for written defamation was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance of the same power. Article 360 originally provided that the venue of criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed, or exhibited, regardless of where it was written, printed, or composed, and originally did not specify the public officers and courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation. Before amendment, a criminal action for libel could be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed, making the action transitory and allowing the injured party a choice of venue; experience showed that the offended party could harass the accused by laying venue in a remote or distant place. Republic Act No. 4363 laid down venue rules, the common feature of which is that whether the offended party is a public officer or a private person, he always has the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published. Congress did not confine the amendatory law to venue; it also specified that the preliminary investigation should be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where the action may be instituted. That specification deprived the ordinary municipal court of the power to conduct preliminary investigations in written defamation cases, but it had nothing to do with the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases cognizable by it. Retaining that power of the Court of First Instance would implement the amendment’s purpose of preventing complainants from harassing and embarrassing the accused with libel suits in distant municipalities. The maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius did not apply: it is not a rule of law but a tool of statutory construction, not universal or conclusive, and cannot be used to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking body; it is inapplicable where there is some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another otherwise within the statute, or where no reason exists why other persons or things not enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice would follow. The Court of First Instance was not mentioned due to inadvertence, which is not unusual since preliminary investigations are usually conducted by municipal courts and fiscals, and a preliminary investigation by the Court of First Instance is the exception, not the general rule. The power of the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional provision that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; implicit in that provision is the constitutional grant of power to the judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants, and the term “judge” embraces a judge of the Court of First Instance. The silence of Article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation, although the exercise of that power is tied to the venue rules: the power is lodged in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where the libelous article was printed or first published, or where the offended party actually resided, or where the offended public official held office, at the time of the commission of the offense. Petitioner’s contention that in chartered cities the city fiscal has exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations is not correct. While Section 23(f) of the Charter of Cotabato City empowers its city attorney to investigate charges and prepare informations or complaints, that power is not exclusive; Section 78 of the same charter provides that the municipal or city court of Cotabato City may also conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments, a provision found in Section 87 of the Judiciary Law and Section 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The same power is found in the last sentence of Section 41 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of Manila, which took effect after Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila was decided. That provision is not found in Commonwealth Act No. 326, the charter of Bacolod City, under which Montelibano vs. Ferrer and Guerrero vs. Ferrer were decided, nor in the old Manila Charter contained in the Revised Administrative Code; hence, in those cases, it was held that the city court could not conduct preliminary investigations.

• Legislative Purpose or Mischief Rule — In construing a statute, the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes that induced the enactment of the law are important factors. The Court applied this rule to Republic Act No. 4363, holding that its purpose was to prevent out-of-town libel suits and that its enumeration of officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations in written defamation cases was meant to divest ordinary municipal courts of that power, not to deprive the Court of First Instance of its authority.
• Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The inclusion of one thing excludes another, but the maxim is not a rule of law; it is merely a tool of statutory construction or a means of ascertaining legislative intent, is not of universal application, and is not conclusive. It cannot defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking body, and it is inapplicable where there is special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another otherwise within the statute, or where no reason exists why other persons or things not enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice would follow. The Court held that the non-mention of the Court of First Instance in Article 360, as amended, did not exclude it from conducting preliminary investigations in written defamation cases.
• Constitutional Basis of the Judge’s Power to Conduct Preliminary Investigation — The power of the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional provision that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Implicit in that provision is the constitutional grant of power to the judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants; the term “judge” embraces a judge of the Court of First Instance. The Court applied this to uphold the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato to conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel-by-radio charge.
• Non-Exclusivity of the City Fiscal’s Preliminary Investigation Power — A city attorney’s statutory power to investigate charges and prepare informations or complaints is not exclusive where the city charter also grants the municipal or city court the power to conduct preliminary investigations. The Court applied this by citing Section 78 of the Charter of Cotabato City, which allows the municipal or city court of Cotabato City to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense without regard to the limits of punishments.
• Venue and Preliminary Investigation in Written Defamation — Republic Act No. 4363 limited the venue of criminal and civil actions for written defamation to the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published, or where the offended party actually resides or held office at the time of the offense, and specified that preliminary investigation should be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where the action may be instituted. The Court held that the Court of First Instance’s power to conduct preliminary investigation is tied to these venue rules.

• “Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the enumeration in the amendatory law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for written defamation was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance of that same power.” — This is the ratio decidendi: Republic Act No. 4363’s enumeration was intended to strip ordinary municipal courts of preliminary-investigation authority in written defamation cases, not to remove that authority from the Court of First Instance.
• “That maxim is not a rule of law. It is just a tool of statutory construction or a means of ascertaining the legislative intent. It is not of universal application and is not conclusive. It cannot be used to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking body” — This defines the Court’s treatment of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius and explains why the maxim did not exclude the Court of First Instance from conducting the preliminary investigation.
• “Escribano's contention that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations is not correct.” — This rejects the petitioner’s central premise and supports the holding that the city attorney’s power under the Cotabato City charter is not exclusive.
• “Implicit in that provision is the constitutional grant of power to the judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. That which is plainly implied in the language of a law is as much a part of it as that which is expressed” — This states the constitutional basis for the Court of First Instance judge’s power to conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants.

• Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz, L-34038, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 356 — Cited for the rule that the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional provision on probable cause and issuance of warrants, and that the judge’s authority is not merely statutory.
• People and Navarro vs. Hechanova, L-26459, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 101 — Cited in relation to the specification in Republic Act No. 4363 that preliminary investigation should be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where the action may be instituted.
• Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311 — Cited to establish the purpose of the amendment: to prevent complainants in written defamation cases from harassing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits filed in remote municipal courts.
• People vs. Borja, 43 Phil. 618 — Cited for the old rule that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed, which made the action transitory and allowed harassment through choice of venue.
• Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859; Montelibano vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228; Guerrero vs. Ferrer, 106 Phil. 1163 — Cited by petitioner for exclusive city fiscal authority but distinguished by the Court because the charters involved in those cases did not contain a provision allowing the city court to conduct preliminary investigations.
• Callanta vs. Villanueva, L-24646 and 24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377 — Cited in connection with the rule that city courts could not conduct preliminary investigations under charters lacking the provision allowing them to do so.
• Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, 145 — Cited for the rule that the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes that induced the enactment of a law are important factors in its construction.
• Springer vs. Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. 845, 227 U.S. 189; People vs. Manahan, 115 Phil. 657, 668; Manabat vs. De Aquino, 92 Phil. 1026, 1027 — Cited in the discussion of the limits of the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, particularly that the maxim is an auxiliary rule to be ignored where circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.

• Article 360, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 — Governs venue and preliminary investigation in written defamation cases. The Court held that it did not exclude the Court of First Instance from conducting preliminary investigations; its enumeration was intended to divest ordinary municipal courts of that power to prevent out-of-town libel suits.
• Article 355, Revised Penal Code — Libel by means of radio is a written defamation under this article. The Court applied Article 360, as amended, to the libel-by-radio charge against Escribano.
• Section 23(f) and (g), Republic Act No. 2364 (Charter of Cotabato City), as amended by Republic Act No. 3332 — Empowers the city attorney to investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws and city ordinances, prepare the necessary informations or complaints, and have charge of the prosecution of all crimes triable in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato and the municipal court of the city. The Court held that this power is not exclusive.
• Section 78, Republic Act No. 2364 (Charter of Cotabato City) — Provides that the municipal or city court of Cotabato City may also conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments. The Court cited this to show that the city attorney’s preliminary-investigation power is not exclusive.
• Section 13, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and investigation, the judge shall either refer the complaint to the municipal judge for preliminary examination and investigation or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously; if he finds reasonable ground to believe that the defendant committed the offense, he shall issue a warrant for arrest and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information. The Court cited this as a basis for the Court of First Instance’s authority.
• Section 1[3], Article 111 (now Section 3, Article IV), 1973 Constitution — Provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Court cited this as the constitutional source of the Court of First Instance judge’s power to conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants.
• Section 87, Judiciary Law; Section 2, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Cited in relation to the power of the municipal or city court to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments.
• Section 41, Republic Act No. 409 (Revised Charter of Manila) — Its last sentence grants the city court the power to conduct preliminary investigations; it took effect after Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila was decided. The Court cited this to distinguish the older cases where the city court could not conduct preliminary investigations.
• Commonwealth Act No. 326 (Charter of Bacolod City) — Lacked the provision allowing the city court to conduct preliminary investigations; it was the charter under which Montelibano vs. Ferrer and Guerrero vs. Ferrer were decided. The Court cited this to distinguish those cases.

Castro, C.J., Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, concurring in the dismissal on the ground that the mere non-mention of judges of the Court of First Instance as among those authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written defamation under Republic Act No. 4363 cannot be construed to mean a withdrawal of the constitutional and statutory power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations; he further opined that city charter provisions do not grant the city fiscal sole authority to conduct investigations to the exclusion of the regular courts, and that the rulings in Sayo, Montelibano, Guerrero, and other cases must be deemed abandoned. Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.

• Barredo, J. — Dissented on the ground that courts of first instance have no power to conduct preliminary investigation, as explained in his separate opinion in Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz, 71 SCRA 412-425.
• Fernando, J. — Dissented because his concurrence in Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz did not go so far as recognizing the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation by virtue of the constitutional provision cited. He viewed that provision as covering only preliminary examination, not preliminary investigation proper; in the absence of a statutory grant, a court of first instance cannot exercise the power of holding a preliminary investigation, which is more of a prosecuting rather than a judicial function, unlike a preliminary examination, which is deemed best left in judicial hands. He also noted that he was not pleased with the grant of such power not only to the judge but also to such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, but that the Constitution having spoken, it is for the judiciary to obey.