Escamilla vs. People

A defense of alibi, even when corroborated, cannot prevail over the categorical and positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses, especially when physical impossibility to be at the crime scene is not established.

Petitioner owned a sari-sari store along Arellano Street in Manila. The victim, Virgilio Mendol, was a tricycle driver whose route passed the store. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on August 1, 1999, a brawl ensued at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets. Mendol was about to ride his tricycle when petitioner, standing 30 meters away in front of his store, shot him four times, hitting him once in the upper right chest. Mendol survived because of timely medical attention.

• The Shooting: On August 1, 1999, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Virgilio Mendol was shot at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, Manila. Petitioner fired four times, hitting Mendol once in the upper right chest.
• Identification of the Assailant: Three prosecution witnesses—Mendol, Joseph Velasco, and Iluminado Garcelazo—positively identified petitioner as the shooter. They were situated at the intersection facing Arellano Street, with a street lamp five meters away illuminating petitioner's position. All three knew petitioner from prior interactions at his store.
• Medical Findings: Mendol was taken to the hospital, where the attending physician opted not to extract the bullet due to the risk of further damage. The physician testified that the victim would have died without immediate medical intervention.
• Defense Evidence: Petitioner claimed he was asleep at home. His wife testified they slept at 9:00 p.m. and were awakened at 3:00 a.m., but admitted she did not know if petitioner left the house between those hours. Barangay Tanod George Asumbrado testified he saw a big man in his twenties shooting, but only from a back view 12 meters away while hiding.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Petitioner argued that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see him fire the gun and that their testimonies were successfully discredited.
• Negative Paraffin Test: Petitioner maintained that his negative paraffin test result proved he did not fire a gun.
• Alibi Over Positive Identification: Petitioner asserted that his defense of alibi, corroborated by a disinterested party, should overcome the positive identification by three witnesses.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Respondent countered that the prosecution witnesses were credible, with no serious discrepancies in their testimonies.
• Inconsequential Paraffin Test: Respondent argued that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof and is inconsequential when there is positive identification of the accused.
• Prohibited Question of Fact: Respondent maintained that petitioner raised a question of fact, which is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alibi vs. Positive Identification: Whether a defense of alibi, corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes the positive identification by three witnesses.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. The identity of the assailant was proved with moral certainty through the categorical and positive identification by three eyewitnesses who had no ill motive. Intent to kill was simultaneously demonstrated by the use of a gun and the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.
• Alibi vs. Positive Identification: The defense of alibi was rejected. Petitioner failed to prove the two requisite conditions for alibi: presence in another place and physical impossibility of being at the crime scene. His alibi placed him in his house, which was located just in front of the locus criminis. Furthermore, his wife's testimony lacked certainty about his whereabouts during the shooting, and the barangay tanod's identification of a different shooter was based merely on a back view from 12 meters away while hiding.

• Positive Identification Prevails Over Alibi — A categorical and consistently positive identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over denial and alibi. For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he was in another place at the time of the offense, and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
• Intent to Kill in Frustrated Homicide — The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage, may be proven by the means used, the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim, and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing. Continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit demonstrates such intent.

• "We have held that a categorical and consistently positive identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over denial."
• "Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places."

• Anilao v. People, G.R. No. 149681 (15 October 2007) — Followed as controlling precedent for the rule that positive identification prevails over denial.
• People v. Erguiza, G.R. 171348 (26 November 2008) — Followed for the two requisite conditions for the defense of alibi to prosper.
• Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609 (18 December 2008) — Followed for the rule on how intent to kill may be proven in frustrated homicide.
• Esqueda v. People, G.R. No. 170222 (18 June 2009) — Followed for the definition of physical impossibility in the context of alibi.
• People v. Lucas, 260 Phil. 334 (1990) — Followed for the principle that testimonies of relatives deserve scant consideration when there is positive identification by witnesses.

• Articles 249 and 50, Revised Penal Code — Applied as the substantive basis for the crime of frustrated homicide, penalizing the accused who performs all acts of execution that would produce homicide but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator's will.

Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Bienvenido L. Reyes.