Escobar vs. People

Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of conclusiveness of judgment has no application in criminal law proceedings; for criminal procedure, the applicable concept is res judicata "in prison grey" as double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7, not res judicata under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioners are officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani: Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Provincial Administrator Perla C. Maglinte, Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang, Management and Audit Analyst III Vivencia S. Telesforo, and Provincial Board Member Eugene L. Alzate. They were charged alongside Vice-Governor Felipe Katu Constantino, Board Member Margie P. Rudes, and Executive Assistant Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta with malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. The funds in question were sourced from the Countrywide Development Fund allocated to the province, intended for livelihood projects. Commission on Audit Circular No. 96-003, dated February 27, 1996, prescribed accounting and auditing guidelines on the release of fund assistance to NGOs and People's Organizations, requiring supporting documentation including accreditation, memoranda of agreement, and work and financial plans before disbursement.

On May 27, 2002, the Provincial Government of Sarangani disbursed ₱300,000 in public funds sourced from the Countrywide Development Fund, purportedly as financial assistance to the Malungon Market Vendors Association for recovery from a fire that had burned down the Malungon public market in 2001. The disbursement was processed through a Disbursement Voucher supported by a letter request dated May 20, 2002 and a Project Proposal, both purportedly signed by one "Nema Tamayo," described as a team leader of the association. The check issued — DBP Check No. 282390 — was made payable to "Tita P. Sarifio," described as the treasurer of the association. Governor Escobar certified on the voucher that the expense was "necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision"; Telesforo certified that the supporting documents were complete; and Cagang certified that there were available funds. The voucher was signed as received by "Tita P. Sariño," a person who could not be located in Barangay Malungon.

According to the prosecution, the entire transaction was a fabrication orchestrated from within the Office of the Vice-Governor. Mary Ann Gadian, a computer operator in that office, testified that in May 2002 she received instructions from Vice-Governor Constantino, Board Member Juanito Purisima, and Zoleta to prepare supporting documents for the disbursement of funds to be used for the wedding of Board Member Alzate, and to use the name "Tita P. Sarifio" in the fictitious documents. Gadian prepared the fictitious letter and Project Proposal under the name "Nema Tamayo" and had a coworker sign above that name. She then brought the documents to Provincial Administrator Maglinte, who instructed her to ask Zoleta whether an additional ₱10,000 for department heads could be added; Zoleta told her to "double the amount so that the processing will be expedited." Maglinte directed Gadian to source the ₱300,000 from the ₱1,000,000 CDF of Malungon. Maglinte reviewed the falsified documents, affixed her initials under Governor Escobar's name, and accompanied Gadian to the Governor's office, where the voucher was signed. Because Provincial Accountant Camanay was absent, Telesforo signed over Camanay's name on the voucher. Cagang, as Provincial Treasurer, reviewed and signed the voucher and the check, though Gadian observed him "shaking his head" as he did so.

After the check was prepared, Gadian called Joy Tangan of the Office of the Vice-Governor for further instructions from Zoleta. Pursuant to those instructions, Tangan accompanied a woman acting as a "dummy" to claim and encash the check. Tangan gave the ₱300,000 to Gadian, who delivered it to Zoleta. Zoleta gave Gadian ₱100,000 and called Alzate to come to her office. When Alzate arrived, Tatang Purisima gave him ₱200,000 for the wedding. Gadian placed the ₱100,000 in five envelopes of ₱20,000 each and brought them to Maglinte's office, where several officials awaited their shares. Tangan corroborated Gadian's account of these events. Juanilio Vegafria, the president of the Malungon Market Vendors Association from 2001 to 2004, executed an affidavit stating that the association never received the ₱300,000 and that no member or officer named "Nema Tamayo" or "Tita P. Sarifio" existed.

Petitioners denied the allegations against them. Maglinte claimed she had no participation in the falsification and that Vice-Governor Constantino had informed her over the phone that documents from the Malungon Market Vendors Association would be brought to her office; she said she was unaware of COA Circular No. 96-003. Escobar denied knowledge of the anomaly, stating his only participation was signing the voucher, which appeared regular on its face; he later formed a Fact-Finding Committee upon learning of the anomaly from a radio program. Telesforo testified she signed the voucher only after verifying that the supporting documents were complete and in order. Cagang testified that the voucher was already signed by Escobar and Telesforo when it reached his office. Alzate denied receiving ₱200,000 and presented evidence that the check was encashed on May 29, 2002, when he was in Cebu City for a national board meeting, supported by plane tickets, certificates of appearance, and minutes of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan showing his absence on official business.

The Commission on Audit Special Audit Team, led by State Auditor IV Helen Cailing, discovered irregularities in the grant of financial assistance, finding that the supporting documents lacked the approval of Governor Escobar, that the beneficiary was not accredited, that there was no memorandum of agreement, and that the check was encashed when it should have been for deposit only to the association's account. The Sandiganbayan found that the documents had been falsified, leading to the disbursement of public funds to an association that neither prepared the documents nor received the financial assistance. It found that Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang had custody of the funds and approved the voucher despite deficiencies under COA Circular No. 96-003, and that Maglinte, Alzate, and Zoleta acted in conspiracy in the falsification of the supporting documents.

• Elements of Estafa Not Established: Petitioners argued that Maglinte and Alzate did not acquire juridical possession of the money subject of the case, and even assuming they did, it was not received in trust, on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same. Petitioners likewise asserted there was no prior demand made upon Maglinte or Alzate.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Petitioners maintained that there was no proof that Maglinte and Alzate participated in the falsification of the fictitious documents. Gadian's testimony that Maglinte "advised" her in the preparation of the voucher was mere conjecture, as Gadian admitted she had no knowledge of any discussion between Zoleta and the other accused prior to receiving instructions. Similarly, there was no testimony showing Alzate was aware of the falsification; he merely received money from Constantino without knowledge of its source.
• Uncorroborated Testimony of Co-Conspirators: Petitioners asserted that the conviction was based on the uncorroborated testimonies of witnesses Gadian and Tangan, who participated in the crime, appeared to be the most guilty, and were motivated to lie by their desire to be made state witnesses.
• Due Process Violation: Petitioners argued that Alzate's constitutional rights were violated when the Sandiganbayan denied his motion for new trial and motion to present additional witnesses based on technicalities.
• Not Accountable Officers: Petitioners contended that Escobar and Telesforo are not accountable officers under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, arguing that only the Provincial Treasurer is accountable for the funds of a province under the Local Government Code. They relied on the Government Auditing Code and Arriola and Radan vs. Sandiganbayan for the proposition that accountability depends on duties and functions that allow receipt of public property for which accounting is required.
• Good Faith Reliance (Arias Doctrine): Petitioners invoked Arias vs. Sandiganbayan and Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan to argue that Escobar relied in good faith on his subordinates, as the voucher appeared to have been prepared with regularity and nobody called his attention to any anomaly. They argued there was no discrepancy between the check and the disbursement voucher, as both were payable to "Tita P. Sarifio/Treasurer Market Vendors Association."
• Conclusiveness of Judgment: Petitioners relied on Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Chavez to argue that the rule of conclusiveness of judgment bars relitigation of the Sandiganbayan's determinations in Criminal Case No. 28331 — where the Sandiganbayan held that Escobar is not an accountable officer, was not aware of the anomalies, and did not participate in the falsification — as those determinations involved material facts already settled between identical parties.
• COA Circular No. 96-003 Inapplicable: Petitioners argued that COA Circular No. 96-003 does not apply to fund assistance to NGOs or POs funded out of a CDF of a congressman, and that the disposition of a trust fund is subject to the provisions of the Special Allotment Release Order rather than the circular. They further asserted it was not sufficiently established that the supporting documents were deficient or incomplete.

• Conspiracy Established: Respondent countered that Maglinte's complicity was evident from her conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime — she instructed Gadian to ask Zoleta whether ₱10,000 could be added for department heads and to source the fund from the CDF of Malungon. Both Maglinte and Alzate shared in the proceeds, and Alzate quickly arrived to receive ₱200,000 after being informed by Zoleta that the money was ready.
• Arias Doctrine Inapplicable: Respondent argued that Arias and Magsuci do not apply because there were reasons for Escobar to closely examine the transaction — the letter request and Project Proposal were signed by "Nema Tamayo," yet the disbursement voucher was payable to "Tita P. Sarifio." Escobar made no attempt to ensure implementation of the project, monitor the funds, accredit the organization, or enter into a Memorandum of Agreement, constituting reckless imprudence.
• Ample Opportunity for Defense: Respondent pointed out that Alzate had four years to prepare to present evidence but only sought to present additional evidence via a motion for reconsideration after the Sandiganbayan had already admitted all formal offers of evidence. His motion was filed two years after he testified, a year and a half after manifesting he was not presenting additional evidence, and a year and two months after the Sandiganbayan ruled on the admissibility of his exhibits.
• Accountable Officers: Respondent argued that the funds were in the nature of a trust fund in the possession of the local government as trustee, and that Escobar had to certify and approve the validity, propriety, and legality of expenditures, while Telesforo had to certify and approve the completeness and propriety of the supporting documents.
• Credibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: Respondent argued that petitioners were the ones who controlled and directed the commission of the crime, and that the candid admission of Gadian and Tangan of their complicity was a guarantee of their truthfulness.
• Conclusiveness Inapplicable: Respondent contended that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable because this case is not a continuation of Criminal Case No. 28331.
• COA Circular Applies: Respondent argued that COA Circular No. 96-003 applies to all releases of fund assistance to NGOs or POs, citing its text describing it as a restatement of auditing guidelines on the release of fund assistance, its definition of fund assistance as government funds entrusted to NGOs/POs, and its guideline that utilization of fund assistance charged to savings or trust receipts shall be approved by proper authorities.

• Conspiracy in Estafa: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners Alzate and Maglinte of estafa through conspiracy.
• Good Faith Reliance (Arias Doctrine): Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying Arias vs. Sandiganbayan to find that petitioner Escobar properly relied on good faith that his subordinates would perform their functions in accordance with the law.
• Due Process: Whether the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Alzate due process when it denied his motion for new trial and did not allow his presentation of additional witnesses based on technicalities.
• Accountable Public Officers: Whether petitioners Escobar and Telesforo are accountable public officers.
• Credibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting all petitioners based primarily on the testimony of participants in the commission of the crime.
• Conclusiveness of Judgment: Whether the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in Criminal Case No. 28331 binds the Sandiganbayan in this case.

• Conspiracy in Estafa: No. The conspiracy among Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta was sufficiently established through circumstantial evidence showing their participation in the falsification and their sharing in the proceeds, satisfying the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Good Faith Reliance (Arias Doctrine): No. The Arias doctrine does not apply where circumstances should have alerted heads of offices to exercise more diligence; discrepancies in the voucher and check required closer examination of the supporting documents.
• Due Process: No. Alzate had four years to prepare his defense, and the evidence he sought to present was not newly discovered, having been already in his possession when he testified and marked as his exhibit.
• Accountable Public Officers: Yes. Under Section 340 of the Local Government Code, local government officials may become accountable officers through their participation in the use or application of public funds, and Escobar and Telesforo's signatures were required for disbursement.
• Credibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: No error. The testimonies of Gadian and Tangan, though from participants in the crime, were credible and admissible; their candid admission of complicity guaranteed truthfulness, and the issue of witness credibility is not proper for a petition for review on certiorari.
• Conclusiveness of Judgment: No. Conclusiveness of judgment is a civil law doctrine with no application in criminal proceedings, except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted; the applicable concept in criminal procedure is double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7.

• Conspiracy in Estafa: The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code were proved: there was a false pretense (falsified documents executed under a fictitious name), the false pretense was made prior to the commission of the fraud (the documents were falsified before the disbursement), the offended party relied on the false pretense (the government was induced to part with public funds because of the falsified documents), and damage resulted (the government suffered the loss of ₱300,000). Conspiracy was established through circumstantial evidence. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it; direct proof is not essential and may be inferred from a chain of circumstances. Maglinte's participation went beyond passive acquiescence: she instructed Gadian to add ₱10,000 for "suso" officials to facilitate approval, directed Gadian to source the funds from the CDF of Malungon, reviewed and initialed the falsified documents, accompanied Gadian to the Governor's office, and received proceeds. Alzate's participation was established by the fact that the illegal disbursement was set into motion specifically for his wedding, and he received ₱200,000 without hesitation upon being called by Zoleta. Zoleta regularly instructed Gadian to make fictitious documents, directed the falsification throughout the process, reviewed the falsified documents, instructed Tangan to accompany a dummy payee to encash the check, and received the cash. Following Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan and People vs. Romualdez, the existence of conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that the acts of multiple persons are parts of some complete whole.

• Good Faith Reliance (Arias Doctrine): The Arias doctrine — that heads of offices may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare documents — is not an absolute rule. As held in Rivera vs. People, it is not a magic cloak that can be used to escape liability. Where exceptional circumstances should prod a head of office to go beyond what subordinates prepared, the doctrine does not apply. In Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, a discrepancy between the names on checks and disbursement vouchers was held to be an unusual fact that should have alerted the official to examine the documents more closely. Here, there were discrepancies in the voucher and the check — the letter request and Project Proposal were signed by "Nema Tamayo," yet the disbursement voucher was payable to "Tita P. Sarifio." These discrepancies should have prodded Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to examine the supporting documents. Furthermore, the disbursement violated multiple requirements of COA Circular No. 96-003: the disbursement was not included in the work and financial plan, the association was not accredited, there was no memorandum of agreement, the beneficiary did not submit financial statements, the letter request was not approved by the Governor, the check was issued in the name of an individual rather than the association and was encashed instead of deposited, there was no official receipt, and there was no listing of beneficiaries. The failure of Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to account for or liquidate the disbursement during the COA audit further demonstrated criminal negligence, supporting their conviction for malversation.

• Due Process: The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. Alzate had four years to prepare to present evidence but only sought to present additional evidence via a motion for reconsideration after the Sandiganbayan had already admitted all formal offers of evidence. The machine-validated entry on the check — which Alzate sought to present through a DBP teller — was not newly discovered evidence, as Alzate was already aware of its existence when he testified and had even marked it as his Exhibit "2-A." Under Rule 122, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a new trial requires newly discovered evidence that the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial. Additionally, Alzate's motion to present additional witnesses failed to comply with Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 on notice and hearing of motions, as it was not set for hearing. Petitioners failed to establish that Alzate was not afforded ample opportunity to be heard.

• Accountable Public Officers: Section 340 of the Local Government Code provides that any officer of a local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable, and that other local officials who, though not accountable by the nature of their duties, may likewise be held accountable through their participation in the use or application thereof. Following Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature of their functions, or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds. As part of standard procedure, Telesforo was required to certify that the supporting documents were complete, and Escobar was required to sign them before a check could be approved for disbursement. No checks could be prepared and no payment effected without their signatures. Thus, Escobar and Telesforo had control and responsibility over the subject funds and were accountable officers by reason of their participation.

• Credibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: The Sandiganbayan exercised extreme caution in evaluating the testimonies of Gadian and Tangan, who were particeps criminis. Their candid admission of complicity was, in a way, a guarantee of their truthfulness. Under People vs. Bayona, the candid admission of an accused of participation in a crime is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. Under People vs. Binsol, the fact that a person participated in the commission of a crime does not disqualify him from testifying or render his testimony ineffectual if otherwise competent and admissible; a government prosecutor is free to produce as a witness anyone whom he believes can testify to the truth of the crime charged. Petitioners presented no cogent reason to reverse the Sandiganbayan's appreciation of the testimonies. In any case, the issue of witness credibility is a matter of evidence not proper for a petition for review on certiorari.

• Conclusiveness of Judgment: Res judicata is a civil law doctrine with no application in criminal proceedings, except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed: in Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court rejected the argument that dismissal of an administrative case was conclusive in criminal proceedings, holding that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law; in Asistio y Cansino vs. People, the Court held that res judicata has no bearing on criminal proceedings, with the applicable concept being double jeopardy; and in Trinidad vs. Marcelo, the Court reiterated that res judicata is a civil law doctrine inapplicable in criminal proceedings. At most, the applicable concept is res judicata "in prison grey" as double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7, which is not in question here. Accepting the argument that conclusiveness of judgment bars this case — where the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28331 erroneously held that Escobar was not an accountable officer — would lead to the absurd result that a person acquitted on an erroneous legal ground could commit the exact same crime against the same party with impunity, under the claim that the erroneous application of the law is forever binding.

• Conclusiveness of Judgment in Criminal Proceedings — Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of conclusiveness of judgment (res judicata) has no application in criminal law proceedings. The applicable concept in criminal procedure is double jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7, not res judicata under Rule 39, Section 47. The Court applied this by rejecting petitioners' argument that the Sandiganbayan's findings in Criminal Case No. 28331 — that Escobar was not an accountable officer — should bar relitigation in this case, noting that accepting such an argument would allow a person acquitted on an erroneous legal ground to commit the same crime with impunity.

• Arias Doctrine (Good Faith Reliance on Subordinates) — Heads of offices may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. However, this is not an absolute rule; where exceptional circumstances should alert a head of office to examine documents more closely, the doctrine does not apply. The Court applied this by finding that discrepancies in the names on the voucher and check — "Nema Tamayo" on the letter request versus "Tita P. Sarifio" on the disbursement voucher — should have prompted Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to exercise a higher degree of circumspection.

• Accountable Public Officers under the Local Government Code — Under Section 340 of the Local Government Code, local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature of their functions, or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds. Officials whose signatures are necessary for disbursement of funds — such that no checks can be prepared and no payment effected without their approval — have control and responsibility over the subject funds and are accountable officers. The Court applied this by holding that Escobar and Telesforo, whose signatures were required for disbursement as part of standard procedure, were accountable officers by reason of their participation.

• Inference of Conspiracy — Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that the acts of multiple persons are merely parts of some complete whole. The Court applied this by finding that Maglinte's instructions to add funds for "suso" officials, her review of falsified documents, and her receipt of proceeds, together with Alzate's receipt of ₱200,000 for his wedding without hesitation, sufficiently established conspiracy.

• Testimony of Particeps Criminis — The fact that a witness participated in the commission of a crime does not disqualify him from testifying or render his testimony ineffectual if otherwise competent and admissible. The candid admission of an accused of his participation in a crime is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. A government prosecutor is free to produce as a witness anyone whom he believes can testify to the truth of the crime charged, and the failure to follow the requirements for discharge of a co-accused as state witness does not violate due process nor render the testimony ineffectual. The Court applied this by affirming the Sandiganbayan's reliance on Gadian's and Tangan's testimonies.

• "Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of conclusiveness of judgment has no application in criminal law proceedings. For criminal procedure, it is not res judicata under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, but res judicata in prison grey as double jeopardy, under Rule 117, Section 7." — This is the opening statement of the decision and articulates the controlling doctrine on conclusiveness of judgment in criminal proceedings, distinguishing the civil law concept from the criminal law concept of double jeopardy.

• "Arias v. Sandiganbayan is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability." — This passage, drawn from Rivera vs. People, defines the limits of the Arias doctrine and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the liability of heads of offices who rely on subordinates.

• "Local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature of their functions; or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds." — This formulation, drawn from Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, establishes the two modes by which local officials become accountable under Section 340 of the Local Government Code, expanding the concept beyond officers who have custody by nature of their duties.

• "Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design." — This passage, drawn from Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, articulates the standard for proving conspiracy through circumstantial evidence, establishing that the assent of minds may be inferred from a chain of circumstances.

• Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 794 (1989) — Established the doctrine that heads of offices may rely to a reasonable extent on subordinates in good faith. Distinguished in this case because exceptional circumstances — discrepancies in the documents — should have alerted petitioners to examine the supporting documents more closely.

• Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil. 321 (2005) — Carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine where unusual circumstances, such as a discrepancy between the names on checks and disbursement vouchers, should prompt a conscientious official to go beyond what subordinates prepared. Followed in this case.

• Rivera vs. People, 749 Phil. 124 (2014) — Reiterated that the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule and cannot be used as a magic cloak to escape liability. Followed in this case.

• Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, 765 Phil. 39 (2015) — Held that officials whose signatures are necessary for disbursement of public funds are accountable officers under Section 340 of the Local Government Code, either by nature of their functions or by participation in the use or application of funds. Followed as controlling precedent on the accountable officer status of Escobar and Telesforo.

• Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 (1999) — Held that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law with no bearing in criminal proceedings, and that administrative, civil, and criminal liabilities are separate and distinct. Followed on the inapplicability of conclusiveness of judgment in criminal cases.

• Asistio y Cansino vs. People, 758 Phil. 485 (2015) — Reiterated that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and has no bearing on criminal proceedings; the related concept in criminal law is double jeopardy. Followed in this case.

• Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 34 (2003) — Established that conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence without direct proof of an express agreement. Followed in finding conspiracy among Maglinte, Alzate, and Zoleta.

• Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan, 310 Phil. 14 (1995) — Held that without evidence of conspiracy, a head of office is not negligent for relying on misplaced good faith on a subordinate. Distinguished and not applied in this case due to the presence of circumstances warranting closer examination.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa by means of deceit, including using a fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions. Applied to convict Maglinte, Alzate, and Zoleta, the Court finding that the elements — false pretense executed prior to or simultaneously with the fraud, reliance by the offended party, and resulting damage — were all satisfied by the falsified documents that induced the disbursement.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — Defines malversation of public funds by accountable officers. Applied to convict Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang, who as accountable officers had custody of public funds and failed to account for or liquidate the disbursement.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Applied to establish conspiracy among Maglinte, Alzate, and Zoleta through circumstantial evidence.

• Articles 315 and 171 in relation to Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Defines the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. Applied to convict Maglinte, Alzate, and Zoleta as principals, each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years minimum to eleven years and four months of prision mayor maximum, with a fine of ₱5,000.

• Section 340, Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) — Provides that any officer of a local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable, and that other local officials may likewise be held accountable through their participation in the use or application thereof. Applied to hold Escobar and Telesforo as accountable officers by reason of their participation in the disbursement process, their signatures being required before any check could be approved.

• COA Circular No. 96-003, dated February 27, 1996 — Prescribes accounting and auditing guidelines on the release of fund assistance to NGOs/POs, requiring accreditation, memoranda of agreement, work and financial plans, and proper documentation. Applied to determine the deficiencies in the disbursement — the association was not accredited, there was no memorandum of agreement, the disbursement was not included in the work and financial plan, and the check was encashed instead of deposited — establishing that the financial assistance was illegally and fraudulently made.

• Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court — Defines the concept of double jeopardy, described as res judicata "in prison grey." Cited to distinguish the applicable concept in criminal proceedings from civil res judicata, and to note that double jeopardy was not in question in this case.

• Rule 39, Section 47, Rules of Court — Defines res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment in civil proceedings. Cited to distinguish from the criminal law concept and to hold that it has no application in criminal proceedings except as to civil cases impliedly instituted.

• Rule 122, Section 2, Rules of Court — Defines the grounds for a new trial, requiring newly discovered evidence that the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial. Applied to deny Alzate's motion for new trial, the machine-validated entry on the check not being newly discovered evidence.

• Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5, Rules of Court — Govern notice and hearing of motions. Applied to deny Alzate's motion to present additional witnesses, which was not set for hearing and thus failed to comply with these requirements.

Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Lucas P. Bersamin (Acting Chairperson), and Francis H. Jardeleza. No separate concurring opinions were written.