Escaler vs. Court of Appeals

The Court held that for a vendee to enforce a vendor's warranty against eviction, the vendor must be formally summoned in the eviction suit at the instance of the vendee, either by being impleaded as a co-defendant or through a third-party complaint. Substantial compliance, such as furnishing the vendor with copies of pleadings, is insufficient to activate the vendor's liability under Articles 1558 and 1559 of the Civil Code.

On March 7, 1958, private respondents Africa V. Reynoso and Jose L. Reynoso sold a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal, to petitioners. The deed of sale contained an express warranty of title and a covenant to defend the property against all claims. In 1961, a petition was filed (Case No. 4252) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking the cancellation of the original certificate of title (OCT No. 1526) from which the petitioners' titles were derived, on the ground that the land was already previously registered under another title. The cancellation petition was granted in 1964, resulting in the nullification of the petitioners' titles. Petitioners subsequently filed Civil Case No. 9014 against the vendors to recover the value of the property and damages based on the breach of the warranty against eviction.

On March 7, 1958, spouses Africa V. Reynoso and Jose L. Reynoso sold a 239,479-square-meter parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal, to petitioners. The deed contained a warranty of title and a covenant to defend the property. On April 21, 1961, the Register of Deeds and another entity filed a petition (Case No. 4252) to cancel the original title (OCT No. 1526) covering the land, alleging it was previously registered under another title. Petitioners, as vendees, filed an opposition in that case. They furnished a copy of their opposition to respondent Africa Reynoso by registered mail. On June 10, 1964, the court in Case No. 4252 issued an order cancelling OCT No. 1526 and all subsequent titles derived from it, including the petitioners' titles. This order became final. On August 31, 1965, petitioners filed the instant action (Civil Case No. 9014) against their vendors for breach of warranty against eviction.

Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in strictly applying Articles 1558 and 1559 of the Civil Code. They contended that by furnishing the vendors with a copy of their opposition in the eviction case (Case No. 4252), they had given sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, which constituted substantial compliance with the requirement to summon the vendor. They further argued that the appellate court should have at least remanded the case for a hearing on the merits.

Respondents countered that the cause of action had been fully adjudicated in Case No. 4252 when petitioners failed to file a third-party complaint against them. They maintained that petitioners' failure to implead them as co-defendants in the eviction suit, as required by Articles 1558 and 1559, barred the subsequent enforcement of the warranty against eviction.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues: Whether the vendors' liability for breach of warranty against eviction could be enforced despite the vendees' failure to formally summon the vendors in the eviction suit by impleading them as co-defendants or filing a third-party complaint against them.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the vendors' liability was not enforceable. It held that Articles 1558 and 1559 of the Civil Code require the vendor to be summoned in the eviction suit at the instance of the vendee. This means the vendor must be made a party to the suit, either as a co-defendant or through a third-party complaint. The Court found that merely furnishing the vendor with a copy of the opposition filed in the land registration proceeding did not satisfy this mandatory requirement. Because the fourth requisite for enforcing eviction liability—the vendor's formal summons—was absent, the petitioners' action failed.

• Warranty Against Eviction (Articles 1548, 1558, 1559, Civil Code) — Eviction occurs when a vendee is deprived of the purchased property by a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale. The vendor is liable for eviction unless the vendee fails to summon the vendor in the eviction suit. The vendee must request that the vendor be impleaded as a co-defendant within the period to answer the complaint. The Court applied this doctrine strictly, ruling that the procedural mechanism for activating the vendor's liability is mandatory and not satisfied by informal notice.

• "The term 'unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee' means that the respondents as vendor/s should be made parties to the suit at the instance of petitioners-vendees, either by way of asking that the former be made a co-defendant or by the filing of a third-party complaint against said vendors."

• Bautista et al vs. Laserna, et al., 72 Phil. 506 — Cited as precedent for the requisites of a vendor's liability for eviction.
• Jovellano, et al vs. Lualhati, 47 Phil. 371 — Cited as precedent for the requisites of a vendor's liability for eviction.
• Canizares Tiana vs. Torrejos, 21 Phil. 127 — Cited as precedent for the requisites of a vendor's liability for eviction.

• Article 1548, Civil Code — Defines eviction and establishes the vendor's inherent obligation to warrant the thing sold.
• Article 1558, Civil Code — Provides that the vendor is not liable for warranty unless summoned in the eviction suit at the vendee's instance.
• Article 1559, Civil Code — Requires the vendee to ask that the vendor be made a co-defendant within the time to answer the complaint.

• Justice Aquino — Dissented, arguing that strict compliance with Articles 1558 and 1559 was impossible because the eviction occurred as an incident in a summary land registration proceeding, not an ordinary civil suit. He opined that furnishing the vendor with a copy of the opposition constituted substantial compliance with the notice requirement and that a contrary view would lead to the vendor's unjust enrichment.